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Abstract 
 
   “No Radical Hangover” recovers the history of left-wing progressivism in the Midwest 
from 1967 to 1989. In response to the limited achievements of the New Left and black power 
revolutionary politics, left-wing progressives combined radical analyses of the 1960s urban 
rebellions, policing, the Vietnam War, and deindustrialization with pragmatic and reformist 
political strategies such as coalition-building, lobbying, policymaking, and electoral politics.  
The study is organized around five case studies illustrating how progressives sought to 
address particular “focal points” for action—Detroit Reverend Albert Cleage’s attempt to take 
power after the 1967 rebellion, the city’s anti-police brutality campaign during the early 1970s, 
the Indochina Peace Campaign’s movement to end U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the 
Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy (DARE) and the Ohio Public Interest Campaign (OPIC) 
attempts to respond to deindustrialization and economic recession during the late-1970s and 
early-1980s.  
“No Radical Hangover” reveals the existence of a consequential left-wing progressive 
politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Progressives in Detroit and Ohio organized successfully 
around issues of police killings and war and empire. These campaigns successfully won debates 
around these issues in public discourse and rallied a coalition of different groups and 
constituencies to achieve their goals. Consequently, left-wing progressive activists did not 
succumb to sectarianism, neither did they focus on a narrow “identity politics.” 
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This study also uncovers the struggles that left-wing progressives experienced in their 
efforts to enact racial and economic justice.  OPIC and DARE failed to implement their visions 
of economic democracy, but it was not due to a lack of political imagination.  Rather, DARE and 
OPIC suffered from a lack of political power, especially in the economic realm.  They were, 
however, successful in devising and articulating alternatives to deindustrialization. 
Studying progressive politics in the Midwest during the 1970s and 1980s from 
comparative, social movement, intellectual, political, and urban perspectives allows one to see 
how movements against war and empire and police brutality help inform the resurgence of 
campaigns to confront plant closings. 
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Introduction 
 
On October, 10, 1987, economic democracy emerged as an issue in the Democratic 
presidential primary when Reverend Jesse Jackson set out to distinguish his 1988 campaign from 
his 1984 run with an appeal to the most “disadvantaged” segments of American society and the 
nation’s workers.1 While addressing a packed crowd at the Raleigh Civic Center in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, Jackson combined left-wing critiques of racism, poverty, deindustrialization, the 
drug trade, and U.S. foreign policy. During his speech, Jackson argued that, while racism 
remained a serious issue, “economic violence” had emerged as an overriding concern for 
workers. “Economic violence is the critical issue of our day! When plants close on workers 
without notice, and leave them without jobs or training for new jobs—that’s economic violence,” 
Jackson exclaimed.2  
Jackson referenced plant closings and job loss several more times in the speech. He 
argued for “more jobs, less drugs” and connected corporate tax breaks with deindustrialization. 
Paraphrasing his late mentor, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Jackson declared, “slave labor 
anywhere is a threat to organized labor everywhere.” With his comments on plant closings, 
capital flight and corporate tax law, and job loss, Jesse Jackson highlighted deindustrialization as 
among one of the top concerns of his forthcoming presidential campaign. Job loss remained an 
issue on the campaign trail for Democrats as both Jackson and Massachusetts’s governor 
Michael Dukakis endorsed a provision in pending federal trade legislation that would become the 
                                                 
1 Roger Bruns, Jesse Jackson:  A Biography (Westport, Connecticut:  2005), 74.  
2 Jesse Jackson, “A Chance to Serve,” in Keep Hope Alive:  Jesse Jackson’s 1988 Presidential Campaign, ed. Frank 
Clemente (Boston:  Keep Hope Alive PAC & South End Press, 1988), 27.  
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nation’s first law regulating plant closings—the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act (WARN).3 Jesse Jackson’s 1988 primary campaign and the passage of the WARN Act in 
1989 represented an extension of a movement for left-wing economic politics and to take on the 
challenge of deindustrialization that had begun during the 1970s.  
Once the self-styled black militant, Jackson had first sought the Democratic nomination 
for the presidency in 1984.  Inspired by Congressman Harold Washington’s mayoral win in 
1983, Jackson aimed to nationalize Washington’s “rainbow coalition” strategy by appealing to 
the “disposed and disaffected.”4 Still, African Americans comprised the bulk of Jackson’s 
electoral base in the 1984 campaign.  Jackson’s connections with Nation of Islam leader Louis 
Farrakhan and his “hymietown” reference to Jewish voters in New York City undermined his 
efforts to appeal to nonblack voters. In the period between the 1984 campaign and his 1987 
announcement, Jackson worked to expand his base of support to include white industrial workers 
and farmers, gay and lesbians, students, Latino/as, Asian Americans, and left-wing activists. 
Jackson framed his second campaign in more populist terms and based it on progressive 
economic principles.  Jackson’s populist 1988 campaign represented a national culmination of a 
consequential movement around economic democracy. Like the scores of progressive activists 
and organizations such as the Ohio Public Interest Campaign (OPIC) and the Detroit Alliance for 
a Rational Economy (DARE) who advocated for progressive economic policies during the 
1970s, Jackson’s campaign, as The Nation’s editors remarked, was “leading a movement for 
reform, not a revolution.”5 Jackson’s “movement for reform” and “not a revolution” contrasted 
                                                 
3 The WARN Act requires businesses with 100 workers or more to give 60 days notice in advance of a plant closing 
or layoff. Ronald G. Ehrenberg and George H. Jakubson, Advance Notice Provisions in Plant Closing Legislation 
(Kalamazoo:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1988), 5. 
4 Quoted in Editors, “For Jesse Jackson and His Campaign,” The Nation, April 16, 1988, 521.  
5 Howard Brick and Christopher Phelps, Radicals in America:  The U.S. Left Since the Second World War (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 2015), 258-259.  
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him, and other left progressives of the 1970s with the self-declared revolutionary movements 
against imperialism and for black liberation during the late-1960s and early1970s. However, 
Jackson’s, DARE’s, and OPIC’s visions of economic democracy was not new as it drew and 
built upon previous left-wing economic reform movements of the Congress of Industrial  
Organizations (CIO), the Popular Front, and the Poor People’s Movement.  
Deploying a political, intellectual, and social movement analysis, “No Radical Hangover” 
recovers this history of left-wing progressive politics in the Midwest from the late 1960s through 
the 1970s and into 1980s. In response to the limited achievements of the New Left and black 
power revolutionary politics, progressive activists and organizations continued to articulate 
radical analyses of imperialism, policing, and economics. Left-wing progressives combined their 
radical analyses with pragmatic and reformist political strategies such as lobbying, 
policymaking, and electoral politics. Jesse Jackson’s populist 1988 campaign represented the 
nationalization not just of Harold Washington’s 1983 mayoral campaign, but of a significant 
scaling up of the left-wing progressive politics of the 1970s and 1980s. Left progressives, 
especially in the Midwest, organized around issues such as urban planning and development, 
policing, empire, labor, and economic democracy.  
These movements around economics, policing, and foreign policy in the Midwest arose 
in the midst of a national progressive upsurge. This upsurge included nationally-known activists 
such as Chicago’s first black mayor, Harold Washington, Mel King in Boston, Ruth Messinger 
in New York City, and Tom Hayden in California. It also included national activists such as 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader. The aforementioned figures operated within the left-liberal 
realm of the Democratic Party, yet to the right of the feminist, black, and Marxist radicals still 
pursuing various forms of revolution. Organizers such as Heather Booth created national 
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institutions such as the Citizen-Labor Energy Coalition (CLEC) and the United Auto Worker 
(UAW) President Doug Fraser’s Progressive Alliance.6  
DARE and OPIC activists viewed industrial plant closings and economic recession as the 
most important issues facing progressives and Midwesterners during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Progressive organizations such as Massachusetts Fair Share and the Campaign to Keep GM Van 
Nuys Open emerged to confront economic recession and restructuring in other Rustbelt regions.7 
OPIC and DARE offered their own alternatives to the discursive formation of free market 
economics and mainstream liberal growth-based urban development. Both organizations derived 
their visions of economic democracy from their analyses of U.S. society and prior social 
movement organizing around an array of issues such as police brutality, urban policy and 
development, and the war in Vietnam. Both organizations exemplified a progressive politics 
grounded in left-wing critiques of the U.S. political economy. 
In “No Radical Hangover,” I use the term left-wing progressive politics to refer to the 
pairing of radical political analysis and pragmatic strategies in the pursuit of social and economic 
reform. Left-wing progressives eschewed the politics and rhetoric of 1960s revolutionaries. 
OPIC avoided Marxist critiques of political economy. Left-wing formations such as Detroit’s 
anti-STRESS activists, and organizations such as the Indochina Peace Campaign (IPC), DARE, 
and OPIC turned radical critiques of urban development, the carceral state, imperialism, and 
political economy into reformist political strategies. The aforementioned formations worked in 
coalitions with liberals and organized labor. Left-wing progressives of the 1970s and 1980s 
                                                 
6 Andrew Battista, The Revival of Labor Liberalism (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 2008); James Jennings, 
“Boston:  Blacks and Progressive Politics,” in The New Black Vote:  Politics and Power in Four American Cities, 
ed. by Rod Bush (San Francisco:  Synthesis Publications, 1984). Also see Radical America’s double issue on black 
progressive politics during the 1980s:  Radical America, Vol. 17, No. 6 & Vol. 18, No. 1 (1983-1984). 
7 Eric Mann, Taking on General Motors:  A Case Study of the UAW Campaign to Keep GM Van Nuys Open (Los 
Angeles:  Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1987); Harry C. Boyte, Heather Booth, and Steve Max, Citizen Action and the New American Populism 
(Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1986).  
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combined popular mobilization with electoral politics, lobbying, and policymaking to eradicate 
lethal policing and end the war in Indochina. The Ohio Public Interest Campaign and the Detroit 
Alliance for a Rational Economy advocated for economic democracy. OPIC not only devised 
and advocated for plant closure legislation, the group called for policies to ensure full 
employment, to curtail the power of corporations, and for greater democratic decision-making in 
the economy. DARE devised an urban redevelopment plan—rational reindustrialization—
grounded in a mix of market and municipal socialism and worker- and citizen-control over the 
local economy.  
Progressives during the 1970s and 1980s articulated populist critiques of corporate power 
and advanced a program of “economic democracy”—the establishment of an economy where 
workers, citizens, communities, and even municipalities would exercise control over production 
and investment of revenues generated by labor. Regarding progressives’ economic politics, as 
political scientist James Jennings explains, progressives “did not accept the accumulation or 
protection of capital as a greater priority than the needs of poor and working class citizens.”8 
Left-wing progressives’ attempts to enact economic justice also entailed, but were not limited to, 
greater regulation of corporations, establishment of worker-owned enterprises, and public control 
over energy, utilities, and banking.  
Context determined who opposed progressives in Detroit and Ohio. President Richard 
Nixon opposed the late antiwar movement that OPIC arose from while the Detroit Police 
Department and then-Detroit mayor Democrat Roman S. Gribbs sought to defend the city’s 
policing methods against the anti-police brutality movement’s left-wing. Capitalists—business 
and corporate leaders and organizations and private developers—resisted OPIC’s and DARE’s 
                                                 
8 James Jennings, “Boston:  Blacks and Progressive Politics,” in The New Black Vote:  Politics and Power in Four 
American Cities, ed. by Rod Bush (San Francisco:  Synthesis Publications, 1984), 214-215.  
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policies. Business organizations such as the Ohio Manufacturers Association (OMA) and the 
Greater Cleveland Growth Corporation (GCGC) lobbied against OPIC’s policies because they 
saw it as a threat to business’ private property rights. In Detroit, Mayor Coleman Young and his 
labor-liberal-corporate coalition emerged as DARE’s opponents. Young felt less threatened than 
the OMA and the GCGC. When Young criticized the organization, he often did so dismissively. 
Private sector opposition transpired in the context of a business offensive against organized labor 
and the left throughout the country during the 1970s. Private interests embarked on a broad 
strategy to confront left-wing and liberal economics that included political lobbying, influencing 
university and college curricula, and the media. This business offensive eventually helped 
discredited key aspects of postwar liberalism such as labor rights and the welfare state. 
 
Historiography 
 
“No Radical hangover” reshapes our understandings of the histories of the antiwar and 
black power movements, black radicalism, progressive politics, the war on crime, liberal social 
reform and black urban politics, and deindustrialization during this period. This study 
concentrates less on the fracturing of the left and more on how the left transformed between 1967 
and 1988. Analyzing the left’s transformation between 1967 and 1988 requires analyzing strands 
of new left and black power activism alongside each other. Also, in contrast to recent synthetic 
histories of the left that often focus solely on familiar national leaders and organizations, this 
study concentrates on local and state-based progressive organizations and their interaction with 
local, state, and national politics.  
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This study elucidates the development of black power and black radical politics after 
1967.9 Many narratives of the black power movement suggest that black radical politics declined 
during the 1970s.10 However, “No Radical Hangover” shows that black radicals had a 
consequential impact on local politics, as well as in debates around policing, imperialism, urban 
development, and deindustrialization. Scholars such as political scientist Michael Dawson have 
highlighted how some leftists have misinterpreted black power and black radicalism during this 
period.11 Rather than assuming that black radicals only pursued sectarian and/or a narrow 
identity-based racial politics, this study underscores the importance of the black power 
movement’s and black radicals’ willingness to engage in coalition and electoral politics during 
this period.12 In the wake of the 1967 Detroit rebellion, black power activists such as Reverend 
                                                 
9 Debates around periodization in the “long” civil rights and black power movements tend to dominate scholarship. 
This conversation as pushed scholars to interrogate the meanings of “civil rights” and “black power” as concepts in 
African American and U.S. politics after emancipation and through the 1970s. However, the problem with the 
“long” frameworks is that they fail to deeply analyze the transformations of the civil rights and black power 
movements during the 1970s and 1980s. The progressivism of the 1970s developed within the periodization of the 
“long” civil rights and black power movements and this politics provokes questions about the relationship between 
electoral politics and progressive social movements. Black radical Kenneth Cockrel launched his campaign for city 
council four years after the Black Panthers entered local electoral politics. Mel King ran for mayor on a progressive 
“rainbow” platform in 1983 after participating in the city’s black power movement during the 1970s.  
 
For work on the “long” civil rights and black power movements see, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights 
Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec 2005); Peniel 
Joseph, “Black Liberation Without Apology:  Reconceptualizing the Black Power Movement,” The Black Scholar, 
31 (Fall 2001-Winter 2002): 3-4; Matthew J. Countryman, Up South:  Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). For a critique of the long framework in civil rights and 
black power studies see Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire:  Temporal 
and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies,” The Journal of African American History (March 2007).  
 
10 These studies have added to our understandings about the political and structural forces that helped undermine 
some institutional forms of black radicalism during the 1970s and 1980s such as state repression, internal conflicts, 
the country’s rightward drift, and the emergence of a generation of black liberal officeholders. Cedric Johnson, 
Revolutionaries to Race Leaders; Adolph Reed, Jr.  
11 Michael C. Dawson, Blacks in and Out of the Left (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2013), 126-174; 
Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams:  Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars (New York:  
Metropolitan Books, 1995). 
12 Many social scientists argue that black politics drifted rightward, even took a neoliberal turn, during this period. 
Such arguments make sense considering the direction the larger political culture travelled. As historian Heather Ann 
Thompson remarked about black municipal politics, many African Americans voted for liberal mayors. Many 
African Americans, however, including Boston’s Mel King, Washington, D.C.’s Marion Barry, Chicago’s Harold 
Washington, and Congressman Ronald Dellums advocated for or supported progressive policies, politicians, and 
movements. Heather Ann Thompson, “Rethinking the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism:  The Rise of Mayor Coleman 
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Albert Cleage, Jr. sought to build an intra-racial and multi-class coalition in the effort to push the 
city’s political and business elites to “transfer” power back to the city’s black residents. Black 
radicals from the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, on the other hand, worked with white 
radicals, as well as liberals, labor activists, civil rights organizations, and black nationalists in the 
effort to oppose the Detroit Police Department’s (DPD), “Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe 
Streets” (STRESS) unit during the early 1970s. Rather than solely focusing on splits within black 
radical organizations such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, “No Radical 
Hangover,” explores black radicals’ decisions to engage in coalition and electoral politics.  
“No Radical Hangover” also retells the history of the radical flank of the anti-war 
movement during the early-1970s. Antiwar radicalism did not end with the fracture of the 
Students for a Democratic Society in 1969. In fact, this investigation of the left argues that one 
cannot understand how the radical antiwar movement helped end U.S. involvement in Indochina 
without accounting for Indochina Peace Campaign’s contributions.13 In response to the political 
failures of new left radicalism, left-wing progressives in the IPC such as Jane Fonda, Tom 
Hayden, and others organized across scale—local, regional, and national—to end U.S. military 
                                                                                                                                                             
Young and the Politics of Race in Detroit,” in African-American Mayors:  Race, Politics, and the American City, 
eds. David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 2001), 223-225. 
For the rightward drift in African American politics see Robert C. Smith, “’Politics’ Is Not Enough:  The 
Institutionalization of the African American Freedom Movement,” From Exclusion to Inclusion:  The Long Struggle 
for African American Political Power, eds., Ralph C. Gomes and Linda Faye Williams (New York:  Greenwood 
Press, 1992), 112; Robert C. Smith, We Have No Leaders:  African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era (New 
York:  State University of New York Press, 1996); Reed, Jr., Stirrings in the Jug; Cedric Johnson, Revolutionaries 
to Race Leaders:  Black Power and the Making of African American Politics (Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007); Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion:  The Second Reconstruction and Beyond 
in Black America, 1945-2006  (Jackson:  University Press of Mississippi, 2007). 
13 Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal:  The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse:  Syracuse 
University Press, 1990); Simon Hall, Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement (New York:  Routledge, 2012); 
Penny Lewis, Hardhats, Hippies, and Hawks:  The Vietnam Antiwar Movement as Myth and Memory (Ithaca:  ILR 
Press, 2013); James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets:  From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (New York:  
Simon and Schuster, 1987); Simon Hall, Peace and Freedom:  The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements of the 
1960s (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). Surprisingly, the IPC remains understudied in the 
scholarship of the post-World War II antiwar movement. Charles DeBenedetti discusses the IPC substantively in his 
classic study of the antiwar movement, An American Ordeal.  
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involvement in Indochina. Left-wing progressives articulated a radical analysis of war and 
imperialism. Most importantly, they deployed “focal point theory” as a method of analysis and 
organizing. They also incorporated congressional lobbying into their campaign strategy. The 
study of the IPC also emphasizes how left-wing economic politics arose out of critiques of U.S. 
imperialism and foreign policy. Activists in OPIC considered the globalization of the 1970s as 
part of the same system.  
The analyses of the fate of various 1960s social movements in “No Radical Hangover” 
asks scholars of social movements, including those of the “long” civil rights and black power 
movements, to reconsider how movements develop, interrogate the meanings of movement 
success, failure, and their periodization.14 Some scholars and activists argue that the left 
abandoned a universalist class-based politics after the 1960s in favor of “identity politics” and 
failed to devise a response to transformations in political economy.15 The truth of these 
arguments is only a matter of degree. Some leftist movements and organizations did split. 
However, out of the black power movement in Detroit, that city’s campaign against police 
killings, SDS, and the IPC, activists in Detroit and Ohio reconstituted themselves in progressive 
organizations in response to economic restructuring.  
This study’s analysis of left-wing responses to the Detroit Police Department’s killings of 
its city’s residents complicates debates around black agency and war on crime policies during the 
                                                 
14 For work on the “long” civil rights and black power movements see, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil 
Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec 2005); 
Peniel Joseph, “Black Liberation Without Apology:  Reconceptualizing the Black Power Movement,” The Black 
Scholar, 31 (Fall 2001-Winter 2002) :  3-4; Matthew J. Countryman, Up South:  Civil Rights and Black Power in 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). For a critique of the long framework in civil 
rights and black power studies see Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire:  
Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies,” The Journal of African American History (March 
2007).  
15 Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams:  Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars (New York:  
Metropolitan Books, 1995); Gosse, Rethinking the New Left; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive. More scholars are challenging 
the identity-class and economic politics binary. See Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare and Gordon K. Mantler, 
Power to the Poor:  Black-Brown Coalition & the Fight for Economic Justice, 1960-1974 (Chapel Hill:  The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013).  
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late-1960s and early-1970s.16 Recent scholarship seeking to explain the origins of the war on 
crime and mass incarceration tend to focus on policymakers’ role in formulating and 
implementing policy. The post-World War II carceral state is conceived of as a long-term bi-
partisan political project, rather than a system driven by conservativism. In an attempt to restore 
black agency, Michael J. Fortner has suggested that African Americans were among the 
grassroots activists who demanded policies such as the Rockefeller drug laws that contributed to 
the growth of the carceral state during the 1970s and 1980s. “No Radical Hangover” captures a 
more nuanced picture of black responses to crime and racialized and violent policing. Moderate 
black leaders such as the Detroit Urban League’s Frances A. Kornegay, as well as many black 
Detroiters, initially supported the Detroit Police Department’s STRESS. But STRESS’s deadly 
tactics provoked some black Detroiter’s to change their minds about the unity.  
While many black Detroiters supported tough on crime initiatives, anti-black state 
violence also served as a catalyst for radical politics. The left-wing of the anti-STRESS 
campaign linked their analysis of the carceral state in Detroit to urban development, corporate 
power, and war. They reframed crime as a product of capitalism and racism rather than culture 
and behavior. They also refocused their analysis of crime on corporations such as Chrysler.  
 “No Radical Hangover” builds on the scholarship that contextualizes the history of black 
mayors and urban politics within the post-World War II structural transformation of cities that 
included deindustrialization, white flight, shifts in federal urban policy, urban fiscal crises, and 
                                                 
16 Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters:  Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in 
Postwar American History,” Journal of American History, Vol. 97, No. 3; Elizabeth Kai Hinton, From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard 
University Press, 2016) ;Donna Murch, “Who’s to Blame for Mass Incarceration,” Boston Review, October 16, 
2015; Michael J. Fortner, “Historical Method and the Noble Lie,” Boston Review, October 23, 2015.  
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the emergence of neoliberal governance.17 This study suggests that some liberal black mayors 
such as Detroit’s Coleman Young did not turn towards austerity out of an adherence to a 
neoliberal ideology, but out of sheer pragmatism. 18 Young and other black mayors challenged 
the federal government’s stance toward struggling Northeastern and Midwestern cities during the 
1970s. In the same year Gerald Ford’s administration initially opposed a bailout of New York 
City, Ford also ignored Young’s plan for massive federal investment in the nation’s cities.19 
Although Young successfully acquired federal resources from the Carter administration, the 
federal government’s unwillingness to completely reconstruct America’s cities also forced the 
mayor to continue his reliance on austere measures and private sector investment.  
“No Radical Hangover” highlights the tensions between black liberalism and black 
radicalism in urban politics. After supporting Young’s 1973 mayoral candidacy, and the mayor’s 
dismantling of STRESS in 1974, black radical city councilman Kenneth Cockrel emerged as the 
chief critic of Young’s administration. Cockrel argued that Young’s development policies served 
                                                 
17 Political scientists have supplied many of the analyses of black mayors thus far. For a sample of this literature see 
William E. Nelson, Jr. and Philip J. Meranto, Electing Black Mayors:  Political Action in the Black Community 
(Columbus:  Ohio State University Press, 1977); Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., Paul Puryear, The 
New Black Politics:  The Search for Political Power (New York:  Longman, Inc., 1982); Adolph Reed, Stirrings in 
the Jug. 
Some historians have taken to studying black mayors as a group. Scholars such as David R. Colburn and J. Philip 
Thompson, III have aspired to classify black mayors according to periodization, personal background, campaign 
platforms, and governance. See David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler, eds., African-American Mayors:  Race, 
Politics, and the American City (Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 2001); J. Phillip Thompson, III, Double 
Trouble:  Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for a Deep Democracy (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2006). Matthew J. Countryman, “’Who Needs the Bullet When You’ve Got the Ballot’:  African American 
Big City Mayors and the Public Discourse of Black Power,” Paper presented at the Eisenberg Institute for Historical 
Studies, University of Michigan (January 14, 2010).  See Leonard N. Moore, Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black 
Political Power (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
 
18 See Spence, Knocking the Hustle:  The Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics (New York:  Punctum Books, 2015); 
Lang, Black America in the Shadow of the Sixties:  Notes on the Civil Rights Movement, Neoliberalism, and Politics 
(Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 2015).   
19 President Ford’s administration initially opposed a bailout of New York City in 1975. For analyses of New York 
City’s fiscal crisis see William K. Tabb, The Long Default:  New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis (New York:  
Monthly Review Press, 1982); Robert Fitch, The Assassination of New York (New York:  Verso, 1993); Janet L. 
Lughod, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles:  America’s Global Cities (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 
1999); Soffer, Ed Koch and the Rebuilding of New York City (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2010); David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2005).   
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business’ and private developers’ interests. Aware of the broader political and economic context, 
black radical city councilman Kenneth Cockrel and DARE devised and articulated a more radical 
proposal for revitalizing Detroit. Rational Reindustrialization represented the city’s left response 
to fiscal deficits, deindustrialization, white flight, and economic recession.  
The dissertation’s analysis of 1970s left progressivism and economic democracy 
complicates analyses of transformations of political economy and culture during the 1970s and 
1980s.20 In past scholarship, the 1970s has been seen as a period characterized by the decline of 
the New Deal Order and the U.S. left.21 Recently scholars assert that the 1970s are pivotal in the 
shift from manufacturing to finance capitalism and the period when the American working 
class’s significance in political culture declined. “No Radical Hangover” maintains that the 
period between 1967 and 1989 was consequential for the progressive left.22 Progressives in 
Detroit and Ohio influenced policing, helped end the war in Indochina, won elected office, and 
                                                 
20 This project contributes to the growing field of scholarship that seeks to understand the transformations in U.S. 
politics and economics during the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars have deployed countless metaphors, phrases, and 
adjectives to describe and interpret post-1970s America. Judith Stein sees the 1970s as a “pivotal decade” where the 
U.S. political economy turned from an industrial to a financial-based economy. Jefferson Cowie echoes Stein’s 
characterization of the 1970s, where he writes American society “really did move in a new direction.” Natasha 
Zaretsky’s analysis of the American family during the 1970s captures a collective sense of decline whereas Daniel 
T. Rodgers believes that the 1970s represented an “age of fracture.” What is important about the new political 
history of the 1970s establishes what they consider the decade as its own period. New analyses state more than the 
obvious—that “something happened”—and challenge psychological understandings of the period. Scholars 
understand the period not as a narcissistic one devoid of political conflict, but one of political and cultural 
engagement, contention, uncertainty, and transformation, which is the case for any period. 
See Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies:  The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York:  Da 
Capo Press, 2001);  Edward D. Berkowitz, Something Happened:  A Political and Cultural Overview of the 
Seventies (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2006); Philip Jenkins,  Decade of Nightmares:  The End of the 
Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2006); Natasha Zaretsky, No 
Direction Home:  The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill:  University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007); Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising:  A New Politics, 1974-1980 (New York:  W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2010); Dan Berger, ed., The Hidden 1970s:  Histories of Radicalism (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey:  Rutgers University Press, 2010);  Cowie, Stayin’ Alive;; Ferguson, et al., eds., The Shock of the Global; 
Stein, Pivotal Decade;  Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
21 Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1989).  
22 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade:  How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New Haven:  
Yale University Press); Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive:  The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New 
York:  New Press, 2010). 
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influenced discussions on economic restructuring and federal policy. To see the ways in which 
progressives sought to push the country left in the 1970s and 1980s, one must look at local and 
state politics whereas most political histories of the period focus on Presidential and national 
politics.23 Local and state politics was where progressives tended to focus. Judith Stein argues 
that industrial policy must be national and come from the top-down.24 Progressives, however, 
conceded that they did not have the political capital, nor the proper organization, to influence 
national domestic policy during the late-1970s and early-1980s. Organizations such as OPIC and 
DARE sought to build economic policy up from the state and local levels.  
Studying progressives’ responses to deindustrialization in the Midwest means analyzing 
how they addressed the contradictions in the political economy of New Deal liberalism. 
Economic and racial liberalism was grounded in the early-to-mid twentieth century fordist 
industrial economy. As scholars such as Judith Stein has shown, particular liberal tenets and 
economic forces like U.S.’s free market-based foreign policy and deindustrialization undermined 
aspects of the New Deal governing ideology.25 This study demonstrates how left activists sought 
to make sense of how liberal policies grounded in an adherence to free markets and private 
property rights undercut the sustainability of a racially-integrated blue-collar middle class based 
upon semi-skilled industrial labor, the welfare state, racial integration into the U.S. economy, and 
the full realization of citizenship for racialized groups such as African Americans. What 
progressives had in common with conservative and centrist policymakers who saw free market 
                                                 
23 Matthew Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 98, 
No. 3 (Dec. 2011).  
24 Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America:  Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel 
Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 249; Pivotal Decade.  
25 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade. Oren M. Levin-Waldman also makes this argument in relation to deindustrialization 
in his book, Plant Closure, Regulation, and Liberalism:  The Limits to Liberal Public Philosophy.  
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fundamentalism and the finance sector as the answer to the economic crisis was the recognition 
of the growing obsolescence of New Deal liberalism during the 1970s.  
 
A Brief History of Economic Democracy 
 
The progressive advocacy for economic democracy during the 1970s and 1980s is a key 
theme in “No Radical Hangover.” In contrast to New Deal liberalism and its emphasis on the use 
of macroeconomic policy to maintain the overall health of market capitalism, progressive 
economic political activists have long sought greater democratic control over local and regional 
economies within the American polity. Industrial plant closings, crises in energy, stagflation, 
urban fiscal crises, and the general unraveling of Keynesian economics all pushed activists to try 
to devise an economic politics distinct from New Deal liberalism and neoliberalism.26 
Progressives constructed a broad economic program that synthesized democratic socialist 
principles with aspects of New Deal policy to address deindustrialization. Fundamental to all of 
these programs was the demand for more accountability from the private sector and greater 
public control over economic institutions and natural resources.  
Economic democracy is an intellectual and political descendant of early-to-mid twentieth 
century notions of industrial democracy.  The concept of industrial democracy emerged in the 
midst of the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century.27  After the economic turbulence of 
the late-nineteenth century, labor organizers, politicians, and progressive activists sought to rein 
                                                 
26 Social scientist Lester Spence defines neoliberalism “as the general idea that society works best when the people 
and the institutions within it work or are shaped to work according to market principles.” Neoliberal ideology 
combines classical liberal principles—a belief in free markets, individualism, and private property rights—with a 
prerogative to privatize public services and institutions, dismantle the modern welfare state, and destroy the 
organized labor movement. Spence, 3.  
27 Douglass Rossinow, Visions of Progress:  The Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia:  University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 6; Steve Fraser, “The ‘Labor Question,’” in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 
1930-1980, eds. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton, New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1989); Nelson 
Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris, eds. Industrial Democracy in America:  The Ambiguous Promise (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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in the power of growing corporations. They advocated different iterations of industrial 
democracy during this period. Expressions of industrial democracy ranged from Samuel 
Gompers’s American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) call for collective bargaining over wages, 
hours, and work conditions within a market economy to the Industrial Workers of the World’s 
(IWW) syndicalist vision of worker-governed industries.28 For advocates politically in between 
the AFL and the IWW, the concept suggested an infusion of democracy into industrial relations 
and collective ownership over production.29  
Industrial democracy percolated in U.S. political culture as the nation entered into a 
potentially grave economic crisis with the Great Depression. The concept boasted several 
features that extended beyond collective bargaining—greater decision-making power for 
workers, ‘industrial jurisprudence,’ and a social wage for all. 30 The Congress of Industrial 
Organizations promoted a robust notion of industrial democracy between 1935 and 1945. Trade 
unionists such as CIO President John Lewis advocated for restoring the balance between workers 
and employers in bargaining during the 1930s.31 He called for democratic decision-making in 
industry. “If we are to have political democracy in this land of ours, we must also have industrial 
democracy, democracy in our industrial establishments which will recognize that the rights of 
those who work for a living are equal to those who merely profit from the labor of those for a 
living,” Lewis stated in the essay “The Struggle for Industrial Democracy.”32 CIO trade unions 
used the strike weapon as a strategy for pursuing economic democracy, most notably in the 1936 
                                                 
28 Milton Derber, “The Idea of Industrial Democracy in America, 1898-1915,” Labor History (Fall 1966), 266. 
29 Derber; “The Idea of Industrial Democracy in America, 1898-1915”; Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris, 
Industrial Democracy in America:  The Ambiguous Promise; Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War:  The 
Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-1921  
30 Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2002) , 
32.  
31 Marc Stears, Demanding Democracy:  American Radicals in Search of a New Politics (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 111-112. 
32 John L. Lewis, “The Struggle for Industrial Democracy,” Common Sense, (March 1937), 8.  
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UAW Flint sit-down strike. As part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act, or the Wagner Act, institutionalized collective bargaining.  
The black radical tradition, with its emphasis on both Marxist and racial analyses of 
political economy and social relations, served as a crucial source of inspiration for progressive 
politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Advocates of the black radical tradition believe that racism, 
capitalism, and imperialism structures American society, especially the U.S.’s domestic and 
foreign policy.  Black radical W.E.B. DuBois advocated for economic democracy—or a black 
cooperative commonwealth—during the 1930s and 1940s. As the Great Depression 
reinvigorated calls for industrial democracy among labor leaders and liberals, economic crisis 
provoked Du Bois to consider economic justice for African Americans. Drawing from his studies 
of Karl Marx, DuBois argued for the importance of democratizing industry. DuBois wrote in 
Dusk of Dawn:  The Autobiography of the Race Concept: 
But through the crimson illumination of war, I…saw even more clearly that so-called 
democracy today was allowing the mass of people to have only limited voice in government; 
that democratic control of what are present the most important functions of men:  work and 
earning a living and distributing goods and services; that here we did not have democracy; we 
had oligarchy, and oligarchy based on monopoly and income; and this oligarchy was 
determined to deny democracy in industry as it had once been determined to deny democracy 
in legislation and choice of officials.33 
 
Similar to the radicals who challenged capitalists’ private property rights in the Progressive Era, 
DuBois called on African Americans to organize a black cooperative commonwealth where they 
would construct a planned economy based upon communal property ownership. In an editorial 
entitled “Segregation,” that appeared in the January 1934 edition of The Crisis, Du Bois 
articulated a separatist solution to racism and economic exploitation. As President Roosevelt’s 
administration considered steps to address economic depression, Du Bois argued for African 
                                                 
33 W.E.B. DuBois, Dusk of Dawn:  An Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept (New Brunswick:  
Transaction Publishers, 1991), 285.  
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Americans to demand their fair share. “Groups of communities and farms inhabited by colored 
folk should be voluntarily formed. In no case should there be any discrimination against white 
and blacks. But, at the same time, colored people should come forward, should organize and 
conduct enterprises,” Du Bois wrote.34  
DuBois’s socialist vision of a democratic and cooperatively planned economy was 
distinctly different from the Nation of Islam’s economic program with its emphasis on privately-
owned black businesses serving the religious organization. DuBois’s model influenced radical 
black journalist Robert L. Allen’s prescription for economic justice in his 1969 book, Black 
Awakening in Capitalist America.35 Similarly, Detroit Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr. saw the 
construction of a black cooperative as the answer to the urban crisis in the city after its 1967 
rebellion. 
The idea of industrial democracy, as labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein argues, 
narrowed between the 1930s and 1950 when the United Auto Workers (UAW) signed its 
landmark contract with General Motors. The UAW launched a series of strikes in GM to develop 
leverage in negotiations. UAW President Walter Reuther sought a contract with the Big 3 
automakers that comprised wide-ranging elements that included pensions, health care, and labor 
input on location decisions.36 The “Treaty of Detroit” ensured income raises, health benefits, and 
pensions for union members. This arrangement served as a template for other organized labor 
unions. However, the firm would pay the aforementioned benefits rather than the federal 
government. Also, and most importantly for this dissertation, the collective bargaining regime 
                                                 
34 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Segregation,” in W.E.B. Du Bois:  A Reader, ed. David Levering Lewis (New York:  Henry 
Holt & Company, 1995), 557-558; Zhang Juguo, W.E.B. Du Bois:  The Quest for the Abolition of the Color Line 
(New York:  Routledge, 2001), 114-115.  
35 Robert L. Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America:  An Analytic History (New York:  Doubleday, 1969), 
234.  
36 Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther:  The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 
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also reified corporations’ private property rights. Corporations retained control over investment 
decisions, technology, and plant location. They emerged from the 1950 negotiations with their 
command over capital and scale intact.37  The Treaty of Detroit’s reification of management 
prerogatives underscored the fundamental dilemma facing economic progressives—how to 
acquire the power and resources to challenge capital’s private property rights.  
One of the links between the industrial democracy of the 1930’s and the activism of 
OPIC and DARE can be found in the Students for a Democratic Society’s (SDS) promotion of 
participatory democracy and economics in the 1960s.  SDS viewed organized labor skeptically, 
seeing the trade union movement in the years after the Treaty of Detroit as too reformist and 
bureaucratic to push for a democratization of the economy. SDS sought to move beyond Old Left 
notions of industrial democracy and post-World War II bureaucratic unionism. Instead, new 
leftists sought to apply the term, “participatory democracy,” to the economic as well as the 
political realms. "It is not possible to believe that true democracy can exist where a minority 
utterly controls enormous wealth and power,” SDS declared. SDS’s 1962 mission statement, The 
Port Huron Statement, advanced a politics that anticipated progressives’ emphasis on the “public 
interest” during the 1970s. The Port Huron Statement called for greater government involvement 
in the economy and for “the public” to “determine economic development.”38  
The movement for economic democracy of the 1970s, with its embrace of social 
democratic principles such as worker control over industry, thus had deep roots in American 
labor politics.  OPIC and DARE both departed from the collective bargaining notion of industrial 
democracy of the mid-to-late twentieth century and returned to the CIO’s tripartite goals of 
economic governance. 1970s progressives favored a recuperation of 1930s and 1940s industrial 
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democracy combined with updated commitment to racial justice. The left-wing progressivism of 
the 1970s called for using the state to regulate capital flight and make possible worker, citizen, 
and local government control over industry. Members of OPIC committed themselves to 
supporting the concept of full employment, even to the point of supporting liberal Democratic 
employment legislation. In contrast, DARE viewed worker and community ownership of 
industrial property as the most rational strategy to achieve full employment.  Groups such as 
DARE challenged the assumption that rationality only existed in free market capitalism. 
Industrial capitalism, as practiced in Detroit and elsewhere, inevitably created job loss. 
Progressive organizations and activists believed communities were entitled to industrial property 
rights because of the role that their labor played in generating value for firms and as a way to 
protect local jobs. Progressives’ embrace of economic democracy reflected their recognition that 
the U.S. political culture was drifting away from New Deal liberalism and Keynesianism during 
the 1970s and 1980s.   
Economic democracy arose during the 1970s and 1980s in response to economic 
recession and restructuring and at the same time as neoliberalism and other free market 
orthodoxies.39 “No Radical Hangover” contends that economic democracy experienced a 
resurgence in response to the period of tremendous economic turbulence between 1967 and 
1989. The urban crisis came to a head during the mid-1960s as African Americans revolted in 
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cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, Newark, and Detroit. While many white Americans benefited 
from the postwar boom, African Americans living in cities suffered from the effects of capital 
flight and suburbanization, as well as a from residential segregation, police brutality, and chronic 
unemployment. Inflation rates rose during the late 1960s as President Lyndon B. Johnson 
engaged in inflationary spending by simultaneously escalating of the war in Vietnam and 
maintain the Great Society.40 The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks drove up energy prices in the United 
States and sent the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy reeling. Auto, appliance, textile, 
furniture, and television manufacturers struggled. Energy shocks and ‘stagflation’ (simultaneous 
high levels of inflation and unemployment) provoked a national recession in 1974 and 1975.  
The global political economy also underwent significant transformations during the 
1970s. Keynesian economics entered into crisis starting in the early 1970s. President Nixon’s 
administration pulled out of the Bretton Woods international monetary system to compete with 
Japan’s and Germany’s cheap currency. The U.S. began reporting trade deficits for the first time 
since the late nineteenth century. Organized labor unions, leftist economists and scholars, and 
progressive organizations such as OPIC paid special attention to the growth of multinational 
corporations (MNC). MNCs were characterized by their greater command of productive scale 
and efforts to consolidate production and disparate markets into a single global economic unit. 
Postwar MNCs capitalized upon technological advances such as containerization and advanced 
communications which enabled them to move capital with less effort and manage labor and 
production on more of a global scale.41  
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The late 1970s and early 1980s were also plagued by economic turbulence and shocks 
and crises in cities and industries such as automobiles and steel. The fiscal crisis of the state 
threatened cities such as New York City and Cleveland, as they almost defaulted in 1975 and 
1978 due to strained budgets. Scholars point to government and private responses to these crises 
as sources of the development of neoliberal governance with its emphasis on the privatization of 
what had previously been socialized.42 The Chrysler Corporation almost failed in 1979 after 
suffering staggering losses in 1978. Federal, state, and local entities enacted regulatory agencies 
that aimed to structurally reorient local governments away from public welfare spending. They 
also forced struggling corporations such as Chrysler to reorient itself towards lean, and more 
flexible, production, which often entailed shedding factories and workers. Structural adjustment, 
typically associated with global regulatory institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, sought to roll back welfare states, privatize services, and free capital from 
legal restraints.43 New York City was forced to reorient the city away from providing services 
such as free college tuition, low-cost transportation, and welfare. City workers, as with laborers 
for Chrysler, were also expected to subsidize public and corporate debt. In 1978, a local bank, 
Cleveland Trust, demanded Cleveland Mayor Dennis Kucinich sell the city’s municipal electric 
company to the private Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company in exchange for rolling over 
bank notes to cover the city’s debt.44 The steel industry also entered into crisis during the late 
1970s as it shed thousands of jobs. The recessions between 1979 and 1982 straddled Ronald 
Reagan’s election. U.S. Federal Reserve Bank chairman Paul Volcker helped initiate the 
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downturn by raising interest rates in 1979.45 President Ronald Reagan’s administration also 
enacted austerity onto poorer and working Americans by cutting federal welfare spending.  
During the 1960s, the politics of left-wing social movements—civil rights, black power, 
organized labor, the new left, and feminism—had been grounded in the New Deal political 
economy—a politics that emphasized integration into political and economic institutions and the 
redistribution of the fruits of economic growth. In the 1970s, however, progressives, along with 
conservatives and liberals, had to confront the fact that the American economy would not 
experience infinite growth. Policymakers and activists scrambled to address a crisis-prone 
economy. No post-capitalist future was on the horizon. 1970s left progressive economic politics 
was rooted in a politics of limits in industrial America. This politics emphasized control over 
declining cities and industries. Left progressives fought against corporations who had abandoned 
the post-war social contract. They also worked for community and state control over public 
goods (including industrial property) and industrial conservation and retention.  
 
Progressivism and the Political Economy of the Midwest 
Left progressive politics, especially expressions of economic democracy, took root in the 
Midwest. Scholars often point to the oil shocks and chronic stagflation as the most consequential 
economic crises of the 1970s. 46  Deindustrialization, however, constituted the more fundamental 
transformation in the political economy of the Midwest.47 For most of the 20th century, 
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manufacturing, especially of automobiles, tires, steel, and durable goods, had served as the 
bedrock of the region’s economy. Consequently, cities such as Gary, Indiana and Chicago, 
Illinois, and states such as Michigan and Ohio were particularly hurt by plant shutdowns, 
economic recessions, and international competition, especially from Japanese manufacturers 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Industrial plants closed at alarming rates during the 1970s and 
1980s. According to scholar Pearl Kramer, the region lost 829,000 manufacturing jobs between 
1977 and 1986.48 The decline of Detroit’s manufacturing base is infamous. Manufacturing 
employment in the city dropped by 63% between 1970 and 1990. The deindustrialization of 
Chicago is less known. Chicago lost 32.4% of its manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1986.  
Between 1977 and 1979, Youngstown lost nearly 10,000 jobs due to steel mill closings. 
Cleveland lost 68,442 manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1983. The steel crisis hit 
Youngstown during the late 1970s and it decimated Gary’s economy in the next decade as U.S. 
Steel shed thousands of jobs.49 
As scholars have documented, many urban industrial centers suffered from steep 
population loss due to suburbanization and out-migration from the region after World War II. 
Gary, Indiana lost 35 percent of its population between 1960 and 1990.50 Between 1970 and 
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1990, Detroit’s population declined from 32 percent. Chicago lost a little over 10 percent of its 
population during the 1970s. Cleveland’s metropolitan area suffered a 9 percent loss in 
population during that period whereas the city lost 23.6 percent of its residents during the 1970s. 
In contrast, Southern and Western states grew by nearly 35 percent during the 1970s and 
1980s.51 The black population grew after WWII. The black populations in Chicago, Detroit, and 
Cleveland during the 1970s. Chicago’s black population increased from 32.8 percent to 39.5 
percent during the 1970s. Cleveland’s black population increased from 44 percent to 66 percent 
while Detroit’s increased drastically from 44 percent to 63 percent during the same period.52 The 
demographic transformation of U.S. cities, especially of many Midwestern industrial urban 
centers, led to new opportunities for black Americans to ascend to political power in cities during 
the 1960s and 1970s.53  
Putting OPIC’s and DARE’s visions of economic democracy within a larger political 
context illustrates the depth of the progressive politics of deindustrialization. Scholars and 
activists have produced many useful case studies of workers’ and community responses to 
factory shutdowns.54 However, these case studies fail to draw connections between local 
struggles and the broader circulation of ideas within liberal and leftist political circles. 
Approaching progressive responses to deindustrialization and economic recession from 
comparative, social movement, intellectual, political, and urban perspectives allows one to see 
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how movements against war and empire and police brutality informed anti-plant closing 
campaigns. “No Radical Hangover” connects OPIC’s and DARE’s economic analyses and 
politics to a progressive tradition that extended back to the early twentieth century, to the labor 
politics of the 1930s and 1940s, and to 1960s radical activism. Neglecting this important context 
obscures the ways that the work of progressive activists and organizations arose out of radical 
social movements of the 1960s.55 
Much of the recent historical literature analyzing the transformations of regional political 
economies during the mid-to-late twentieth century has focused on the rise of the South and 
West, the so-called “Sunbelt,” whose economy is grounded in conservative political structures 
and cultural values.56 These studies are important since they chart how economies of oil, defense, 
and hi-tech have reshaped the geography of economic growth, political power, and culture in the 
U.S.57 However, Sunbelt ascension narratives, as well as studies of urban crisis in cities like 
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Detroit and Cleveland, often obscure workers’, activists’, and policymaker’s responses to 
economic transformations after the 1960s.58  
Public Policy scholar Mark Rom reminds us that “there is no single Midwest.”59 The 
region has generated various overlapping political traditions and demographics on the left and 
the right—early twentieth century progressivism, McCarthyism, and Reagan Democrats. “No 
Radical Hangover” contrasts Thomas Sugrue’s analysis of the resurgence of white working class 
conservatism with Midwestern traditions of radicalism and economic democracy.60 Chicago 
represented a hub for New Left and Black Power activism. Cleveland State University boasted a 
very small population of student activists. Detroit’s radicalism is well known—Walter and 
Victor Reuther, and future mayor Coleman Young, all began their activist careers as labor 
radicals. Once collaborators with Trotskyists C.L.R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya, activist 
Grace Lee and James Boggs became mainstays of the city’s radicals. Black nationalist Reverend 
Albert Cleage sought to organize the city’s African American population in support of black-
controlled urban development after the city’s 1967 uprising. Kenneth Cockrel helped found the 
Marxist-Leninist Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement and League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers.61  
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Left-Wing Social Movement Politics and Theory during the 1970s and 1980s 
 
 The left wing progressive politics of the 1970s and 1980s signified a shift in strategy and 
orientation from the new left radicalism of the 1960s.  “There were faces from the 60s,” leftist 
journalists Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway remarked in “The New Progressives,” 
about a 1975 conference on local and state policy alternatives. But for these activists, seeking to 
pursue a strategy of electoral politics and democratic reform, there was “no radical hangover.”62 
Progressives during this period combined a radical analysis of society with a political 
pragmatism. Essentially, they pursued reformist strategies to achieve their radical goals. They 
incorporated strategies such as electoral politics, lobbying, and grassroots policymaking in their 
pursuit of a progressive agenda around foreign and domestic policy. Unlike many of their radical 
counterparts who pursued a politics of revolution outside of the established political process, left 
progressives believed they could challenge lethal policing, President Nixon’s foreign policy, 
corporate power, capital flight, and deliver economic justice by mobilizing outside voices to 
participate within the established political system. Taking Cockburn’s and Ridgeway’s 
“hangover” metaphor seriously, 1970s progressives believed they had learned important lessons 
from the turmoil of the late-1960s and that that saw the political landscape more clearly in the 
1970s. 
 
Coalition Politics:  From the late 1960s to the Rainbow Coalition 
 
Coalition politics is a vital characteristic of the left-wing progressive politics that 
emerged between 1967 and 1988.63 Reverend Albert Cleage’s Federation for Self-Determination, 
Detroit’s anti-police brutality campaign, the Indochina Peace Campaign, as well as DARE and 
OPIC worked in coalitions with various political groups. Cleage sought to build an intra-racial 
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coalition of black nationalists and radicals around a strategy of self-determination that demanded 
that Detroit’s white political and business establishment hand over resources to the city’s black 
population. The Indochina Peace Campaign worked with anti-war Democrats in Congress and 
anti-war organizations such as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) to end 
the war in Indochina. The left-wing of the anti-STRESS movement worked with liberal 
organizations such as New Detroit, Incorporated, black nationalists such as the Republic for New 
Afrika, organized labor, and the black police organization, the Guardians. The left flank of this 
movement also supported State Representative Coleman Young’s mayoral run in 1973. The Ohio 
Public Interest Campaign built a coalition of left-wing, liberal, organized labor, civil rights 
organizations, and religious groups to press for statewide plant closing legislation.  
OPIC’s coalition politics reflected civil rights legend and social democrat Bayard 
Rustin’s vision of a labor-liberal-civil rights-religious coalition. In his famous 1965 Commentary 
essay, “From Protest to Politics,” Rustin outlined his vision to remake the Democratic Party 
around the “March on Washington” coalition comprising liberals and religious, labor, and civil 
rights groups.64 Rustin argued that the civil rights movement had approached a crossroads in 
strategy after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Rustin’s conception of party realignment 
reflected his desires to build a national progressive majority. Conversely, OPIC decided to 
organize a state-based coalition that included labor unions, religious, and civil rights 
organizations because they thought building a progressive majority would be difficult in the 
midst of the crisis in liberalism. Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition adhered both to Rustin’s 
aspirations of building a liberal-labor-black coalition and of realigning the national Democratic 
Party around progressive politics.  
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In contrast to the early- and mid-twentieth century progressive movements for economic 
democracy where whites predominated, DARE and OPIC aimed to incorporate African 
Americans activists and workers alongside whites into their coalitions. While both groups 
enjoyed some successes in this area, they remained mostly white. OPIC’s statewide Rustinian 
coalition garnered some support from labor and civil rights leaders. DARE’s cadre of activists 
rooted their racial politics in the aftermath of Detroit’s 1967 rebellion. Black and white members 
of DARE developed racialized analyses of capitalism and policing that viewed black workers 
and residents as agents of revolutionary struggle. They also presumed that black workers and 
residents were also targets of containment. However, neither DARE nor OPIC were able to 
articulate a distinct racial analysis of plant closure. Members of OPIC remained mum while their 
black coalition members often raised the issue of race.  Perhaps more surprisingly, DARE failed 
to employ a racial analysis in response to the 1979 Chrysler bailout. DARE thus operated in the 
Marxist-tradition that viewed class alone as the foundational identity, hindering organizing 
efforts in a black-majority. Coleman Young, in contrast, focused his campaign for a federal 
bailout of Chrysler almost exclusively on the need to save black jobs.65  
 
Progressive Campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Between 1967 and 1983, left progressives in the Midwest relied upon campaign strategies 
to pursue their political goals. Distinct from social movements in their scope and duration, 
campaigns are concentrated periods of organizing around a single issue in pursuit of a clear, 
identifiable goal.66 The Indochina Peace Campaign, the anti-STRESS movement, and OPIC built 
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successful progressive campaigns during this period. For members of Detroit’s anti-STRESS 
movement, the goal evolved from reforming STRESS operations to eradicating the program. 
Activists in IPC sought to end U.S. involvement in Indochina. The anti-STRESS and IPC 
campaigns ended once the groups achieved their goals.  
In the midst of these campaigns, progressive activists and organizations engaged in 
discursive framing, raising questions about prevailing narratives on race, American expansion 
and exceptionalism, crime, and the economic development. 67 They produced pamphlets, 
newspapers, and documentaries to disseminate their ideas both to their supporters and to broader 
audiences. Progressive social movements and activists rearticulated ideas—the absorption and 
recasting of concepts articulated by activists in the past or by advocates living in other locales 
and participating in unrelated struggles.68 Activist-intellectuals also crafted and told histories of 
their own movements. 
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“Focal point” Organizing 
 
In the pursuit of campaign goals, activists and organizers need to identify clear targets 
and take advantage of political opportunities. IPC activists called this process of analyzing 
power, locating targets and pressure points, and exploiting opportunities, “focal point theory.” As 
IPC activist Tom Hayden explained to the Ann Arbor chapter of the Indochina Peace Campaign, 
“The focal point method is an activist’s way of seeing that the best way to have an effect is to 
mobilize strength against the weak point of a system you’re trying to change.”69 The concept, as 
articulated by Hayden, reflects radical and foreign origins. Hayden cited North Vietnamese 
Communist leader, Trường Chinh, as immediate inspiration for the concept. Focal point theory 
also recalls the “foco” theory of armed struggle, which presumed that smaller mobile guerilla 
forces could initiate revolutionary change.70  
The “focal point” concept is a theme that runs through “No Radical Hangover.” It 
highlights progressives’ analyses of political opportunities and the targets, or power structures, 
that they made the focus of their political activism.  For black power activists such as Detroit’s 
Reverend Albert Cleage, the urban rebellions of the 1960s revealed a weak point in the American 
political system. Even liberal policymakers and corporate leaders identified focal points for 
action. For them, the black hard-core unemployed, especially black men, represented targets in 
trying to prevent urban rebellions. For the IPC, the U.S. wars in Indochina represented a focal 
point for rolling back U.S. imperialism; the Congressional appropriation process was the 
pressure point that gave antiwar activists the means to stop military intervention.  The Ohio 
chapter of the IPC extended focal point organizing to domestic policies when it decided to make 
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plant closures the focus of its efforts to rein in corporate power. OPIC activists saw state 
government as the best target for addressing deindustrialization.  
Detroit activists, on the other hand, saw local government as the strategic opening. Left-
wing activists in the Anti-STRESS campaign argued that transforming society required 
controlling public institutions such as city hall and the city’s courts. Yet, pragmatism determined 
activists’ decisions to run for elected office; they would only run if they could win. This proved 
to be the case as radical lawyer Justin Ravitz ran as a Marxist for Recorder’s Court Judge in 1972 
on a platform promising to change the ways in which justice was administered. Rumors that 
Black radical lawyer Kenneth Cockrel would run for mayor circulated before the 1969 and 1973 
mayoral elections, however he declined to run both times, due to a belief that he may not have 
been able to win. After Coleman Young’s mayoral election in 1973, Cockrel ran and won a seat 
on city council in 1977.   
 
Organizing Across Scale 
 
Left-wing progressives paid close attention to scale in their organizing. They organized 
on the local, state, and national level, sometimes simultaneously. Between the 1940s and 1970s, 
various civil rights organizations and black leaders applied pressure on the judicial, legislative, 
and executive branches of federal government to challenge de jure segregation. This did not 
mean that civil rights activists did not conduct local campaigns or seek change at the local level. 
However, organizations such as the NAACP and the SCLC relied upon national strategies when 
local authorities refused to acquiesce to their demands. Black power activists saw the 
neighborhood, the city, and the factory as the spaces for organizing. The IPC paid close attention 
to the national electoral map as they developed a practice strategy for overturning President 
Nixon’s military strategy in Indochina. The IPC leadership thought it best to organize opposition 
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to the war in Midwestern battleground states such as Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. 
The organization deployed a national and local strategy to end U.S. military involvement in 
Indochina.  
During the 1970s, progressive activists viewed municipal and state government as a 
crucial lever in struggles against police killings and plant closure as well as the quest for 
economic democracy. This development is significant not only because of liberalism’s retreat on 
a national level, but also because it was a response to the “new federalism” programs of 
Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan that devolved power from the federal government to state 
governments. DARE activists pursued a city-based strategy while OPIC sought to organize on 
the state-level. OPIC’s state-based organizing represented an innovation that underscored the 
importance of state government in implementing national urban policy and setting the tone for 
urban economic development. The larger left-wing progressive movement also conceived of 
their politics in these terms. Progressives held its first Conference for Alternative State and Local 
Policies in Madison, Wisconsin in 1975 where they gathered scores of likeminded activists, 
policymakers, and elected officials to devise strategies on issues such as energy, taxes, and urban 
development and governance.  
 
Movement Success, Failure, and Defeat 
Analyzing progressive politics during the 1970s and 1980s complicates understandings 
about movement success and failure. Progressives organized successfully around police brutality 
and ending the war. Whereas they influenced conversations about deindustrialization and 
economic recession, business leaders and elected officials defeated progressive efforts to enact 
anti-plant closure legislation and to restructure Detroit’s economy. Thus, assumptions that leftists 
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failed because they abandoned a class politics, adopted an “identity politics,” or neglected to 
devise alternative strategies misses the political and structural obstacles progressives faced 
during this period. They encountered several obstacles. First, OPIC and DARE did not acquire 
the political capital or power that would be necessary to defeat capital and local governing 
coalitions. DARE remained politically isolated in a city with a strong black liberal mayor with a 
long-standing commitment to redistributionist policies. Coleman Young constructed a local 
governing coalition that included organized labor, developers and business leaders, and much of 
the city’s African American population. Although Mayor Young had to confront structural 
factors such as a declining manufacturing and tax base, as well as changes in federal urban 
policies, he was in a better position than DARE to rehabilitate Detroit.  While OPIC successfully 
built a coalition of civil rights and labor leaders and community organizations in Ohio on plant 
closing legislation, they could not successfully replicate IPC’s lobbying strategy to acquire 
congressional support needed to pass the Community Readjustment Act. Business leaders and 
Republicans in Ohio rallied to defeat OPIC’s legislative efforts.  
Both organizations, like many progressives who advocated for economic democracy, 
confronted larger political, cultural, and legal structures. DARE found itself in a position similar 
to black power activists who had advocated both for a black economy during the 1960s. Could 
marginal political actors create alternative economies in a system of capitalist accumulation? 
DARE was reticent about the possibilities of building socialism in one city, or neighborhood. 
DARE’s rational reindustrialization plan depended upon business and corporate leaders to turn 
over private property in order for workers to develop. This was the same problem that black 
power activists encountered when they argued for whites to transfer land or provide investment 
capital without strings attached. They recognized they would eventually need more political 
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power on a national level to acquire the capital from the federal government needed to 
implement rational reindustrialization. Yet, federalism also presented a problem. Presidents 
Nixon, Ford, and Reagan embarked on a process of devolving power and resources back to the 
states, making state politics more important. Federal and state urban policy also may have 
prevented DARE from implementing economic democracy as the aforementioned 
administrations, including Jimmy Carter’s, tied funds to project development.71 Cockrel and 
DARE long understood that taking state power was a necessary precursor to implementing 
economic democracy, but movement-building and winning local elections was the first step the 
organization could not move beyond. There was a mismatch between DARE’s analysis of capital 
flight, their political capacity, and legal impediments in implementing their vision of economic 
democracy.   
“No Radical Hangover” highlights the importance of assessing the impact of social 
movements while remaining aware of the fundamental structural obstacles activists faced.  As 
historians Howard Brick and Christopher Phelps illustrate, the left in the U.S. tends to vacillate 
between the margins and mainstream of American political culture.72 There are moments where 
leftists in Detroit and in Ohio were able to break into the mainstream of local and state politics. 
Kenneth Cockrel, a black radical socialist, could get elected to city council in Detroit, but he was 
the only one. Activists from OPIC like Ira Arlook were talking about organizing against 
“economic globalization” in 1975.73 The movement produced and featured several labor activist-
intellectuals such as OPIC’s Ed Kelly who helped frame the issue of deindustrialization during 
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the 1970s. These movement intellectuals successfully influenced national conversations around 
plant closings with their analyses.74 But activists struggled to actually reform the system.  
Progressives were successful when they joined coalitions to organize against war and 
police brutality. Some of them could even win elected office. Yet, they were unable to defeat 
business and their allies politically or to challenge the private property rights of corporations. As 
Phelps’s and Brick’s model makes clear, the left could influence the mainstream on foreign 
policy and urban policing, yet they simultaneously swim against the nation’s political currents on 
economic issues. Business and political leaders in Ohio supported the free market orthodoxy that 
was resurgent in economic development. Even Detroit Mayor Coleman Young had to adjust to 
new realities of competing with other cities for urban development on corporatist terms.  
DARE’s and OPIC’s focus on the industrial sector also reflected masculine politics. It is 
true that women worked in auto and steel production. However, members of DARE and OPIC 
failed to articulate concerns that women industrial workers may have had in their movements. 
Their politics reflected a traditional focus on the structural unemployment on black men. By the 
mid-to-late 1970s, DARE and OPIC were even neglecting this analysis of black male 
unemployment.75  OPIC and DARE tried to develop a universal politics of economic democracy, 
one which would establish state-supported economic citizenship for everyone.  One of the 
problems that these two organizations, along with many progressives, had during the 1970s and 
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1980s was that they relied upon vague populist rhetoric.  They sought to replace Marxian notions 
of the working class with ambiguously defined notions of the “public interest,” “citizen politics,” 
and “the community.”76  While DARE’s and OPIC’s developed and promoted left wing analyses 
of politics and economics, their political expression of those analyses were often deradicalized.  
Progressives’ jettisoning of the language of socialism appeared to be one of the costs of trying to 
build a popular movement.  If politics appeared to become more slippery and incoherent among 
progressives, it was a product of an explicit rhetorical strategy, rather than just a byproduct of the 
fracturing of political discourse 77  
OPIC and DARE activists also failed to deal with the gendered implications of the 
emerging prominence of the service industry in the Midwest. The gender politics of both groups 
was primarily masculine even as they both featured women in publicly-visible positions. 
DARE’s Sheila Murphy emerged as a key organizer and intellectual in the anti-police brutality 
movement. She managed white Marxist Justin Ravitz’s successful campaign for Recorder’s 
Court Judge in 1972 and Kenneth Cockrel’s 1977 City Council Campaign. Jane Fonda helped 
found the Indochina Peace Campaign in 1972. She used her celebrity to bring publicity and 
legitimacy to the IPC’s efforts. Sandy Buchannan also worked on OPIC’s staff and MaryLynne 
Cappelletti served as OPIC’s legislative director. Black women’s presence in the two groups was 
mostly invisible. DARE revolved around a single charismatic male leader, Kenneth Cockrel 
whose personality had chafed at some left-wing activists going back to the movement against 
police violence. DARE’s existence depended upon Cockrel’s city council seat and his mayoral 
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aspirations. The organization did not survive Cockrel’s decision not to run for re-election in 
1981.  
Historian Van Gosse has argued that the left of the 1970s and 1980s “had no coherent 
alternative to the extraordinarily sophisticated, rationalized, world of global corporate 
capitalism.” 78  In contrast, “No Radical Hangover” demonstrates that the left’s problem was not 
an absence of ideas or the poverty of its analysis, but rather a lack of political power. 
Progressives sought to mount an intellectual and political challenge to economic restructuring 
and global capitalism. 79 For some scholars, the left and liberals either remained mired in the 
New Deal or sought a “post-economic” politics.80 “No Radical Hangover” contradicts these 
arguments. It is true that progressives’ conceptions and expressions of economic democracy did 
not transform mainstream political culture. Yet, the left’s problem was not the absence of ideas. 
What progressives suffered from was a lack of the political power needed to implement their 
policy ideas.81   
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 focuses on the conflict among various approaches to addressing the urban 
crisis in Detroit after the 1967 uprising. For black power activists such as Reverend Albert 
Cleage, Jr., structural racism in American cities represented the focal point for the movement. 
Conversely, for the New Detroit Committee—an urban coalition of Democrats, business leaders, 
African Americans, and organized labor—the focal point for addressing the urban rebellions was 
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the “hard-core unemployed.” Consequently, liberals in local and national politics pursued a range 
of strategies in response to the urban crisis. President Lyndon Johnson and other liberals 
advocated for a cocktail of policies that included addressing structural unemployment—hiring 
the “hard-core unemployed,” developing coalitions of activists, policymakers, and business 
leaders to implement jobs policies, and focusing on the war on crime.  Cleage’s Federation for 
Self-Determination called for a black-led reconstruction of black neighborhoods grounded in the 
principles of black self-determination. To pursue this strategy, the FSD unsuccessfully sought to 
pressure New Detroit and the city’s power structure to “transfer” power and resources to the 
city’s black residents.  
Chapters 2 and 3 concentrates on successful progressive campaigns and the 
transformations in leftist politics in Detroit and in Ohio during the 1970s. In September 1971, a 
coalition of civil rights activists, black nationalists, labor organizers, liberals, and black and 
white radicals arose to defeat the Detroit Police Department’s Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe 
Streets Unit (STRESS). This coalition aimed to reform, and then later, abolish STRESS. Leftists 
developed a radical critique of city police power that connected STRESS to downtown 
development, war and empire, the drug trade, and the racist and classed nature of the local 
criminal justice system. With STRESS representing the focal point, the left-wing viewed 
municipal politics as the pressure points for action. The left wing pursued the abolition of 
STRESS in the courts and through electoral politics. Left-wing electoral politics in Detroit 
culminated with Mel Ravitz and Kenneth Cockrel’s elections to public office in 1972 and 1977.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the Indochina Peace Campaign’s successful movement to end the war 
in Indochina. The IPC emerged out of Tom Hayden’s and Jane Fonda’s tour of battleground 
states in the fall of 1972. While the IPC comprised a network of chapters in various states and 
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cities including Chicago, New York, and Santa Monica, this chapter focuses specifically on the 
actions of the Ohio branch and national leadership. IPC represented an example of progressive 
politics—radical analysis and reformist strategy. Believing that the radical left—SDS, 
Progressive Labor, and the Weathermen—had failed in their efforts to bring down American 
empire, the organization mounted a campaign to pressure policymakers to defund U.S. military 
intervention. The organization developed “focal point theory”—locating the particular 
institutions, policies, or politician that made the whole system vulnerable. IPC argued that ending 
U.S. military involvement in Indochina would halt imperialism.  
Chapters 4 and 5 interrogate unsuccessful movements for economic democracy that 
emerged in response to deindustrialization and economic recession in Detroit and Ohio. Between 
1975 and 1981, DARE and OPIC challenged business’s private property rights, revived 
Progressive Era and 1930s-style call for citizen and worker control, and sought to rescue an 
industrial economy undergoing crisis and restructuring in the Midwest. OPIC’s state-wide plant 
closing bill—the Community Reinvestment Act—and DARE’s critique of the 1979 Chrysler 
Corporation Loan Guarantee and the group’s economic plan, Rational Reindustrialization, 
reflected an appeal to what scholar-activist Staughton Lynd called the “community right to 
industrial property.”82 
Chapter 4 investigates the defeat of the Ohio Public Interest Campaign’s effort to enact 
the Community Readjustment Act. By the mid-1970s, the focal point shifted from imperialism to 
confronting what activist Ira Arlook called “corporate globalization” and multinational 
corporations’ abilities to freely move capital out of cities.83 OPIC saw state government, rather 
than the federal government, as the focal point for action. Thus, the group built a state-based 
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Rustinian coalition of labor, religious, and civil rights activists advocate for the anti-plant closure 
bill. They grounded their arguments for the bill in terms of workers’ and communities’ rights to 
economic decision making and industrial property. While OPIC activists drew from IPC’s 
analysis of U.S. empire and global capitalism, they mobilized around rather vague terms such as 
“citizen” and “public interest.” Ohio business organizations such as the Ohio Manufacturers 
Association, Democratic legislators, and Ohio’s Republican Governor, James Rhodes defeated 
OPIC’s campaign for the CRA. 
Chapter 5 analyzes DARE’s construction and articulation of rational reindustrialization. 
It illustrates how the organization sought to intervene in a national conversation around 
deindustrialization and declining cities just as Reverend Cleage had aspired to do during the mid-
to-late 1960s. DARE combined radical analyses of liberal urban development, the 1979 Chrysler 
loan guarantee, and deindustrialization with popular mobilization, electoral politics, and 
policymaking in their attempt to enact economic democracy in Detroit. Instead of Mayor 
Coleman Young’s and his allies’ downtown development strategy, DARE advocated for creating 
a “public enterprise sector” where municipal government and the city’s workers and citizens 
would share ownership. DARE drew simultaneously from progressives’ arguments for economic 
democracy and from the conservative concept of enterprise zones. DARE’s vision of rational 
reindustrialization represented the left-wing alternative to industrial policy measures that arose 
out of the Carter and Reagan administrations, as well as from policy advocates like financier and 
New York City fiscal crisis manager, Felix Rohatyn.  
DARE’s fate differed from OPIC’s. The organization suffered from political isolation. 
Detroit Mayor Coleman Young led a coalition of organized labor, corporate leaders, liberal 
organizations, developers, and the city’s black residents. DARE missed an opportunity to 
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broaden its base when Poletown residents opposed Coleman Young’s work to enable General 
Motors to construct a plant in that neighborhood. Cockrel was the sole representative of the 
city’s left loyal opposition in city government. Since DARE’s fate was tied to Cockrel’s, the 
group disintegrated once he left the City Council.  Still, DARE’s plan garnered attention from 
local business leaders and the progressive left.  
The conclusion, “Reflections on Left-Wing Progressive Politics during the 1970s and 
1980s,” assesses the five case studies of progressivism. I evaluate the performance of Albert 
Cleage’s Federation for Self Determination, the Anti-STRESS movement, Indochina Peace 
Campaign, and the Ohio Public Interest Campaign and the Detroit Alliance for a Rational 
Economy. In addition to reflecting on the meanings of progressive politics during this period, I 
consider the efficacy of combining social movement and electoral strategies. In addition to 
considering DARE’s electoral strategy, I briefly analyze Reverend Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 
1988 presidential campaigns and his Rainbow Coalition. Jackson’s campaigns and efforts to 
transform the Democratic Party represent a nationalization of 1970s and 1980s progressive 
politics. However, Dukakis’s defeat of Jackson in 1988, the triumph of centrist politics embodied 
by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), and Jackson’s decision to demobilize the 
Rainbow Coalition in favor of pursuing elite brokerage politics raises questions about whether or 
not progressive social movements can include successful electoral wings.  
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Chapter 1 
 
“Transfer of Power”:  Black Power and Liberal Coalitions as Responses to the Urban 
Crisis 
 
 
On January 8, 1968, Detroit’s Federation for Self-Determination announced that it was 
splitting with the city’s newly-formed urban coalition—the New Detroit Committee (NDC). 
After the July 1967 rebellion, Reverend Albert Cleage and the FSD had demanded that Detroit’s 
white political and economic establishment “transfer” power to the city’s black population. 
Cleage demanded that whites place institutional and financial resources under black control.  The 
New Detroit Committee—a liberal interracial urban coalition comprised of white business, 
political, and labor leaders and black activists and established in the wake of the rebellion—
offered to supply funds to FSD and another black organization, the Detroit Council of 
Organizations, for urban redevelopment. However, Cleage and the FSD turned down NDC’s 
offer because they were still bound to NDC’s funding guidelines. Cleage viewed the arrangement 
as a betrayal of what he called the “transfer of power” strategy.  
That day, FSD’s Cleage and the national director of the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), Floyd McKissick, held a press conference in Detroit regarding the FSD’s decision to 
sever ties with the New Detroit Committee (NDC). McKissick charged the NDC with 
“paternalism” and called the committee “a failure” because it “failed to recognize that the 
principle of black self-determination is lesson one, page one in the subject of black power.” 
Cleage also drew upon prevailing leftist/black nationalist discourses of colonialism to criticize
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 the NDC’s offer. ”We’re tired of charity, colonialism, and plantation thinking,” Cleage declared. 
“Black people must make the decisions affecting their lives just like most whites do.” 1 
Kenneth Cockrel, a black radical lawyer and community activist, supported Cleage’s 
decision.  Cleage criticized the NDC’s strategy of dealing with the urban crisis as corporatist. 
“Their thing is profit, and the only way the government can get these companies to go into the 
ghetto is by guaranteeing them profit.” Cockrel, like other radicals and black power activists, 
saw the urban crisis as failure of liberalism broadly. Cockrel’s connected the NDC-FSD fiasco to 
the marginalization of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964 Democratic 
National Convention and suggested that a lack of political power was the problem. In contrast to 
black social democrats such as Bayard Rustin who sought the transformation of the national 
Democratic Party, Cockrel advocated the creation of radical and independent political 
formations. He advocated for an electoral approach to radical politics that carried over into the 
1970s. “Politics with a big P is necessary—we must begin to behave politically, and establish 
networks between people who operate on the same premise. You are going to see the formation 
of a national revolutionary political apparatus,” Cockrel declared.2  
The NDC-FSD split raised several fundamental questions about how best to respond to 
the urban crisis of the 1960s that extended beyond the city of Detroit:  Who should direct the 
reconstruction of America’s cities?  What political and economic strategies should activists, 
business leaders, and government deploy to rebuild predominately black neighborhoods that had 
been the sites of rebellion such as Watts, Detroit’s Twelfth Street, or Cleveland’s Hough 
neighborhood? Lastly, how should the rebuilding be funded—through the federal government, 
private sector, a mixture of both, or reparations?  
                                                 
1 Quoted in “Traditional Leadership, Corporations Get a Slap,” Michigan Chronicle, January 13, 1968.  
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Michigan Chronicle, January 20, 1966.  
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This chapter seeks to address these questions by examining the post-1967 black power 
politics and the establishment of the liberal New Detroit Committee (NDC), a coalition of 
business, labor, civic leaders, and black residents, particularly the fraught relationship between 
the NDC and Albert Cleage’s Federation for Self-Determination. Historian Devin Fergus argues 
in Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980 that liberals, 
especially in North Carolina, “created the operational space for the state’s developing Black 
Power movement.”3 This chapter complicates Fergus’s argument. NDC’s and FSD’s relationship 
confirms that Detroit’s liberals sought a similar course—the NDC sought a relationship with the 
FSD, which included the New Detroit Committee providing funds to the FSD as long as it 
adhered to particular guidelines about political participation. The NDC-FSD split departs from 
Fergus’s insights about the relationship between black power and liberalism because Cleage’s 
commitment to his brand of black power politics, which stressed the transfer of power and 
complete independence from white-dominated institutions, short-circuited the arrangement. 
Cleage’s influence began to wane afterwards, however, as other black power organizations such 
as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers emerged.  
The urban rebellions of the 1960s generated black power-inspired and liberal urban 
coalitions around particular strategies for redeveloping America’s cities. Both groups identified 
their own focal points for action. Liberal coalitions—embodied by the New Detroit Committee 
and the National Urban Coalition—saw the hard-core unemployed as their focal point.4 
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Providing jobs to structurally-unemployed black Americans represented the key to preventing 
urban uprisings for liberals. Consequently, business leaders in the New Detroit Committee such 
as Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford, II instituted programs to hire the hard core unemployed. 
The NDC also aimed to support black-led organizations such as Cleage’s Federation for Self-
Determination and the liberal Detroit Council of Organizations (DCO) in their redevelopment 
efforts.  
Black power activists and organizations such as the Federation for Self-Determination 
saw the black neighborhood, or the black city, as the focal point for action. For black power 
activists in Detroit and throughout the U.S., the urban rebellions were a problem of racist and 
economic exploitation, if not “internal colonialism,” which rendered blacks powerless. The 
solution to the urban crisis, according to Cleage and other black power advocates, lay in white-
dominated institutions transferring power and resources to African Americans and black 
communities. Consequently, Albert Cleage called for the construction of a cooperative economy. 
Building such an economy, according to Cleage, would address a central problem that black 
power activists and progressive activists in the 1970s often encountered—the lack of capital 
needed to create economies owned and controlled by either African Americans, workers, or 
communities. Yet, Cleage’s inability to compile enough resources from organizations such as 
NDC hindered his cooperative economic vision. After Cleage refused NDC’s funds in January 
1968, he was no longer seen as the preeminent black power leader in the city. The political 
center of gravity shifted toward a small group of black radical workers—Kenneth Cockrel, 
General Baker, Mike Hamlin, John Watson, and others—who were the founders of the Dodge 
Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.  
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Ultimately, gaps between liberal analyses, prescriptions, and strategies for rehabilitating 
the hard core unemployed also arose. Nationally, the Kerner Commission called for the creation 
of 2 million jobs—one million in the private and public sectors each—however, it appeared that 
such a large scale job program was never really on the table. President Johnson shelved the 
Kerner Report. The Johnson administration’s narrowing concentration on Vietnam threatened the 
War on Poverty at home. Johnson also focused much on his response to the urban rebellions on 
policing black ghettoes. Nixon’s election in 1968 meant a continuation of the war in Indochina 
and the escalation of Johnson’s war on crime. These circumstances provided the national context 
for the development of two social movement campaigns—one in Detroit around police brutality, 
where the city’s police department acquired federal funding, and the other, based in Ohio, to end 
the war.5 
The liberal response to Detroit’s rebellion also transformed between 1967 and 1971. The 
1969 economic recession wiped out the jobs programs. Additionally, as members of Detroit’s 
business and corporate community advocated for jobs programs, they continued to close 
enterprises and move them outside of the central city. The changes in local priorities—from 
black empowerment and jobs programs to increased policing and a focus on downtown 
development—roughly matched the national political shift as the Nixon administration focused 
on law and order and limited forms of black capitalism.  
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“The ‘New’ Urban Coalition:  The Liberal Response to the Detroit Rebellion 
By the summer of 1967, the nation’s long hot summers had come into full swing. Police 
encounters with black Americans in Newark and Detroit sparked uprisings a week apart.  On 
July 12, Newark police officers Vito Pontrelli and Oscar De Simone stopped 40-year-old black 
cab driver John Smith. Bystanders said that the officers assaulted him even though the police 
charged him. After 9:30 P.M. witnesses saw police officers drag Smith out of the car and into the 
police station. As bystanders gathered across the streets from the station, other black cab drivers 
began communicating to each other about Smith’s beating. Police, members of CORE, and some 
unidentified members of the community implored for the growing crowd to disperse. Someone, 
or some people, hit the police station with Molotov cocktails. Violent protests ensued for the 
next five days. The rebellion left 26 dead.6  
In the early hours of the morning of July 23, Detroit police sergeant Arthur Howison led 
a police raid on a well-known “blind pig” establishment located in the heart of one of Detroit’s 
largest black neighborhoods. When Howison announced the police action, a brawl between black 
patrons and the police ensued. Once the brawl ended, Howison and the rest of his detail (vice 
squad) arrested and detained the 85 people who were inside the blind pig.7 The fight between the 
police and black patrons spurred to the Detroit rebellion. It was the most destructive uprising in 
US history.  Forty-three people died, 1,189 were injured, and 7,231 people were arrested. The 
city suffered close to $40 million in property damage.8   
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In an essay for the August 1, 1967 edition of Dissent Magazine entitled “War, Riot, and 
Priorities,” a group of liberal congressional Democrats argued that President Johnson had 
neglected addressing the causes of the urban crisis. Michigan representative John Conyers, Jr. 
and nine other congressmen criticized Johnson’s pursuit of the Vietnam war and pleaded for a 
redistribution of resources from war to the cities, “The crisis of our ghettos,” the statement read, 
“is more urgent than the war in Vietnam. To bring real and lasting peace to our cities, we must 
end the war in Asia.” They also articulated a progressive solution— one that stood politically 
between Democrats and the New Left and Black Power radicals—to the crises in Vietnam and at 
home, one that drew from the progressive political tradition of full employment. The 
congressmen echoed National Urban League President Whitney Young’s call for a “Marshall 
Plan” for U.S. cities, “We must begin, in effect, a Marshall Plan for the cities, a redistribution of 
American affluence and a new plan for the full participation of this nation’s deprived in 
reconstructing every ghetto in every city of this country.”9  
The Newark and Detroit uprisings provoked President Johnson and other national 
political and business leaders to seek explanations for the urban crisis at a time when the War on 
Poverty came under scrutiny by civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr.10 On July 29, 
President Johnson called a meeting to organize a probe of the causes of the civil disorders. The 
commission of public leaders charged with examining the wave of riots consisted of civil rights 
leaders and a bipartisan group of legislators including the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) Roy Wilkins, New York City Mayor John Lindsay, 
and the chairman of the newly formed group, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson charged the 
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commission with investigating the nation’s riots without regard to the Administration’s views on 
urban affairs. “Let your search be free,” Johnson insisted.11 The Kerner Commission, as 
observers eventually dubbed it, undertook a massive study of the history of racism and inner city 
conditions that contributed to the rebellion. Members of Detroit’s civic and business 
communities also created a coalition—the New Detroit Committee—to address the conditions 
that gave rise to the city’s revolt. Calls for a massive reconstruction of riot-torn cities, new 
strategies for addressing black male joblessness, and the establishment of “new” urban coalitions 
of the public and private sector arose from the ashes of the riots in Detroit and other American 
cities during the late 1960s.   
The most destructive riot in U.S. history caught Detroit’s business leaders off-guard.  
Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford, II pointed to the business leaders’ aloofness on race 
relations as a cause of the civil disorder. Ford admitted, “I thought I was aware…but I guess I 
wasn’t.” Chrysler executive Lynn Townsend declared, “We’d better make an extra effort. Detroit 
is the test tube for America. If the concentrated power of industry and government can’t solve 
the problems of the ghetto here, God help our country.”12 It also led the business, civic, and 
political leaders to organize. Four days after Detroit’s uprising, Republican Governor George 
Romney and Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh summoned local business owner, J.L. Hudson to 
organize the New Detroit Committee. 
J.L Hudson, Jr.’s participation on the New Detroit Committee was an extension of his 
family’s civic work in the city.  The Hudson family had been an institution in the city since the 
late nineteenth century. J.L. Hudson’s great-uncle, Joseph Lowthian Hudson founded the 
furniture store, what would become J.L. Hudson Company, in 1881. Hudson donated time and 
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resources to local organizations such as the Detroit Institute of Arts. J.L. Hudson, Jr. went to 
work for the Hudson Company in 1950. He also started working for the family’s foundation, the 
Hudson-Weber foundation in 1956.  J.L. Hudson, Jr. became president of the family’s furniture 
company in 1961 at the age of 29.13  
The rebellion raised the stakes for Cavanagh’s political career. Detroiters had elected the 
33-year-old Cavanagh to City Hall in 1961. Up until July 1967, Cavanagh appeared as the model 
mayor for the model city. The new mayor addressed the city’s financial deficit in one year. He 
successfully acquired over $230 million in federal money for the city between July 1962 and 
August 1967. Cavanagh governed as an integrationist, either appointing black Detroiters to 
important positions in city government, or selecting white officials that the city’s black 
population favored.14 The mayor even fought poverty before President Johnson declared war on 
it in 1964. The Cavanagh administration concentrated on addressing the problem of the “hard 
core unemployed” in the early 1960s. He commissioned a study on youth unemployment and 
delinquency in 1962. He established youth programs such as the Special Youth Employment 
Project to address unemployment. These programs, alongside others concentrating on 
redevelopment, comprised what the Cavanagh administration later referred to as the Total Action 
against Poverty (TAP).15  Despite the national attention that Cavanagh’s handling of race 
relations and poverty attracted attention, conditions for African American residents of Detroit 
continued to deteriorate from years of capital flight, residential and job discrimination, and racial 
violence.16 
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Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh, and J.L. Hudson announced the formation of the 
New Detroit Committee on Tuesday, August 1 at Detroit’s City-Council Building.  Much of the 
committee at the founding comprised of the city’s business leadership. The meeting, however, 
did not proceed without controversy. Congressman John Conyers criticized the composition of 
the meeting and charged that Cavanagh, Romney, and Hudson had failed to include any black 
Detroiters from the riot zone. Conyers pointed out that “the voiceless of the community” were 
unrepresented. “I didn’t hear anyone off of 12th Street…Anyone poor or black. And that’s what 
triggered this as I understand it,” said Conyers.17  
Addressing job discrimination and unemployment remained consistent with the 
prevailing liberal understanding that black male unemployment, the denial of a male 
breadwinner wage, and black family disintegration, were among the root causes of racial 
inequality, crime, and the urban crisis.18 The “problem of jobs,” historian Guian A. McKee 
writes, “struck Northern, urban African Americans with particular ferocity.”19 Detroit’s blacks 
experienced more from unemployment than the city’s whites. The black unemployment rate—
18.2 percent— more than doubled the city’s total unemployment rate in 1960.20 The black 
unemployment rate declined to 8% in 1967, but it measured around 15 percent in the riot area.21 
Detroit’s blacks also suffered from income inequality. A white high school graduate earned 
$1,600 more per year than a black graduate.22 Detroit’s black unemployment reflected national 
trends. While black unemployment decreased from 12.6 percent in 1958 to 8.2 percent in 1967, 
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the black unemployment doubled that of whites despite the nation’s economic growth during the 
1960s.23 According to Newsweek, one in three black Americans seeking jobs could not find 
work. 24 Blacks also tended to work in the lowest-paying and most menial jobs as a result of 
discrimination in hiring and in unions.25  
Riot surveys also focused on the employment status of participants in the civil 
disturbance. In the Detroit Urban League’s survey of 437 African Americans living in the riot 
zone, 22 percent of them were male and 12 percent female. Thirty-five percent of the rioters who 
participated in the survey were between 15-24 years of age, whereas 15 percent of rioters were 
between the ages of 25 and 35 years of age. The survey concluded that rioters “were more likely 
to have been unemployed. Fifty-six percent of rioters who were breadwinners told the 
interviewers they had been unemployed for at least a month during the past two years.” The 
DUL also identified a correlation between rioting and length of unemployment. “Those who had 
been jobless for more than a year were more than three times as likely to be rioters as those who 
were unemployed for only a month…”26 This profile matched the Kerner Commission’s generic 
profile of a riot participant. The typical rioter was black and an unmarried male who was 
between 15 and 24 years of age.  If he worked, “he was more likely to be working in a menial or 
low status job as an unskilled laborer. If he was employed, he was not working full time and his 
employment was frequently interrupted by periods of unemployment.”27 
Looking for ways to create a more representative and well-functioning committee, 
Hudson consulted Kent Mathewson, President of the Metropolitan Fund, an organization devoted 
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to “seeking public and private alternatives for solving the many region-wide problems in 
metropolitan Detroit.”28 Hudson also conferred with Hugh White and James Campbell. White 
and Campbell were members of the Detroit Industrial Mission, an organization which Hudson 
had previously supported.29 White and Campbell pushed Hudson to approach some of the city’s 
black organizations about participation in the budding committee. More significantly, though, 
White and Campbell urged Hudson to include black militants in the process. Hudson eventually 
asked West Central Organization leader, Alvin Harrison of the Afro-American Unity Movement, 
Lorenzo Freeman and the eighteen-year-old Norvell Harrington to serve. Yet, they represented 
one-third of the black membership and a fraction of the committee’s total membership. The other 
black committee included the local NAACP executive secretary Robert Tindal and local school 
official and future NAACP President Arthur Johnson.30 Also Hudson chose not to invite one of 
the city’s most prominent black militants to join the committee—Reverend Albert B. Cleage. 
Black militants’ token inclusion into the committee would soon empower Cleage and the rest of 
the city’s militants.  
Cavanagh offered no clear objective for NDC. Cavanagh charged Hudson with 
establishing an organization that could “bring together a group of citizens to help produce and 
coordinate the public and private resources necessary to help rebuild the social and physical 
fabric” of Detroit.31 Hudson later told historian Sidney Fine, “The committee didn’t have a 
charge or a mission, a goal-objective, a precedent; it was really a matter of—we need help, we 
need private sector leadership to begin to focus on these problems and to help us redress these 
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things.”32 Cavanagh’s failure to provide a clear charge induced a sense of confusion about the 
organization’s aims and powers that affected its ability to interact with other groups like the 
black militant Federation for Self Determination. 
The New Detroit Committee would eventually bill itself as the “first urban coalition” 
because its formation preceded the establishment of the National Urban Coalition on August 24, 
1967. More than 800 mayors, business, labor, and civil rights leaders including Bayard Rustin, 
New York City Mayor John Lindsay, and David Rockefeller assembled in Washington to devise 
a national public and private response to the urban rebellions. Like New Detroit, the NUC also 
advocated for the federal government to “reorder national priorities” and to institute a massive 
jobs program.33  New Detroit and the NUC foreshadowed the founding of numerous coalitions in 
U.S. cities. By 1968, forty-two coalitions existed in cities from Cleveland and Minneapolis to 
New York and Newark, New Jersey.34 These coalitions envisioned themselves in the broadest 
fashion, consisting of labor, civil rights, political, and business leaders. Members of local and the 
national coalition, like A. Philip Randolph, Henry Ford, II., and chairman John Gardner saw 
urban coalitions as a bulwark against racial and political polarization and as an institutional 
advocate for the nation’s cities.35   
The New Detroit Committee’s corporate leaders saw tackling the problem of the hard-
core unemployed as paramount.  The first NDC report reflected this understanding, “To many, 
jobs are the key to the solution of the urban crisis. While the Detroit riot of July 1967 was unique 
in that many of those arrested did have good jobs, many others did not…Even in Detroit, surveys 
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disclosed chronic unemployment to be a major and continuing source of discontent.”36 The city’s 
business leaders moved to hire those systematically excluded from the economy—the “hard-core 
unemployed” –by establishing affirmative action job programs. Local businesses and national 
corporations such as Joseph L. Hudson’s J.L. Hudson Company and the Ford Motor Company 
relaxed normal hiring stipulations and, in some cases, established outposts in the riot zone. 
Business leaders like Hudson and Henry Ford, II, and corporations such as General Motors and 
Chrysler, saw their hiring programs as part of a burgeoning strategy to aid blacks in their 
struggle for civil and economic rights. 
In October, 1967, Ford Motor Company declared that it would launch a job program that 
would hire 6,500 workers from the inner city.37 Ford set up “community action centers” in the 
riot area to recruit and hire workers and revised its hiring requirements to accommodate inner-
city workers.  The city government assisted Ford with its hiring program by lending staff from 
the Mayor’s Committee for Human Resource Development (MCHRD) to in the “community 
action centers.”  Company representatives or members of the MCHRD assisted prospective 
workers with their applications and performed interviews. They considered criminal records on a 
case-by-case basis. MCHRD provided medical personnel to perform physicals. The company 
also “temporarily” discontinued the written test for applicants.38 They gave hired workers 
without transportation bus tickets to travel to work and offered $5 weekly advances if needed. 
For those who Ford did not hire, they referred them to social workers who could help them find 
other jobs.39 
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The following month, the J.L. Hudson Company established a job training program that 
would ultimately hire 500 people—250 “hard-core unemployed people” and 250 students who 
were at risk of dropping out of school. General Motors similarly sought applicants in Detroit’s 
inner city. GM collaborated with the city’s Urban League to hire the Urban League’s 250 hard-
core unemployed referrals in their “Operation Opportunity” program.40 The program waived 
several normal hiring requirements such as the employment test, minimum attainment of a high 
school diploma, and relaxed restrictions on hiring people with previous criminal records.41 
Aware of the presence of the hard-core unemployed in the city before the rebellion, the 
Detroit chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
tried to address job discrimination several months before the riot. It called for the city to create 
10,000 jobs for the “hard core unemployed.”42 The Greater Detroit Board of Commerce created a 
Manpower Committee to undertake such a task. Yet, the riot threw a wrench into the Manpower 
Committee’s plans. Members of the NDC responded to the NAACP’s challenge in the aftermath 
of the rebellion.  The NDC teamed with the Board’s Manpower Committee to work towards the 
10,000 job goal set by the NAACP. The two organizations set up recruitment centers within the 
riot zone while Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, and the Hudson Company also instituted their 
own programs to hire the hard core unemployed.  
Discussions of the hard-core unemployed after riots in Detroit and Watts were not new. 
They stemmed from an almost decade-long national conversation about structural 
unemployment. Economists Kenneth Galbraith and Gunnar Myrdal, and socialist Michael 
Harrington had published influential texts investigating the persistence of unemployment among 
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the nation’s impoverished in what many considered as the “Age of Affluence.” All of the authors 
articulated elements of pathological explanations for the existence of the hard-core unemployed. 
Even as Galbraith recognized particular pathologies among the poor such as “mental deficiency” 
and “an inability to adapt to the discipline of industrial life,” Galbraith argued that the liberals’ 
pursuit of growth and abandonment of redistributionist economic policies left the chronically 
unemployed behind.43 Myrdal in Challenge to Affluence attributed structural unemployment to 
technological changes in industrial production, such as automation, demographic changes in the 
workforce, as well as “the emergence of an ‘underclass,’” who was politically apathetic and “so 
mute and so devoid of initiative.”44 Harrington called the underclass “the rejects of the affluent 
society,” many of which were expelled from the economy due to their obsolete skills.45 Both 
Myrdal and Harrington anticipated the famous Moynihan thesis when they argued that the 
structurally unemployed were caught in a cycle or culture of poverty.46 Cultural and behavioral 
assumptions also undergirded further discussions about, and policies for, the hard-core 
unemployed in Detroit. 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report—The Black Family:  The 
Case for National Action—became a focal point for national conversations around race, gender, 
and joblessness when it leaked in March 1965. The Moynihan Report not only picked up on the 
theme of jobs as an answer to crime and poverty, but it sought to chart the next direction for the 
Johnson Administration’s civil rights agenda. The difference between Moynihan and the 
aforementioned writers was that Moynihan, in The Black Family, racialized and gendered the 
victims of racial discrimination in the U.S. economy.  Moynihan identified black family 
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breakdown as “the fundamental problem” plaguing black Americans. The report articulated the 
gendered aspects of both the problem of poverty and crime in a way that was only implied in 
newspaper reports and policy speeches about criminal activity.  
Moynihan’s analysis and conclusions about the crisis of the black family rested upon 
normative assumptions about the heterosexual nuclear family—that it was the primary institution 
for socializing youth and instilling proper norms for social reproduction and mobility. Building 
on decades of poverty research, especially from black social scientists such as E. Franklin 
Frazier, the Moynihan Report argued that centuries of enslavement and racial discrimination 
destroyed the black family. As a result, these forces produced and reproduced “abnormal” black 
families, whom were mostly headed by black women. He wrote, “In essence, the Negro 
community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with 
the rest of American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole and imposes a 
crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many of Negro women as 
well.”47   
Moynihan’s report assumed that all successful upwardly mobile families featured a male 
breadwinner who serves as the head of the household. Black men, according to Moynihan, were 
denied this possibility. Consequently, he contended that, over time, black men suffered from 
psychic injuries as a result of having to cope with the loss of prestige in the black family in a 
patriarchal society. The injuries suffered by black men and the presence of black female-headed 
families produced what Moynihan called a “tangle of pathology” that seemed to reproduce itself 
independently from white racism. “At this point, the present tangle of pathology is capable of 
perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world. The cycle can be broken if these 
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distortions are set right.”48  Moynihan identified a combination of deviate behaviors in this cycle, 
or culture of poverty, such as crime and illegitimacy.  
Ultimately, the problem of poverty and family breakdown for Moynihan was a problem 
of black male unemployment. Moynihan thought that many black men suffered from structural 
unemployment. Moynihan reported that 75.8 percent of men of color participated in the national 
labor force, as opposed to 78 percent of white men. While he stated that a percentage point could 
be attributed to long-term physical and mental illness, it was “reasonable to assume that the rest 
of the difference is due to discouragement about finding a job.”49 Moynihan’s behavioral 
analysis of structural employment is consistent with his contemporaries’ analyses of hard-core 
unemployment. It also downplayed macroeconomic explanations of the issue by individualizing 
structural unemployment. According to Moynihan, they especially experienced higher rates of 
unemployment in comparison to black women. Black women, Moynihan reported, were more 
educated and more likely to find employment than their male counterparts.50 As a result, the 
status of the black woman as head of the household and primary breadwinner “undermines the 
position of the father.”51 These circumstances, along with strict welfare rules, often pushed black 
men out of the home. To address the crisis of the black family, Moynihan concluded that the 
federal government needed to devise and implement policies that would restore black men to 
their “natural” position as breadwinners.52 
Moynihan’s analysis articulated the fundamental assumptions undergirding both the local 
responses to urban rioting, street crime, and unemployment. The report’s behavioral and 
individualistic focus attributed poverty to behavior and culture. It also joined the racialization of 
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poverty and crime. The report contained elements of the discourse regarding the “hard-core 
unemployed” that would regain currency in the aftermath of the uprisings in Watts, Detroit, and 
elsewhere. While local manifestations of national crime policy would eventually stigmatize and 
target the black men who mostly made up the hard-core unemployed, Moynihan’s concept of the 
self-perpetuating “tangle of pathology” informed discussions of poverty in Detroit before and 
after the 1967 riot. The solution to these issues did not necessarily lay in an explicit assault in 
racial discrimination, but in addressing the psychic injuries of black men by providing 
employment.  
At the same time, the tangle of pathology explanation for black poverty, and black male 
unemployment, placed the rehabilitation of black masculinity and the black family beyond the 
reach of policy. If the problems of structural unemployment lay in repairing what liberals such as 
Moynihan saw as fatalistic behavior, then would post-riot policies to hire the hard-core 
unemployed even work? Would training programs work if black men were unmotivated, let 
alone uneducated and lacking in skills? Moynihan’s behavioral and cultural analysis of the 
problem of the black family and black male unemployment also elided macroeconomic problems 
that also rendered black men vulnerable in the labor market. Vague calls to strengthen the black 
family by providing employment ignored the fact that black Americans were more vulnerable to 
production slowdowns, the threat of inflation, and economic downturns due to racial 
discrimination.  
The discourse pathologizing black men and women had been percolating in the city of 
Detroit since at least the early 1960s. In 1964, Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh’s Committee on 
Community Renewal hired Greenleigh Associates, Inc. to conduct a study of Detroit’s “low-
income households” and the city’s social services. Between July 1964 and January 1965, 
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Greenleigh Associates interviewed a random sample of 2,081 households. Two-thirds of the 
households were black, and according to the report, were poorer than white ones.53 They studied 
the various ways that poverty affected black and white families in numerous areas including 
employment, family, education, housing and health. Many of the households featured high 
unemployment, with blacks comprising a greater unemployment rate than whites—22.3 to 15 
percent. The Greenleigh report anticipated Moynihan’s findings about the black family. It 
concluded that the black family tended to exhibit more families with “abnormal” structures. 
Black Detroiters suffered from higher rates of family break down and out-of-wedlock births. The 
Greenleigh studies exhibited a narrow focus on the problem of poverty and what they called 
“family functioning.” Unlike Moynihan, the Greenleigh studies of low-income families did not 
account for larger social forces, such as racism, or the transformation of the city’s economy. It is 
possible that narrowly focusing on the city’s social welfare system led Greenleigh Associates to 
propose solutions reinforcing psychological and behavioral understandings of poverty.  
The Greenleigh studies highlighted family “abnormalities,” generally, and the 
disproportionate rates of family breakdown and dysfunction and illegitimacy among black 
Detroit families. According to the Home Interview Study, over half of the families had one or 
more children. Yet, one out of three families had one parent. More than two-thirds of one-parent 
families were black.54 The Greenleigh studies also report that black Detroiters tended report 
more out-of-wedlock births. According to the studies, 24.9 percent black families reported 
children born out of wedlock compared to 4 percent of whites. Instead of emphasizing black 
male victimhood, the Greenleigh studies appear to attribute the blame for this development to 
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black men. “In addition, the Negro male finds it more difficult to support a family than the white 
male. For this reason marriage is less likely to take place even if there are children.”55  
Greenleigh’s suggestions for reforming the city’s welfare system reinforced the sort of 
psychological explanations for the existence of low-income black families that permeated 
discussions about structural unemployment and poverty. The report concluded that “counseling 
services” needed “to be at the core of a program of services” to address family breakdown.56 
Placing counseling improvements at the center of reform depoliticized poverty and emphasized 
individualistic behavioral solutions. “Counseling services, that is skilled professional help, were 
most frequently required to assist households in obtaining and using other community resources 
and to make some kind of plan that would help them and their children take steps to escape from 
their world of poverty.”57 While the studies did acknowledge the impact of economic change and 
the importance of raising incomes, they did not include any recommendations for economic 
development beyond rehabilitating the city’s poor population. Their call for job training and 
“vocational counseling” underscored individualistic approaches to solving the unemployment 
problem among the city’s low-income families.  
The Detroit Urban League drew from the Greenleigh study and echoed much of 
Moynihan’s comments about poverty, the degradation of black masculinity, matriarchy, and 
black family breakdown in their 1966 report, The Detroit Low-Income Negro Family. The DUL 
report illustrates how the response to urban crisis before the city’s rebellion relied on the 
validation of patriarchy, stigmatization of black women, and the rehabilitation of black 
masculinity. Relying on both the Greenleigh and Moynihan reports, the DUL contended that 
slavery and historical racial discrimination caused black family breakdown. Black men, 
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according to report suffered a dual psychological injury—from the impact of racial 
discrimination in the job market and from the presence of black female-headed households.  
Although the Detroit Urban League did not refer to the “hard-core unemployed” 
explicitly, they assured their readers that they were referring to the structurally disadvantaged. 
“The point that many fail to see is that while many Negroes…have been able to move into 
positions of reasonable security, another group has not been able to do so. For one reason or 
another these people have remained disadvantaged and have not been as visible to most people 
as has been the rising Negro middle class.”58 The difference between the DUL’s report, past 
discussions of the structural unemployed, and even Moynihan’s, was the lack of attention paid to 
the processes that caused lower class African American Detroiters to endure poverty and remain 
disadvantaged. The DUL reports the growth in the city’s black population, but nothing on the 
causes of joblessness. No discussion of the history of racial discrimination in employment, 
automation, or industrial decision-making appears in the document.  
In their report, the Detroit Urban League mobilized a discourse of black male victimhood 
bound up in a “culture of poverty” frame that pathologizes black men and stigmatizes black 
women. Detroit Urban League’s executive director, Francis Kornegay, argued in the Introduction 
that slavery had made the African American male “less than a man.”  When discussing the 
inequality between black and white male incomes, the report reiterates Young’s point about 
black male victimhood. “The inability of the Negro male to compete equally with the white male 
has a great deal to do with family disorganization.” In the conclusion, the report states, “Past and 
present injustices in employment, housing, and education are showing their effects on the low-
income Negro family. The Negro male is the prime victim of this set of factors. The low-income 
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Negro family tends to be wife-dominated, the male loses a great deal of self-respect and his 
family loses respect for him.” 59 The reiteration of the Moynihanian understanding of black urban 
poverty casts a critical eye on black female breadwinners. “The absence of the father and the 
forced employment of the mother (which, incidentally, keeps her away from the home much of 
the day) is not a healthy situation by any standpoint,” the report states.60 It also led to a 
disproportionate attention to the victimhood of black men and the institution of the heterosexual 
black male-headed family.  
The Detroit Urban League did not invoke the trope of the “hard-core unemployed,” but 
they focused on advocating for more jobs for black men as a means to instituting patriarchy, and 
thus rehabilitating black men. Out of their twelve recommendations, three were devoted to 
employment. The DUL advanced the customary calls to eradicate racism in hiring, promotions, 
and layoffs. They also called for labor unions to halt discrimination within their ranks. The 
seventh recommendation illustrated the link between racial liberalism and gender conservatism 
hovering over debates about poverty and the black family. The organization explicitly demanded 
programs that would “allow the low status Negro male to develop into a responsible, 
contributing husband and parent.”61  The DUL only advanced one, and rather important, 
recommendation for explicitly to help assist black mothers—making day care available for black 
women who had to work.62 
 
Henry Ford II’s drive to hire the hard-core unemployed also exhibited his, and the 
NDC’s, growing belief that American business had a special responsibility to respond to social 
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problems. On multiple occasions, Ford argued publicly that he, and other business leaders, had a 
duty to use available resources to address black unemployment and dismantle job discrimination. 
He told the National Urban League on November 17, 1967 that “the achievement of genuinely 
equal opportunity” was “the most urgent task” for business. Ford also advanced a business-led 
affirmative action policy:  “It is not enough to provide technically equal opportunities. 
Management should be willing to go directly into the city, to seek out the unemployed, to make 
sure that hiring standards are not unnecessarily or unrealistically restrictive, and to lend a helping 
hand in adjusting to the work and the work place.”63 Ford echoed his call for business to take 
affirmative action to help integrate blacks into the national economy at an annual meeting of the 
company’s shareholders in June 1968. However, this time he grounded his call in the language of 
corporate self-interest:  “Your company and members of its management are engaged in such 
activities because we believe that business and industry have an obligation to serve the nation in 
times of crisis, whether the crisis is internal or external…Prudent and constructive company 
efforts to help overcome the urban crisis are demanded not only by your company’s obligations 
as a corporate citizen, but by your management’s duty to safeguard your investment.”64 Blending 
his civil rights rhetoric with that of corporate self-interest allowed Ford to demonstrate that 
investing in confronting job discrimination and hiring what some may consider as 
“unemployable” workers protected the corporation from potential violent reprisal.  
Ford’s, and NDC’s, advocacy of corporate hiring programs occurred within a larger 
conversation about the corporation’s role in addressing social problems from racial 
discrimination and the urban crisis to the environment. Mayor Cavanagh and President Johnson 
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encourage corporations and their leaders to take on a larger role in addressing poverty and black 
joblessness.  Johnson tapped Ford to oversee a national jobs program in February 1968. Ford 
would lead a newly formed National Business Alliance (NAB) “to find jobs for a half million 
hard core unemployed men and women over the next three years…”65 Johnson charged Ford 
with finding 200,000 jobs in the private sector during that summer with the intent to create 
700,000 jobs in the following years. 66 Other corporate leaders and economic observers expressed 
weariness. Robert E. Slater, president of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance thought his 
organization may have been doing “too damned much” in urban affairs.67 Some business leaders 
considered social responsibility too much of a financial risk. R.A. Peterson, Bank of America’s 
president, worried that corporations stood to lose money if they invested capital in some of the 
nation’s cities. Peterson went as far as to calling such socially-responsible investment a 
“dangerous illusion.”68  
While one could see business leaders’ apprehension about investing in the nation’s inner 
cities as based in a pragmatic desire to please stockholders, it also reveals an ideological position 
about how business and “markets” should operate. Marketing scholar Reavis Cox published an 
editorial in the Wall Street Journal in October 1969 wondering if business should invest its 
resources in addressing social issues. Cox ultimately concluded that doing so would unfairly 
raise expectations, possibly contributing to “new tensions with which business and the market as 
a market are not really prepared to cope.”69 Conservative economist Milton Friedman answered 
the question of whether or not corporations had the duty to address social problems in an 
emphatic editorial. Friedman argued in “A Social Conscience for Business?” that corporations 
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did not have the obligation to act for the common good if it meant hiring a particular group of 
people. In fact, Friedman argued that Ford and other businessmen who advocated such 
responsibilities for corporations were “preaching pure and unadulterated Socialism.” Friedman 
articulated a vision of political economy that distinguished clearly between the roles of the 
government and private sector. He contended that corporate executives like Ford could devote 
their personal time and energy to advocating particular political causes, but one could not spend 
the stockholders’ money while doing so. The corporate executive, according to Friedman, only 
had the duty to generate a return on the stockholders’ investment, not spend their money on 
“government functions.”70 Ford, Hudson, and other NDC business leaders, on the other hand, 
thought that investing corporate money was worthwhile because integration would protect their 
stockholders’ investments.   
 
“Transfer of Power”:  The Black Power Response to the NDC 
 
The 1967 uprising and the dispute with the New Detroit Committee raised Albert 
Cleage’s profile in Detroit and national politics. “For six months—from October 12, 1967 to 
April 18, 1968,” journalist Hiley H. Ward wrote, “Albert Cleage was the “visible, titular head of 
the 660,000 Detroit black community.”71 During this period, Cleage sought to rally and organize 
the city’s black leaders and residents to implement a black power program for the rebuilding of 
Twelfth Street and other affected areas. Cleage, like many black power activists, reasoned that 
the rebellions highlighted the racial, economic, and cultural exploitation of black communities by 
white-dominated institutions. The uprisings, he believed, did not arise out of a lack of jobs or 
criminality. Instead, Cleage saw the lack of black political power and of control over local 
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institutions as the problem. Consequently, Cleage grounded his vision of black power in a 
demand for the city’s power structure to transfer power to two black organizations that he helped 
establish after the uprising—the Citywide Citizen’s Action Committee and the Federation for 
Self-Determination.  
While various aspects of black power politics had circulated in the north and south for 
two decades, Stokely Carmichael popularized the slogan after taking over James Meredith’s one-
man March Against Freedom in June 1966.72 As historian Peniel Joseph points out, “Black 
Power scandalized America in the 1960s, the concept of black power remained difficult to 
define, even for Carmichael. 73  In a 1966 CBS News special report on black power, journalist 
Mike Wallace asked Carmichael, “And the means you will use to achieve all of this?” “Any 
means necessary,” he replied. Wallace pressed Carmichael:  “Spell that out. What does that 
mean?”  “It means we will develop tactics as we go along. And whatever those tactics are, we 
will use them.” “Tactics? That means you got to buy the buildings. You got to buy the 
businesses. You got to train the people. How are you going to do that by yourselves? How are 
you going to do it without the help of the white community?” Carmichael responded, “Well, the 
first help we need of the white community is to just turn over those buildings to us…turn them 
over.”74  
Black power activists and civil rights leaders throughout the country struggled to define 
concept’s ideological and political content during this period.  In a speech before the NAACP in 
July 1966, President Roy Wilkins denounced black power as “antiwhite” that “leads to a black 
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death.”75  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who initially expressed dismay at the slogan, accepted the 
black power movement’s “psychological call to manhood,” its advocacy for racial pride, and its 
argument for independent black electoral politics during the summer of 1967.76  
Black power activists advocated for a vision of racial solidarity and self-determination—
the power to define one’s political fate as a group. However, some black power activists such as 
the Black Panther Party, Detroit’s Republic for New Afrika, and the League of Revolutionary 
Black Workers sought to synthesize black nationalism with Marxist-Leninism, or an anti-
capitalist, politics. Conservative manifestations of black power also arose during the mid-to-late 
1960s and early-1970s. Floyd McKissick’s CORE eventually advocated for black capitalism and 
viewed President Richard Nixon as a political ally. The west coast organization, US, represents a 
more conservative manifestation of black power that emphasized black cultural expression, the 
restoration of heteronormative gender roles, and political organizing as a strategy for liberation.  
Many black radicals and nationalists deployed the “colonial analogy” to explain the roots 
of revolt. This concept rhetorically captured the combination of racial and economic exploitation 
of predominately black neighborhoods in cities, or ghettos. Inspired by movements and wars for 
national liberation in third world colonies such as Algeria and Ghana, black power activists and 
intellectuals such as Stokely Carmichael and members of the Black Panther Party likened racial 
and economic oppression to colonialism. Even non-black power activists such as psychologist 
Kenneth Clark and I.F. Stone used the analogy to describe the circumstances of inner-city 
African Americans.77  
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Black intellectual Harold Cruse was among the first to use the colonial analogy in his 
explanations of black nationalism taking hold in the country in the early 1960s. In two essays, 
“Negro Nationalism’s New Wave” and “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,” 
Cruse argued that the U.S. had a semi-colonial relationship with black Americans. He also 
maintained that black Americans held a semi-colonial relationship to the United States. The 
historical experiences of slavery and racial oppression marked black Americans as colonial 
beings. The difference between the traditional and domestic varieties of colonialism, Cruse 
asserted, was that black Americans experienced citizenship during the 1960s in name, and due to 
living in the “home” country; they were in close proximity to the dominant group.78 Psychologist 
Kenneth Clark asserted in his 1965 book, Dark Ghetto:  Dilemmas of Social Power, that the 
“dark ghettos are social, political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies.”79 Activist 
Stokely Carmichael and political scientist Charles V. Hamilton argued that black Americans 
“have a colonial relationship to the larger society, a relationship characterized by institutional 
racism” in their 1967 book, Black Power:  The Politics of Liberation.80  
The colonial analogy contained an analysis of power, oppression, and space. Activists 
often pointed to independence or a redistribution of power and resources as the means of 
resolving unequal power relations and exploitation. Black power activists often disagreed on the 
means and the scope of the goal. For black revolutionary nationalists such as the Black Panther’s 
Eldridge Cleaver, African Americans needed to rely upon guerilla violence in their attempts to 
win independence from the U.S. government. Albert Cleage, in contrast, called on whites to hand 
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over power, institutions, and other resources to African Americans living in predominately-black 
neighborhoods and cities.  
Many black power activists, including Cleage, Cleaver, and Carmichael, also articulated 
a spatial analysis of black power. For them, neighborhood and city in which African Americans 
comprised the majority represented the base of struggle and the space whereby black self-
determination would be exercised. Most of these areas where black Americans were predominant 
were economically underdeveloped as a result of their colonial relationship to adjacent white 
communities and institutions. These inner-city calamities were akin to Fanon’s depictions of 
“settler zones” in The Wretched of the Earth.81 Defining this colonial relationship as institutional 
racism, Carmichael explained that a system of state policies, including urban renewal and 
highway clearance programs, housing and school segregation, as well as a series of exploitative 
relationships between blacks and merchants, landlords, and welfare institutions, created black 
ghettos.82  Ultimately, the effects of institutional racism were measurable when one looked at 
certain disparities between African Americans and whites in areas such as employment and 
education.  
Many activists agreed that structural trends such as post-World War II black in-migration 
into the cities and white flight helped create the circumstances by which African Americans were 
primed to take over local political institutions. The Black Panther Party advanced a spatial 
conception of the “dispersed” black colony that was distinct from the visions of a black nation 
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comprised of the southern black belt states.83 For Carmichael, the Panthers, and Cleage, the black 
nation need not be geographically contiguous. The black nation already existed in the multitudes 
of black-dominated cities and neighborhoods dispersed throughout the U.S. “The colonies of the 
United States—and this includes the black ghettoes within its borders, north and south—must be 
liberated,” Carmichael declared in a 1966 New York Review of Books article.84 
The focus on the city and the neighborhood as a focal point and space for political 
organizing also reinforced black power advocates’ focus on subjectivities other than the 
proletariat, or the industrial working-class. Some, such as the Black Panther Party, targeted Karl 
Marx’s concept of the lumpenproletariat—criminals and other members at the bottom of society 
who possessed counterrevolutionary impulses—as agents of revolt and potential 
revolutionaries.85 Racial nationalists such as Cleage did not coin a new term to describe their 
agents of change as much as they infused new meanings into what it mean to live as a black man 
or woman in the midst of the black power movement.   
The internal colonialism analysis, however, had its shortcomings, including a tendency to 
overlook the particular issues pertaining to the industrial economy such as automation and 
deindustrialization.86 Internal colonial theory envisioned a ghetto completely devoid of industrial 
economy and capacity. Many black power critiques of economic exploitation focused more on 
                                                 
83 Kathleen Neal Cleaver, “Back to Africa:  The Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party 
(1969-1972),” in The Black Panther Party Reconsidered, ed. Charles E. Jones (Baltimore:  Black Classic Press, 
1998), 216. 
84 Stokely Carmichael, “What We Want,” The New York Review of Books (September 1966).  
85 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York:  International Publishes, 1926), 83. 
86 Carmichael and Hamilton admitted that the colonial analogy contained inadequacies. Yet, it was distinct from 
liberals’ analysis of race, poverty, and unrest that concentrated on pathology and family breakdown. The colonial 
analogy reflected two goals of black power activists:  first, to identify with revolutionary struggles abroad. The 
second goal was to rebuke postwar racial liberalism and to place the responsibility of black powerlessness and 
poverty onto what they viewed was a white system of oppression. Carmichael and Hamilton wrote, “To put it 
another way, there is no ‘American dilemma’ because black people in this country form a colony, and it is not in the 
interest of the colonial power to liberate them…Thus, institutional racism has another name:  colonialism.” Even if 
some male black power activists accepted Moynihan’s call to restore heteronormative black families, they still saw 
white political and economic power in the U.S. as the enemy.  Carmichael and Hamilton, 5-6.  
74 
 
African Americans’ consumer power than on questions of employment or industrial production. 
Black power activists often charged white merchants with overcharging black consumers. Cleage 
also criticized white businesses for job discrimination. Only the Detroit-based League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers grounded their black power analysis in an analysis of African 
American workers “at the point of production.” Yet, the League’s analysis did not rest upon a 
colonial frame. And while black nationalists’ calls for economic power and the creation of black 
cooperative businesses implied controlling production of goods to be sold, activists such as 
Cleage often failed to detail what kind of economy—capitalist, communist, socialist, or mixed—
they viewed as fit for the dispersed black nation.  
Cleage’s conception of black power—captured in his “transfer of power” plea—
represented a local example of seeking to operationalize Carmichael’s demand for whites to hand 
over institutions and resources to African Americans. Cleage called for total black control of 
rebuilding Twelfth Street and the rest of Detroit’s predominately-black neighborhoods. He 
envisioned a city run by a black executive, black control over the education system and police 
department, as well as a cooperative-based economy. He thought the cooperative approach 
would address the problems of the lack of start-up capital. Twelfth Street, and the rest of black 
Detroit, would serve as a model for black self-determination throughout the country, especially 
the dispersed black “nation within a nation” Cleage often outlined.  
Cleage began articulating his demand for a “transfer of power” in his column for the 
state’s leading black newspaper, the Michigan Chronicle. In his August 26 column, “Unite or 
Perish,” Cleage stated the goal for the black power movement in Detroit “can be simply stated:  
self-determination for the black community or the transfer of power from the white 
establishment to the black community.” Cleage continued,  
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It means that we must control the political life of our community, including the police 
department and the courts. It means that we must control the business life of our community, 
including our own shopping centers, stores, housing, cooperatives, and development 
corporations. It means that all federal funds spent in our black community must be under the 
control of black people. […] No white man, no white businesses, no white organization and 
no white politicians will be permitted to exploit the black community any longer.87 
 
Cleage’s transfer of power represented a comprehensive answer to the urban crisis. Cleage’s 
articulations of the transfer of power concept was similar to Carmichael’s and Hamilton’s, 
prescriptions articulated in Black Power. 
Cleage presented his most cogent explanation of all of the facets of his “transfer of 
power” concept in an article published in the March 1968 edition of Center Magazine. He 
reiterated the importance of black control of the city’s politics. However, Cleage advanced a 
nuanced analysis of black control over municipal institutions. He acknowledged the need to elect 
a black mayor sooner than later, “Normally, if we followed the gradual evolution of our power in 
the city we could wait for, not the election in 1969, but the one after that. However, it not seems 
almost a necessity for us to elect a black mayor in 1969...” Yet, Cleage, like other black power 
activists and organizations, assumed that black control of City Hall would ensure black 
nationalist governance. Cleage contrasted his idea of black political power with Gary, Indiana’s 
Gary Hatcher and Cleveland’s Carl Stokes’s elections. Cleage did not see the black power 
embodied by Hatcher and Stokes as a legitimate expression of black power. Instead, he called 
“ornaments” of black power because whites aided in their election. Even as Cleage predicted 
Coleman Young’s election in 1973, he did not explain how electing a black mayor in Detroit 
would be any different than Hatcher’s and Stokes’s elections. 88 
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In “Transfer of Power,” Cleage argued, “Politics is only one aspect, however. It is also 
necessary for blacks to have economic control of their community.”89 Cleage advocated for the 
construction of a black cooperative economy for Twelfth Street. This strategy, according to 
Cleage, would address the fundamental problem of not possessing the wealth and capital 
necessary to pursue urban development independently. “In Detroit we are trying to invent 
strategies for this, such as the development of co-op retail stores, co-op buying clubs, co-op light 
manufacturing, co-op education, and similar undertakings that can become possible when large 
numbers of people with a sense of unity and a sense of cause can put together small individual 
amounts of money to create enough total capital to establish businesses with some degree of 
security and possibility of success.” It was often unclear whether or not Cleage’s vision of 
cooperative economy was one grounded in private property and capital accumulation or a 
communist or socialist conception of economics. Republic of New Afrika leader, Milton Henry, 
presumed that Cleage envisioned the black cooperative economy upholding private property 
rights, unlike the RNA’s revolutionary nationalism that sought to undermine capitalism. 
“’Cleage’s Nation within a nation is private property,’” Henry claimed.90 Cleage disavowed 
support for radical politics such as communism and socialism. Cleage declared in a speech to the 
Socialist Workers Party, “’I am not a Marxist—I do not pretend to be, I don’t even pretend to 
know anything about it.’”91 
Cleage’s call for a “transfer of power” and the recognition of black communities and 
cities as autonomous spaces still allowed for white entrepreneurs to operate within these areas. 
Thus, Cleage reasoned that black Americans would need to rely upon selective patronage, 
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boycotts, and picketing to ensure white businesses operated fairly. This meant that white-owned 
firms had to adhere to a racial and residential quota. “We must get the white man who is doing 
business in the black ghetto to recognize that if 85 per cent of his business is with black people, 
he will have to hire 85 per cent of his employees from the black community,” Cleage stated.92 
These tactics and demands were not new. Black Americans had relied upon these tactics to 
challenge segregation in public accommodations, job discrimination, and consumer 
exploitation.93  
Cleage’s transfer of power vision, however, did not directly address two contributing 
factors to the urban crisis—automation and deindustrialization. While it seems that Cleage’s 
answer to black unemployment was the creation of a black cooperative economy grounded in 
individuals’ private property rights, his conception of economic exploitation did not account for 
black industrial workers’ experiences in the auto plants, nor did it recognize the impact of the 
decentralization of the auto industry on black workers in Detroit. Cleage’s conception of 
economic exploitation fit within the nationalist, colonial frame, in which white merchants 
exploited black consumers and extracting profits from black neighborhoods.  
While Cleage’s dispersed nation would not formerly separate itself into a black nation-
state, Cleage maintained that the federal government would have to interact with it as if it were 
an autonomous sovereign state. Cleage’s desires for a dispersed black colony throughout the U.S. 
raises questions about the non-nation-state expression of black nationalism. Cleage’s brand of 
black power seems occupy a space between advocating a black nation-state and the expression of 
black electoral power. Twelfth Street, and other predominately-black neighborhoods and cities, 
would be ran by black Americans, would be autonomous, and yet would remain within the U.S. 
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Would these spaces constitute city-states? If the federal government agreed to Cleage’s 
arrangement, would it build on the type of federalism facilitated by the War on Poverty where 
the federal government would extend resources directly to the cities. The difference between the 
OEO dealing with Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley and the federal government dealing with 
Cleage is that the federal government would recognize the legitimacy of black control over 
particular urban spaces. The result would have been a race-based federalism designed to benefit 
black Americans rather than whites.  
In some cases, white leaders tried appropriating black power discourse in an effort to 
deradicalize and redirect it in a moderate and business-friendly direction. Henry Ford, II 
expressed a vision of black power consistent with black leaders such as the Urban League’s 
Whitney Young. He stresses equal opportunity, nonviolence, and black voting and economic 
power. Ford stated in front of the National Urban League on November 17, 1967: 
"It is good that Negroes are increasingly determined to take control of their own destiny, to 
demand what is theirs by right and to seek the power to enforce those demands. But real 
Black power is not violence in the streets or self-imposed segregation. Black power is the 
power of the purse and the vote, of knowledge and skill, of self-discipline and self-
confidence. Black power is black people and white people working together and voting 
together to elect Mayor Stokes in Cleveland and Mayor Hatcher in Gary and Mayor White in 
Boston. This is the kind of power the Urban League has been working for more than a half a 
century to build. It is the kind of power that will enable Negroes to participate effectively in 
the revision of national priorities we must have before we can achieve victory over poverty, 
discrimination, and slum living."94 
 
Ford eschewed violence and separatism. He declared that “insurrection can lead only to anarchy 
and repression” and that separatism does not represent a “real alternative.” Instead, Ford echoed 
Whitney Young’s call for “responsible militancy.” The goal of business and blacks, Ford argued, 
should not be gradualism, but “the fastest possible progress toward genuinely equal opportunity.” 
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Part of this coalition’s task is to redirect “irresponsible” and “violent” militancy into 
“constructive and practical action.”  
 
Cleage’s Attempt to Engineer a Transfer of Power:  The FSD-NDC Split 
 
On August 9, 1967, two weeks after Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh, and Joseph 
Hudson announced the formation of NDC, over 1,000 members of the city’s black population 
descended upon the County-City building to devise a response to the formation of the Detroit’s 
liberal urban coalition. According to prominent local activists, Grace Lee and James Boggs, 
“every layer of the black community, top, middle and bottom,” were represented.95  Many of the 
city’s prominent black activists attended such as Kenneth Cockrel, Edward Vaughn, Norvell 
Harrington, Nadine Brown, and Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr. Writers from the local leftist publication, 
The Fifth Estate remarked about the event, “It was undoubted the first time that ‘Soul’ had ever 
had possession of the chambers which it built and owns for even a few hours.”96 Within those 
chambers, the city’s black militant leadership did not just question the legitimacy of the NDC’s 
leadership, they gathered to announce that they should lead the city’s reconstruction efforts.  
Black power captured the crowd. The crowd shouted down black moderates. When the 
executive secretary of Detroit’s NAACP, Robert Tindal had the floor, the crowd drowned out his 
remarks and some yelled “forget it.” The provocative rhetoric emanating from the meeting 
resembled that of black power activists nationwide. Some speakers alluded to the prospects of 
future violence if whites did not turn over control of Detroit to the city’s black population.   
Black power militant Edward Vaughn announced to the enthusiastic crowd, “We must control 
our community or there won’t be a community.” UAW official, Nadine Brown declared, “We 
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are going to get half or there won’t be anything for anyone else to have.”97  General calls for 
black power and organization also arose from the meeting. Attorney Milton Henry declared, “We 
want freedom to control our lives in all its activities…There will be hell. We will live in constant 
fury until we’re free.”98 Local CORE Chairman Clyde Cleveland critiqued the composition of 
the NDC, arguing that the “Hudson Committee needs a black man as head” and “that not a single 
black businessman or resident of the 12th street area was included.” Henry also called for the 
formation of an organization that would “give orders to the J.L. Hudson New Detroit 
Committee…”99 
The cheering crowd also voiced its support for other measures including Governor 
Romney’s plan to outlaw housing segregation. They also supported the construction of a black-
led post-riot governing coalition larger than the one that the NDC had conceived. Speakers   
called for “cutting off federal funds to the city unless the Hudson committee is placed in a 
secondary, advisory capacity to their new committee.” They also demanded “that all plans 
developed by any group for the inner city be brought before the new committee for approval.”100 
The raucous crowd began naming potential nominees to lead the burgeoning organization. They 
nominated several including Henry, Vaughn, and Cockrel. Rev. Cleage was eventually selected 
to chair the new organization. Cleage used his remarks to announce the arrival of a new black 
coalition and to appeal to racial unity. He called the audience “the new black establishment.” He 
chided black moderate “Toms,” presumably black integrationists such as Tindal and the 
NAACP. Cleage pleaded for them to “come home.”101  
                                                 
97 Quoted in Fine, 373.  
98 Quoted in “a NEW Detroit?” 
99 “New Black Establishment Insists It Give the Order,” Michigan Chronicle, August 19, 1967.  
100 Carol Schmidt, “New Black Establishment Insist it Give the Order,” Michigan Chronicle, August 19, 1967.  
101 Ibid.; Quoted in Fine, 373; Hubert Locke, “Riot Aftermath:  New Dimensions of the Racial Struggle,” Albert B. 
Cleage Papers, Box 6, Folder:  Locke – The Detroit Riots of 1967; BHL, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
81 
 
Nine days later, Cleage, Brown, and others formally established “the new black 
establishment”—the Citywide Citizens Action Committee. Cleage, Brown, Clyde Cleveland, and 
activist Glanton Dowdell, comprised the organization’s leadership. Cleage envisioned the CCAC 
as an organizational embodiment of black power. Publishers of the National Urban Coalition’s 
City Magazine called it “possibly the most broadly based Black Power organization in any 
city.”102 The organization charged itself with leading “the rebuilding of the 12th Street area and 
other areas in Detroit damaged by the Detroit riot to insure that [the] new buildings, businesses, 
and other constructions” were “owned and operated by Negroes.”103 CCAC’s sought to advance 
black community control as the answer to Detroit’s urban crisis. Cleage declared later in August, 
the CCAC’s “basic goal can be simply stated: self-determination for the black community or the 
transfer of power from the white establishment to the black community.’”104 
The CCAC represented the latest organizational expression of black power and advanced 
a comprehensive approach to addressing Detroit’s ills. They articulated an economic politics 
distinct from the corporate-led plans devised by the NDC business leaders. They believed that 
the organization could foster a more cooperative form of black economic development within the 
capitalist system.105 Members of the CCAC concentrated on constructing cooperatives like the 
Black Star Co-Op, Inc. Consistent with his understanding of a “transfer of power,” Cleage 
viewed white private and government funds as potential sources of investment. In the August 26, 
1967 edition of the Michigan Chronicle, Cleage stated that “all federal funds spent” in Detroit’s 
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black community “must be under the control of black people.”106 Regarding developing black 
businesses, Cleage stated, “hour main hold up is getting funds for small business development. 
We have found some white, private investors who are interested in our cooperatives. They are 
willing to let us use their money but allow us to direct the course of our business. We have not 
found resistance to our plans in either the white or black community.’”107 The issue of black 
community control and white investment was not inconsistent with many black power activists’ 
understanding of black capitalism. Both Cleage and Hudson saw a sort of black power as crucial 
to the reconstruction project of Detroit, only with a slight difference—who would ultimately 
control the resources necessary to govern black life in the city.  
Joseph Hudson did not object to the formation of the CCAC. Hudson met with Cleage 
privately in the aftermath of the rebellion.108 He and Ford also extended overtures to Cleage in an 
effort to work with the CCAC.  Hudson declared “that New Detroit would ‘recognize, welcome, 
and cooperate’ with the new ‘Black Establishment Committee.’”109 Hudson also met with Cleage 
before announcing his intentions of working with Cleage. Ford was drawn to the argument that 
“traditional” black leadership failed to represent the best interests of the city’s black population. 
He also visited Cleage at his church to discuss a potential working relationship. 110   
Cleage and the CCAC entered into the business of the Detroit’s revitalization to some 
fanfare from some black Detroiters and the city’s business leadership. However, they still 
struggled to construct an all-black coalition broad enough to operate with the authority they 
believed was needed to take control over the city’s reconstruction process. In fact, the CCAC 
intended to enlist integrationists in the organization, but moderates, according to scholar Richard 
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W. Thomas, “held a special resentment for Cleage, who many moderates saw as ‘Johnny-come-
lately’ to the black movement.” In August 1967, President of the Council of Black Ministers, 
Roy Allen, formed a moderate black organization to rival Cleage’s CCAC, the Detroit Council of 
Organizations (DCO).111  
 The rivalry between the CCAC and the DCO spilled into the open in September and 
October 1967. While speaking at a gathering that the Booker T. Washington Business 
Association (BTWBA) organized that month, both Cleage and DCO member James S. Garrett 
acknowledged the need for black unity. Garrett even agreed with Cleage that black self-
determination was the central aim.112 However, Garrett took to an editorial in the Michigan 
Chronicle to defend the aims of the DCO and make distinctions between their organization and 
the CCAC.113  While maintaining his support for black unity, Garrett wrote, the “CCAC has 
advocated separatism. DCO does not, but rather endeavors to make Negroes an integrated part of 
the total community.” The DCO uttered particular aspects of black power publicly. However, it 
maintained that black integration into the city’s political and social institutions represented the 
best path towards rebuilding a post-riot Detroit whereas the CCAC continued to advocate for 
black control over the reconstruction process.114 While the CCAC continued to operate into 
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1968, the failure of the organization to attract moderate blacks to its coalition led Cleage and 
other black leaders to decide to form a new federation of black organizations.  
More than seventy-five black Detroiters “representing a cross-section of local 
organizations” gathered at the office of the WCO to form a black organization with a broader 
base than the CCAC and DCO on December 1. Despite the meeting’s small attendance, 
organizers saw the new organization that emerged from this meeting as the representative of the 
city’s black community. This new organization would engineer the “transfer of power” that 
Cleage and other militants desired. 115 As the organizational representative of black Detroit, the 
new organization would serve the primary negotiator with the NDC. President of the BTWBA 
and black businessman, Edgar Brazelton, oversaw the affair.  Cleage was voted chair and 
Lorenzo Freeman of the WCO was elected vice-chairman. The attendees named the new 
organization the Federation for Self-Determination, which saw itself as “non-sectarian” and 
“non-partisan,” charged itself with fostering “unity in the inner-city.” Brazelton declared at the 
meeting, “Such an organization will give a true and representative voice of the powerless 
neighborhoods and communities through the Detroit area.”116 Their proposal to the NDC 
advanced a larger goal:  “to improve[e] the political, social, and economic stature of black 
people… to eradicate[e] racial prejudice, and to develop… self-determination for black people in 
all areas of community life.”117 
 Cleage, Brazelton, and other saw the FSD as a coalitional body that would help lead in 
Detroit’s reconstruction. Their proposal to the NDC outlined an ambitious, yet rather ambiguous, 
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structure.118 The organizers did not envision the FSD as a community development organization, 
per se.119 The purpose of the FSD, Wayne State University economist, Dr. Karl Gregory 
announced was to serve as “a forum for gathering, exchanging, and disseminating information, 
discussing priorities and promoting cooperation among members.”120  The FSD requested 
funding for staff and offices as well as for the institution for an urban research center. The FSD 
would focus on organizing the urban research center as its first endeavor. The urban research 
center, according to Gregory, “would be a complete compilation of services to members,” which 
“would enable the Federation to serve as a referral agency and also to identify gaps in private 
and public services…”121 
 In contrast to the CCAC, the FSD did enjoy some participation from the city’s moderates. 
The FSD garnered participation from some members of the Booker T. Washington Business 
Association and the Wolverine Bar Association. According to Sidney Fine, even the NAACP’s 
Robert Tindal and James Garrett worked with the Federation for Self-Determination. However, it 
failed to garner support from the DCO. Fine reports that Roy Allen refrained from joining the 
FSD because he thought he would have to follow the dictates of the FSD or be “eliminated.”122 
Ultimately, the FSD mostly drew from the city’s militant activists and organizations such as the 
Citywide Citizens Action Committee, the West Central Organization, and CORE. 
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 At the December 14 meeting, the NDC “endorsed the concept of a federation” and 
considered contributing the necessary resources to fund the FSD’s six month plan.123   The 
Federation requested $137,000 for the initial development phase and another $200,000 a year for 
the following two years.124 The FSD also requested fundraising assistance from the NDC for the 
first phase. Both Hudson and Henry Ford, II supported the FSD plan and were ready to grant the 
organization $32,000 in start-up money. However, the NDC’s black moderate and white 
members of the NDC decided to delay funding the FSD.125 The DCO also sent a telegram to 
New Detroit before the December 14 meeting arguing that supporting the FSD “would preclude 
an opportunity for other Negro organizations having a stake in Detroit’s future to concretize and 
present their proposals on the federation concept and allied matters.”126 The DCO even 
threatened to boycott stores ran by any of the NDC’s membership if Hudson’s committee did not 
consider DCO’s concerns. The coalition of moderate black and whites on the NDC and DCO’s 
actions led to further tension between the black militants and some of the black moderates and 
white committee members. Norvell Harrington walked out of the meeting, accusing the NDC of 
selling out the black militants and signaled that he may resign if the NDC could not work out “its 
problems.”127 
 NDC’s decision to delay the FSD’s funding allowed the DCO to compose and submit its 
own proposal before NDC’s January 4 meeting.128 Due to DCO’s pressure, the NDC agreed to 
provide $100,000 to both the DCO and the FSD for its first year of operations. Both 
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organizations also had to raise the matching funds. Further stipulations also accompanied the 
award. The NDC stated that both organizations had to work with William Patrick, the city’s first 
black councilman and the executive director of the NDC. According to Hudson, Patrick would 
serve as an “interlink,” or liaison between the NDC and the two organizations. Also, because the 
funds ultimately came from the Ford Foundation, neither organization was allowed to use the 
money for “direct political activity.”129  
 NDC’s proposal incensed Cleage and other members of the FSD.  The organization voted 
78 to 52 to decline the NDC grant. The FSD subsequently voted unanimously to sever all ties 
with the NDC. They saw NDC’s proposal in direct opposition to their understandings of black 
power. Instead of “transference of power,” the FSD argued that the NDC sought to dictate the 
terms for black self-determination. According to the January 4 meeting minutes, “Mr. Joseph L. 
Hudson made statements which appeared to place the Federation for Self-Determination in a 
subordinate position and to distort its image to such a degree that the Federation appeared to be 
giving up self-determination.”130  
The FSD issued multiple press releases in the ensuing days explaining why it decided to 
relationship with the NDC. In the January 5 press release, the organization announced that Renny 
Freeman and Norvel Harrington, two black militants serving on the NDC, had resigned in 
protest.131  The FSD called the NDC’s terms for the grant “unacceptable.” The FSD understood 
that its actions had national significance given the NDC’s status as the “first” urban coalition. 
The FSD declared, “The Federation herewith refuses the $100,000, or sixteen cents per black 
person of Detroit, which with the best of inten[t]ions would be insufficient, but as offered, would 
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set an example nationwide, mortgaging the freedom of black people and playing havoc with their 
self-respect.”132 The FSD argued that the NDC acted paternalistically when it awarded the FSD 
the grant with strings attached. In the press release issued by the FSD on January 7, it stated, 
“Whites have tried to absorb blacks paternalistically and then on terms set by whites.”133 The 
following week, Cleage argued “We're tired of charity, colonialism, and plantation thinking. 
Black people must make the decisions affecting their lives just like most whites do."134 
Some prominent black power activists thought Cleage’s and FSD’s refusal of NDC’s 
resources had national significance. CORE director Floyd McKissick visited Detroit on January 
8. McKissick explained during a press conference,  
“Detroit—to black militants throughout the nation—means far more than the community of 
Detroit. It means the recognition of the industrial empire and Detroit represents that industrial 
empire for the nation. The New Detroit Committee represents the first attempt in this country 
to deal on a respectable, honorable, egalitarian basis with the black people in this country. 
This committee has met with failure. This committee has proceeded to follow the normal 
paternalistic methods of dealing with the black community.  The New Committee of Detroit 
has failed to recognize that the principle of black self-determination is lesson one, page one in 
the subject of black power…We have come to this community and have to support Rev. 
Cleage’s Self-Determination group because without white people understanding the principle 
of self-determination, I think we are going to let a major problem go unsolved. So what 
happens in Detroit right now is more important than Newark, more important than Chicago, 
New York, and San Francisco, Los Angeles and Denver. We in the struggle recognize this 
overall importance.”135 
 
CORE’s Roy Innis stated, “Only when black people have strength based upon power can there 
be a meaningful coalition. The dilution of power in the black community either through 
continued oppression or paternalism must come to an end.”136 
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 McKissick’s and Innis’s charges of paternalism reflected radical critiques of the urban 
coalitions. Carmichael and Hamilton viewed white control of black labor and the inner city’s 
social institutions within inner cities as examples of “the colonial situation.”137 They also 
maintained that coalitions with whites were counterproductive as long as whites possessed 
economic and political power. Activist scholars Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven called 
the urban programs of coalitions in Detroit and Cleveland “corporate imperialism for the 
poor.”138 Documenting the FSD-NDC breakdown, Michigan Chronicle journalists Bill Gilliam 
and Carol Schmidt referred to FSD’s denial of funds as “a direct slap…to what is being called 
corporate imperialism.”139  
Cleage, Freeman, Cockrel, and the rest of the FSD voted to disband on in April 1968 
after failing to raise the necessary funds to operate the organization. The member organizations 
and individuals also thought disbanding the Federation was “necessary...in order to establish a 
realignment among militant organizations. Black organizers also desired to focus on their, or 
their organizations, individual endeavors. The FSD decided to allocate the remaining funds—a 
mere $250—to John Watson’s Inner-City Voice newspaper. 140 
Some black militants lamented the lost potential of the FSD and pointed to the failure of 
the organization’s leadership as a source of fracture. One anonymous militant may have been 
referring to Rev. Cleage when s/he pointed to the “lack of integrity and the personal ambitions of 
those who had the responsibility of making the Federation operative.”141 Rev. Cleage’s 
reputation as lightning rod affected the FSD’s ability to attract a diverse black membership and 
outside resources. Karl Gregory noted in a later interview, “One of the big obstacles to getting 
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leaders together was some of the traditional ministers viewed Rev. Cleage as a Black Nationalist 
and the titular head and some people couldn’t abide with that.” Gregory mentioned how the FSD 
sought to acquire resources from “some foundation folks” in New York, but “Cleage was a little 
bit too radical for foundation folks.” 142 At the same time, some black militants within the FSD 
did not see Cleage as sufficiently militant. According to a story in the May 11, 1968 edition of 
the Detroit Scope Magazine, Detroit’s black militants “rejected” Rev. Cleage. The “rock-hard 
militants,” according to the article, “helped kill the Federation for Self-determination” and had 
went ‘underground.’”143 William Serrin, correspondent for The Reporter, wrote, “…the next step 
may well be militancy at its extreme:  black warfare. Already some of his young followers are 
leaving Cleage because he is not prepared for that step. As a result, the Federation for Self-
Determination has been disbanded.”144 
 
Conclusion:  Downtown Development and the War on Crime Triumphs 
 
 The rebellions in Newark and Detroit in 1967 spurred the imagining and construction of 
various coalitions. The radical and social democratic visions did not gain traction. Cleage’s 
“transfer of power” strategy failed when he disbanded the Federation of Self-Determination after 
declining New Detroit’s grant. Under fire from the left, Rustin’s plans to organize a coalition of 
liberals and labor, civil rights, and religious organization around the “Freedom Budget” failed to 
materialize. Even the liberal coalitions changed after the late-1960s. The New Detroit 
Committee, although initially charged with leading the private sector’s response to the urban 
crisis, settled into the role of advocacy—calling on the private sector to fulfill its social 
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responsibility to address unemployment by creating jobs and calling on government to enact fair 
housing laws, educational reforms, and better police-community relations. The NDC also 
emerged as an organization that could help integrate the city’s black population. The NDC, in 
effect, became a facilitator of resources. In the name of black self-determination, the NDC 
sought to redistribute money to the city’s black organizations as long as those black 
organizations adhered to certain parameters and reported back to the NDC.  
There was also a mismatch between the NDC’s plans to rebuild the city and some of their 
members’ business prerogatives. Between 1967 and 1970, the NDC could brag about creating 
jobs despite the national recession. NDC’s advocacy for the creation of jobs revealed a glaring 
paradox—Ford, Hudson, and others sought to stimulate the job market while they moved many 
of the city’s firms into the suburbs and beyond. The Budd Company and K-Mart moved to the 
suburb of Troy. Ford Motor Company began building a complex in Dearborn while the Chrysler 
Corporation sought to construct facility in near Troy.145 Many of Hudson’s department stores 
were located in the suburbs.146 Larger economic and political conditions also hindered the NDC-
sponsored job programs.  
The 1969 economic recession affected Detroit business’ efforts as well. Many of the 
businesses who participated in job programs cut jobs. Ford silently closed its two inner-city 
hiring centers after it reduced production earlier in 1969.147  This problem with NDC” job 
programs reflected a national trend. Many of the companies who instituted hiring programs in 
the aftermath of the rebellions could not retain their workers. According to scholars Lipsky and 
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Olson, many of the 100,000 recruited in the National Alliance of Businessmen’s JOBS program 
lost their jobs after employers collected their subsidies from the federal government.148  
As early as the summer of 1968, members of New Detroit’s Economic Development 
Committee also began exploring other means of redeveloping the city of Detroit. The EDC’s 
Fred Kaiser began soliciting the opinions of other business leaders about how to revitalize the 
city as early as June 1968.  Their conclusions had national implications. The business and 
political leaders articulated a single argument—the city, the NDC, and its allies would have to 
work to establish a “better business climate” if they hope to retain and attract more businesses 
and stop capital flight. Strand even argued that the city focused too much on “minority group 
interests” and failed to pay attention to the city’s business community. Robert L. Gage, area 
manager of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company wondered if the business community could 
pressure city government “to conduct their affairs so as to reflect an understanding of the 
problems of industry..." Strand even anticipated then corporate lawyer Lewis Powell’s call for 
business leaders to advocate for their interests in government.  “The business interests, too, must 
stand up and be counted,” Strand wrote.149 Leaders in the private and public sector who believed 
in market-based solutions to economic crisis in the Midwest adhered to this logic.  
Downtown development remained a viable solution in Detroit. The EDC’s efforts to 
pursue the physical construction of the city’s downtown district found greater organizational 
expression when Max Fisher resigned from New Detroit to create the Detroit Renaissance, Inc. 
                                                 
148 Olson and Lipsky, Commission Politics:  The Processing of Racial Crisis in America (New Brunswick, N.J.:  
Transaction Books, 1977), 141. 
149Letter from  Letter from George Catlin to Fred Kaiser, June 25, 1968;  Letter from Thomas L. Disk to Fred 
Kaiser, July 1, 1968;  Robert L. Gage to Fred Kaiser, July 2, 1968;  Letter from Forrest Strand to Fred Kaiser, 
October 3, 1968, New Detroit, Inc. Papers, Box 32, Folder 19 & 20. For a discussion of Powell’s Memo see 
Kimberly Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands:  The Making of the Conservative Movement From the New Deal to Reagan 
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in 1970. The organization comprised the city’s “business and economic elite.”150 According to 
Detroit Renaissance’s first report, the city’s business leaders established the organization aimed 
to address industrial flight from the city.  Detroit Renaissance’s strategy concentrated on 
redeveloping the city’s downtown. In other words, the organization sought to institutionalize 
Robert A. Gage’s advice to Kaiser:  improve Detroit’s business climate by transforming the 
city’s image. Generally, “revitalization, growth, and renewed prosperity” represented the 
organization’s broad goals.151 Detroit Renaissance, Inc. did not just offer an urban development 
program for the city’s future mayors to implement, it also served as a target of Detroit’s left-
wing activists.  
The decline of the job programs, as well as NDC’s failures to build a broader working 
coalition with some of the city’s black militants, left crime fighting as another strategy for 
revitalizing Detroit. Those supporting downtown development exhibited an ambivalence around 
race and gender in urban revitalization policy. Instead of trying to recruit and hire the hard-core 
unemployed, business leaders instead endorsed more aggressive policing of downtown. The 
focus on black criminality produced new laws and police tactics stigmatizing black men and 
women in Detroit during the late 1960s and early 1970s, sometimes to deadly results. Activists 
from the city’s black revolutionary worker movement and white left took note and responded to 
police brutality.  
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151 Detroit Renaissance, A Three Year Report (Detroit:  Detroit Renaissance, Inc., 1973).  
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Chapter 2 
 
“Detroit under STRESS”:  Coalition Politics in the Campaign to Stop Police Killings in 
Detroit 
 
 
On the morning of September 23, 1971, more than 1,000 Detroiters gathered at Cass Park 
to march in protest against the slaying of two black teenagers—15-year-old Ricardo Buck and 
16-year-old Craig Mitchell—by white undercover police officer patrolman, Richard Worebec. 
Worebec served in the city’s undercover police unit—STRESS, or Stop the Robberies, Enjoy 
Safe Streets—that Police Commissioner John Nichols instituted to combat street crime in 
January 1971.1 The predominately African American march swelled to four thousand as the 
demonstrators walked from Woodward to Gratiot and then to the Wayne County Jail to 
demonstrate their solidarity with those incarcerated. Prisoners staying on the Gratiot and Clinton 
                                                 
1 Detroit protesters carried signs expressing solidarity with political prisoner Angela Davis and the prisoners 
involved in the Attica uprising. California Governor Ronald Reagan ordered that the University of California-Los 
Angeles fire Davis because of her membership in the U.S. Communist Party in 1969. The FBI unsuccessfully 
connected her to a California shootout that led to the death of a judge in 1970. Black prisoners in Attica took over 
the state prison in September 1971 with the intent of improving living conditions. New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller called in the National Guard to put down the uprising. On September 13, four days before officer 
Worebec shot and killed Buck and Mitchell, national Guardsmen killed twenty-nine prisoners and the ten guards 
they held hostage.“Summary of Findings and Recommendations From Michigan Civil Rights Commission 
Investigation of STRESS Unit – Detroit Police Department,” 6 December 1971, Box 5, Folder 22,  Kenneth V. and 
Sheila M. Cockrel Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library (WPRL), Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. 
(Hereafter, Cockrel Collection); Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion:  The Second Reconstruction and 
Beyond in Black America, 1945-2006 (Jackson, University of Mississippi, 2007), 124-128. 
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sides of the jail cheered the marchers as they passed. If any of the prisoners could have caught a 
glimpse of the marchers, they would have seen placards expressing support for Angela Davis, the 
Attica Prisoners, and the slain teens.2  
Many onlookers stood, with their arms raised and fists clenched, as they listened to an 
array of speakers representing the broad black-led coalition that organized the demonstration. 
The speakers included Michigan Chronicle columnist, Jim Ingram, who served as one of the 
mediators during the Attica prison rebellion; Lonnie Peek, black student leader at Wayne State 
University; Cokwe Lumumba of the black nationalist Republic of New Africa (RNA); Tom 
Moss, president of the Guardians of Michigan, a black police organization; and the presidents of 
the local branches of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  Activist Adrean Davis read a 
letter from the “political prisoners” in the county jail. Kenneth Cockrel, one of the founders of 
the Labor Defense Coalition (LDC), called for the end of STRESS and spoke on the burgeoning 
movement.  “We’re going to show them discipline the man never knew existed in the black 
community,” Cockrel declared.3  
The demonstration made an impression on the local media and even the police. The 
conservative-leaning Detroit News called the gathering “one of the best organized Detroit 
demonstrations in several years” and Nadine Brown from the city’s black newspaper, the 
Michigan Chronicle, remarked on the protest’s orderliness. When referring to the marchers’ 
                                                 
2 Nadine Brown, “To Combat all Forms of Repression,” Michigan Chronicle, 2 October 1971.  
3 Peter Cain, “4,000 Join in Orderly Protest against STRESS Killing of Pair,” Detroit News, September 24, 1971; 
Nadine Brown, “To Combat all Forms of Oppression,” Michigan Chronicle. 
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discipline, one white DPD intelligence officer told the Detroit News:  “This has got to be the best 
demonstration ever.”4    
The demonstration boasted a broader agenda—it connected local concerns with police 
violence against black Detroiters with national political and economic developments. The march 
highlighted political repression of blacks (and leftists) in the U.S. and President Richard Nixon’s 
economic agenda.5 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) work with local law enforcement 
agencies to harass and disrupt black and white radical organizations during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s is well known. The police riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago, the 1969 police killing of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in Chicago, 
and the May 4, 1970 shootings at Kent State all represented products of the prevalent calls for 
law and order in U.S. cities.  
The march not only represented the largest black-led and non-labor union protest in 
Detroit since the aftermath of the 1967 uprising, it sparked a three year political struggle against 
STRESS and signaled the emergence of a broad-based left, liberal, labor, and black power 
coalition around police violence against black Detroiters. Liberal civil rights organizations such 
                                                 
4 Cain, “4,000 Join in Orderly Protest against STRESS Killing of Pair”; Nadine Brown, “To Protest Slayings Here, 
N.Y,” Michigan Chronicle, September 25, 1971.  
5 The march coincided with President Richard Nixon’s visit to Detroit on the same day where he discussed his 
economic program with the Economic Club of Detroit, a prestigious organization comprised of the city’s economic 
elites. In August, Nixon had imposed a ninety day wage and price freeze as part of his broader strategy to address 
rising unemployment and inflation. September 23, 1971 was significant, the protestors argued in their flyer “because 
Nixon will be developing the economic component of the oppression that Rockefeller enforced in a brutal military 
way on the prisoners at Attica.” The organizers’ connection of political repression with a racial and economic 
analysis refutes the notion that leftists turned to “identity politics” during the 1970s. The Detroit’s Anti-STRESS 
coalition’s economic analyses of crime, drug use, and the relationship between policing black bodies and urban 
development foreshadowed the left urban progressive’s integrated ideological outlook that they would articulate 
throughout the 1970s. Judith Stein, “Conflict, Change, Economic Policy,” in Rebel Rank and File:  Rebel Rank and 
File:  Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s, eds. Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal 
Winslow (New York:  Verso, 2010), 91-92; Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism:  The 
Political Economy of American Empire (New York:  Verso, 2012), 141; Labor Defense Coalition, “Protest the 
Murders of Buck and Craig by STRESS Flyer,” 1971, Box 5, Folder 37, Cockrel Collection, WPRL; Todd Gitlin, 
Twilight of Common Dreams:  Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars (New York:  Holt, 1995). 
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as NAACP, SCLC, and New Detroit, Incorporated, black radical organizations like the RNA and 
the Black Workers Congress (BWC), white left organizations such as the Motor City Labor 
League (MCLL) and From the Ground Up (FTGU), the multiracial LDC, and organized labor 
locals such as the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
all lent support to the Anti-STRESS coalition. The existence of such a broad coalition challenges 
the notion of that liberalism, civil rights, black power, and the new left fractured. Detroit’s Anti-
STRESS movement illustrates the ways in which local conditions can provoke the reconstitution 
of political coalitions and the roles that left progressives played in urban politics. 
This chapter uses the Anti-STRESS coalition’s campaign to stop the police killings of 
Detroiters to illustrate a successful example of progressive politics. The left wing of the Anti-
STRESS movement—comprising radical black power activists and white new leftists— 
accomplished two overlapping goals that turned out to be in real tension. First, it helped build a 
vast coalition of organizations and leaders around police brutality. This development contrasts 
with Heather Ann Thompson’s frame for understanding Detroit politics between 1967 and 1973 
in Whose Detroit?:  Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City. Rather than political 
conflict among conservatives, liberals, and radicals characterizing the city’s political culture, a 
closer examination of the Anti-STRESS coalition reveals how the Labor Defense Coalition, a 
multiracial organization led by radical lawyers, helped construct a coalition that incorporated 
liberal civil rights groups such as the NAACP and organized labor. 6   
                                                 
6 Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City (Ithaca:  Cornel 
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Second, the left wing of the Anti-STRESS coalition developed and articulated a radical 
analysis of crime and policing built from the activism of the1960s and early-1970s.7 The 
organization interpreted the police killings, and policing in general, as a product of both racism 
and class exploitation. Rather than pointing to pathology and behavior as the reasons for criminal 
activity, black and white leftists took a structural approach. They grounded their critiques of 
police repression, and the rise of crime and drug use, in an anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and anti-
imperialist analysis. According to Cockrel and others, crime rose as jobs and capital fled the 
inner city. According to the campaign’s left-wing, STRESS and downtown development served 
only to bolster private capital. Essentially, urban growth depended upon policing black bodies. 
By the late 1970s, their multifaceted analysis of urban development, crime, and repression gave 
way to the anti-corporate critique of urban development they would later articulate as members 
of DARE. Their economic and anti-racist critique of police repression and downtown 
redevelopment illustrates how “identity” and economic politics were not mutually exclusive. 
Members of the coalition’s left wing pursued a reformist campaign strategy that 
incorporated a variety of tactics. STRESS, Detroit’s Mayor Roman Gribbs, Police Commissioner 
John Nichols, and Wayne County Prosecutor William Cahalan represented the campaign’s focal 
points. Radical lawyers such as Justin Ravitz and Kenneth Cockrel sought to use the legal system 
to pressure Gribbs, Nichols, and Cahalan into abolishing STRESS. The Coalition’s left-wing also 
engaged in electoral politics. Cockrel, Ravitz, and other leftists saw taking over public 
institutions as a viable strategy for eradicating lethal policing and transforming the local criminal 
justice system. Most importantly, the left’s participation in the coalition was consequential. They 
helped publicize STRESS’s excesses. The Anti-STRESS left worked to elect Justin Ravitz 
                                                 
7 For more on the history of radical criminology see David F. Greenberg, ed., Crime and Capitalism:  Readings in 
Marxist Criminology (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1993). 
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Recorder’s Court Judge in 1972. State Representative Coleman Young rode the coalition’s 
support into city hall in 1973. Young disbanded STRESS upon entering office. Cockrel built 
upon the Coalition’s efforts and Ravitz’s election in his successful city council campaign in 
1977.  The left wing of the Anti-STRESS coalition laid the ideological and organizational 
foundations for future progressive coalition politics. 
Analyzing Detroit’s Anti-STRESS coalition complicates histories of crime and law and 
order policing.8 This investigation of the campaign against police violence in Detroit during the 
early-1970s suggests that the excesses of law and order policies—surveillance and police 
killings—created coalitions of liberals and radicals in cities during a moment when scholars have 
argued that leftists entered into sectarian politics. It also created the space for left-wing activists 
to advance radical critiques of policing and to pursue electoral politics. The issue of racialized 
police repression and state violence brought together two Detroiters who would later disagree 
about how to address the city’s deindustrialization and decline in the late-1970s and early-
1980s—Kenneth Cockrel and Coleman Young—into the same movement.  
The Detroit Police Department’s implementation of STRESS illustrates the array of black 
responses to crime and law and order policing. It is true President Lyndon Johnson and federal 
policymakers and elected officials helped engineer racialized law and order policies, as scholars 
who seek to explain the political origins of the war on crime have illustrated. This chapter, 
however, is a reminder that black responses to illegal activity and the implementation of these 
policies in cities fall along a spectrum.9 Some black Detroiters chafed at what they perceived as 
                                                 
8 Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters:  Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in 
Postwar American History,” The Journal of American History (December 2010); Elizabeth Kai Hinton, From the 
War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard 
University Press). 
9 For the debate about black agency in the rise of mass incarceration in Donna Murch, “Who’s to Blame for Mass 
Incarceration”; Michael J. Fortner, “Historical Method and the Noble Lie.”  
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the racist application of stop and frisk. Some, such as the Michigan Chronicle’s Bill Black, 
roundly criticized black criminal activity and called for tougher policing. And while this chapter 
devotes much attention to black leftist opposition to STRESS, even some black residents such as 
Detroit Urban League Executive Director Francis A. Kornegay, initially welcomed the police 
unit. It was not until the Anti-STRESS coalition began pressuring the DPD and city leaders and 
the Rochester Street shootout before skeptics such as Kornegay began reconsidering the unit.  
A closer investigation of the left wing Anti-STRESS coalition highlights the complex 
development of left politics in Detroit. Kenneth Cockrel, Sheila Murphy, Frank Joyce, and Jack 
Russell all cut their political teeth in Detroit’s black power movement or while working for white 
leftist organizations. Murphy’s, Joyce’s, and other white new leftists’ participation in the Anti-
STRESS coalition represented an successful execution of Stokely Carmichael’s, and other black 
power activists’, demand for whites to organize other whites to fight against racism. Murphy, 
Joyce, and other white leftists supported black activists and residents in their fights against police 
brutality before the implementation of STRESS. They continued their work by devising and 
articulating anti-capitalist and anti-racist critiques of STRESS, running for elected office, and 
executing the left-wing’s political education strategy.  
Much of the literature on civil rights, black power, and the new left rely on declensionist 
understandings to explain the fate of these movements.10 This literature presumes that black and 
white radicals were disinterested in working in coalitions with liberals because radicals viewed 
them as embedded in the power structure. Scholarship on the new left, especially, emphasize 
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white radicals’ decisions to cast their lot with either revolutionary violence or the Third World 
Marxist-inspired New Communist Movement. A more complex explanation of the development 
of the progressive left during the 1970s emerges out of an analysis of the leftists who participated 
in the Anti-STRESS coalition. Instead of limiting the fate of the left to sectarianism and fracture, 
this chapter illustrates another path that leftist activists took in the wake of the 1960s leftist social 
movements. Cockrel, Murphy, Joyce, and others saw their political fates and aspirations tied to 
building a left-liberal coalition around confronting repressive policing. Yet, despite their aims to 
developing a larger political base than their leftist contemporaries such as ex-League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers-turned New Communists General Baker, the LDC also 
simultaneously helped build a left progressive politics that developed outside of traditional labor-
liberal coalitions.11  
 
The War on Crime and Police Repression in Detroit  
Detroit’s last white mayor before 1973 took advantage of the political turmoil generated 
by the 1967 uprising and voters’ desires for law and order into city hall. In the 1969 election, 
Wayne County Sheriff Roman Gribbs squared off against Wayne County Auditor, Richard 
Austin. Austin’s professional record made him a formidable candidate. He was the first black 
American in Michigan to become a certified public accountant. Austin was Wayne County’s first 
black auditor. He was a moderate who aspired to continue the labor-liberal-corporate coalition. 
Austin received endorsements from the UAW, Teamsters, the local steelworkers’ union, the 
Michigan Chronicle, and the Detroit Free Press. Gribbs’s victory can be explained by the salient 
issues of race and crime, as well as Austin’s lack of stature among Detroiters. White Detroiters, 
                                                 
11 Max Elbaum, Revolution in the Air:  Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che (New York:  Verso, 2002), 
104-105.  
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according to a Detroit Free Press survey, saw crime, welfare, and black political power as the 
most significant issues as well. Gribbs’s experience as sheriff lent him more legitimacy among 
whites who may have been skeptical of a black mayor and who desired a mayor who emphasized 
strong policing. Gribbs’s desires to incorporate the use of Mace in policing angered many black 
Detroiters.12And while Gribbs was a moderate, he took advantage of whites’ sentiments with his 
appeals to law and order.13 
However, despite winning the primary, Austin lost the general election by a little over 
7,000 votes.14 Gribbs appealed to white fears of crime while Austin sought to downplay the issue 
of race.15 He also attempted to redbait Austin by accusing him of employing a black radical on 
his campaign staff. Similar to the case in Cleveland where business interests threw their support 
behind candidates such as Carl Stokes in 1967 whom they believed could maintain order, the 
city’s financial leaders backed Gribbs. Gribbs garnered much financial support from 
suburbanites.16 
While Gribbs’s election signaled a retrenchment in law and order politics in Detroit, 
Austin’s strong campaign foreshadowed the ascendancy of black political power in the 1970s. 
However, black Detroiters needed more than just demographics to take City Hall. They also 
needed political opportunity to mobilize an electoral coalition that could vote a black American 
into City Hall. The Detroit Police Department’s STRESS shootings created such a crucible for a 
broad based left-liberal coalition and black political power. 
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Aggressive policing through policies such as its stop and frisk and the Detroit Police 
Department’s institution of its STRESS unit represent an example of the city’s gendered 
response to the urban crisis. The DPD and both mayors Jerome Cavanagh and Roman Gribbs 
undertook policies that criminalized black masculinity. Both mayors supported stop and frisk and 
increased downtown policing whereas the STRESS unit often targeted “suspicious” black men, 
often with deadly force. The unit killed fifteen black Detroiters, mostly young men, between 
January 1971 and March 1972. The establishment of STRESS not only reflected national trends 
in law enforcement policy, it reflected the presumption that policing black men, the 
criminalization of urban space, and urban revitalization were linked. In effect, the city’s 
institutions adoption of these measures exemplified the connections between the war on poverty 
and liberal anti-crime politics and the ways they were both rooted in discourses of black 
pathology and the regulation of black bodies.  
Detroit’s identity as “the motor city” began to transform due to its declining tax base and 
industrial economy and rising criminal activity between 1967 and 1974. Journalists began to 
refer to the city as the “murder city” and the “capital of crime.” In 1969, Detroit endured 488 
murders. The city earned its “murder capital” moniker in 1974 when it recorded over 800 
murders. In 1974, there were a reported 39,300 robberies, up from 35,700 in 1972.17 That year, 
the New York Times reported on how the “benign neglect” of the federal government 
contributed to the city’s rising crime rate. The failure to redevelop inner city houses designated 
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for urban renewal had left a built environment for city residents who were participants in the 
city’s illicit drug and crime economy.18  
White and black middle class flight, deindustrialization, the demise of liberal post-riot job 
programs, and the economic downturn of the late 1960s all set the stage for the city’s growing 
drug trade and rising murder rate, and thus the creation of the STRESS police unit. The 1969 
recession erased post-riot job creation. Whites fled the city in droves. Black Americans moved 
into 7,000 to 9,000 previously white-owned homes a year.19 Mayor Jerome Cavanagh’s 
successor, Roman Gribbs, warned of budget cuts in the face of declining tax revenue growing 
deficits.20 
One of the consequences of uneven development, white flight, deindustrialization, and 
the general erosion of inner city jobs was the creation of illegal underground economies and 
increasing instances of violence against persons and property. The Kerner Commission Report 
reminded Americans of how racial and class segregation created the conditions for elevated 
criminal activity in low income, racially-segregated neighborhoods in 1968. When comparing 
crime statistics among various racial and income districts, they found that “variations in the 
crime rate against persons within the city are extremely large. One very low-income Negro 
district had 35 times as many serious crimes against persons per 100,000 residents as did the 
high-income district.” Greater strife between the city’s police force and its black community 
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accompanied the rise in criminal activity in low-income, racially segregated neighborhoods, the 
Commission argued.21 
Developments in national urban policy helped shape policing in Detroit. President 
Lyndon Johnson had declared a war on crime in 1965 at the same time his administration was 
trying to wage wars on poverty and in Vietnam. President Johnson oversaw the passage of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. President Richard Nixon’s administration 
increased funding to LEAA programs.22 The LEAA received $63 million in 1969 and $268 
million in 1970. LEAA’s allocation jumped to over $698 million in 1972. The 1968 Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
which provided state and local law enforcement agencies with financial resources needed to 
modernize their police forces. The state of Michigan received almost $7.6 million between 1969 
and 1971, with local police forces getting 38% of the funds. In 1972-1973, Detroit devoted 70% 
of its LEAA funding to officer training, police aviation, resource management, and radio 
communications.23 
Detroit’s county—Wayne— was a major beneficiary of LEAA funding. Wayne County 
received hundreds of thousands of dollars for drug treatment, drug use prevention, fighting 
organized crime, and other measures to improve their courts, resource management, and 
technology. The LEAA also listed an unspecified $35,000 grant for STRESS. The report referred 
to the program as the city’s “most dramatic” and bragged about the unit’s efficacy. “In the first 4 
months of the STRESS project, a 10-percent drop in street crimes has been realized in Detroit.24   
                                                 
21 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
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 The Nixon administration strengthened Johnson’s national crime policy while weakening 
the previous administration’s anti-poverty policy. While the Johnson Administration sought to 
link the wars on crime and poverty, Nixon separated the efforts when he abandoned the Great 
Society during the early 1970s.25 The Nixon Administration consolidated into block grants—the  
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)—many of the Great Society-style urban 
programs that had allowed cities to tap into various agencies for money, Nixon’s new federalism 
emphasized “revenue sharing” among cities, thus also distributing federal funds more widely 
than had Johnson’s war on poverty.26  The Great Society had tended to extend most of its 
resources to northeastern and midwestern cities whereas Nixon’s urban policies funneled more 
money to the growing cities of the south and west. 27 
With the support of the police department, the Detroit Common Council (city council) 
passed a controversial Crime Control Ordinance—otherwise known as the stop and frisk law—in 
early July 1968 in an effort to curb street crime.28 The Detroit Free Press criticized the law as an 
instrument criminalizing blackness. Earlier in the year, the editors at the Detroit Free Press 
declared that the law “aimed at black punishment.” They argued that the law “should come as no 
surprise in a society which insists on punitive measures in an attempt to halt ‘crime on the 
streets’…”29 Mayor Cavanagh, however, supported the measure. He mobilized crime statistics 
and the sort of “crime in the streets” discourse embedded in calls for law and order in the mid-
1960s in an address to the city council. “There is no more important issue in this city, or in the 
nation, today than the mounting crime and lawlessness on our streets. Women are afraid to walk 
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in broad daylight for fear of purse-snatchers, and even strong men will not venture into many 
areas of our city after dark. Disrespect for the law is growing, and particularly among the 
young.” He attributed part of the city’s declining economy to crime. Downtown businesses 
failed, Cavanagh maintained, because “people are unwilling to come into the city after dark.” 
Cavanagh addressed criticisms that the law disproportionately targeted the city’s black 
population. “The murders, the rapes, the assaults are not evenly spread throughout this city, but 
are concentrated in the five inner-city precincts. It is the people in this part of the city who are 
suffering the most from crime. Thus, rather than being an ordinance which could penalize the 
Negro community, this is an ordinance which will enable the Police Department to protect more 
effectively the true victims of the city.” 30   
Black Detroiters demonstrated a range of responses to tougher policing. Some black 
Detroiters supported the stop and frisk measure. 31 Others, however, sent letters and petitions to 
Cavanagh arguing that the law unfairly criminalized African Americans. Petitions and stock 
letters indicate some organizing on behalf of Detroit residents against the law. Eloise Anderson 
sent a copy of such a letter to Cavanagh, “We the undersigned are against the Stop and Frisk 
Ordinance recently passed by the Common Council. It is our feeling that this was a mistake due 
to the fact that it is another means of intimidating black citizens.”32 Some letter writers told their 
own stories about stop and frisk and relayed others’ experiences with police frisking. Reverend 
William J. Fitzpatrick told the mayor of how the police stopped one of the members of his 
church. The image of respectability did not protect the victim as Fitzpatrick indicated: “This was 
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a well-dressed citizen.” Fitzpatrick, like many others who wrote to express their dissatisfaction 
with the law, warned of its potentially deadly implications. “This is an example of what this 
search and seizure or stop and frisk is going to do for the Negro people of our city. It is going to 
cause serious trouble and perhaps some killing.”33  
 However, the stop and frisk policies were not enough for Detroit Urban League’s Francis 
Kornegay. In a 1969 report on the Urban League’s anti-crime efforts in the city, he, stated, “It is 
a shocking reality. It is worsening. A more serious consequence, while the community is aware 
of the alarming menace of crime and all of its attending effects – the fact remains, there is 
nothing being done to combat it – to declare war against it – to arouse total community efforts to 
curb it – to reduce it to a larger degree.” Kornegay called for 1,000 more police officers, more 
security guards for “underground garages, public hearings and for extra security work in high 
crime areas, and a law to curb drug trafficking.34 Kornegay continued his support for increased 
policing into the following year. In March 1970, according to a TV2 report, “As League 
Executive Francis Kornegay puts it, ‘The lack of safety of the citizen and his property has 
reached such proportions that fear, if it continues to develop, can destroy the best in our city.’” 
They recommended more police and a “relentless attack” on drug trafficking.”35 
Kornegay’s call for tougher policing highlights how some black civic leaders helped 
drive the war on crime. The Detroit Urban League saw safety and crime fighting as a priority 
after the city’s uprising. In addition to calling for increased law enforcement and stricter drug 
laws, the Urban League organized the Citizen’s Campaign for Crime Prevention and Leadership 
Development and the 12th Street Academy to address safety concerns, train youths, and prevent 
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crime. These initiatives grew out of the national organization’s “new thrust” or “ghetto strategy” 
to address the city’s urban crisis.36 The goal of DUL’s crime program was to build closer 
relationships between the city’s black populations and the DPD.37 The organization sought to 
mobilize “human resources – the citizen with many resources ready to be used but really not 
asked.”38 Kornegay called for a voluntarist approach where black residents would work in 
tandem with the police department to stop unlawful activity. This entailed the formation of block 
clubs, neighborhood associations, and a neighborhood watch where citizens would notify the 
police “on suspicious actions.” While the DUL admitted that a mix of factors—structural and 
pathological—gave rise to crime in Detroit’s black communities, this aspect of the organization’s 
“new thrust” plan sought to enlist volunteers as de factor agents of the local state.39  
State violence and repression reigned during the late 1960s and early 1970s in many U.S. 
cities and college and university campuses where radical activists and organizations operated. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s counterintelligence program, or COINTELPRO, served as 
the main arm of state repression. Created in 1956 to combat communism. Embodied by the FBI’s 
director, J. Edgar Hoover, the program spied on and sought to disrupt the civil rights movement. 
COINTELPRO famously harassed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. for his personal infidelities, even 
suggesting that he should commit suicide.40 After 1965, COINTELPRO focused much of its 
efforts on neutralizing the black power movement. The goal of the new effort was to “expose, 
disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type 
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organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and supporters.”41 In 
1969, the FBI declared the Black Panther Party “the greatest threat to the internal security of the 
country.”42 The Panthers suffered from a loss of members due to imprisonment and deaths 
including Bobby Hutton, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in Chicago, and George Jackson in San 
Quentin State Prison in California at the hands of law enforcement.  
States also conducted repression in prisons. Angela Davis, George Jackson, and the 
Attica uprising served as inspirations for many in the Anti-STRESS coalition. California 
Governor Ronald Reagan fired communist Angela Davis from the University of California-Los 
Angeles in June 1969. The following year, the FBI implicated Davis in the August 7 shootout 
between George Jackson’s little brother, Jonathan, and San Quientin guards after Jonathan 
Jackson and a group of prisoners took Judge Harold Haley, district attorney Gary Thomas, and 
others hostage.43  On August 21, 1971, San Quientin guards shot and killed George Jackson, a 
Black Panther activist who had struck a correspondence with Davis.44 On September 9, prisoners 
rebelled and took control over the prison. The prisoners demanded more humane treatment and 
requested that the Black Panthers negotiate with the state. New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller responded with force, sending in the National Guard. Soldiers, state and local police, 
and police guards attacked the prisoners, killing them and the ten guards they took hostage. The 
state of New York’s suppression of the 1971 Attica uprising illustrated the lengths at which 
officials were willing to go to stamp out black resistance.45  
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Tensions between Detroit activists, many of the city’s black residents, and the police 
department escalated after several incidents of violent repression. One incident involved the 
Midwest branch of the SCLC’s Poor People’s Campaign. On May 3, 1968, members of the Poor 
People’s Campaign descended upon Cobo Hall for a demonstration. The campaign’s leaders met 
to ensure that the demonstration proceeded in as orderly and organized a fashion as possible. The 
action proceeded “peacefully and orderly until a car stalled,” Georgakas and Surkin reported.46 
The stalled automobile apparently agitated the mounted police and they launched a charge into 
the crowd of demonstrators. Sam Dennis, a Department of Justice official, corroborated the 
unprovoked nature of the police attack:  “I saw old ladies being pushed and manhandled, grabbed 
by the collar and pushed out doors. I saw young men beaten with billy clubs…I saw officers ride 
horses into a crowd which I judged to be under control. In addition, I saw officers strike 
individuals for no apparent reason.”47 
In October, black and white protestors against George Wallace’s presidential candidacy 
clashed with white Wallace supporters and the DPD. Over a 1,000 assembled at Cobo Hall to 
demonstrate their disapproval of Wallace. The demonstration turned into an anti-black race riot 
reminiscent of those inflicted on black Americans in the aftermath of World War I. A fight 
ensued after a Wallace sympathizer sprayed chemicals at a black protestor. The DPD intervened 
and, according to observers, directed much of their violence at the protestors. The DPD also beat 
bystanders and reporters on the scene.48  
The police abuse continued a few days later when DPD officers beat a number of black 
youths at the Veterans Memorial Hall. Members of a police wives’ organization held a dance at 
the hall on the same night as an Ebenezer AME Church-sponsored youth dance. Some of the 
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white women complained of the black harassment. Two black teenagers, according to Darden 
and Thomas, asserted that some of the white police officers hurled racial slurs. An attack by 
DPD officers led to the hospitalization of the seventeen year old son of the director of a local 
YMCA, James Evans. A subsequent investigation determined that the black teenagers were 
innocent. Nine police officers were suspended and the assistant Wayne County prosecutor 
declared that the offending officers “threatened and assaulted the Negro youths without 
provocation or justification.”49 
For many black residents, the incident at the New Bethel Baptist Church on March 29, 
1969 further demonstrated police force run amok. In March 1968, the Detroit Police Department 
raided the New Bethel Baptist Church, where the nationalist Republic of New Afrika (RNA) 
held its meetings. The DPD engaged members of the RNA in a shootout. After what became 
known as the New Bethel Incident, one white police officer lay dead and another was injured in 
the raid. The DPD arrested 142 people. Crockett drew the department’s ire by holding bond 
hearings for those arrested that night. Crockett’s actions led to a state investigation of his actions. 
To the dismay of many whites, the DPD, and Mayor Cavanagh, Judge George Crockett, who 
before his election to the bench had a long history a labor and radical attorney, released all but 
two of the suspects in a trial that he held in the police station.50   
The DPD’s STRESS program would eventually demonstrate the Kerner Commission’s 
correlation between increasing crime and police-community strife. Police Commissioner John 
Nichols created STRESS in January 1971 to prevent street robberies. STRESS operations 
included “intelligence” and “decoy” tactics. STRESS officers often posed as hippies, drunks, or 
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“some other likely robbery victim.”51 Interactions often produced violent confrontations between 
the decoys and the targets, who tended to be black, of such operations. The “decoy” tactics 
proved most controversial because they often led to deadly outcomes. The unit was responsible 
for ten fatal shootings between its establishment in January and October 1971. 52   
At first, many black Detroiters welcomed the STRESS program. Detroit Urban League 
President Francis Kornegay, the editors of the Michigan Chronicle, the local African American 
newspaper, and the black Ministerial Alliance all declared their support for STRESS.53 Black 
Detroiters supported it for good and pragmatic reasons—those who lived in low income and high 
crime areas had a greater risk of being a victim of a violent crime. Intensified policing also had a 
positive impact in the city’s fight against crime. By September 1971, the police had confiscated 
370 handguns and the Michigan Chronicle was reporting “a significant drop in street 
robberies.”54 
The establishment of STRESS also accompanied Detroit’s corporate sector’s refocusing 
on downtown development as a primary urban revitalization strategy. Max Fisher, Henry Ford, 
II, Mayor Gribbs, and other economic elites formed Detroit Renaissance, Inc. in 1970. Fisher and 
Ford saw a need for a private sector response to deindustrialization once the Detroit 
Renaissance’s organizational predecessor, New Detroit, Inc., decided to concentrate more on 
addressing social issues. The group inspired Ford’s plans to revitalize the city’s riverfront to the 
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tune of $500 million. While the members of the organization did not publicly comment on crime 
in the city, several of the city’s business leaders understood that greater policing could help build 
a favorable business climate. The issue of crime emerged in internal discussions among business 
leaders in the New Detroit, Inc.’s Economic Development Subcommittee, a committee Fisher 
helped established as a member of New Detroit, Inc. in 1968. Thomas L. Disk of the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway company argued that Detroit needed to contain its “criminal element,” calling 
“rowdyism” “serious problem” if a firm sought to invest in Detroit. Coupling crime fighting with 
downtown development was not a redevelopment strategy specific to Detroit. This form of urban 
governance developed in cities such as Los Angeles and Atlantic City.55 The further 
stigmatization of black, and mostly male, bodies was one consequence of the linkage between 
downtown developments and increased policing.56 The glaring irony behind private sector 
development organizations such as Detroit Renaissance, Inc., is that Henry Ford, II, and other 
corporate members of Detroit Renaissance, Inc. would not invest in the city’s neighborhoods or 
in new manufacturing jobs in the city.57   
 
The Development of the Left-Wing of the Anti-STRESS Coalition 
 
In April 1971, members of the Black Workers Congress, Motor City Labor League, and 
the National Lawyers Guild established the Legal Defense Coalition (LDC) to respond to police 
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repression. Defined as a radical-led interracial coalition, the LDC aimed “to combat acts of 
institutionalized repression throughout all arms of the administration of criminal justice.”58 LDC 
lawyers—Kenneth Cockrel, Justin Ravitz, Ted Spearman, Marc Strickland, William Goodman, 
Neal Bush, Jeff Taft, and M. Gerald Schwartzbach—sought to defend individual victims of 
police brutality and confront various aspects of what they considered an unjust municipal court 
system. Their greatest contributions to the broad-based Anti-STRESS movement and to the 
development of a left independent progressivism were the LDC’s efforts to prosecute STRESS in 
public opinion and in the courtroom and Justice Ravitz’s 1972 campaign for Recorders Court 
Judge.  
The constituent elements of the left wing of the Anti-STRESS coalition—Black Workers 
Congress and Motor City Labor League—emerged out of several post-rebellion black and white 
leftist organizations. Several of the key members—Kenneth Cockrel, Sheila Murphy, and Justin 
Ravitz—cut their political teeth in struggles around labor and police brutality and efforts to build 
a socialist movement in Detroit after 1967. The stories of leftist organizations such as the League 
of Revolutionary Black Workers, Ad Hoc Action Group, and From the Ground Up illustrate the 
process by which a segment of the city’s left fragmented and reconstituted itself in a broad-based 
coalition against police brutality.  
Kenneth Cockrel served as the instrumental architect of what would become the city’s 
Left Anti-STRESS Coalition’s politics and strategy. He rose to prominence as a political 
organizer in his participation in black worker struggles and as a defense lawyer for black 
activists before working in the Anti-STRESS coalition.  He was born in 1949 in the Royal Oak 
suburb of Detroit. His mother was a housewife while his father worked at the Ford Highland 
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Park plant. After his parents died, Cockrel moved to the city to attend Northwestern High 
School. He transferred to Central High School before dropping out in 1955 and worked as a 
weapons technician in the Air Force. Upon returning from his service in the Air Force, Cockrel 
earned his high school equivalency credentials and attended Wayne State University where he 
received a B.A. in political science in 1964 and his Juris Doctorate in 1967.59  
Cockrel expressed a vision of left independent black politics even in the aftermath of the 
1967 rebellion and Cleage’s rejection of an alliance with the NDC. While sitting on a panel with 
several black militants, including John Watson, Cockrel voiced his support for a form of black 
power independent from white corporate and foundation money and outside of the purview of 
the local labor-liberal coalition. Cockrel supported Reverend Albert Cleage’s rejection of the 
NDC approach to redevelopment and race relations management. Yet, Cockrel argued that 
white-backed self-help approaches to black economic development had failed after Cleage 
refused the NDC’s money. Instead, he urged for blacks to concentrate on armed struggle and to 
participate in revolutionary party politics with a “big P.” Watson, on the other hand, provided the 
audience with the target—capitalism and racism. 60  
The League of Revolutionary Black Workers emerged out of the proliferation of the 
black revolutionary workers’ movements in the city’s auto plants in 1968 and 1969. Black 
workers endured the brunt of manufacturing speed ups, automation, and labor in “the hardest, 
dirtiest, and most dangerous jobs” since the mid-1960s.61 More than 4,000 workers responded to 
the speed ups by participating in a wildcat strike that paralyzed the Dodge Main plant in 
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Hamtramck on May 2, 1968.62 Dodge disproportionately held black workers responsible, firing 
and suspending dozens.63 Immediately after the strike, Cockrel, General Baker, Jr., Mike 
Hamlin, John Watson, Luke Tripp, and others formed the Dodge Revolutionary Union 
Movement (DRUM) to defend the fired black workers. DRUM founders sought to organize 
black workers in the city’s Dodge plants against racism in Chrysler plants and in the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) union. The success of DRUM led other black workers in other plants to create 
their own revolutionary union organizations.64 The spread of RUM’s led to the DRUM 
leadership’s creation of an umbrella organization, the League of Black Revolutionary Workers 
(LBRW) in 1969.    
Auto worker and activist General Gordon Baker personified the organization’s mix of 
nationalist, Marxist-Leninist, and worker consciousness. Baker was a Detroit native—born on 
September 6, 1941. He started working in the Ford Motor Company’s stamping plant in 
Dearborn in 1963 and at the Dodge Main Plant the following year.65 He worked with several 
local radical groups—the Garveyist African Nationalist Pioneer Movement, the Revolutionary 
Action Movement, and UHURU. He also participated in the Detroit Robert F. Williams Defense 
Committee in 1962.66 Baker’s 1964 trip to Cuba also led him to revise his earlier black 
nationalism and to adopt a third wordlist Marxist-Leninism. After the rebellion, according to 
Hamlin, the decision to organize in Dodge Main arose out of the meetings that Baker had 
facilitated with other black autoworkers in the offices of the Inner City Voice, a black radical 
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newspaper founded in the wake of the rebellion in September 1967.67 Mike Hamlin, born to a 
sharecropper in Mississippi in 1935, moved with his family to Ecorse, a southwest suburb of 
Detroit, after his father found a job working in construction in 1947.68 Hamlin served in the 
Army before coming back to Detroit in 1960. John Watson was a Detroit native, attending Cass 
Technical High School. Watson’s strengths lay in his intellectual and editorial abilities. 
According to Hamlin, Watson “was a genius,” and a devoted Marxist. Watson would participate 
in political rap sessions with Hamlin and Cockrel while working for the Detroit News.69  
Wayne State University and the Detroit News served as the early crucibles for this 
cohort’s intellectual and political development. Hamlin, Watson, and Cockrel met while working 
for the more conservative Detroit News. Cockrel, Hamlin, and Baker all were politically active 
on Wayne State’s campus. Wayne State University, known for its radical tradition, served as a 
crucial base for black organizing and activity. Wayne State enrolled between 2,500 and 3,500 
black students. Wayne State’s black student body outnumbered that of the Big Ten universities.70 
Baker participated in police brutality protests held at Wayne State during the 1960s. Watson, 
Cockrel, Hamlin, and the rest of the burgeoning black radical cohort took advantage of this 
milieu after the rebellion.  
John Watson’s control over the school’s student newspaper—the South End—represented 
an early attempt of independent black radical institutional control. A student committee selected 
Watson to run the newspaper for the 1968-1969 academic year. As editor, Watson enjoyed a 
command over resources and scale that would make most political activists jealous. He 
controlled a $100,000 printing budget. He earned a salary and he could employ staff. The South 
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End’s circulation of around 18,000 copies also allowed Watson and his cohort of activists to 
reach large numbers of Detroiters. He employed Hamlin and Luke Trip to help fulfill his radical 
vision for the newspaper. As evidenced by Watson’s first editorial, the South End would devote 
itself to “promoting the interests of impoverished, oppressed, and exploited, and powerless 
victims of white, racist monopoly capitalism and imperialism.”71 Watson’s goals of addressing 
monopoly capitalism and imperialism reflected the ideological and political standpoint of black 
and white activists in the black power movement and the more radical wing of the Students for a 
Democratic Society. Their concerns with racism, capitalism, and imperialism percolated in the 
League’s politics. Hamlin and others used the university paper as an organizing tool and resource 
for the cadre. Paid staff often doubled as South End workers and community organizers. 
Watson’s takeover of the South End represented the type of politics that Cockrel would advocate 
for as a member of the Anti-STRESS coalition and as a city councilman in the late 1970s.  
The spread of revolutionary union movements in Detroit led to the DRUM leadership’s 
creation of an umbrella organization, the League of Black Revolutionary Workers (LRBW) in 
1969. The League characterized itself as both Marxist-Leninist and nationalist. In doing so, they 
reflected the revolutionary nationalist trend in 1960s and 1970s black radicalism. Cockrel often 
voiced his disagreements with what he believed to be the Black Panther Party’s narrow focus on 
self-defense. According to Historian Ahmad Muhammad, the League disagreed with the BPP’s 
public projection of itself as a paramilitary force.  Still, the two organizations shared a similar 
ideological outlook, emphasizing interlocking critiques of racism, capitalism, and imperialism.72  
And like the Black Panther Party, the league sought to mobilize a particular segment of the black 
community. Only instead of focusing on the lumpen proletariat, the League concentrated on 
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organizing the black working class. Following black radicals such as W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. 
James, and James Boggs, they constructed an analysis that emphasized the centrality of black 
labor to the history of U.S. economic development.  
Unlike Cleage, the Panthers, and Stokely Carmichael, who organized their nationalist 
politics around mobilizing predominately-black communities and cities, the League articulated a 
spatial politics that centered on the factory and the community. The organization argued that 
blacks were strategically located “at the point of production.” Blacks’ position within the 
industrial economy offered them a source of potential power. If black workers organized 
themselves, the League contended, then they could bring “all production to a halt,” thus striking 
a blow against racism and capitalism.73 As observers noted, the League’s awareness of the 
centrality of black workers in production reflected an awareness of their positionality within the 
regional, national, and global political economy of industrial capitalism. Detroit Organizing 
Committee member Jim Jacobs declared, “To seize control of the political economy of the 
Midwest is to seize control over the political economy of imperialist America.”74 The League’s 
emphasis on the importance of the Midwest anticipates Tom Hayden’s and Jane Fonda’s 
Indochina Peace Campaign’s (IPC) vision of disrupting U.S. military intervention in Indochina 
during the early-1970s. The IPC grounded its view of the Midwest in U.S. electoral politics as 
they sought two objectives: first, try to convince Midwesterners to vote against Richard Nixon in 
the 1972 election, and then to mobilize grassroots support for ending the war in Indochina.  
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The League built upon theories of black labor articulated by radicals such as James 
Boggs.75 They renamed automation “niggermation” and railed against it.76 The concept describes 
the racialized nature of the automation and speed up of production. Hamlin explained in an 
interview with Leviathan, 
The bourgeois response to the fact that 650,000 production workers in auto in 1947 produced 
4.5 million cars and now 650,000 workers are producing 10 million cars is what? Automation. 
[…] I mean in no way is automation responsible for the increase. What is responsible for that 
increased output is what we would call ‘niggermation.’ And what it means is that they will 
speed up on a particular job. If a guy can’t make it,, or refuses to work at that rate:  fire him. 
Then they’ll bring a new guy off the street and tell him the rate they have established via the 
speed up is the actual rate on that job.77 
 
Instead of focusing on how automation displaced industrial workers and created a group of 
unemployable “outsiders,” as Boggs referred to this group in his 1963 book, The American 
Revolution, the League focused on technology’s effects on workers in the plants.78 The concept 
also came to symbolize the poor working conditions that black workers often had to endure 
while working in the plants.  
The League’s view of the black worker contrasted sharply with that of urban liberals 
during the same moment. Liberals viewed the “hard core unemployed” as the focal point in 
rebuilding riot-torn cities. The league, however, saw black workers as the primary agent for the 
revolution against capitalism and imperialism. Simultaneously, law enforcement agencies came 
to view the hard-core unemployed and black activists as threats to political stability. Local law 
enforcement agencies and developers in Detroit came to see black activists and the poor as not 
just threats to the local stability, but as threats to urban growth. These conditions gave birth to 
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STRESS and explained the increased in political repression of activists and workers that DRUM 
and the League sought to defend. 
The League’s critique of labor unions laid a foundation for an adversarial relationship 
between Cockrel that would haunt his and DARE’s efforts to appeal to black workers during the 
1970s. Although the League expressed its willingness to work with white radicals, the 
organization levied a ruthless critique against white workers and labor unions. League workers 
derisively referred to the UAW as “You Ain’t White.” They argued that organized labor—AFL-
CIO, UAW, United Mine Workers, and the Steel Workers represented the “antithesis of the 
freedom of black people…and the world.” The League contended that the racism that permeated 
these organizations contributed to the further exploitation of black workers. They also linked an 
anti-imperialist critique of the unions, arguing that U.S. military interventions such as the war in 
the Philippines during the late-nineteenth century supported “the demands of white labor.” The 
League also pointed to labor’s support for the Vietnam War as further evidence of its 
conservative foreign policy stance. The League’s critiques of organized labor and the members’ 
struggles against the UAW for union leadership affected Cockrel’s and DARE’s attempts to 
organize Detroit workers during the late 1970s.79 
Taking control over unions and the state represented the ultimate goals for the league. 
The League’s critical view of the UAW contributed to the League’s efforts to take control over 
another institution—union locals in the various plants within the city. Their efforts to take exert 
influence in locals mostly resulted in failure. Ron March entered into a preliminary election for 
trustee of the UAW’s Local 3 in the Dodge Main plant against Joe Elliot, a white man who 
enjoyed the support of the local’s leadership.  March won the preliminary election despite 
suspicion of voter irregularities and harassment of March supporters. March lost the October 
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runoff, however. UAW leaders Walter P. Reuther and Irving Bluestone saw DRUM as a threat. 
The Local’s leadership mobilized support from Polish retirees. The UAW warned workers about 
the prospects of a DRUM success. A March win would result in a cut of retirement benefits. 
DRUM members also contended that police harassment contributed to voter suppression as well. 
RUM organizations continued to participate in union electoral work, but they continued to 
encounter similar obstacles. 80 Ultimately, the UAW defeated the League in their effort to take 
over unions, but the call to take power persisted through the left-wing of the Anti-STRESS 
movement and Cockrel’s run for city council during the 1970s. 
In the 1970s, Cockrel began pushing for a strategy that combined coalition politics with 
taking power of local institutions. Rather than demanding that the white power structure hand 
over resources, as Cleage had, or focusing an organizing strategy solely on the auto plants, as the 
LRBW had, Cockrel turned to coalition politics—a combination of direct action, leftist politics, 
and electoralism—as the best strategy for taking control over the city.81 Cockrel articulated this 
vision at a 1970 anti-repression conference organized by the Ad-Hoc Action Group, People 
Against Racism, the West Central Organization, and the LRBW.82  In this speech, Cockrel 
argued that the ultimate goal of the League, and for others in the city’s left, should be to win 
control over the city’s public institutions. “We also understand that the only way you end 
oppression is not by circulating petitions, not by writing letters to the attorney general…We say 
that the only means whereby you can do this is to run the police department and run the city. So 
we say we’re committed to running the city,” he declared.83  
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Cockrel then proceeded to outline a strategy that foreshadowed the one he would seek to 
execute as a city councilmember and as a member of the Detroit Alliance for a Rational 
Economy during the 1970s:  “In order to do this we’ve got to develop a political machine.” And 
as he would as a member of the left-wing of the Anti-STRESS movement, Cockrel dismissed 
any notions that a synthesis of direct action and electoral politics signified mere reformism. “We 
don’t engage in superficial discussions between the cats relating to electoral politics. That’s 
bullshit. We relate to whatever’s going to give us the power to create and widen the sphere 
within which we can function to bring about the destruction of this country.”84 
Cockrel discussed taking political power in an interview that he and Mike Hamlin gave 
for the radical publication, Leviathan, during the same year. In this dialogue, Cockrel told the 
interviewers that the LRBW had considered running Cockrel for mayor in 1969.  “During the last 
race for mayor there was some serious discussion of the possibility of the League having a 
candidate. And I was probably going to be that candidate and we would relate to, like running for 
elective office man, and taking over the city. We are relating concretely to the ’73 campaign in 
the city of Detroit.” However, Cockrel’s position on electoral politics remained nuanced. “The 
League does not take the position, and never has asserted and never will assert, that the 
resolution of the kinds of questions which impel us to engage in the struggle is going to come 
from litigation, or from participation in electoral politics. The position we take, however, is 
this—that we’re about the business of acquiring resources. The resources we want to acquire in 
Detroit is, you know, monopolistic control of the use of force.” 85  
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The League formed an alliance with civil rights veteran James Forman after he delivered 
his “Black Manifesto” speech at the Black Economic Development Conference (BEDC) in April 
1969 in Detroit. The Manifesto demanded $500 million in reparations from the nation’s 
churches. The BEDC envisioned using the funds to construct a southern land bank, publishing 
houses, job training centers, among other ventures.86 Cockrel, Watson, and fellow League 
member, Mike Hamlin served on BEDC’s leadership committee. 
The LBRW’s work with Forman led to a series of internal disputes.  Cockrel, Watson, 
Hamlin and others bristled at what they perceived to be the narrow nationalism of others in the 
league’s leadership.87 According to Cockrel, the question of engaging in electoral politics also 
divided the group.  Eventually, Cockrel, Watson and Hamlin joined with Forman to form Black 
Workers Congress in June 1971.  Two years later, schisms within the BWC led to its demise as 
well. Forman’s tendency towards autocracy and personality politics provoked critiques from 
Cockrel. 88 
The participation of Cockrel and other veterans of the LRBW in the BEDC represented 
their first attempt to address economic development issues on a national scale. The major lesson 
that Cockrel drew from this experience, however, was the need for the creation of an 
independent multiracial political organization ideologically flexible enough to participate in 
various forms of activism.89   
Despite this history of intra-organizational factionalism, Cockrel’s work as a defense 
counsel for legally embattled black Detroiters laid the foundation for the legal tactics  of the 
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emerging left-wing of the Anti-STRESS coalition. Cockrel earned his reputation as a silver-
tongued black socialist lawyer with his successful defenses of black nationalist activists in New 
Bethel One and New Bethel Two cases, as well as James Johnson’s murder trial.90  In these 
cases, Cockrel demonstrated an ability to connect the defense of his clients to the large social 
issues of racism, police brutality, and worker exploitation.  Cockrel famously proclaimed that he 
“would put Chrysler on trial for damages to this man caused by his working conditions” in the 
James Johnson’s trial in 1970.”91  For Cockrel, these cases represented examples of what an 
inside-outside political approach could accomplish. When discussing his prospects for sitting on 
city council, Cockrel credited this strategy for his courtroom successes, “what we’re able to do in 
court was influenced by our ability to generate support for alternative approaches to legal 
problems in the community from which the jurors came.”92  
White leftists in organizations such as Ad Hoc Action Group (Ad Hoc), People Against 
Racism (PAR), and the Detroit Organizing Committee (DOC) provided human and institutional 
support for black radicals and Detroiters who suffered from police brutality. White veteran 
activists such as Sheila Murphy, Frank Joyce, Jim Jacobs, and Jack Russell were central the 
development of the anti-racism wing of the city’s white left.  With their supporters, they co-
sponsored and co-organized various demonstrations as well as political education events such as 
the “From Sun-Down to Sun-Up” political education forums with the Labor Defense Coalition. 
They were also instrumental in developing a left interpretation of police repression, crime, drug 
use, and electoral politics in their pamphlets and newspapers—including the Motor City Labor 
League’s Changeover and From the Ground Up’s Groundwork. 
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Born in 1947, Sheila Murphy “grew up in the Detroit Catholic Worker movement.”93 Her 
Irish-American Catholic parents cared for the poor as they opened and worked in Houses of 
Hospitality during the 1930s.  Her father was a conscientious objector during World War II and 
wrote for the Detroit-based anarchist paper, Catholic Worker. Murphy started her work as a 
secretary in 1966 in the West Central Organization (WCO)—one of the city’s numerous 
neighborhood-based political organizations, for which her parents served as board members.  
Boasting a multiracial membership, the WCO adopted its political organizing strategy 
from the famed neighborhood organizer, Saul Alinsky. The organization predicated itself on 
Alinsky’s concerns for developing power and autonomy among neighborhood residents. The 
WCO struggled for fair housing during Mayor Jerome Cavanagh’s administration during the 
1960s. They organized opposition around Mayor Cavanaugh’s urban renewal plans and the 
expansion of Wayne State’s campus. Murphy first met Cockrel while working for the WCO.  It 
is possible that Murphy’s and subsequently DARE’s pragmatic outlook on participating in 
electoral politics comes from Alinsky’s pragmatism that permeated this organization. 94   
Subsequently, the twenty-one-year-old Murphy helped found the predominantly-white 
Ad Hoc Coalition in 1968 in response to the city’s police department’s excessive and brutal 
policing. For the organization, the answer to the urban crisis lay in radically changing police-
community relations. In an untitled report, the organization called for community control in 
police-community relations.  “There must be Community Control in bringing about a 
revolutionary change in Police-Community Relations. It is urgently necessary that such a 
program be made feasible on a level that will bring significant social change. This urgency is a 
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manifestation of the ‘urban crisis’ that permeates American life,” the organization declared.95 
They organized a police observation program to support black Detroiters.  
Ad Hoc practiced a racial allyhood politics, which entailed practicing anti-racist politics 
on black power activists’ terms. Ad Hoc’s political education program helped shaped the left 
wing of the anti-police brutality movement.  Calling police repression one “of the fundamental 
problems facing white America,” the organization accepted Carmichael’s and Hamilton’s 
challenge to try to educate and organize other whites. They quoted black power activists in their 
report, “’one of the most disturbing things about almost all white supporters is that they are 
reluctant to go into their own communities—which is where the racism exists and work to get rid 
of it.’”96 According to the group, alienation and paternalism represented barriers towards 
effective white anti-racist politics. However, Ad-Hoc failed to identify the source of alienation. 
Ad-Hoc claimed a broad reach with a mailing list of 600 and a 150 person crisis unit.97.98  
One of the organization’s most significant endeavors was its support for members of the 
Republic of New Afrika (RNA) and civil rights activist and Recorder’s Court judge, George 
Crockett, Jr. in the New Bethel cases. Murphy and Ad Hoc assisted the city’s Black United Front 
with organizing a 3,000 person rally in defense of Crockett.99 Murphy remained active in Ad 
Hoc until 1970 where she shifted her focus to working with other whites in the Motor City Labor 
League (MCLL), a multi-issued organization.  
Frank Joyce, born in the Royal Oak suburb of Detroit, and graduated from the same high 
school as Tom Hayden, Dondero High School. Authors Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin state 
                                                 
95 Ad Hoc Action Group, “Report—Final Rough Draft,” (no date) Cockrel Collection, Box 4, Folder 5, WPRL.  
96 Quoted in Ibid. 
97 Ellen Karasik, “The Middle Class ‘Ad Hoc Action’ Group,” Detroit Scopes, May 24, 1969.  
98 Ad-Hoc Action Group, “Report—Final Draft,” Cockrel Papers, Box 4, Folder 5, WPRL. 
99 Geogakas and Surkin, 55-57; Mast, 183; Thompson, Whose Detroit?, 75-77. 
129 
 
that Joyce’s “personal style was very much in the mode of SDS-type radicals of the 1960s.”100 
He involved himself in civil rights and anti-Vietnam work. He worked for the Northern Student 
Movement during the mid-1960s, which was an organization that supported civil rights activism 
in the south and employed white college students to work in northern cities.101 Joyce also sought 
to practice a white anti-racism that accepted the dictates of 1960s black power racial politics. He 
supported the NSM’s decision to become an all-black organization. He stopped working for the 
NSM and founded People Against Racism as a white anti-racist organization with the purpose of 
supporting the work of NSM and other black power organizations. Additionally, PAR aspired to 
confront racism among whites. Jim Jacobs participated in the Students for a Democratic Society 
before working for the local Detroit Organizing Committee. 
In 1970, Black labor radical Mike Hamlin led the formation of the MCLL. The MCLL 
was an umbrella group that included Ad Hoc, People Against Racism, and the Detroit 
Organizing Committee. While it fashioned itself as Marxist-Leninist group struggling to institute 
socialism, the MCLL was primarily an educational and cultural organization. For the MCLL, 
Murphy organized a book club that focused on “local radical history, mass culture, and the use of 
media.” The MCLL also established a publication, Journey, which featured poetry and fiction. 
Jack Russell, who eventually became one of Cockrel’s closest political advisors on economic 
development, got involved with From the Ground Up in 1972, an organizational off-shoot 
comprised of ex-MCLL members. Jack and Michelle Russell also founded the radical From the 
Ground Up Book Store.102  
Soon after the Detroit’s branch of the National Lawyers’ Guild, the Motor City Labor 
League, and the BWC created the Labor Defense Coalition, Cockrel began calling for a coalition 
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politics for the Anti-STRESS movement. 103 In an internal document written in May 1971, the 
LDC declared that the coalition “will be comprised of large number of persons of a variety of 
colors and political beliefs ranging from Marxist-Leninists to liberals.”  In a later statement, the 
LDC affirmed, “The program of LDC is specifically designed and projected to comport with the 
views and aspirations of hundreds of thousands of people in this City.” 104 The LDC also sought 
to build a left coalition within the broader Anti-STRESS coalition. They worked closely with 
two white left organizations—the Motor City Labor League and From the Ground Up. The left 
wing’s coalition strategy illuminates one of the many paths that leftists took in the wake of the 
black power and new left social movements of the 1960s. In contrast to his former colleagues in 
the League of Revolutionary Black Workers who joined “New Communist” groups in the 
aftermath of the League’s collapse in June 1971, Cockrel emphasized the importance of building 
a broader base of supporters around the focal point of racist and violent policing, as part of the 
drive to defeat the DPD’s STRESS program as well as to build a foundation for future political 
endeavors.105  
Anti-repression sentiment extended beyond the city’s radical left. While the city’s 
radicals led the LDC, black and white liberals also voiced their opposition to police repression. 
State Senator Coleman Young, Dr. Charles E. Morton of the Inner City Business Improvement 
Forum, Congressman John Conyers, and members of New Detroit, Inc. were among those who 
opposed police surveillance of the LBRW and other black radicals. In a May 1971 statement 
supporting Cockrel’s and LDC’s efforts, Young said, “We want to wipe out all spying, finks, 
stoolpigeons and wire tappers and put them (the policemen who conduct these surveillance 
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activities) back on the streets to fight crime.”  Young also called Detroit Mayor Gribbs “a puppet 
of the police.”  Lawrence P. Doss, President of New Detroit, Inc. and the Metropolitan Detroit 
AFL-CIO and also expressed their reservations with STRESS in the wake of the September 1971 
shooting deaths of Ricardo Buck and Craig Mitchell.106 A chasm between the city’s radicals like 
Cockrel and liberal politicians such as Young would grow after 1973.  But in this moment, police 
surveillance, brutality, and killings brought liberals and radicals closer together.107108  
Other developments galvanized public opinion against STRESS after the September 1971 
killings. The Wayne County prosecutor’s office cleared Officer Worobec of any wrongdoing in 
less than two weeks following the September 17 shooting.  On October 4, the Detroit City 
Council invited Commissioner Nichols to discuss STRESS’s activities. The meeting swirled with 
contention. While acknowledging the ten deaths at the hands of STRESS, Nichols stressed the 
unit’s 1,747 arrests between January and September 30 as well as a general decline in robberies. 
He also read portions of the DPD’s training manual that explained when officers should resort to 
deadly force. Councilmen Nicholas Hood and Mel Ravitz supported the program, but not the 
killings. Hood declared, “We are all concerned about ways to lessen crime so we have a city 
where it is safe for people to walk the streets…The problem is, and this is the dilemma I face, 
how can we lessen crime and yet remove the impression that this is an execution squad.” A 
group of white homeowners presented the council with a petition supporting STRESS. Kenneth 
Cockrel and others attended in anticipation of council members allowing more Detroiters to 
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testify. Yet, city council members adjourned the meeting without allowing anyone else besides 
Nichols to testify, angering many of the black attendees.109  
While Nichols’s reliance on crime statistics appeared to illustrate STRESS’s 
effectiveness, crime statistics can be manipulated, not only to justify police killings, but to 
racialize a particular group. In effect, Commissioner Nichols was resorting to what historian 
Khalil Gibran Muhammad has called the “condemnation of blackness.” in his constant references 
to crime statistics that stigmatized African Americans. Nichols and the DPD rationalized the 
excesses of STRESS by citing high rates of criminal activity in high crime precincts, many of 
them populated by black Detroiters. Nichols admitted that STRESS officers deployed a racial 
understanding of space to decide how to configure their teams:  “Depending on the time of day 
and the ethnic characteristics of the neighborhood, the race of the officer may give him away, so 
this is important in team composition.”   Moreover, Nichols’s claim that STRESS was the cause 
of declining crime rates was questionable.  The Detroit Commission on Community Relations 
(DCCR) pointed to other likely factors to explain drop in crime rates such as a citizen’s 
unwillingness to report a crime “because of a feeling of futility or a fear of the police” and a 
reluctance to walk city streets because of a fear of crime.110 It is possible that a fear of police 
violence could also deter a black Detroiter from walking the streets.  
Cockrel and the lawyers of the Anti-STRESS coalition embarked on their strategy of 
using the courts to challenge the STRESS program when they took on Nathaniel Johnson’s case 
in December 1971. Johnson was charged with assault with intent to rob STRESS officers after a 
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deadly encounter between the officers and Johnson and Clarence Manning, Jr. STRESS officers 
Michael Worley, who posed as a “hippie”, and Raymond Peterson shot and killed Manning after 
Worley baited him into conversation. Officer Richard Worobec pursued and apprehended 
Johnson.111 
In his defense of Nathan Johnson, Cockrel utilized the same strategy that had made him 
famous in his defenses of the New Bethel One, Two, and James Johnson, Jr. trials—he attacked 
the institutions responsible for the killing. “The real case here is the case against STRESS,” 
Cockrel declared. He continued, “The real case is against those four men out there who 
committed cold-blooded murder. We are not defending a criminal case here—we are prosecuting 
STRESS. The four STRESS officers involved in this incident are cold blooded, murdering liars.” 
He then urged the jury not only to acquit Johnson, but to call for the abolition of STRESS. The 
jurors delivered a non-guilty verdict after fifteen minutes of deliberation. Of course, Cockrel and 
the LDC lawyers knew that the jurors could not issue any resolutions regarding STRESS outside 
of delivering the non-guilty verdict. Yet, the non-guilty verdict for Johnson provided another 
victory for the Left Anti-STRESS coalition as momentum began to build towards its goal of 
abolishing STRESS.112  
 
The Radical Criminology of the Left Wing of the Anti-STRESS Coalition 
 
Members of the Left Anti-STRESS coalition began to articulate their left-wing critique of 
STRESS, the justice system, crime, and drug use in early 1972. Sheila Murphy, Brian Flanigan, 
Margaret Borys, and Kenneth Cockrel all published articles in their organization’s publications. 
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The coalition also held educational forums where they also developed their outlook. The left 
wing developed a radical criminology critiquing the state’s definitions of crime. They also 
grounded their analyses of criminal activity and the drug trade in an anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist framework. 
Historians and scholars rightfully concentrate on the popular and legal challenges to 
STRESS.  But the left-wing’s policy analysis of STRESS is often overlooked. The problem with 
STRESS, according to the Left Anti-STRESS coalition, was that the unit really did not protect 
people, nor did it address the problem of crime. They presented a structural analysis of 
repression and crime that distinguished themselves from the Urban League, Michigan Chronicle, 
and the city’s ministers whom supported the idea of a special unit to address crime, but not the 
brutality of the STRESS program.  Criminal behavior, the radicals argued, had to be seen as a 
product of racism’s and capitalism’s destructive impulses—deindustrialization, corporate power, 
exploitation of workers, and discrimination against black Americans.  Consequently, crime 
represented a social and economic problem, not just a failure of the individual. The liberal 
analysis of crime, as expressed in Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report on the black family and the 
Kerner Commission report, did acknowledge the role that racial discrimination and ghettoization 
played in producing crime and proposed economic solutions. But, the liberal interpretation also 
focused on cultural deficiencies and pathologies such as family breakdown, matriarchy, and the 
absence of a male breadwinner.113  
The left wing of the coalition developed their views of crime along the same vein of other 
radical criminologists. Radical criminology reemerged in the midst of the New Left and Black 
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Power movements and the urban rebellions where leftist activists began questioning liberal 
assumptions undergirding crime and poverty.  Radical criminologists such as Anthony Platt, 
sociologists Herman and Julia Scwendinger, prisoner-activists George Jackson and Angela 
Davis, and organizations such as the American Friends Services Committee argued that it was 
impossible to establish a proper system of criminal justice in a capitalist system. Rather than 
focusing on pathological and behavioral theories of criminal activity, radical criminologists 
argued for an anti-capitalist systemic approach. State definitions of crime downplayed white 
collar and corporate crimes along with what radicals considered crimes of the state such as war 
and imperialism. Criminal justice, for this group of intellectuals and activists, would be grounded 
in “a socialist, human rights definition of crime,” which would view “the state and legal 
apparatus” as a “central focus of investigation as a criminogenic institution.”114  Ultimately, the 
solution to eradicating crime lay in radically restructuring society “and the elimination of 
economic and political systems of exploitation.”115 The left wing of the Anti-STRESS Coalition 
thus anticipated the formation of journals such as Crime and Social Justice that would serve as a 
platform for radical criminology.116  
MCLL activist Sheila Murphy expressed the left critique of STRESS and crime in an 
article published in the January-February 1972 edition of Changeover. After blasting the 
program’s questionable recruitment practices, she wrote, “crimes of violence against people must 
be stopped. But how? The causes of such crimes must be understood. The DPD does not ask 
what the causes are or how, we, as a society can eliminate them.” Murphy then proceeded to link 
what she perceives as capitalism’s tendency to maximize profits at the expense of employment to 
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the rise of crime. “Historically capitalist societies have not achieved full employment of the work 
force. This inability flows from the basic economic principle that in order to maintain the proper 
profit margin, it is necessary that an unemployed segment of the work force exist to keep wages 
down…Those who do not [work] are denied access to the means of survival.” Without the ability 
to earn a living legally, Murphy states, one must rely on crime and violence to survive.117 
Murphy’s analysis reflected what would become a policy concern among many 
progressives and liberals towards the end of the decade—that of full employment. Her analysis 
also points to the crucial question confronting liberals and progressives on the local level—how 
should left-wing activists respond to deindustrialization? And, while Murphy and others would 
not confront this issue until the late 1970s when they worked for DARE, this analysis provoked 
them to wonder if constructing a full employment economy would ever become a viable option 
in the context of corporate-led and driven urban development.  
From the Ground Up built upon Murphy’s analysis in its1973 pamphlet, Detroit Under 
STRESS. According to the pamphlet, the STRESS program demonstrated an understanding of 
crime as a product of deviant behavior. Specifically, it connected rising crime to the damaging 
effects of growing inflation on the nation’s workers and poor, the declining city economy, and 
the absence of social services and job opportunities.  
 
Life in Detroit, as elsewhere in the country, means…food costs that are skyrocketing out of all 
proportion to income. […] It means housing which is either inadequate, unfit to live in, or 
priced beyond one’s ability to pay, particularly because interests rates grow dialing more 
prohibitive. It means poor and inadequate educational opportunities and even poorer and more 
inadequate healthcare. […] Faced with such pressures, it is small wonder that some persons 
resort to ‘street crime.’ Such people mistakenly view burglary, auto theft, or larceny as a way 
to begin to bridge the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots.’ Unfortunately, some are 
even driven to assault, rape or murder by their inability to cope with the frustrations of their 
life situation. One cannot speak of ‘high crime areas’ in Detroit. The entire city is such an 
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area, though sections of the center city, riddled with poverty, police complicity in drug traffic, 
and double high rates of unemployment, are, to be sure, the ‘highest crime areas.’118 
 
From the Ground Up’s analysis also reminded readers of the contradictions caused by chronic 
unemployment, inflation, creative destruction and the perpetuation of normative gender roles. 
While the crisis in the male breadwinning family may not have been a direct cause crime, it 
contributed to what the activists perceived as a growing willingness to participate in illicit 
economic activities:  The document challenged the normative gender roles that undergirded 
family life and labor in the U.S. capitalist economy: “constantly bombarded by advertising in the 
media and elsewhere with that standard of life which the American culture demands that the 
‘good father’ (or mother) provide for his family. One’s role as a man or woman, as a 
provider…is defined by dynamics of socialization which are far beyond the control of the 
ordinary individual as are the economic means to fulfill that role.”119  
 Leftists in the Anti-STRESS coalition also sought to redefine crime.  Viewing STRESS 
as a product of racial and class domination, they argued that the program’s terribly ineffective 
focus on “street crime” obscured the criminal damage inflicted by the wealthy. The writers of the 
pamphlet asserted that “crime is no stranger to this class of people.”  Members of the coalition 
had several prominent examples of government and corporate criminality at their disposal. They 
referenced Watergate, “massive tax evasion,” and “devastation of the environment” as “crimes 
which have far greater economic impact on the society than burglary, auto theft or the like.”120 
FTGU member Margaret Borys published an article about 328 Detroiters suing the Chrysler 
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Corporation over pollution under the Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act of 1970. The 
plaintiffs and Borys deemed the Chrysler Corporation “a public menace.”121  
 According to the left wing of the Anti-STRESS coalition, the police state and downtown 
development also worked in tandem. STRESS represented a far cry from the basic job programs 
that GM, Ford, and other businesses established in the aftermath of the rebellion. Despite New 
Detroit’s race relations advocacy and management, the combination of police repression and 
downtown redevelopment emerged to replace a concern for the “hard core unemployed.”  The 
Left coalition observed,  
 
“In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that revitalization of the center city is a 
requirement of Detroit’s profitable future. Renaissance Center…stands as the tangible 
manifestation of the decision of the affluent to effect the rebirth. […] Set against this 
background, the function of STRESS as a tool of those in power becomes clear. The 
intimidation of the black community, the fostering of racial tension and division, the 
ostensible effort ‘to make the streets safe’ in the center city, all represent an attempt to 
perpetuate the existing structure of the society.”122  
 
The authors of the pamphlet did not present any evidence to back up their claim, but they noticed 
that STRESS and Detroit Renaissance, Inc. had emerged within a year of each other. Left wing 
Anti-STRESS activists may have been correct to see increased policing and downtown 
development as linked considering how Max Fisher’s New Detroit, Inc.-Economic Development 
Subcommittee argued that creating a favorable business climate rested on containing criminal 
activity in 1968.123  
Ultimately, the radicals argued, STRESS and the city’s corporate community resorted to 
both the condemnation of blackness and the “criminalization of urban space” to address the 
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city’s problems with crime and declining economy.124 In other words, corporate downtown 
development depended upon subjecting urban African Americans to increased policing.  
Coalition leaders implied that policies aiming at returning workers and the poor back to the 
center of economic development reflected the best strategy instead of hoping for developers to 
redistribute revenues from office buildings and luxury apartments back to the city’s workers. 
Cockrel argued, “STRESS does not re-order the priorities of an economy in which Chrysler 
Corporation announces that its first year quarter earnings are triple that of last year.”125 Their 
recognition of the connections among municipal, corporate, and police power led members of the 
coalition to challenge these forces directly in court and in electoral politics beginning in the 
spring of 1972.  
 
Spring 1972:  The Turning Point in the Fight against STRESS 
  
Anti-STRESS sentiment among black Detroiters reached its peak in the spring of 1972. 
Ironically, the event that garnered the most attention was a shootout between black STRESS 
officers and Wayne County Sheriff deputies on March 9. That night black STRESS officers 
Virgil Starkey, Ronald Martin, and James Harris saw an armed man enter into an apartment at 
3120 Rochester Street where Wayne County Sheriff Aaron Vincent and his deputies were 
playing a poker game. Martin and Harris followed the man into the apartment after calling for 
reinforcements. The STRESS officers entered into the apartment “with guns blazing.” The 
officers executed Deputy Henry Henderson while he tried to identify himself as law enforcement 
and wounded three other deputies. The “Rochester Street Massacre,” as the Left Anti-STRESS 
coalition called it, finally forced Mayor Gribbs and Commissioner Nichols to reform the unit. 
They instituted a wide range of reforms including more rigorous psychological testing of 
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STRESS personnel, reducing the amount of teams in the unit, and providing more helicopters for 
support. Psychiatrists would also examine any officer involved in a fatal shooting. The reforms 
reflected Gribbs and Nichols’s stubborn commitment to the program in the face of growing black 
anger. Gribbs argued that major crimes had continued to decrease for a sixth month when faced 
with questions about whether or not he should abolish the program. In practice, the reforms 
provided greater protection for the STRESS officers. Nichols planned on adding more manpower 
to “provide better coverage” and “more effective” protection of the program’s decoys. They also 
failed to address the lack of safety and accountability of the police department to the city’s black 
citizens.126  
The Rochester Street incident signaled a watershed moment for Anti-STRESS sentiment 
among black Detroiters. State Representative Daisy Elliot called for Nichols to investigate the 
March 9 shootout. Lawrence Doss of NDI called for the suspension of STRESS until the DPD 
established further reforms including more comprehensive psychological screening of officers, 
the establishment of a “special training program” for STRESS officers, and the assignment of 
sergeants to each STRESS unit.127 Detroit Urban League executive director Francis Kornegay 
even reconsidered his prior support for STRESS. On March 17, he issued a press release calling 
for Gribbs and Nichols to enact more substantial reforms or to get rid of the unit. For some black 
Detroiters, Mayor Gribbs’s reforms were out of the question. On March 26, over 2,000 people 
rallied in support of abolishing STRESS. At a press conference, a range of black organizations 
such as members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the black police 
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organization, the Guardians, the Pan African Congress, and the Michigan delegation to the Gary 
Convention all demanded for the unit should be abolished.128  
Subsequently, Cockrel, Spearman, Ravitz, and the LDC filed a civil lawsuit against 
Gribbs, Nichols, and Wayne County Prosecutor William Cahalan in Wayne County Circuit Court 
demanding the indefinite suspension of STRESS. The LDC sought to use the suit to bring public 
attention to the excesses of the STRESS program. Specifically, they sought to subpoena Nichols, 
Gribbs, and Cahalan in an effort to place the police unit on trial. The complaint detailed fifteen 
deaths that allegedly were the responsibility of STRESS. The suit also called for the appointment 
of a special prosecutor to prosecute Gribbs, Cahalan, and Nichols “where proper” and others 
“found to have engaged in criminal offenses.” 129 
 Thirty organizations, citizens, and activists signed on as plaintiffs to the LDC suit, 
underscoring the breadth of the Anti-STRESS coalition. Consistent with the LDC’s goal of 
building a coalition that spanned from liberals to the left, the lawsuit contained members of the 
city’s civil rights, labor, and left wing communities. Many of the moderate organizations that 
supported the September 1971 demonstration, such as the NAACP and the Guardians of 
Michigan, signed on as plaintiffs of the case. Other liberal organizations such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Coordinating Council on Human Relations signed onto 
the lawsuit as well. White leftists Frank Joyce and Sheila Murphy lent their names whereas 
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AFSCME, Foundry Workers for Action Caucus, and the Wolverine Worker’s Alliance were 
among the labor organizations that supported the lawsuit.130  
Nichols, Gribbs, and Cahalan had good reason to fear the case would proceed because it 
appeared on Judge Edward Bell’s docket. Bell was a black judge who was willing to hear the 
case. However, Cahalan, Gribbs, and Nichols all successfully petitioned the Michigan State 
Court of Appeals to have their names eliminated from the lawsuit and to protect STRESS 
officers from further legal action. Cockrel, Ravitz, and the LDC promised they would appeal the 
Court’s decision, but to no avail. The failed lawsuit led Cockrel and other members of the 
coalition began to turn to another strategy to confront police repression and the larger question 
concerning the inequities in the municipal and county criminal justice system —electoral 
politics.131  
 
The Left’s Electoral Turn:  The 1972 Election of Justin Ravitz to Recorders Court Judge 
 
Justin Ravitz’s campaign for Recorder’s Court judge in 1972 marked the first entry of the 
city’s radical Anti-STRESS coalition into electoral politics. Justin Ravitz was raised in a modest 
Jewish family in Omaha, Nebraska and attended Babson College in Massachusetts. By 1965, 
Ravitz had earned a master’s degree in international relations from the University of 
Pennsylvania and a law degree at the University of Michigan. He befriended Cockrel upon 
moving to Detroit.  Ravitz and Cockrel built a relationship in the same way several of the 
League’s leaders fostered theirs—through rap sessions about politics. Eventually, Cockrel, 
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Ravitz and others joined together to found a law firm, Philo, Maki, Ravitz, Pitts, Moore, Cockrel, 
& Robb.132  
Ravitz explained its rationale for running for public office in an internal draft of the 
campaign’s training manual:  “We are jointly about the business of developing a competent and 
solid political base comprised of people who share a vision of building a more humane and 
rational society.”133 Electoral politics for the Anti-STRESS coalition fulfilled other purposes. 
First, they thought controlling a bench could help address injustice in the city’s justice system. 
By winning the seat, Ravitz could directly affect the lives of the hundreds of Detroiters who 
enter into his courtroom. The campaign estimated that Ravitz would be able to decide the fates of 
upwards 1,500 Detroiters a year. Ravitz also argued that he would make for an effective critic 
and advocate for a fairer justice system when he was outside the courtroom:  “the justices never 
criticize their ‘colleagues’ and bring…important questions to the attention of the people. Justin 
will do this—thru the media and thru maintaining constant contact speaking to people throughout 
this city. This is EXTERNAL work.” A judge Ravitz could be the first person from the Anti-
STRESS left wing to demonstrate an inside-outside strategy of left municipal politics.134 
Second, members of the left-led electoral campaign saw their efforts as a means to taking 
over municipal institutions. Cockrel alluded to this aspiration as a member of the League on 
multiple occasions.135 Ravitz’s campaign recalls Sheila Murphy’s interpretation of the Anti-
STRESS campaign as an effort to take power back from Gribbs, Nichols, “and the people they 
work for.”136 From the Ground Up argued in their program that they “must organize politically to 
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take political and economic control.”137  On the other hand, for the activists, the strategy of 
taking control of institutions represented a pragmatic decision. Cockrel, Murphy and others knew 
that the courts, city council, and city hall were the places where people with power made the 
crucial decisions.  
For the Anti-STRESS coalition, taking power meant using electoral campaigns to build a 
social movement in the medium-term and an independent left-wing political machine in the long-
term. Thus, electoral campaigns were, for Cockrel and his allies, extensions of their political 
education efforts. According to Georgakas and Surkin, “This group was convinced that the 
electoral process was a viable means of educating the public on issues, of propagandizing wider 
solutions, and of winning some limited power.”138 They sought to lay the foundations for an 
inside-out strategy of political organization. 
Much of Ravitz’s campaign staff were veterans of the city’s new left and Anti-STRESS 
coalitions—Margaret Borys, Lynda Chabot, Brian P. Flanigan, Jim Ingram, Frank Joyce and 
Sheila Murphy.  Murphy served as Justin Ravitz’s campaign manager.139 Yet, most of the 
campaign workers, according to Borys, “had little or no prior electoral experience…”140 The 
Ravitz campaign published an organizing manual—“A Mini Manual of Criminal Justice”—
outlining Ravitz’s and the coalition’s views on electoral politics, the criminal justice system, and 
heroin use. Despite the campaign’s lack of electoral experience and its lack of funds, Borys 
argued that the campaign was more organized than Ravitz’s opponents. The Ravitz campaign 
successfully recruited more than 400 unpaid volunteers to work the polls during the general 
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election. Borys also reported after the campaign that the number of Ravitz’s contributors “greatly 
outnumbered that of any other candidate.”141  
Ravitz grounded his campaign platform in the left wing critique of crime and a reformist 
agenda. The campaign claimed that the city’s criminal justice system “helps maintain and 
perpetuate crime.”142 Ravitz advanced a radical critique of the city’s justice system. He criticized 
the police, bail system, courts, prisons, and the heroin economy. Ravitz argued that prisons failed 
to prevent crime, they bred illicit activity. Instead of rehabilitating inmates, the campaign 
contended, prisons merely served to segregate them from the rest of society.143 By calling the 
city’s justice system “an assembly line” Ravitz alluded to the way that it produced criminals and 
inmates via the repressive policing and the institution of what Ravitz referred to as the 
“Philadelphia Plan” where the state would elevate criminal charges with the intent of convicting 
suspects on lesser charges.144 The assembly line metaphor pointed to how various institutions 
inside and outside of the Detroit’s justice system—city hall, police, prosecutors, judges, jails, 
prisons, and illicit markets—took the poor, or “hard core unemployed,” and warehoused them.  
The Ravitz campaign advanced an economic critique of the city’s bail system. Ravitz 
called it “the ransom system of checkbook justice.” He insinuated that judges used bail to 
unreasonably detain suspects who tended to be poorer. “Poor people go to the Wayne County Jail 
while rich people (when charged) go free. A $100 bond for an indigent is preventative 
detention!”145 Ravitz argued that bail bondsmen’s sole purpose was to profit “off of human 
misery.” Their campaign also pointed to the bondsmens’ campaign contributions to judges and 
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their lobby in Lansing as evidence of their political organization. Ravitz promised to reform the 
city’s bail system… 
The Ravitz Campaign also articulated a critique of the political economy of the heroin 
trade. Heroin use became a problem in the city during the early 1970s [check]. According to the 
campaign, there were about “30,000 or more” heroin addicts in Detroit. Ravitz argued that jailing 
addicts and initiatives such as STRESS hindered the city from confronting the problem at its 
source—the wholesaler. For Ravitz’s campaign, justice lay in prosecuting corporations and the 
system for criminal activity rather than individual drug sellers in the underground economy with 
the intent of eradicating unlawful drug trafficking.  
Left wing members of the coalition contended that the proliferation of the heroin trade 
and drug use resulted from U.S. imperialism, specifically the war in Indochina.  In an article in 
Groundwork, May Weinbaum described the connection between U.S. imperialism, multinational 
capitalism and the heroin trade at home as the “heroin empire.” She compared large dealers to 
global capitalists, “They may be dope pushers, but they are also pushers of Shell Oil, Ford Motor 
Company, etc….who are waiting in line for Indochina’s markets…”146  Weinbaum proceeded to 
argue that the U.S. took political advantage of the development of domestic drug markets. The 
anti-repression coalition believed that drugs pacified urban blacks. The drug trade also 
‘manufactured’ more fodder for the local criminal justice system.  
Ravitz, and members of the Left Coalition, did not really present any explicit evidence 
for their political and economic critiques of the heroin trade, relying instead on mainstream 
media sources, including the New York Times as well as leftist sources like Ramparts and 
Monthly Review. Frank Browning and Banning Garrett of Ramparts argued that Nixon’s policy 
of extend the war into Laos, they argued, intensified the trade. “Nixon is widening the war in 
                                                 
146 May Weinbaum, “The Heroin Empire,” Groundwork, July-August 1973.  
147 
 
Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the 
world’s supply of the narcotic, for which the U.S. is the chief consumer,” they declared. The 
authors maintained that Cold War policy altered opium supply networks and, in some cases, 
helped facilitate it’s distribution by supplying the Laotian air force with helicopters and planes.  
In the Monthly Review, Sol Yurick analyzed a “new” agent in local economies—the 
addict. He argued that the addict “is a social type generated in response to changes in the social 
economy in a time of world crisis.”147 Essentially, the creative destruction of particular urban 
economies via public and private policy engendered the emergence of illicit drug markets and 
consumers. Drug consumption represented a market and psychological response to deteriorating 
conditions. Once considered a target for public policy, the urban worker became the target of a 
drug market abetted by U.S. foreign policy and domestic neglect. For Yurick and the Anti-
STRESS coalition, the criminalized addict became the human signifier of the coming of what 
Daniel Bell later called “the coming of post-industrial society”148 
Ravitz led the field of forty-two candidates in the August 1972 primary. His 130,514 
votes were enough to finish second in the November 7 general election.  Left wing members of 
the Anti-STRESS coalition considered Ravitz’s election a clear victory. It demonstrated that a 
self-espoused radical could win political office in Detroit and laid the foundation for future 
electoral action.149 In November 1972, Margaret Borys, published an article that detailed the 
Ravitz campaign strategy. She declared “The Ravitz Campaign understood that we can neither 
litigate nor elect our way to liberation, but selective and serious entries into each arena can 
advance the building of a socialist society.” She then argued, “The political objectives of the 
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Ravitz Campaign are continuing ones:  (1) to build class solidarity by organizing a self-conscious 
and anti-racist white movement; (2) to take leadership in the implementation of transitional 
reforms and demands; and (3) to achieve a mass multi-racial, independent, radical people’s 
political movement—a movement conscious of the need and value of victories, unafraid and 
relentless in its pursuit of power.” 150  Borys’s points epitomize what would become the 
Cockrel’s and DARE’s pragmatic view of the use of electoral politics as an avenue for radicals to 
gain political power. For Cockrel, DARE, and their allies, the road towards radical social change 
lay within the city’s political institutions—the courts, mayor’s office and city council.151  
 
The Left Anti-STRESS Coalition and the Election of Coleman Young 
 
 
With the turmoil accompanying STRESS, it was clear that police-community relations 
would emerge as one of the most significant issues in the 1973 mayoral election. Consequently, 
the local press contemplated whether or not two of the most prominent figures in the city—
Police Commissioner John Nichols and black radical lawyer Kenneth Cockrel—would run in the 
primary. Michigan Chronicle asked in its January 12 edition:  “Nichols vs. Cockrel for Mayor?” 
When asked by reporters about a potential run, Nichols was mum about such plans.  “I’m a 
policeman, not a politician,” he said.152 
The concept of a Cockrel candidacy was not too fanciful.  Michigan Chronicle named 
him one of the “Black Detroiters to watch” at the beginning of 1972.153 Cockrel forces explored 
the possibility of a Cockrel mayoral run later that year. On June 8, a group of “young Blacks and 
whites” formed the “Draft Cockrel for Mayor Committee” and issued a press release calling for 
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Cockrel to run for mayor.  Two hundred Cockrel supporters gathered three days later at the 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport to back the committee.154 The committee argued that Cockrel was 
the best person to confront suburbanization and “the rapidly deteriorating economic base of the 
city.”155  Michigan Chronicle journalist Bill Black also reported that the coalition used the rally 
to support universal health care and full employment. Cockrel attended and addressed the crowd, 
but he declined the draft at the time. He said his candidacy depended upon the degree of popular 
support he could earn.  
Cockrel sought Julian Bond’s endorsement of a potential campaign that October.156 Many 
black Detroiters, and some in the media, saw Cockrel as a legitimate candidate. According to the 
Michigan Chronicle, what distinguished Cockrel from other black activists were his tendencies 
to back up his flamboyant rhetoric with action. “The feeling among young Blacks…is that only 
Ken Cockrel ‘acts’ while the others ‘rap.’” Cockrel, ultimately, decided not to run. He only 
wanted to run if he had popular support and, like in Ravitz’s case, if he could win. “We know we 
could run this city,” Cockrel said in an interview.157 Even though Cockrel stayed out of the race, 
Ravitz’s win and Cockrel’s flirtations with a mayoral run pointed to how Cockrel was leaning 
towards an explicit electoral focus.  
Not everyone in the coalition supported Cockrel’s electoral efforts, however. The issue of 
electoral and coalition politics created friction among members of the city’s white left cadre 
organizations (MCLL and FTGU) in the wake of Ravitz’s victory. Members of MCLL thought 
the Ravitz’s campaign turned into an organizational surrogate for Cockrel’s political ambitions. 
White members of the MCLL such as Frank Joyce were skeptical of whether or not leftists could 
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actually achieve radical change through electoral politics. Some believed the Ravitz campaign’s 
professed support for a possible Cockrel mayoral campaign in 1973 compromised the 
organization’s ideological integrity and political independence.158 Surprisingly, Justin Ravitz 
also voiced his disapproval of Cockrel running for mayor in a memo addressed to Cockrel and 
Murphy. Ravitz opposed a Cockrel candidacy at that time because of pragmatic concerns, not 
ideological ones. Ravitz expressed concern about whether or not the campaign could mobilize 
the human resources necessary to build a mass multiracial organization capable of winning the 
election. Ravitz did not believe they could build that type of organization solely through an 
electoral campaign, especially if they should lose. However, Ravitz and others reversed their 
course when Cockrel decided to run for city council in 1977.159 
While Coleman Young cited Richard Austin as the early favorite among the city’s black 
population,160 Austin chose not to run. Cockrel’s and Austin’s decisions to stay out of the race 
meant that state senator Coleman Young would not have to face two of the city’s most 
formidable black leaders in the primary. A former black radical with union roots, Young ran 
successfully for a state senate seat in 1964 and won. Young remained an ally of the city’s Anti-
STRESS forces as he fought against police repression from Lansing. He co-chaired a committee 
against political repression with John Conyers and fought unsuccessfully to establish a civilian 
review board to curb STRESS’s excesses.161 Without having to compete with two of Detroit’s 
more prominent black leaders, Young could capitalize on the city’s sizable black population and 
the black population’s discontent with excessive policing and crime, especially if he had to face 
an unpopular police commissioner in Nichols.  
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Coleman Young’s rise appeared to signal the ascendancy of a working-class oriented 
black power in Detroit. He hailed from a working class, military, and organized labor 
background. Young served in the military as a second lieutenant for the Tuskegee Airmen and 
worked for the Ford Motor Company. In 1943, Young joined the UAW in the midst of the sit-
down strikes in Flint. And like Cockrel and other black labor radicals in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Young often clashed with UAW leadership. Walter Reuther purged Young and other 
members of the union’s left-wing in the midst of the Red Scare of the early 1950s.  Young 
continued his labor organizing as a member of the National Negro Labor Council (NNLC). He 
gained national notoriety in 1952 for standing up to Georgia congressman John Wood while 
testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC).162  
While serving as a State Senator for nine years, Young rose quickly through the 
Democratic Party’s ranks. His fellow Democrats elected him minority floor leader in 1966. 
Young supported legislation aimed at protecting the workers, the poor, and the state’s African 
American population such as increasing Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) benefits, open 
housing, protecting residents from urban renewal displacement, and a bail bond law which 
allowed the accused to pay 10 percent of bail to the court.163 Now, Young stood a great chance of 
becoming Detroit’s first black mayor.  
Young, Nichols, and white liberal city councilman Mel Ravitz were among the nineteen 
candidates who had entered the mayoral primary.  Young also had to contend with another 
prominent black Detroiter, Judge Edward Bell who stepped down from his position as judge on 
Wayne County Circuit Court in the midst of the Left Anti-STRESS Coalition to focus on his 
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mayoral campaign.164 Young appeared to be a longer shot than expected. He finished fifth in an 
early poll. The UAW’s Community Action Program endorsed Ravitz.  The UAW’s failure to 
endorse Young stung the candidate, his black supporters, and the rank and file. According to 
journalist Nadine Brown, the UAW’s actions “angered many union members and sent them to 
his rescue.”165 The endorsement of Rev. Cleage’s Black Slate helped solidify black support 
behind Young.166  In the August primary, Young finished second to Nichols and thus advanced 
to the November runoff election.  
Cockrel and the Left Anti-STRESS Coalition tacitly endorsed Young in the general 
election despite their weariness with the city’s liberal establishment. In a Groundwork article 
analyzing the Young-Nichols contest, Brian Flanigan highlighted Young’s Anti-STRESS views. 
Flanigan also quoted one of Young’s campaign promises that the coalition, and many within the 
city’s black population, cherished:  Young’s guarantee to fire Nichols promptly should he win.167 
B.P Flanigan continued the left wing’s attack on Nichols as well, calling him “racist” and 
reminding readers that Nichols was the one responsible for STRESS.168  
Cockrel’s discussion of Young’s candidacy in an interview that appeared in the 
July/August 1973 edition of Groundwork highlighted the coalition’s ambivalence towards the 
city’s liberal elite. Cockrel identified Young as the “closest to an individual with whom we could 
work.” Yet, Cockrel maintained his, if not the coalition’s, desires to build an independent left 
political force in the city.  Cockrel wondered what kind of role the UAW would play in Young’s 
coalition, considering its “illusory kind of image as being liberal and progressive…” It is evident 
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that Cockrel appreciated Young’s criticisms of police repression and the potential that he would 
follow through. However, Cockrel’s skepticism of a return of liberal-labor coalition and his 
clearer advocacy of building an independent politics signaled that he was drawing a line between 
Young’s coalition and his. It also underscored a hope that their manifestation of a left 
independent politics could become a force that Young and his coalition would have to respect.169 
STRESS and crime emerged as the most significant issues in the 1973 mayoral election. 
Young often promised to abolish STRESS. During his first public debate with Nichols, Young 
reminded the audience that he would end STRESS. Young combined his critique of STRESS 
with strong law and order rhetoric. During his first public debate with Nichols, Young said he 
aimed to “run the muggers and drifters off the streets.” He referred to criminals as “jackals” and 
“thugs.” 170  Young argued that, even with STRESS, Nichols and the police department failed to 
curb the city’s crime.171 Consequently, Young contended that he would combine abolishing 
STRESS with implementing more reforms aimed at improving the quality of policing. This 
included recruiting and hiring more black police officers. Young also argued that rebuilding the 
neighborhoods and revitalizing downtown would also aid in deterring criminal activity. Young’s 
Anti-STRESS politics and reformism left Nichols on the defensive. 172  
Ultimately, Young connected Nichols’ mayoral bid with the others mounted by police 
chiefs across the country. He thought a Nichols win would contribute to the emergence of what 
he called a “coast-to-coast police state.”173 What is ironic is that Young was not just arguing for 
who should run the cities, but, who should oversee the draconian police regimes emerging to 
                                                 
169 “An Interview with Kenneth Cockrel,” Groundwork, July/August 1973. 
170 Nadine Brown, “Nichols, Young Square Off,” Michigan Chronicle, October 13, 1973; Thompson, “Coleman 
Young of Detroit,” in African-American Mayors:  Race, Politics, and the American City, ed. David R. Colburn and 
Jeffrey S. Adler (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 2001), 236.  
171 Thompson, “Coleman Young of Detroit,” 236.-237.  
172 Rich, 105; Jacoby, 308; Thompson, Whose Detroit?, 1987-198/  
173 Young and Wheeler, 198.  
154 
 
contain the growing criminal activity in the nation’s declining cities. Young’s insinuation that 
downtown revitalization could also curb crime illustrated the interconnectedness of increased 
policing and private sector-led development that the anti-repression left argued against in their 
Anti-STRESS pamphlet.  
Coleman Young barely defeated Nichols in the general election, joining other newly-
elected black mayors Thomas Bradley in Los Angeles and Maynard Jackson in Atlanta in 1973.  
Young won with almost 52% of the vote and by a margin of less than 4% of all votes cast. 
Young’s victory was a direct result of the city’s demographic change. Detroit lost 117,000 
people in the three years before the election. By the time of the election, the city’s blacks 
constituted more than half of the city’s eligible voters.174   
These demographic changes signaled the defining irony of black urban power. Young, 
like other black mayors, entered into city halls as whites and middle class blacks were leaving 
for the suburbs. Also, Detroiters elected a mayor who had to contend with Nixon’s restructuring 
of urban policy, the OPEC oil shock, and corporate disinvestment. As Grace Lee Boggs 
reflected, “What Young did not realize was how much the game had changed. By 1974, the year 
he was inaugurated, U.S. corporations were going multinational and deindustrializing Detroit.” 
Young may have emphasized the salience of racial polarization after his victory. That did not 
mean that he was less aware of the global restructuring of corporations like General Motors as 
leftists who would establish progressive organizations such as the Ohio Public Interest Campaign 
and the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy. Yet, Young governed within the confines set 
by constraining national and state policy and the increasingly dire economic situation.  Doing so 
included governing with the at least tacit support of local private developers and corporate 
                                                 
174 Remer Tyson, “Coleman Young:  Street wise and Canny,” The Nation, December 24, 1973; Rich, 103.  
155 
 
elites.175 Cockrel and DARE, in contrast, thought they could confront corporate flight by 
regulating their expansion or developing more democratically-controlled local economies.176 
While Young struggled to revitalize Detroit, he was able to fulfill one of his main 
campaign promises. On February 13, 1974, he eliminated the STRESS unit. Young also 
announced a broader reorganization of the city’s police force, establishing fifty “mini-police” 
stations throughout the city. Young expressed respect for residents’ civil liberties. Young ordered 
all officers “to halt all acts of disrespect toward any citizens.” He also assured that “all officers 
shall be instructed that in strict enforcement of the laws any violation of a citizen’s rights will 
result in discipline and possible prosecution.”177 
 
Conclusion 
Cockrel’s and the city’s left-wing’s participation in the Anti-STRESS movement 
illustrated how using progressive politics—the combination of radical analysis, coalition-
building, and reformist strategy—to address the focal point of policing could deliver a 
consequential victory for the Detroit’s black residents during the early 1970s. Members of the 
Anti-STRESS coalition dramatized the DPD’s police killings of black Detroiters through the 
courts and in marches and demonstrations. The Anti-STRESS coalition took advantage of 
political opportunities presented by the September 1971 killings of Buck and Mitchell as well as 
the Rochester Street Massacre to galvanize more opposition against deadly police tactics.  
Previous instances of surveillance and violent repression during the late-1960s and early-
1970s helped forge a left-liberal consensus around police reform. Radical lawyers such as 
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Kenneth Cockrel challenged Detroit law enforcement’s racist tactics while defending black 
activists in court. Future mayor Coleman Young also spoke out against the harassment of black 
activists. Yet, it was the killings of black teenagers by the STRESS that forged a coalition of 
black power and new left activists and members of Detroit’s liberal, civil rights, and labor 
organizations.  
Left-wing members of the coalition such as Sheila Murphy devised and articulated a 
radical analysis of criminal activity and policing. They argued that STRESS served to contain the 
Detroit’s black and poor populations, especially as the city’s business leaders and real estate 
developers aimed to revitalize downtown. Murphy and others also challenged behavioral and 
cultural understandings of crime. They contended that crime was a product of capitalism as it 
employers’ desires to maximize profit resulted in unemployment. Structural employment, left-
wing activists reasoned, left displaced workers with little recourse but to resort to participate in 
illicit markets. Justin Ravtiz stressed how the city’s criminal justice system further perpetuated 
poverty as poorer suspects had to pay bail. Murphy, Ravitz, and the Coalition’s left-wing 
stressed the need for law enforcement to prosecute white-collar crime. They also argued that 
U.S. military involvement in Indochina helped facilitate heroin distribution throughout the global 
drug market.  
The Coalition’s popular mobilizations and the left-wing’s legal strategy raised awareness 
and placed pressure on the campaign’s targets—Police Commissioner John Nichols, Mayor 
Roman Gribbs, and Wayne County Prosecutor William Cahalan. Activists successfully pushed 
Nichols to reform STRESS in March 1972. However, Coleman Young’s mayoral election led to 
the abolishment of STRESS. However, the left-wing’s electoral strategy highlighted tensions 
among radicals. Many leftists supported Ravitz’s decision to run for Recorder’s Court Judge in 
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1972. This aspect of their electoral strategy was consistent with black and white leftists’ desires 
to transform criminal justice through established institutions. However, some white activists 
expressed skepticism about the prospects of electoral politics delivering radical transformation. 
Some activists grew disconcerted with what they saw as a development of personality politics 
around Kenneth Cockrel. They feared the Ravitz campaign was turning into a Cockrel electoral 
operation.  
These tensions around electoral and social movement politics among the left-wing 
activists, however, were longstanding. The League of Revolutionary Black Workers also split 
around a social movement and electoral strategy during the late-1960s, with Cockrel, Hamlin, 
and Watson joining the Black Workers Congress. Another split among the BWC occurred, 
however, with Cockrel working exclusively with the Labor Defense Coalition to abolish 
STRESS. Pragmatism prevailed in the debate about Cockrel’s political ambitions. Instead of 
running, Cockrel and the left-wing through their support behind Coleman Young’s candidacy. 
Ravitz’s election set the stage for Cockrel’s campaign for city council in 1977.  
Cockrel and the rest of the anti-repression left were still a long way from creating a left 
progressive organization devoted to addressing deindustrialization directly. Yet, they continued 
to argue for the development of a left independent political force in city politics after Young’s 
election. On November 20, 1973, the coalition held a panel discussion to reflect on Detroit’s 
mayoral election featuring Ravitz, Cockrel, and The Guardian’s Executive Editor, Irwin Silber. 
Ravitz maintained that the coalition remained focused on “building an independent political 
machine” and “taking over the institutions that have oppressed us for years.” Ravitz reiterated 
the coalition’s Anti-STRESS politics, especially its connection to the decline of U.S. imperialism 
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and the nation’s economy. Ravitz argued that the American system of imperialism and capitalism 
had entered into a decline as millions descended into poverty and criminal activity.  
Cockrel built on Ravitz’s argument for a left independent politics by critiquing the 
coalition’s predecessors—the Motor City Labor League, League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers, and the Black Workers Congress. Cockrel argued that there was a disconnect between 
these organizations’ exceptional ability to critique society and their unwillingness to engage in 
activities—electoral politics and municipal control—that he believed could lead to the type of 
political conflict these radical organizations desired.  
This was not the first time Cockrel criticized the city’s black radical organizations in a 
coalition-sponsored forum. In May 1973, Cockrel offered his history of black radicalism in 
Detroit since the 1967 rebellion. He argued that few of the organizations, including organizations 
he led and/or affiliated himself with including League of Revolutionary Black Workers that 
emerged from the 1967 riot ultimately failed to serve the black masses. “We’ve all failed,” 
Cockrel declared.178  What distinguished Cockrel’s post-election discussion was his ability to 
differentiate the Anti-STRESS coalition’s politics from the previous ones of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s more clearly. Cockrel called explicitly for a “progressive” multiracial and 
metropolitan electoral strategy.  
The only way that we can get out of the box of racial division between the urban area and the 
suburban area is that we develop a people’s movement inside of the city that is constituted not 
just of black people but that is constituted also of white people who have the capacity to begin 
to organize in the suburbs around the objective reality of the fact our destiny is inextricably 
intertwined with the destiny of people who in fact live in suburbia.179 
 
Cockrel’s thoughts about metropolitan-wide political organization resemble some of Young’s 
views on the issue:  “I think we must recognize that there is a commonality of interest for the 
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white population and the black population in the cities and in the suburbs and deal with it from 
that point of view.”180 The remaining questions for both forces moving forward is whether or not 
they could follow through on those aspirations successfully and what ideological shade would 
their politics look like—liberal or progressive?  
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Chapter 3 
 
Indochina, the Focal Point of U.S. Empire:  The IPC and the Final Campaign to End the 
War  
 
 
 
The last phase of the struggle to end the war in Vietnam began on a rainy September 
night in Columbus, Ohio in 1972. There, Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, Holly Near, and former 
POW George Smith delivered a presentation to 300 people about the continuing conflict in 
Indochina. The exhibition featured entertainment, slideshows composed from photos 
documenting the war, and speeches. During the presentation, Fonda and Near explained the 
group’s primary goal—to galvanize opposition against Nixon and to rally “middle America” 
against the war. The affair “ended with people taking literature and hugging goodbye.” Fonda, 
Hayden, Near, and Smith were “coming home,” Hayden wrote. 1 
Hayden, Fonda, and the others repeated the same performance to a crowd at two more 
state fairs that night. The last presentation in Dayton attracted 1,200 people despite starting at 
midnight. The reception easily exceeded the activists’ expectations. Hayden had expressed 
apprehension about launching an antiwar campaign aimed at “mainstream” Americans. 
However, he and his fellow activists also believed that organizing Americans in the coastal states 
would not be enough to defeat President Nixon’s war policy. Hayden’s associates agreed that 
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they could not end the war without garnering support from midwesterners.2  Yet, the positive 
response they received from Ohioans instilled confidence in Hayden and the rest of the group. 
From then on, they referred to the tour’s launch as “the miracle.” Encouraged by the positive 
reception, Fonda and Hayden decided to establish a national organization, the Indochina Peace 
Campaign (IPC), with the intent of mobilizing public pressure to end the war.  
This chapter analyzes the successful campaign to end the war in Indochina during 
between 1972 and 1975. Similar to the Anti-STRESS campaign, IPC’s efforts represented a key 
example of progressive politics during the 1970s. The organization articulated a radical analysis 
of U.S. involvement in Indochina that connected the economy, corrupt executive power, and 
foreign policy. The group combined their radical analysis of war and imperialism with a 
pragmatic strategy. They linked popular mobilization and local action with a national 
congressional lobbying strategy to cut off spending on the war. Hayden and the IPC devised a 
method of analysis and organizing—focal point theory—that guided the campaign’s strategy. In 
an effort to appeal to non-leftist Americans, Hayden and the organization avoided Marxist-
Leninist terminology in its effort to popularize its view of the war.  
This analysis of IPC challenges declension narratives of the U.S. left and the antiwar 
movement. 3  Most scholars of the antiwar movement and the U.S. Left, with the exception of 
Charles DeBenedetti, have ignored the intellectual and political contributions of IPC to the 
1970s, focusing instead on the decline of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the 
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fracture of the New Left.4 However, this chapter shows that one cannot analyze the antiwar 
movement without accounting for IPC’s contributions. It served as an example of the success of 
left progressive coalition politics during the 1970s. The IPC worked with liberal Democrats to 
mobilize opposition against the Nixon Administration’s and the Pentagon’s military aid 
packages. The IPC laid the groundwork for future left progressive organizations devoted to 
addressing plant closure and economic recession.  
The IPC represented an organizational and strategic departure from the radical antiwar 
movement of the mid-to-late 1960s. What distinguished IPC from its predecessor organization, 
the Students for a Democratic Society, was its willingness to take a pragmatic path towards 
ending the war. Hayden’s and IPC’s strategic decision to eschew Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and 
analysis that remained salient among others in the radical New Left represented an example of 
the group’s pragmatism. The IPC retained a radical analysis of the war, but Hayden, one of the 
group’s leading spokespeople and intellectuals, sought to translate the organization’s anti-
imperialist views to Americans viewed leftist politics skeptically. IPC’s pragmatic approach also 
reflected a geographic consciousness. Stopping Nixon and the war meant appealing to “middle 
America” and thus the group concentrated its initial efforts in organizing opposition to President 
Nixon in Midwestern states such as Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. The organization envisioned 
itself as a single-issue organization rather than as one that sought to radically transform society 
like the SDS. Concerned that a majority of Americans were no longer paying attention to the war 
in Indochina because of Nixon’s troop drawdowns and the 1973 Peace Agreement, Hayden, 
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Fonda, and others such as Ira Arlook mounted a campaign to build a progressive majority against 
continued U.S. involvement in the region.   
Tom Hayden’s and IPC’s major intellectual and strategic contribution to left-wing 
progressivism during the 1970s and 1980s was the group’s articulation of “focal point theory.” 
Drawing from, North Vietnamese Communist leader, Trường Chinh, focal point theory” 
suggested that one could oppose U.S. empire by identifying a pressure point—Indochina—and 
stopping U.S. involvement there.5 Rather than the war in Indochina symbolizing a manifestation 
of the “highest stage of capitalism,” or as a military blunder, the IPC saw Indochina as the place 
where multiple contradictions clashed—capitalism and communism and national liberation and 
imperialism.6 Moreover, combining the focal point theory with a campaign strategy focused 
solely on defunding the war left the ideological basis of U.S. foreign policy, and the economic 
interests of military-industrial complex, intact even as the country emerged from the conflict 
with its collective psyche battered. 
The IPC combined a radical analysis with popular mobilization and an insider political 
strategy. The IPC self-consciously organized itself as a campaign. 7 The campaign was a self-
contained effort with one goal in mind—stopping U.S. intervention in Indochina. Similar to 
Detroit’s left wing of the anti-STRESS movement, the IPC featured various tactics that included 
organizing demonstrations, petitioning citizens to raise awareness around the war, and using their 
Indochina Peace Pledge to lobby local elected officials and members of U.S. Congress. The IPC 
targeted antiwar Democrats and Republicans dismayed about Nixon’s Watergate scandal in their 
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congressional strategy. Congress such as California congressman Ronald Dellums and 
incorporated political lobbying of members of Congress and local elected officials with outreach 
to the Vietnamese, direct action, and political education. IPC’s strategy worked as successfully 
pushed Congress to deny Nixon’s, and Ford’s, administrations resources to continue U.S. 
military involvement in Indochina.  
The IPC sought to take advantage of what it called the “Watergate Opportunity.” The 
organization believed that revelations around the break-in at the Watergate Hotel in June 1972 
threw the war in Indochina, and thus U.S. imperialism, into crisis. The organization thus 
grounded its arguments against the war in distrust in the executive branch of government. The 
logic governing the Watergate scandal—the use of executive power to embark on illegal 
activities—, the IPC argued, also underlay the Nixon Administration’s clandestine strategy in 
Indochina. The only way to address the crisis of executive power and in American Empire that 
the Watergate scandal exposed was to build a broad antiwar majority to acquire a greater say in 
U.S. foreign affairs. The IPC aimed to capitalize on Watergate in their campaign to convince the 
U.S. Congress to cut off financing for the war. The IPC ultimately saw Nixon and the executive 
branch of government as the weak spot, or “focal point,” in American power.  
In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon, the IPC’s “focal point” method of analysis and 
campaign politics shaped the Ohio IPC’s turn toward economic progressivism. By the mid-
1970s, the focal point for Ohio IPC activists shifted from U.S. military power to the economic 
policies of multinational corporations. Ohio IPC activists chafed at the undemocratic nature of 
corporate capitalism and thought the next best step for IPC activists was to confront corporate 
power and address plant closings and economic inequality.  Attributing deindustrialization and 
national economic turbulence to the growth of multinational corporations, Ohio activists drew on 
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the success of the antiwar campaign to propose similar methods to address plant closings and 
urban crisis—pressure lawmakers to pass regulations curbing overseas capital investment. 
Similarly to Detroit leftists, they wanted to infuse capitalism with more democracy. The 
campaign to end the war represented another example of how leftists reconstituted themselves 
around vital issues rather than sectarian politics. 
While the IPC stopped the war, the group’s efforts failed in its goal of halting U.S. 
imperialism at its pressure point. This was mostly due to tensions embedded within the 
organization’s goals, campaign strategy, and ideology. The national IPC could not agree on a 
post-Indochina strategy, so the various chapters aimed to organize around different issues. Some 
IPC chapters sought to maintain the national organization with the goal of organizing a 
movement for a more democratic foreign policy. However, others in the organization, including 
its leading members, stuck to the organization’s original charge of disbanding after achieving the 
goal of ending the war.  
 
The Vietnam War, the New Left, and the Antiwar Movement during the 1960s 
 
The Indochina Peace Campaign’s strategy to end the war underscored the early Students 
for a Democratic Society’s emphasis on political transformation rather than the radicalism of the 
post-1964 SDS and the New Communist organizations of the 1970s. At the beginning of the 
1970s, SDS co-founder Tom Hayden argued that the SDS-led wing of the antiwar movement had 
grown too radical in its desire for the revolutionary transformation of U.S. society. Instead, the 
antiwar movement, according to Hayden, should have focused on stopping the war first before 
moving onto larger goals.  Hayden represents a bridge between the first cohort of New Leftists in 
the Students for a Democratic Society who sought to radically interrogate dominant liberal 
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institutions such as organized labor, the Democratic Party, and “corporate liberals,” as well as 
federal domestic and foreign policy. The initial cohort that consisted of Hayden and peace 
activist Al Haber are distinct from a second, more radical cohort that ascended to SDS leadership 
in the late-1960s. Rather than discarding Marxism like the first cohort, SDS radicals such as 
Oglesby applied a radical analysis to U.S. imperialism. Ironically, Hayden’s and Oglesby’s 
analyses of U.S. foreign policy were commensurate despite the former’s disavowal of Marxist-
inspired politics.  
United States military involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 when it committed military 
and financial support to France’s effort to maintain colonial control over the country.8  The 
French left Vietnam following their defeat by the North Vietnamese communist forces in 1954, 
but it was not until the early-1960s that the U.S. increased its military presence to defend the 
anti-communist government of South Vietnam. President John F. Kennedy sent thousands of 
military “advisors” to South Vietnam between 1961 and 1963 in an effort to demonstrate his 
commitment to effectively combatting communism.9  In 1963, Kennedy approved the CIA’s 
decision to back a military coup against Ngo Dinh Minh, the elected president of South 
Vietnam.10  Following President Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson secured 
congressional authority to prosecute military intervention in Vietnam after North Vietnamese 
forces attacked two American surveillance ships in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964.  The 
                                                 
8 Joshua Freeman, American Empire:  The Rise of a Global Power, the Democratic Revolution at Home, 1945-2000 
(New York:  Viking, 2012), 223; Lewis, 57.  
9 Melvin Small, At the Water’s Edge:  American Politics and the Vietnam War (Chicago:  Ian R. Dee, 2005), 13; 
Quoted in James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations:  The United States, 1945-1974 (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 595.  
10 Glenda Gilmore and Thomas Sugrue, These United States:  A Nation in the Making, 1890 to the Present (New 
York:  W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2015), 417-419.  
167 
 
number of American soldiers in Vietnam grew from more than 16,000 at the end of the 1963 to 
450,000 by the end of the 1966.11  
For leftists and antiwar activists, the war represented a manifestation of a racism and 
imperialism. The post-World War II antiwar movement in the United States unfolded in three 
phases:  1955-1964 constituted the early period, 1965-1969 is characterized by the presence of 
New Left organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society, and liberals and 
progressives returned to the fore during the movement’s final phase—1970-1975.12 Historian 
Charles DeBenedetti locates the movement’s origins in 1955 when peace activists sought to 
organize against nuclear testing. The movement then was dominated by two flanks—the radical 
pacifists and liberal internationalists.13 The pacifists included organizations such as the American 
Friends Service Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters League. 
Reverend A.J. Muste was prominent among the pacifists. The latter group comprised groups 
such as the International League for Peace and Freedom and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy (SANE).14   
The threat of nuclear war shaped the early peace movement’s politics, but there were 
differences among the two tendencies. Both flanks struggled against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, atomic bomb testing, and advocated for disarmament. However, liberal activists and 
organizations like SANE retained a belief in the rule of law and the power of government to 
enact reform in foreign policy. Many of the radicals, in contrast, questioned the U.S. 
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government’s aspirations of world dominance. Even though liberals sponsored and participated 
in mass demonstrations during the 1960s, they were committed to working through established 
political channels. Radicals favored nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience.  
Communism represented a crucial fault line between the groups. Liberals subscribed to 
Cold War anticommunism—they excluded communists from their organizations and refused to 
collaborate with them. Radical pacifists abhorred such exclusion.15  Liberal antipathy towards 
leftists persisted well into the 1960s when organizations such as SANE refused to support SDS 
antiwar mobilizations. While the IPC departed strategically from SDS, it maintained contact and 
continued to support the North Vietnamese regime. The IPC represented a mix of the two 
perspectives—their analysis of U.S. imperialism was farther to the left than the liberals, yet the 
organization endorsed working within established political institutions.  
The emergence of the New Left, especially the Students for a Democratic Society, shaped 
the antiwar movement during the 1960s. SDS emerged as one of the leading organizations within 
the movement by the end of 1965. The group, which grew out of the student branch of the 
League for Industrial Democracy was founded by student activists Alan Haber, Tom Hayden and 
others was founded in 1960.  Many of the activists within the IPC’s leadership began their 
activism as members of SDS.  
President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in February 1965, and to rely on 
the draft to provide the soldiers for that escalation, led to the growth of the antiwar movement 
and the SDS. Dissenters protested at universities across the nation. They took to the streets, 
auditoriums, and the classrooms.  In March 1965, professors at the University of Michigan 
organized the nation’s first “teach-in” during which professors and students gathered to protest 
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and learn about the U.S.’s military role in the Vietnam conflict in seminars and lectures.16 Then 
in April, SDS sponsored one of the largest peace rallies in the United States. Up to 25,000 
protestors attended.17  At the march, SDS President Paul Potter delivered his famous “We Must 
Name the System” speech. The speech articulated SDS’s analysis of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam. “What kind of system is it that justifies the United States…We must name that system, 
we must name it, describe it, analyze it, and change it. For it is only when that system is changed 
and brought under control that there can be any hope for stopping the forces that create a war in 
Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow or all the incalculable, immeasurable more 
subtle atrocities that are worked on people all over.” The “system” that Potter referred to 
comprised a constellation of institutions and customs that Hayden and the SDS had described as 
too bureaucratic, authoritarian, and stultifying—universities, the executive and legislative 
branches of federal government, racism, and poverty.  Potter advanced an analysis of U.S. 
foreign policy that anticipated Oglesby’s critique of liberalism in 1967 and Hayden’s and IPC’s 
analysis of Watergate during the early 1970s. Potter argued that U.S. foreign policy driven by 
President Johnson and the Pentagon was contradictory—it promised economic aid to a nation it 
was destroying. Finally, he maintained that U.S. military violence abroad and domestic political 
repression were two sides of the same coin.18  
SDS’s growing prominence within the antiwar movement coincided with the entrance of 
a new cohort of activists into SDS.19 Featuring leaders such as Carl Davidson and Carl Oglesby, 
many hailed from working class roots. This cohort distanced itself from the earlier ideals of 
participatory democracy in favor of more radical forms of protest. They drew upon Marxist 
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thought for their analyses of American domestic and foreign policy.  Members of SDS during the 
mid-to-late-1960s advanced critiques of “corporate liberalism”—the braiding of liberal corporate 
and government interests powered by anti-communism and military force.20 
SDS’s antiwar leadership focused on liberals as the driving force behind “the system,” or 
what they increasingly called U.S imperialism, that was behind U.S. military intervention in 
Vietnam.  Carl Oglesby elaborated on this analysis of U.S. imperialism in his 1967 book, 
Containment and Change. Oglesby’s analysis anticipated the IPC’s understanding of the war. He 
referred to Vietnam as the “nexus” where “west meets east,” similarly to how Hayden and IPC 
saw Indochina as the focal point of U.S. imperialism. He also called Vietnam “a paradigmatic 
example of U.S. imperialism,” locating the war in the history of U.S. expansion. Oglesby 
focused on the roles that multinational corporations played in U.S. imperialism. He drew from 
Leninist understandings of global capitalism—stressing the union between finance and industrial 
capital and its desire to coordinate capital accumulation on a global scale. Corporations could not 
invest its surplus everywhere, however, unless the U.S. military could clear paths for the 
establishment of “free” markets abroad. Oglesby’s discussions of foreign direct investment by 
U.S.-based corporations also anticipated conversations about MNCs among liberals and 
progressives during the mid-1970s.21 
This shift within SDS reflected the growing prominence of Marxist-Leninist analysis and 
politics among New Left and black power activists and intellectuals.  For example, Paul M. 
Baran and Paul Sweezy published Monopoly Capital: an Essay on the American Economic and 
Social Order in 1966. In the book, they asserted that the world economy had reached the 
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monopolistic stage where large transnational corporations dominated particular industries. They 
identified the U.S. as the locus of monopoly capital. According to their theory, U.S.-based 
corporations largely dominated the world economy. Most importantly, the influence of U.S.-
based transnational monopolies extended into every sphere of American life, from race relations 
to the military.  Baran and Sweezy were not the only ones to build upon Vladimir Lenin’s 
insights about the emergence of monopoly capitalism. Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah 
declared neo-colonialism the “last stage of imperialism” a year before Monopoly Capital 
appeared on bookshelves.22 Henry Magdoff published several articles outlining the process of 
U.S. imperialism. Marxist-Leninist analyses of imperialism and the world economy informed 
conversations about U.S. imperialism and MNCs within and outside of the IPC during the 1970s. 
The war in Vietnam reached a boiling point in 1968. Viet Cong troops surprised 
Americans when they momentarily knocked the U.S. military and its South Vietnamese allies on 
their heels during the Tet Offensive that began on January 30.  The offensive revealed to 
Americans at home Viet Cong’s strength and signaled that U.S. forces were not nearly as close to 
victory as the Johnson administration had led on. The antiwar movement took advantage of the 
crisis. As criticism of Johnson’s handling of Vietnam reached a fever pitch, peace activists and 
organizations such as SANE helped organize the “Dump Johnson” movement. Critics and 
activists convinced Senator Eugene McCarthy to challenge the President in the February New 
Hampshire primary.  A month later, Lyndon Johnson shocked the nation when he announced that 
he would not seek the Democratic Party’s nomination for President.23  
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The nation’s economy also suffered because of the war.24 After escalating the war, 
President Johnson relied upon deficit spending to maintain military actions. Johnson sought to 
avoid tax hikes and cutting his domestic programs in order to offset defense costs. Instead, in his 
1966-1967 budget, he asked Congress for $10 billion, more than 55% of the real cost of the 
war.25 Eventually, the President agreed to cut $6 billion in Great Society spending in exchange 
for a tax surcharge to help subsidize the war. The deficit spending combined with the U.S.’s 
balance of payments deficit put inflationary pressures on the U.S. economy. Inflation rose from 
4.4 percent in early 1968 to 6.1 percent in 1969. Great Society cuts hurt the urban poor and 
working class. Inflation damaged their purchasing power while the cost of living rose. The 
declining value of the dollar also fed into the decreased confidence in the currency on the 
international market, sparking gold runs in U.S. and European central banks. They also 
contributed to the development of monetary crises that President Nixon would have to confront 
during the early 1970s. 26 
Turmoil in the Democratic Party intersected with the further radicalization of the antiwar 
movement. The pressures of Democrats to find a Johnson successor and SDS’s revolutionary 
turn intersected at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968. Hayden was 
among the key organizers of the planned protests at the convention. However, upon his arrival, 
he expressed dismay about the direction of SDS. “On the Chicago activist front, nothing was 
going very well either,” Hayden recounts in his memoir. SDS had moved unrecognizably to the 
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left:  Bernardine Dohrn was elected to the national leadership at SDS’s June 1968 convention 
declaring, ‘I consider myself a revolutionary communist.’”27 Thousands of activists traveled to 
participate in the action. Always determined to neutralized political opposition, Chicago Mayor 
Richard J. Daley dispatched 12,000 police to secure the site. The large police presence did not 
prevent what amounted to a “police riot” against the demonstrators.28 Vice President-turned-
nominee Hubert Humphrey left Chicago as he came—a damaged candidate tainted by Johnson’s 
war in Vietnam.  
The “Siege of Chicago” signaled a turning point for the 1960s social movements for 
Hayden. He viewed the revolutionary politics of the Panthers, SDS, and the Yippies with 
dismay.29 However, Hayden thought the action still sent a message to the Democratic Party. He 
reflected, “I lay on the grass, pondering the alternatives. Reform seemed bankrupt, revolution far 
away. We had taught the pro-war Democrats the lesson that business as usual was a formula of 
political defeat and moral self-destruction. But was anybody listening? I felt drawn into a tunnel 
of our own, with no light at its end.”30 A proper political vehicle to end the war, and presumably 
influence the Democratic Party from the left, did not exist. 
The SDS fractured in 1969. During SDS’s national meeting in June 1969, the 
organization split into three factions:  Progressive Labor, a Maoist sectarian organization that 
already tried to takeover SDS, the Weather Underground (or Weathermen), and the 
Revolutionary Youth Movement. The Weather Underground, led by Dohrn, Bill Ayers, and 
Mark Rudd, became the most infamous of the three as it sought to wage its “days of rage” by 
pursuing particular targets with explosives. While Progressive Labor and the Revolutionary 
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Youth Movement II faded into the sectarian left, the Weathermen suffered a self-inflicted wound 
in 1970 when a few activists accidentally detonated explosives at an apartment in Greenwich 
Village, leaving three Weather Underground members dead. The organization spent its 
remaining years underground.31  
In November 1968, Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey to win the presidency. Nixon 
signaled his intentions to continue U.S. military involvement in Indochina. On March 18, 1969, 
Nixon initiated a secret bombing campaign in neutral Cambodia in hopes of disrupting North 
Vietnamese supply lines.  A year later, the U.S. invaded Cambodia, provoking significant 
protests throughout the U.S. Thousands of college students protested at Princeton, Rutgers, and 
the University of Cincinnati. In early May, hundreds of Kent State students joined in the 
nationwide student strike in protest of the war. The events on May 4, 1970 stoked antiwar 
sentiment and generated widespread condemnation. In the late morning of May 4, a 
confrontation between the National Guard and protesters of the right to freely assemble escalated 
to the Guard’s call to disperse. The guardsmen fired 61 shots in 13 seconds, killing four—20-
year-old Sandra Lee Scheuer, 19-year-old Allison Krause, 20-year-old Jeffrey Glenn Miller, and 
19-year-old William Knox Schroeder.32 For the antiwar movement, Krause, Miller, Scheuer, and 
Schroeder became martyrs. The killings highlighted the intensity of state repression of radical 
movements.  
 
 
 
Forming the Indochina Peace Campaign 
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Tom Hayden, Jane Fonda, and the founders of the Indochina Peace Campaign envisioned 
the group as an effort to establish a progressive anti-imperialist voice in U.S. politics. Hayden 
explained the rationale for organizing the IPC in a December 1972 pamphlet, The Indochina 
Peace Campaign. According to Hayden, the IPC emerged in response to what he and other 
activists saw as a void in mass antiwar protest. The war in Indochina also represented a crucial 
flashpoint in the struggle between national liberation and U.S. military, economic, and political 
power. Indochina was the “focal point” of that particular global struggle. Hayden’s and Jane 
Fonda’s first educational tour in Ohio encouraged them and others to establish the IPC as an 
organization devoted to ending the war in Indochina. Yet, unlike the antiwar activists who 
pursued revolutionary politics outside of established institutions, Hayden and the IPC aspired to 
pursue their goal by combining political education and protests with more mainstream tactics and 
strategies such as lobbying.  
During the early 1970s, Hayden settled in Southern California where he taught a class on 
the Vietnam War at Claremont College. While he was teaching, he, Jane Fonda, and others 
decided to establish the Indochina Information Project. Motivated by the belief that the war had 
fallen off the radar of most Americans as well as by Fonda’s infamous trip to Hanoi in July 1972, 
Hayden, Fonda, and others assembled Hayden’s teaching materials, films, and pamphlets to 
create an educational program aimed at raising awareness about continued U.S. involvement in 
the war in Indochina.33  
By the time they established IPC, Fonda achieved a level of respect from other activists 
as well as derision from the antiwar movement’s opponents. By her own account, Fonda entered 
into activism late. “I’m a latecomer to the peace movement,” she declared in an October 1, 1972 
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edition of the Philadelphia Bulletin.34 Yet, Fonda started her activist work in March 1970.35 
Fonda participated in a 1,000 person march with Indians and allies at Fort Lawton near Seattle, 
Washington. Military police arrested Fonda and many of the marchers. Fonda involved herself in 
the movement to end the Vietnam War after the Fort Lawton action. Eventually, Fonda emerged 
as an important spokesperson and organizer in the movement. She frequently visited GIs, 
delivered speeches, published editorials, raised money, and connected activists.36 Fonda 
eventually became a crucial figure in the IPC and Hayden’s future political pursuits. She often 
donated her wealth to organization building for the IPC and Tom Hayden’s California-based 
political organization, the Center for Economic Democracy.  
Daniel Ellsberg’s The Pentagon Papers served as a crucial resource for both Hayden’s 
class and the educational project. Ellsberg had worked as a defense analyst for the RAND 
Corporation and for the Pentagon. In 1968, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger asked 
Ellsberg to compose a paper for the Nixon administration on various strategies for prosecuting 
the Vietnam War. Ellsberg underwent a political conversion between when he encountered the 
classified 7,000 page study, U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam, 1945-1968, otherwise known as 
the Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg had expressed sympathies with antiwar protesters in 1967. 
Nixon’s decision to continue U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam pushed him to leak the Pentagon 
Papers to the New York Times in 1971.37 Ellsberg’s leaks bolstered the antiwar movement’s 
claim that the U.S. had involved itself in a corrupt war. Ellsberg also became a target of Nixon’s 
“dirty tricks,” as the President’s Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) broke into 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, hoping to find information that would discredit the activist. 
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Ellsberg and RAND Corporation employee and co-conspirator Anthony Russo were indicted in 
June 1971.38 Members of Ellsberg legal team embedded itself within the network of antiwar 
activists. Future IPC and Ohio Public Interest Campaign activist, Paul Ryder, befriended Hayden 
while working as a researcher for Ellsberg’s defense team.39  
Jane Fonda’s, Tom Hayden’s, Holly Near’s, and George Smith’s tour debut in Fall 1972 
exceeded their expectations. Hayden expressed apprehension about launching an antiwar 
campaign aimed at “mainstream” Americans. However, founding members of IPC believed that 
organizing Americans in states on the east and west coast would not be enough to stymie 
President Nixon and end the war. Hayden’s associates agreed that they could not end the war 
without garnering support from Midwesterners.40 Yet, the positive response among Ohioans 
instilled confidence in Hayden and the rest of the group. From then on, they referred to the tour’s 
launch as “the miracle.”41 Encouraged by the positive reception, Fonda, Hayden, Near, and other 
activists decided to establish a national organization, the Indochina Peace Campaign, with the 
intent of organizing public pressure to end the war.  
In January 1973, the U.S. signed a peace agreement with South and North Vietnam, 
agreeing to end U.S. involvement in the conflict. However, as IPC and other peace activists 
suspected, the Nixon administration continued U.S.’s involvement by delivering aid to the South 
Vietnamese regime. Following the peace agreement, the IPC focused their efforts on holding 
Nixon and the U.S. military to the terms of the deal.  
IPC’s organization reflected its electoral focus. Activists established local chapters in 
what Hayden called “key electoral states” in California, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, 
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New Jersey, and New York.42 The Santa Monica office served as the organization’s national 
headquarters and “resource center.” The Resource Center was responsible for organizing national 
conferences, conference calls, and other tours. It published the organization’s national 
newsletter, The Focal Point, and distributed pamphlets, flyers, and other organizing and 
intellectual materials to the organization’s locals as needed. Santa Monica’s prominence in the 
national network did not signal that the IPC was a top-down cadre organization like the Black 
Panther Party. While local IPCs participated in the larger campaign to cut war aid by lobbying 
lawmakers in their cities and home states, they organized their own events.   
Internally, the IPC was diverse. Each branch reflected the activists’ personalities and the 
city’s political culture. This coalitional arrangement reflected the activists’ prior political 
experiences and growth. Ensuring each local’s independence allowed for each organization to 
conduct their business as effectively as possible. Detroit’s organization reflected the city’s 
radical political community. Members often articulated themselves in a more Marxist-Leninist 
fashion compared to other branches. Cleveland’s IPC branch, the Indochina Education Project, 
contained a mix of activists from various ideological and political backgrounds. Socialist 
activists like James Miller worked alongside progressives like Ira Arlook. Memories of the New 
Left’s fracture were still fresh in the activists’ minds. Thus, members of the individual locals, 
and each local organization, understood the importance of focusing on a single goal. This 
understanding, at least in Cleveland’s case, mollified any potential internal schisms.   
The Cleveland organization served as a Midwestern hub for the organization.43 James 
Miller and other Cleveland activists established Cleveland’s IPC branch in 1972 after Hayden’s 
and Fonda’s educational tour. Initially, Cleveland activists envisioned Cleveland’s IPC as a local 
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coalition comprised of anti-war activists, members of the clergy, and women’s organizations. 
However, the Cleveland IPC emerged as a distinct organization. Miller [and others] named 
themselves the Cleveland Indochina Education project to denote the organization’s focus on 
political education. While they organized rallies, they worried less about engaging in direct 
action tactics and focused more on raising the awareness of the U.S.’s role in the Indochina 
conflict.44  
The Cleveland antiwar movement and left was relatively small in a city of more than 
750,000 people.45 SDS had organized an ERAP project in the city during the early 1960s. The 
city boasted a visible Black Power movement. Organizations such as the Congress of Racial 
Equality adopted their version of black power and involved themselves in local black politics.46 
The antiwar movement was even smaller. Unlike with the civil rights and black power 
movements where Cleveland emerged as a hub, the city’s antiwar activists appeared rather 
disconnected from larger movement activities. College students at Case Western and Cleveland 
State established their own peace organizations like Bread, Peace, and Land.  
Activist James K. Miller worked for Bread, Peace, and Land before helping establish the 
Cleveland Indochina Education Project. Born in Tacoma, Washington, Miller traveled to 
Cleveland from California in May 1970. Miller grew up as a moderate republican, but grew 
skeptical of U.S. military power during the mid-1960s. He cited the U.S. military’s invasion of 
the Dominican Republic in 1965 as a formative moment in his anti-imperialist politics.  Miller 
refused to register for the draft. Risking imprisonment, Miller was convinced by his father to 
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apply for conscientious objector status in California in 1969. After he was accepted as a 
conscientious objector, Miller migrated to Cleveland, Ohio where he performed his alternative 
service at University Hospital.  At the same time, he was active in the city’s small leftist 
community, eventually involving himself with a group of activists who would form Cleveland’s 
branch of the IPC.47  
IPC activist Ira Arlook was also a transplant to Cleveland. He went to work for 
Cleveland’s IPC after a short stint with the Boston chapter. Arlook cut his teeth in the antiwar 
movement as a graduate student at Stanford University during the 1960s. Similar to antiwar 
activists at the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, Arlook and his colleagues aspired to 
draw attention to Stanford’s role in the U.S. military-industrial complex.48 During the late 1960s, 
Arlook left graduate school to pursue activism full-time. 
Arlook moved to Cleveland to work with that IPC group in 1973. The addition of Arlook, 
and other IPC activists from Boston and New Jersey strengthened Cleveland’s organization. 
Arlook provided the Cleveland IPC with a wealth of organizing experience. Describing him as 
“driven and organized,” Miller said that Arlook “was instrumental in making things go.”49 
Arlook emerged as one of the leaders of the national IPC, serving on its steering committee. 
Most importantly, he emerged as one of IPC’s, and the progressive left’s, foremost intellectuals 
during the 1970s, offering critical analyses of U.S. empire and global capitalism. 
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Focal Point Theory: Tom Hayden and IPC’s Anti-imperialism 
  
The formation of IPC signaled new political strategies and aims for many of the former 
New Left activists. Instead of seeking a radical reconstructing of American society or 
establishing a multi-issue organization as had the radical wing of the New Left, the IPC 
committed itself to accomplishing a single goal—ending the war in Indochina. Ending the war 
required combining community organizing, coalition politics, political education, and political 
lobbying Congress to stop war funding. Hayden and others anticipated skepticism from leftists. 
“Our decision, however, seemed like a ‘step backward’ to many radicals who were accustomed 
to multi-issue or anti-imperialist approaches,” Hayden acknowledged.50 However, the IPC’s 
strategists believed that they could stymie U.S. imperialism permanently by pressuring Congress 
to cut off military funding for the war. The congressional focus was a clear departure from the 
emphasis on direct action and demonstrations of the 1960s antiwar movement. Hayden believed 
that the New Left had failed to mount a focused struggle against the war. Hayden and the rest of 
IPC’s founders envisioned the organization as a progressive single-issue organization and one 
that would utilize an array of strategies to end the war once and for all. Hayden declared in the 
pamphlet, The Indochina Peace Campaign, 
The Indochina Peace Campaign is a single-issue movement, a united front based on 
opposition to U.S. involvement in Indochina and support for self-determination in Indochina. 
It has been a departure from both coalitions and radical organizations with a multi-issue 
focus…Few groups were exclusively doing Vietnam work. Our decision, however, seemed 
like a ‘step backward’ to many radicals who were accustomed to multi-issue or anti-
imperialist approaches…Our 1972 single-issue focus, however, was not based on seeing 
Vietnam as an isolated case; on the contrary, it was because we viewed Vietnam as the focal 
point of a worldwide struggle against American imperialism.51 
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Hayden claimed that antiwar radicals, especially those who comprised the second generation of 
SDS, underestimated the significance of Vietnam. “Some radicals had long held that Vietnam is 
not the central focus of their work or their lives. This ambivalence towards the Vietnam question 
led many to say the war was only a ‘symptom’ of a larger problem, making Vietnam itself only 
important as a ‘tool for organizing’…Other radicals were saying that Americans could not be 
reached on the issue of the war alone but only on more immediate and material issues like jobs, 
taxes, and inflation.”52  
Hayden, however, overstated the point that the antiwar radicals did not attribute great 
significance to Vietnam.  In fact, Hayden’s discussion of Indochina representing the focal point 
of the struggle against US imperialism was not too different from SDS’s Carl Oglesby’s analysis 
of Vietnam in his 1967 book, Containment and Change. Oglesby referred to Vietnam as the 
nexus of U.S. imperialism. He declared, “Vietnam seizes us in a new hold, fingers a new nerve, 
persuades us that this war is a most distinguished and fateful event.” Both theorists connected the 
conflict in Indochina to a range of domestic problems. What distinguished the two, however, was 
Hayden’s desire to devote all of IPC’s resources to stopping the war first, believing that turning 
back the US military in Indochina would allow the movement to address other aspects of the 
American system. Oglesby and the post-1965 SDS also grounded their anti-imperialism in a 
more explicit Marxist critique of monopoly capitalism. 53  
The IPC reflected a new rhetorical tone for the activists. According to Hayden, the IPC 
represented “an effort to repair the painful gap between generations, between radicals and 
Middle Americans.”54 While the IPC contained socialists, Marxist-Leninists, progressives and 
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other radicals, the organization sought to popularize its anti-imperial stance by eschewing 
Marxist-Leninist jargon. Fonda and other IPC members appropriated national symbols, such as 
the American flag, and often used less bellicose language to convey their discontent with 
American military power. While it appeared that the IPC decided to buck the rhetorical trend 
among radical circles, Hayden envisioned IPC’s rhetorical move toward the middle as a 
continuation of the early New Left tradition. “The New Left originally was very American,” 
Hayden admitted. Hayden’s moderate public rhetoric contained in The Indochina Peace 
Campaign pamphlet recalled the early SDS’s sentimentality embedded in the Port Huron 
Statement.  The IPC’s moderated voice reflected a strategic decision to try to establish the IPC as 
a legitimate political organization.  To build a mass base, the IPC leadership thought, the 
organization had to speak in tones and language familiar to midwesterners. Losing the support of 
left radicals represented a worthwhile cost if they could stop U.S. imperialism in its tracks.  
Rhetorical moderation did not reflect all of the local IPC groups’ stances. When chapters 
discussed the future of progressive politics as the U.S. and South Vietnam President Nguyễn Văn 
Thiệu’s regime lost momentum in Vietnam in 1974 and 1975, Hayden and other IPC activists 
often expressed more radical analyses of foreign policy and domestic politics. Particular chapters 
also took on a radical tone locally while allowing the national organizations to really speak for 
them on Capitol Hill.  
Hayden elaborated on his views on empire in the spring in a 134-page book, Love of 
Possession is a Disease With Them. In the text, Hayden contextualized the Indochina War within 
the history of U.S. conquest, extending back to the colonization of the Americas. Hayden 
acknowledged that the ultimate goal of the Indochina war was the “Americanization of 
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Vietnamese economics, politics, and culture.”55 This process came in the form of “a new system 
of domination”—“a growing Western-oriented consumer market economy.”56 Hayden 
substantiated his claims with evidence drawn from blueprints for Vietnamese reconstruction by 
public and private sector organizations such as the RAND Corporation, the Johnson 
Administration, and statements by business leaders such as the Bank of America’s Rudolph 
Peterson. U.S.- and Japanese-based corporations sought to oversee the establishment of 
capitalism in Indochina. “The South Vietnamese economy,” Hayden wrote, “on which the US 
hopes to build is now a catastrophe. The roots of catastrophe lie in the fact that the economy is 
entirely artificial, a creation of American military, economic, and political institutions.” As 
evidence, Hayden pointed to the fact that: 
American corporations like Standard Oil, Shell, and Ford have moved into South Vietnam, 
and dozens other contractors, builders, machine tool companies, and producers of agricultural 
equipment are involved. Alongside them are the expanding Japanese business interests; farm 
machinery factories, telephone and water works systems, a Sony assembly plant; and Toyota 
is rumored to be coming.57 
Hayden thought corporate planners were intrigued by the potential source of cheap labor and oil. 
Business leaders such as Rudolph Peterson hoped that securing South Vietnam, at the very least, 
would ensure the U.S. private sector’s role in developing parts of the Pacific Rim--“the western 
coasts of South America, Central America,” and nations in the Far East, as Peterson defined in 
1968.58 
Hayden’s anti-imperialism stemmed from early-SDS radicalism was distinct from 
Marxist-Leninist-inspired interpretations. Marxist economists like Baran and Sweezy stressed the 
role that monopoly capital played in the creation of U.S Empire. Marxist theorist Harry Magdoff 
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elaborated on this analysis of U.S. foreign policy in his 1969 work, The Age of Imperialism:  The 
Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy. He demonstrated how the U.S. had emerged as the “organizer 
and leader of the world imperialist system.” The U.S. military’s ability to open and secure 
allowed for multinational corporations to invest and circulate capital and resources abroad. The 
U.S. military, not to mention the Federal Reserve and other central banks, was an essential player 
in establishing the conditions for global economic restructuring during the 1970s.59  
These influential texts provided radicals with an updated analysis of the global economy 
and a language to describe corporate restructuring. Black Communist, Henry Winston stated that 
U.S. imperialism—powered by monopoly capitalism—threatened the worldwide black 
movement. “Monopoly aims to stop the advance of the Black liberation movement, to destroy 
organized labor and suppress every struggle of the oppressed and exploited,” Winston declared.60 
Black Panther Huey P. Newton also drew from these insights in his analyses of U.S. Empire 
during the early-to-mid-1970s.61 Despite IPC founders’ abandonment of Marxist-Leninism, 
radical analyses of imperialism provided an intellectual and rhetorical foundation for IPC 
progressives’ analyses of multinational corporations during the mid-1970s.62  
While Hayden and the Resource Center expressed a popular vision of anti-imperialism, 
individual activists and chapters continued to rely upon Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Unlike 
Hayden, members of the Detroit chapter quoted Lenin at length in their analyses and articulated 
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their views of imperialism through a Marxist-Leninist lens.63 The Detroit IPC’s analysis of 
imperialism was prevalent among the Detroit white left. Members of the anti-STRESS 
coalition’s leftwing, especially those from the organization, From the Ground Up, also 
subscribed to such interpretation of American power. The presence of Marxist-Leninism within 
IPC demonstrates the organization’s capacity to incorporate radical elements into the network.  
 
“The Watergate Opportunity”:  IPC’s Congressional Strategy and the Campaign to End 
the War 
 
IPC’s focal point theory also explained the organization’s decision to pursue 
congressional lobbying as the primary strategy to end the war in Indochina. IPC’s strategy 
entailed locating particular levers in local and federal government. For the organization, the focal 
point at the federal level was Congress whereas the local chapters sought to lobby city 
governments and congressional representatives in their home offices. IPC activists thought the 
antiwar movement could stop the war in Indochina by pressuring Congress to cut off the war’s 
funding.  
On June 17, 1972, five men from President Nixon’s Committee to Re-elect the President 
broke into the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. When they were 
caught, two of the men possessed address books that linked them with E. Howard Hunt, a former 
member of CREEP. While Nixon denied any foreknowledge of the break-in, he participated in 
the cover up. Nixon’s cover up backfired as revelations about the depths of his administration’s 
willingness to spy and intimidate the President’s opponents became public. Washington Post 
reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward published many of the developments concerning 
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the scandal with information provided by a shadowy informant, “Deep Throat,” later revealed as 
Mark Felt, associate director of the FBI.64 IPC, like many anti-war activists, observed the scandal 
intently as it learned how the Nixon administration also targeted the movement.  
In the fall of 1973, the IPC launched its campaign to end the war. Its goal, according to 
the organization, was to “force a constitutional crisis” by exploiting the Watergate scandal and 
pushing Congress to stop a war that President Nixon wished to continue.65  They often referred 
to this moment as “the Watergate Opportunity.” They utilized the method of campaigning, or 
organizing and mobilizing people and institutions around a single issue to achieve a specific 
goal. The IPC relied upon an anti-Indochina War pledge as its main lobbying and organizing 
instrument. The purpose of the pledge was to secure support for cutting military aid. It also 
functioned as a means to hold signers accountable. “The pledge and resolution are identically 
worded statements which commit the signer to support the spirit and letter of the key provisions 
of the 1973 peace agreement—provisions whose implementation would result in the end of U.S. 
intervention. The pledge is to be signed by members of Congress since they have a direct role in 
insuring implementation of the Agreements,” Cleveland IPC activist James Miller stated in an 
article for the socialist New American Movement.66 Activists also used it to garner support from 
local elected officials, activists, and potential voters. This congressional strategy also 
distinguished the IPC from its radical predecessors. While antiwar radicals relied upon a plethora 
of disruptive tactics and strategies, the IPC combined their congressional effort with grassroots 
organizing. IPC activists also viewed liberal Democrats and skeptical Republicans as logical 
allies whereas the antiwar radicals of the 1960s criticized the Democratic Party. The most 
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disruptive of their actions were usually rallies. IPC activists thought this strategy was successful 
as they were able to garner the support from several members of Congress.  
During a national IPC meeting in Cleveland in June 1973, the IPC decided that they 
could use the Watergate crisis to substantiate their argument that the war flowed from the 
corruption of the executive branch and that “the establishment” could not be trusted. IPC 
activists believed that the Watergate crisis and the war were inherently linked. IPC identified 
secrecy and dishonest political and military leadership as vital components of U.S. foreign policy 
during the mid-to-late 1960s and early 1970s. The IPC state in their report on the national 
meeting, “Though other factors were involved, the war, and the Nixon administration’s fears 
about the spread of anti-war sentiment to a majority of the population including GI’s and to the 
leaders of the Democratic Party led to the creation of a vast domestic espionage and sabotage 
apparatus and finally to Watergate.” 67  They contended that the Indochina wars reflected the 
undemocratic nature of U.S. foreign policy and the corruption of the executive branch. “To stave 
off defeat in Indochina, the Administration was willing to abandon traditional forms of 
democracy,” the editors of IPC’s Focal Point wrote.68 President Nixon’s desire to discredit the 
antiwar movement, especially Daniel Ellsberg, and his Democratic opponents represented the 
sort of criminality that IPC thought characterized the war. IPC maintained that Watergate made it 
more difficult for the President to execute his strategy in Indochina. 
The IPC officially adopted the congressional strategy at an antiwar unity conference in a 
city in Southwest Ohio, Germantown, in October 1973. There, the IPC organized a meeting of 
numerous antiwar organizations with the intent to create a broad-based alliance. The IPC’s 
willingness to work with liberal internationalist organizations underscored its willingness and 
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desire to position itself closer to the mainstream of the movement and the nation’s larger political 
culture. The goal of the conference, the IPC stated in their conference announcement was “to 
bring clarity and develop a coordinated strategy” to guide all of the participating organizations.69 
According to internal documents, representatives from fifteen groups attended including SANE, 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Episcopal Peace Fellowship the 
Coalition to Stop Funding the War, American Friends Service Committee, and the Vietnam 
Veterans against the War.70  
Before the Germantown conference, the IPC Resource Center published and distributed 
the document, “A Strategy to End the War.” As an introduction of the IPC and an outline of the 
next phase of the 1970s U.S. antiwar movement, the IPC elaborated on their philosophy—the 
Indochina as focal point, their congressional strategy, and the “Watergate opportunity.” In the 
document, they identified three goals for the campaign:  to raise Americans’ consciousness about 
what they considered as the Theiu’s brutal regime, “to organize a base of political power against 
further aid to Thiệu and Lon Nol,” and to work to cut off U.S. military and economic aid from 
Congress.71 
“A Strategy to End the War” also featured a brief economic critique of the war. The 
organization reiterated how President Johnson’s deficit spending affected the national and global 
economy. “The economic burden of the war has led to the erosion of the dollar on the 
international markets and inflation at home. The decline of the U.S. economy from world 
supremacy has begun,” the paper declared.72 The document did not elaborate upon this point. 
Although the IPC’s references to Western neocolonialism does carry Africanist Marxist-Leninist 
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connotations, the organization did not detail any other connections between the war and the 
economy. In fact, the above quote was the only reference to the economy in the document. The 
omission of an extended economic critique reflected the organization’s focus on highlighting the 
connections between Watergate and the war rather than concentrate on the economic aspect of 
what they considered an imperialist project.73 
The organizations agreed to work under the name, the United Campaign and they 
committed to using the pledge and the congressional strategy. The IPC agreed to produce 
campaign materials. The IPC also agreed to join the impeach Nixon drive. “IPC will use the 
analysis of the origins of Watergate in the Indochina War to prepare educational resources for 
both the public and participants in the impeachment drive,” the organization declared in its 
November 16 edition of the Focal Point.74 The name of the larger antiwar effort—the United 
Campaign—was conscious in that it reflected the movement’s campaign strategy and their 
desires to organize around a single issue. Architects of the UC viewed their efforts grounded in 
sustained organizing and lobbying rather than large-scale mobilizations. The IPC Resource 
Center made this distinction in their conference report. The campaign strategy reflected 
Hayden’s critique of the post-1964 New Left antiwar radicalism that he claimed relied 
exclusively on organizing large-scale mobilizations.75  
Over the next year, the IPC successfully gathered support for the peace pledge from 
elected officials in local, state, and the federal government. Several California political leaders 
signed the pledge. Although the organization did not comment on interracial organizing, the fact 
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that a few prominent black elected officials signed or supported the pledge illustrated an element 
of interracial solidarity in IPC’s antiwar effort. This list of signees included Los Angeles’s first 
black mayor, Thomas Bradley.76 Congressman Andrew Young of Georgia also signed the 
pledge.77  
IPC Cleveland and the rest of the Ohio branches also contributed to the congressional 
campaign. The organization urged activists to write letters to Congress. They also visited 
members in their home districts. In October 1974, members of Cleveland IPC met with 
Republican Senator William Saxbe about the war. During the meeting, the IPC activists 
explained how U.S. funding for South Vietnam’s police and prison systems violated the 1973 
peace treaty and urged the Senator to vote against all funding bills for South Vietnam. They also 
expressed concern for “the deplorable and subhuman conditions in which” political prisoners had 
to endure. While Saxbe, according to the activists, “shared our concern,” he remained 
“noncommittal.”  Still, the senator was “generally cordial, desirous of hearing our position.”78 
IPC’s congressional lobbying strategy illustrated how the organization were moving from the 
liminality of New Left radicalism to more conventional political advocacy.  
The Cleveland IPC successfully persuaded four members of Congress to sign the 
pledge—James Stanton, Charles Carney, Louis Stokes and Charles Vanik. On September 23, 
1973, Vanik and Stokes appeared at a press conference at Trinity Cathedral in Cleveland with 
Bishop John H. Burt and Reverend Donald Jacobs to issue a statement condemning the US’s 
continued support of the Thiệu regime.79  
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The IPC campaign received a boost when House Representative Ronald Dellums (CA-D) 
introduced the Indochina Peace Pledge to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Ronald Dellums 
was the only prominent black radical—he identified as a socialist—to work on behalf of the IPC. 
On January 23, 1974, Dellums introduced H.R. 12156, which would end war funding and halt 
“the renewal of U.S. military involvement in Indochina… [and] prohibit the U.S. funding of 
police or prison systems in certain foreign countries.”80 
Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda embarked on a Washington, D.C. lobbying campaign four 
days later. They met with over forty Representatives and eight Senators. Hayden’s and Fonda’s 
trip demonstrated IPC’s ability to garner support from Congress. They secured promises to 
introduce legislation from Senators Cranston, Kennedy, McGovern and Abourezk and House 
Representatives Dellums, Abzug, Conte, Moorhead, and Rosenthal. Hayden and Fonda 
encouraged the United Coalition to take leadership in organizing the left wing of Congress. They 
concluded that the Democrats’ left wing “need direction” and “if Congress does not cut aid it 
will be our fault at least to a degree.” 81 
Disagreements over the congressional campaign and the Watergate focus emerged within 
the IPC. Some IPC activists were dissatisfied with the organization’s work and wanted to expand 
IPC’s focus beyond Indochina. During the IPC National Interim Committee Meeting in 
Cleveland in March 1974, Frank Joyce, representing Detroit’s IPC, reiterated his group’s 
concerns about the lack of clarity around the organization’s ideology. Apparently, he also had 
questions about the congressional strategy, although the report’s author failed to detail them. 
Regarding the Impeach Nixon drive, the Detroit group thought that struggling for impeachment 
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was not enough. The report stated that Detroit activists saw impeachment as “the business of the 
ruling class,” and that IPC should demand Nixon’s resignation.82 
The IPC began seeing some results of their organizing that spring. Seventy-five 
congressional aides established a committee to continue Indochina lobbying work after attending 
a meeting on the subject organized by Hayden, Fonda, and Dellums.83 By March 1973, eighteen 
members of Congress had signed the pledge, including Michigan’s John Conyers, New York’s 
Bella Abzug, and several members of California’s democratic delegation. Organizations such as 
the National Council of Churches, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
Women Strike for Peace, and the United Methodist Church all pledged support for the campaign.  
Cleveland IPC’s lobbying strategy also paid off locally. The local chapter petitioned 
Cleveland’s City Council to pass the IPC’s pledge as a resolution. Besides reiterating the 
organization’s argument that continued U.S. involvement in Indochina violated the 1973 peace 
agreement, the IPC argued that the war was depriving struggling cities of badly needed financial 
resource. “If the January Peace Agreement were truly being followed by the present 
Administration… $1.7 billion could be diverted to our cities, including Cleveland, which so 
desperately need major expenditures…instead of being wasted in a bloody yet futile effort which 
jeopardizes the Peace Agreement and the peace.”84  
The Cleveland City Council passed the 1974 Indochina Peace Pledge in an emergency 
resolution on April 1, 1974.85 Thirteen city councilmembers, including Dennis Kucinich, voted 
for the resolution which echoed IPC’s call for the U.S. to respect the terms of the 1973 peace 
agreement. The resolution also strongly condemned the federal government for financing Thiệu’s 
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police and prison systems as well as for repressing antiwar activism. The city council also 
expressed its “strong objection to the continuing repressive policies and practices of the Theiu 
government” and echoed the IPC’s argument that the the military aid should be diverted to U.S. 
cities. “These tax dollars could be better spent on the cities of this country, including the City of 
Cleveland, which desperately needs additional funds to provide social services for its citizens.”86  
Other cities, including San Diego and Minneapolis, passed similar resolutions that year. 87 
In January 1974, the New York Times reported that Nixon sought to approach Congress 
for more military aid for Thiệu.88 Then, in March, the Pentagon asked Congress to approve a 
$6.2 billion increase in aid for South Vietnam, to improve U.S. defenses in the Middle East, and 
to expand the nation’s presence in the Indian Ocean. House Armed Services Committee 
Chairman, Democrat F. Edward Herbert (LA), called the increase in the ceiling of South 
Vietnam aid from $1.25 to $1.6 billion “the most controversial” of the three.89  
The IPC moved to increase opposition to the Pentagon’s request in March. Aiming to 
influence the vote in Congress, the organization identified over 100 members as potential swing 
voters, including Ohio Senator Robert Taft, Jr. and Kentucky Senators Republican Marlow Cook 
and Democrat Walter Huddleston. The IPC Resource Center and Ohio chapters urged members 
to contact those officials. “We play a vital role,” the Ohio call declared, “SO NOW – write, 
telegram, or call. Tell Senators to vote against supplemental aid to South Vietnam.”90 
Herbert’s claim about the controversial nature of the Pentagon’s request to raise the 
ceiling of aid was prescient. The supplemental aid package to South Vietnam stimulated bi-
partisan opposition. Senators Edward Kennedy and Kansas Republican James B. Pearson 
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introduced an amendment to block military aid to Thiệu.91 Libertarian Republican Barry 
Goldwater testified against the increase in the Senate Armed Service subcommittee hearing on 
March 19. Nine Senators also testified against the spending increase during the subcommittee 
hearing. New York Representative Otis G. Pike led the charge against the bill in the House.92 
Major newspapers such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times published anti-Vietnam 
editorials.93 The Boston Globe urged “no more arms for Saigon” in their March 23 edition.94  
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the Pentagon mounted defenses of the bill. On 
March 25, Kissinger wrote a letter responding to Senator Kennedy’s request that the Secretary 
explain U.S.’s policy towards Vietnam.  In letter, Kissinger argued that the U.S. had committed 
itself to assisting South Vietnam when it signed the 1973 peace agreement.95 Just days before the 
vote, however, Kennedy released a cable from Ambassador to South Vietnam Graham A. Martin 
requesting that Kissinger withhold “an honest and detailed answer” to Kennedy’s inquiries about 
U.S.’s policy in Indochina.96 This revelation stirred up more outrage among Congressional 
opponents of the funding for South Vietnam. IPC scored its first national victory when the U.S. 
House of Representatives voted 177 to 154 against providing more aid to South Vietnam in April 
1974.  
The Nixon Administration’s failure to secure an increase in war funding generated an 
array of responses. A New York Times journalist called the outcome “unexpected.”  According to 
the IPC’s Larry Levin, Dellums could “not believe” what happened.97 Syndicated columnists 
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak called the administration’s effort “bungled” and predicted 
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further instability due to Congress’s failure to raise military spending. However, they also took 
aim at the IPC and the rest of the antiwar movement. They implied that the United Campaign had 
conspired with insurgent forces to foment revolution. They pointed to “the propaganda spread in 
Congress by ‘radical’ peace groups.” They paired North Vietnam’s military strategy with the 
establishment of the United Campaign. Evans and Novak speculated, “the Communists will 
continue sharp military attacks locally this year while preparing for a possible general offensive 
in the future. […] The one factor that could advance the showdown is an economic breakdown, 
to which Communist headquarters have been alerting their cadre. A drastic, sudden reduction of 
US aid would surely trigger such a breakdown.” The columnists continued, “This dovetails with 
the campaign laid out last October when veteran radical Tom Hayden invited 260 antiwar 
activists to Germantown, Ohio for a strategy session. The propaganda line set forth then have 
vigorously relayed on Capitol Hill; the Thiệu government, not Hanoi, is the aggressor and would 
collapse without provocation should the United States withdraw aid.”98 The writers’ redbaiting 
withstanding, they appeared to take IPC’s desires to support the Vietnamese liberation 
movement seriously. They also acknowledged the impact that the campaign to end the war had 
on public policy.  
The IPC capitalized on the supplemental defeat by organizing its largest demonstration to 
date at Kent State University. Held on the four year anniversary of the shootings at Jackson State 
and Kent State, the goal of the protest was to continue the work of building a broad-based 
campaign against war funding as well as to protest the acquittal of the National Guardsmen who 
shot and killed Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Knox Schroeder. 
The IPC envisioned the Kent State rally to be a mass rally. Cleveland IPC activists distributed 
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hundreds of flyers and posters in the six months before the demonstration.99 The organization 
also aspired to demonstrate its national reach. Thus, they secured speakers with national profiles 
such as Daniel Ellsberg, Representative Julian Bond, and Jane Fonda. Ron Kovic, a Vietnam 
veteran-turned-antiwar activist, IPC activist Holly Near, and a student wounded during the 
shootings, Dean Kahler also addressed the crowd.100  
Fonda, Ellsberg, and Kovic delivered speeches underscoring IPC’s argument about how 
the corruption that spun out of the Watergate crisis could be felt in the Kent State and Jackson 
State shootings and their aftermath. Utilizing patriotic rhetoric, Fonda stated,  
The reason this is not a memorial service, the reason we have called a rally together, is 
because the fundamental causes of the killings that took place at Kent State, Jackson State, 
Baton Rouge and Orangeburg are still unresolved, the war in Indochina rages on, fueled from 
American taxpayers, the Watergate Administration continues in office, continues to deceive 
and repress the American people, as long as these things remain unresolved we have an 
obligation as patriots, as responsible American people to protest together, to learn to organize 
together, to sing together…101  
 
Daniel Ellsberg, with the recently released Nixon transcripts in tow, argued that executive 
corruption and the war threatened the idea of self-determination abroad and at home.  “We must 
act to end American suppression and opposition to self-government abroad so we can retain self-
government at home,” he said.102 Kovic, wounded in Vietnam, used his and Dean Kahler’s 
stories as an example to illustrate the connection between U.S. state violence abroad and at 
home:  “Dean Kahler and myself were wounded 10,000 miles apart but our bodies will never 
forget it. Our bodies were destroyed by the same administration.”103 
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In August 1974, the IPC experienced two major victories—President Nixon’s resignation 
and more aid cuts. On August 8, 1974, Nixon announced his resignation from the Presidency. 
That week, Congress also passed the Flynt-Giamo-Conte Amendment that reduced Vietnam aid 
to $700 million. The IPC declared in its August 15-31 issue of Focal Point, “More efforts to 
reduce aid are immediately ahead, but the cut to $700 million marked the culmination of aid 
what we have called ‘the Watergate opportunity’ for the peace movement.”104 
 
IPC Ohio’s Economic Turn:  The Final Conferences, Spring-Summer 1975 
 
IPC chapters engaged in their own discussions about economic and political 
transformation during the spring of 1975. The IPC locals gathered for an “Issues Conference” in 
Mantua, Ohio to explore the contours of a post-Indochina economic political strategy.  Six 
chapters—Los Angeles, Detroit, Santa Monica, Cleveland, Massachusetts, and Ann Arbor—
submitted reports to the group.  All of the proposals, with the exception of Cleveland’s, 
identified an economic focal point. All of the participating chapters viewed the economic crisis 
as an opportunity for action, similar to Watergate.  
The national IPC split because it could not agree on a post-Vietnam focal point. Members 
of the various IPC locals engaged in spirited debate about the fate of IPC and the issues that the 
next campaign should address. Individual activists such as IPC Cleveland’s Ira Arlook and local 
chapters drafted and circulated proposals for future work on issues such as the oil and energy 
crisis, the reemergence of multinational corporate power, and foreign policy. Ultimately, many 
of the IPC organizations pursued different political agendas after their final conference in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, in 1975. Following the internal conversations and the Ann Arbor conference, 
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the Cleveland-IPC decided that growing corporate power in American cities and what Ira Arlook 
called “corporate globalization” represented Ohio IPC’s next focal point.105   
New York and Santa Monica IPC suggested that the rest of the locals should continue to 
rely upon searching for the precise opportunity to exploit. The nation’s economic crisis, both of 
these chapters reasoned, represented that opportunity.  The New York chapter included a section, 
“The Economic Crisis as a New ‘Opportunity’? for war,” in their post-IPC proposal where they 
claimed that the U.S. would seek another military conflict in its effort of solving its economic 
crisis. “The imperialists,” according to the New York chapter, “have gotten into 2 world wars in 
the last 45 years to solve the economic crisis…As the contention develops, specifically between 
the U.S. and Russia, the threat of world war grows greater. Imperialist[s]…will be driven to war 
to insure their ability to make profits.”106 The Santa Monica chapter forecasted the rise of a left 
progressive politics in their postwar proposal. The Santa Monica IPC stated, “In 1975-76 our 
opportunity will lie in the emergence of political and economic populism in the context of the 
American economic crisis.”107 
The Ann Arbor IPC identified the oil crisis as a new focal point. They thought oil and 
energy emerged as key contradictions in geopolitics and economics to exploit:  “oil is the 
struggle for liberation of the key resource areas, and, even more pivotally, shipping lanes from 
imperialist, primarily US control. Domestically, as the contradiction between the working people 
and the monopoly capitalist ruling class, this is the entire range of struggles over energy, control 
of the terms of its production, pricing, marketing, economical and healthful uses.” They 
continued, “Domestically, this is the contradiction between energy and manufacturing capital, 
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evidenced in record high profits for the energy monopoly simultaneous with the partial collapse 
of the auto industry. Internationally, this is evidenced in the increasing struggle between US 
monopoly capital and European and Japanese interests, in which the price and availability of oil 
has become, with food, a chief lever forestalling a strategic US defeat.”108  
The conversation about what constituted the next focal point continued in July 1975 in 
Ann Arbor, which was the IPC’s final official gathering. The July conference not only signaled 
the end of the IPC, but many beginnings. After the meeting Tom Hayden and members of the 
Santa Monica IPC began to work on his senatorial campaign. Ira Arlook, Jay Westbrook, and 
other IPC activists decided to form the Ohio Public Interest Campaign in order to confront plant 
closings, capital flight, and corporate power in cities.  
The Ohio IPC chapters set the tone for the July meeting. Arlook submitted a proposal on 
behalf of the state to the other chapters prior to the conference. Arlook’s proposal was broad in 
scope—sketching political campaigns to address foreign and domestic policy after the war. His 
thoughts regarding domestic policy became the seeds for the Ohio Public Interest Campaign. 
Arlook encouraged other IPC chapters to consider fighting for full employment and addressing 
what he called “corporate globalization.” Arlook echoed leftist critics of MNCs like Robert 
Scheer, “The U.S. economy is dominated by a few hundred corporations that operate throughout 
much of the world. Virtually every major U.S. corporation is a ‘multinational.’ Our national 
economy has, consequently, become so much a part of the world economy that we can no longer 
speak of wages and prices; inflation and unemployment; resource allocation and shortages as 
simply domestic problems.” Arlook continued in his section on “corporate globalization,” 
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“Foreign direct investment has produced a loss in manufacturing jobs in the U.S. and exerted 
downward pressure on wages.”109 
Similar to Scheer’s call for a populist new majority that comprised a broader base than 
the 1960s student-dominated antiwar movement, Arlook called for the establishment of a “public 
interest campaign” composed of the remains of the antiwar movement, sympathetic religious 
organizations, students, liberals, public interest and populist groups, and “some union members” 
and “some” black and Third World people.”110 Arlook conceived of this campaign connecting 
itself to a revitalized left-liberal political coalition to be built on “city, state, and national levels.” 
This public interest campaign was populist in that it would use anti-corporate rhetoric to demand 
public control of multinationals.  
Arlook’s initial vision of the post-Vietnam public interest campaign actually abandoned a 
single issue focus to pursue an agenda connecting domestic and foreign policy politics. Arlook 
wrote, “We will…have to demonstrate convincingly that U.S. foreign policy has much to do with 
the pressing economic problems most people face. We will have to address ourselves to what 
foreign policy looks like from the local level—as, for example, from the unemployment office.” 
“We must show,” he declared, “how unemployment is related as much to foreign policy as it is 
to domestic policy; that it is created in large part by military spending and overseas corporate 
expansion. Why, we should ask, are the Big Three auto manufacturers negotiating with the 
Chilean junta to begin production in Chile, while unemployment is so high in Detroit and 
Cleveland?”111 The new public interest campaign would build upon IPCs strategy—political 
education, direct action, and grassroots pressure. The public interest campaign would also seek to 
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seize on the 1976 presidential election as an opportunity to organize support for its political and 
economic program.112 
Arlook’s domestic politics had two goals: to curb corporate globalization and to attain 
full employment. Arlook’s call for full employment placed the Ohio IPC within the progressive 
tradition. Arlook believed the new organization could stop the corporate globalization through a 
number of measures that included closing tariff loopholes, prohibiting the export of capital and 
technology, taxing MNCs, and abolishing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which 
provided assistance to MNCs and insurance against nationalization and political instability. 
Arlook’s final method of confronting MNCs foreshadowed OPIC’s strategy to fight plant 
closings:  the regulation of deindustrialization. This entailed crafting legislation requiring 
corporations to warn their workers of plant closings two years in advance and to provide lay-off 
insurance, severance pay, and pensions to workers affected by corporate flight.113 His call to 
restrict the power of MNCs also placed him among Scheer, the AFL-CIO, and Congressmen 
Burke and Hartke who also sought to curb the growth of MNCs.  
Most of the chapters agreed generally that IPC should address foreign and domestic 
policy issues. Even though the Detroit chapter had reservations about fighting for full 
employment, they agreed that “fighting for jobs and peace” was “the proper political tactic.”114 
Chicago saw the military budget as the focal point where “the contradictions between public 
need and corporate greed are most sharply focused.” They pointed out how this contradiction 
manifested itself in social service cuts, fiscal crises in cities and states, and unemployment.115 
The Los Angeles chapter agreed that multinational corporations represented the crucial issue. 
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They identified breaking up multinationals as the main goal of the next public interest campaign. 
The LA IPC’s policy proposals resembled Arlook’s in that they called for the closing of tax 
loopholes for MNCs. They also added several other goals that many progressives/leftists would 
fight for later including democratic economic planning on national and regional scales, opening 
of corporate finances to the public, restricting MNCs intervention into domestic affairs of foreign 
nations, and greater self-determination of host nations.116 
Strategically, many of the IPC chapters wanted to build upon the organization’s 
successes. Thus, many did not want to abandon their “campaign” strategy that combined political 
education, grassroots pressure, lobbying, and using pledges to organize other Americans and 
hold legislators accountable. Chicago agreed that the new organization should build broad based 
coalitions with groups they considered to be “to their political right,” such as labor, 
environmental groups, and citizens’ organizations. The Chicago IPC also endorsed utilizing 
pledges and resolutions. The Ann Arbor United Campaign also supported electoral tactics as 
well. While they made sure to point out that electoral politics did not represent an end, the LA 
IPC also agreed with capitalizing on the 1976 elections. “The upcoming elections provide us 
with an ideal platform from which to project our position to the American people….As political 
activists in the United States, we must understand how to operate in the established party politics 
for the achievement of our goals…”117 The LA IPC proceeded to propose working in Tom 
Hayden’s 1976 senatorial campaign and to seek to send delegates to the 1976 Democratic Party 
convention. 
Not all IPC chapters agreed on the economic analysis, or the future direction of the 
organization. Although Chicago did not elaborate, they stated that there were “shortcomings” in 
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Arlook’s paper.118  The Detroit chapter took on Arlook’s economic analysis. The Detroit IPC 
examined political economy through a Marxist-Leninist lens. They remind the other chapters that 
capitalism was a “crisis-ridden” system. They included lengthy discussions of Lenin’s theory of 
imperialism to support their contention that MNCs were only “the contemporary form in which 
monopolies operate” and that “they represent no qualitiative change from the phenomenon Lenin 
observed 60 years ago.”119 Regarding the turn towards domestic economic policy, the Detroiters 
contended that fighting for full employment within the capitalist system was futile since the 
system “requires a reserve army of labor.” 
Opinions regarding the engagement in electoral politics and the view that the 1976 
presidential campaign represented a useful political opportunity ranged from ambivalent to 
highly skeptical. The Chicago branch argued that the new organization “must also look beyond 
the ’76 elections, and not base its work solely on the opportunities presented in an election year.” 
They also acknowledged that IPC could not undertake a uniform political strategy, either. “Many 
of Ira’s proposals may be viable in California, Ohio, or elsewhere, but are somewhat out of touch 
with our reality in Chicago.”120  
The Detroit IPC expressed the strongest disagreement with the electoral approach. They 
acknowledged the short-term usefulness of the congressional strategy, but they reasoned that any 
alliance or work with the Democratic Party was futile. They disagreed with Tom Hayden’s 
entrance into Democratic Party politics. They used Tom Hayden’s entrance into Democratic 
Party politics in California to express its suspicion toward the two party system and the 
Democrats. They frowned upon Hayden’s suggestion that the California Democratic Party 
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represented workers’ interests. The Democratic Party, according to the Detroit IPC, represented a 
bourgeois political party that enjoyed a captured constituency. “The fact is that the Democratic 
Party is a bourgeois political party ranging from George Wallace to Tom Hayden, which is 
significantly to the right of even the British Labor Party. The fact that it has a mass membership 
of people who have nowhere else to go says nothing about its real class character…” They were 
a mass party by default due to the two-party system. They also contended that neither Hayden 
nor his allies sought to bring his potential campaign up for a discussion within the IPC.121 
Ultimately, the Detroit branch predicted Hayden’s defeat. The question that remained after 
examining Detroit’s IPC analysis of electoral politics was whether or not leftists should 
participate in local politics. The Detroit left would confront this question when Kenneth Cockrel 
ran for city council a year later.  
Other chapters, like Ann Arbor, wanted to focus solely on foreign policy. Ann Arbor 
proposed that IPC create a post-Vietnam organization that resembled the IPC. Even though they 
billed this new organization as a “multi-issue” institution, it would still engage in a struggle 
against U.S. imperialism. This organization would expand its geographic focus to address Korea, 
Chile, Zimbabwe, and Iran. It would utilize political education to build a grassroots base and a 
congressional strategy to confront what they considered two major arms of U.S. imperialism:  the 
Pentagon and the CIA. Echoing Arlook’s foreign policy proposals, this new organization would 
seek to organize Americans around cutting the Pentagon budget and the U.S, intelligence 
agencies.122 
The IPC dissolved after the July 1975 conference. IPC’s fate challenges narratives about 
the antiwar movement that emphasizes its decline during the early 1970s. IPC also reveals the 
                                                 
121 Detroit, “The Future of the IPC,” 11-13.  
122 Ann Arbor IPC, “Draft paper on the future of IPC” 
206 
 
pragmatic nature of antiwar organizing. Many IPC activists advanced rather radical analyses of 
U.S. empire, but they pursued political and rhetorical strategies that appealed to non-activist 
Americans and elected officials. Gone was “the movement,” if that meant trying to push the U.S. 
to total revolution. The IPC hitched its politics onto a single issue and to mainstream political 
institutions. Ultimately, IPC activists gave their organization an expiration date. While there 
were many IPC activists who wanted to continue their work, many others such as Tom Hayden 
and Ira Arlook envisioned the organization as a temporary institution that would dissolve once 
the war ended.  
 
Conclusion 
 
IPC’s campaign to end the war in Indochina represented an example of successful 
progressive organizing during the early 1970s. The war in Indochina turned out to be a consensus 
issue among progressive antiwar activists and Democrats, disaffected Republican elected 
officials, and sympathetic Americans. The organization combined a popularized radical analysis 
of U.S. empire with a single-issue campaign strategy that not only included mobilizations, but 
congressional lobbying. The IPC used its Peace Pledge as a grassroots organizing tool and a 
method to secure support for its cause from elected officials. The group developed and 
articulated its “focal point theory” as a means to explain both the centrality of the war in 
Indochina in the maintenance of U.S. empire and its method of applying pressure on Congress. 
As Washington Post columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak explained, one could not 
explain the congressional vote to cut military aid to the Thiệu regime without considering IPC’s 
organizing.  
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The organization’s antiwar politics and strategy was rather sophisticated. Hayden 
disagreed with new left radicals’ strategies to address U.S. empire. He argued that the new left 
radicals who helped engineer SDS’s split in 1969 and those who participated in the New 
Communist Movement during the 1970s failed to directly address Vietnam. Rather than continue 
to build an antiwar movement among radicals in the coastal states, Tom Hayden and IPC 
popularized radical analyses of U.S. imperialism in their efforts to appeal to Americans living in 
Midwestern states. IPC also discovered a third way strategy when it came to expressing its 
support of North Vietnamese self-determination in an anti-communist political culture. The 
organization maintained contact with North Vietnamese activists and sought to relay the damage 
that the U.S.-backed Thiệu regime had done to them.  
“Focal point theory” represented IPC’s most significant intellectual and strategic 
contribution to 1970s left-wing progressivism. This concept represented a method of analyzing 
power and identifying institutional pressure points. Drawing from North Vietnamese Communist 
activists, Hayden identified Indochina as the focal point for the struggle against U.S. 
imperialism. Ironically, it functioned as the left’s version of the U.S.’s domino theory. While the 
U.S. government thought if Vietnam went communist, then the rest of the region would follow 
suit, Hayden and the IPC thought that imperialism could be stopped, and thus paving the way for 
Vietnamese self-determination, if the organization pressured Congress into stop funding the war. 
Thus, Congress emerged as the lever while the Indochina, and corrupt executive power 
embodied by President Nixon, became the targets. Focal point theory guided subsequent actions 
of IPC activists after Saigon fell in 1975. The concept also revealed tensions within the large 
organization.  
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While the group proved right Hayden’s theory that the problem with the antiwar left was 
its inability to concentrate solely on ending the war, the end of the campaign revealed tensions 
within IPC’s strategy and organization. The IPC executed its campaign strategy in an extremely 
disciplined manner. They successfully used the Watergate crisis to appeal to local and national 
elected officials. They scored legislative wins in Congress. But IPC organizers such as Ira 
Arlook and Tom Hayden maintained that the organization had an expiration date—the day the 
U.S. stopped its involvement in Indochina. After the war’s conclusion, the separate IPC chapters 
would decide the next focal point. However, it is no surprise that such a large organization that 
contain locals who were empowered to devise and articulate their own versions of anti-
imperialism and to pursue their own strategies on the ground would produce internal tensions. 
Consequently, once the national IPC reached its goal, the separate branches could not agree on a 
post-Vietnam strategy. Some in the organization wanted to continue the group’s foreign policy 
focus, members of the Ann Arbor IPC saw the oil crisis as the next focal point while Arlook and 
members Ohio’s IPC branches viewed deindustrialization and globalization as the most pressing 
issue. In a sense, social movement victory created organizational tension.  
The shift from anti-imperialism to anti-globalization was one that reflected strategic 
thinking more than anything else. Analyses of imperialism stressing the role that corporations 
and free market ideology swirled around the IPC’s campaign and internal discussions. But the 
IPC saw the Watergate crisis as the most fruitful means of ending the war. Thus, they deployed a 
political analysis that stressed government corruption. IPC activists turned towards talking about 
corporate power after Nixon resigned and the war in Indochina began to wind down. And while 
Marxist-Leninist organizations did not have much political impact, M-L analyses of anti-
imperialism and MNCs informed progressive politics during the early-to-mid 1970s. IPC 
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activists advanced a radical analysis of imperialism that stressed the U.S.’s long history of 
conquest. They also grounded their analysis of Indochina in a populist skepticism of executive 
power.  
The Cleveland IPC and Tom Hayden and the Santa Monica IPC organization decided to 
focus on domestic economic politics.  In 1976, the year after the Indochina Peace Campaign 
disbanded, Tom Hayden entered into the California Senate primary against John V. Tunney. Part 
of Hayden’s reasoning behind his decision lay in his observation that the Democratic Party 
needed reforming and it represented a viable political battleground for leftists. “I believe the 
Democratic Party is a logical arena for the new populist forces,” his campaign program stated. 
Hayden’s campaign also argued that Democratic Party did not listen to their “rank and file” 
supporters. Instead, the campaign declared, “The hierarchy tends to be a more exclusive club, 
dominated by corporate lawyers, and others who have little in common with the rank and file.”123  
Hayden’s campaign published its manifesto in 1976, Make the Future Ours, where it 
outlined Hayden’s political and economic program. He called for full employment legislation 
and the adoption of an economic bill of rights. The program attacked the power of government 
and multinational corporations. Hayden ran on a platform of “economic democracy.”124 Hayden, 
and one of his political advisors, Derek Shearer, first popularized the term during the campaign. 
This entailed providing space for workers and publicly-elected representatives to serve on 
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corporate boards and for establishing more democratic economic institutions such as 
cooperatives.125  
Hayden’s call for economic democracy included a progressive analysis of the crisis that 
viewed technocracy and the lack of political power in economic decision making as the problem. 
“They [analysts and policymakers] cannot acknowledge that the basic problem of our economy 
is not technical but political:  the uncontrolled market power of the banks and corporations. To 
overcome our own powerlessness in the modern market place, we need to move toward 
democratic control of our economy.”126 Hayden lost his campaign to Tunney. But he garnered 
over a million votes and his campaign served as the foundation for the California-based Center 
for Economic Democracy (CED). The CED was a statewide organization, like OPIC, that 
struggled for economic democracy. 
Cleveland IPC’s and Tom Hayden’s and the Santa Monica IPC’s decisions to focus on 
domestic politics reflected the development of a network of progressive organizations devoted to 
organizing around economics. Feminist activist, community organizer, and political strategist, 
Heather Booth and William Winpisinger established the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition to 
struggle for greater democratic control over utilities and energy sources in 1978.127  A month 
before IPC’s final gathering, a large group of progressive activists and politicians assembled in 
Madison, Wisconsin, for the first annual Conference for Alternative State and Local Policies. 
Activists and politicians like Tom Hayden, Lee Webb, and Detroit’s Justin Ravitz gathered to 
devise strategies for progressive governance. IPC activists such as Ira Arlook became frequent 
attendees. Members of the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy also considered themselves 
members of this growing left progressive network.  
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Many scholars of the left in the U.S. also focus on the fragmentation of the left. While the 
end of IPC pushes back against notions of movement failure, the movement did fracture. But it 
did not fracture over internal disputes or repression. IPC struggled through their disagreements 
about ideology and strategy. Most importantly, the organization splintered into multiple groups 
due to success. Ultimately, the splintering was evidence of transformation. This point is often 
missed due to personal disappointment about maintaining a fabled left universalist movement, 
movement periodization, and historiography. It is true that movements are finite and rather self-
contained phenomena—they have a beginning, a life, and an end. Historians who work on the 
antiwar movement are only obligated to charting that particular movement’s life—hence the 
concluding analyses during the end of the 1960s or 1970s. But, what happens when one takes a 
step back and analyze the larger political trajectory?  
The campaign against Indochina and Nixon also stimulated more political activity. 
Activists wanted to continue political work by tackling issues other than U.S. foreign policy. IPC 
Boston Karen Nussbaum involved herself in the women’s rights/workplace movement. Santa 
Monica IPC activist Paul Ryder decided to join Ira, Westbrook, and others in Cleveland to work 
on the issue of plant closings. Detroit IPC activist Frank Joyce worked as an organizer for the 
Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy. These “new progressives” were confident of their 
politics and secure with their decision to engage in electoral politics and push the Democratic 
Party from the left when needed. “The radicalism of the 1960s has become the common sense of 
the 1970s,” Hayden declared at an activist conference.128 
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Chapter 4 
 
Industrial Exodus:  The Ohio Public Interest Campaign’s Movement against Plant Closure 
  
 
On September 25, 1979, over a 1,000 people filled the rotunda in the Ohio Statehouse. 
They gathered to attend hearings before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee on S.B. 
188, a bill that would protect industrial workers from the harmful effects of plant closings. The 
crowd comprised a broad coalition of trade unionists, elected officials, civil rights and religious 
leaders, other grassroots leaders, as well as members of the progressive organization, the Ohio 
Public Interest Campaign (OPIC). The Director of Ohio’s UAW-CAP declared, “We have come 
to Columbus today to let our representatives know that we can’t wait any longer…Since I first 
testified on this bill, 18 months ago, over a dozen major plants and many smaller ones have 
closed in Ohio. Over 18,000 workers have lost their jobs. Our message today is clear:  PASS 188 
THIS YEAR.”1 As the crowd chanted and sang union songs “Solidarity Forever” and “This Land 
is Your Land,” supporters testified in support of the bill introduced by State Senators Michael 
Schwarzwalder and Thomas Carney. Since the room where the hearing was held could 
accommodate less two hundred people, crowds of supporters circled in and out periodically so 
everyone had a chance to witness the proceedings.2  
The September 1979 rally represented the last highlight of OPIC’s campaign against 
plant closings in the state of Ohio.  Since its founding in the fall of 1975, the organization had 
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sought to build a coalition of trade unionists, workers, civil rights and grassroots community 
organizations, and elected officials around plant closings as a focal point. The movement 
centered on supporting workers’ protests against plant closure, grassroots policymaking, and 
public meetings in order to raise awareness about deindustrialization in Ohio and throughout the 
U.S. However, despite the support for such legislation, the movement failed as the bill died in the 
legislature.  
Despite OPIC’s inability to leverage its efforts into law, the campaign for the plant 
closure bill reflected the organization’s and the broader progressive movement’s ability to shape 
conversations about deindustrialization during the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1976 and 1978, 
OPIC crafted the Community Readjustment Act (CRA). The bill called for early notice of 
closure, severance pay, health benefits for six months after a closing, and it demanded firms 
deposit money into a readjustment fund for economic development. The organization’s 
legislation grew out of the organization’s analysis of, and narrative about, deindustrialization. 
OPIC’s signature study of deindustrialization, Industrial Exodus:  Public Strategies for Control 
of Corporate Relocation, influenced future studies of plant closure, progressive organizations in 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois viewed OPIC’s CRA as a model for their efforts to 
curb factory shutdowns.  
OPIC’s campaign against plant closings in Ohio exemplified attempts by progressives to 
build state-based Rustinian coalition of activists, labor organizers, and civil rights and religious 
groups during the mid-to-late 1970s to address economic concerns. The Ohio Public Interest 
Campaign served as the guiding group that organized all of the aforementioned constituencies, 
developed an analysis of deindustrialization, and constructed policy. Rather than trying to 
organize workers inside plants, OPIC focused on mobilizing communities. Such a politics and 
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strategy presumed that the citizen, worker, and community were the main agents rather than just 
the industrial working class. While the plant closing campaign never reached the level of a mass 
movement, the group garnered support for their public actions from leaders in organized labor 
such as Bill Casstevens and UAW President Doug Fraser.  
OPIC relied on various tactics in their campaign against plant closure. While the group 
did not organize direct actions, it did support protesting workers.  It also held public meetings to 
raise awareness around plant closure in the state and organized large rallies in Columbus, Ohio, 
the state capital, to support the CRA hearings.  Finally, OPIC engaged in policy analysis and 
development. The group’s efforts led it to the rhetorical frame of “industrial exodus” when the 
group published Industrial Exodus: Public Strategies for Control of Corporate Relocation in 
1977.  The frame “industrial exodus” influenced other progressive groups such as the Illinois 
Public Action Campaign and scholars of deindustrialization including sociologist Gregory 
Squires and economists Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone.  
OPIC activists aspired to build a “public interest campaign” to stop plant closings. Like 
the IPC, the “campaign” in the organization’s name referred to the activists’ preference to build 
upon what they saw as a winning political strategy. The emphasis on the “public interest” not 
just underscored the organization’s populism, but it represented the organization’s desire to build 
a new broad-based and multiracial coalition around economic interests. For OPIC, the labor 
question remained important during the 1970s. Yet, this aim illustrated OPIC’s desire to take 
plant closings out of the collective bargaining process since organizers presumed that organized 
labor was not strong enough to challenge the private property rights of corporations. OPIC 
sought to address the labor question by arguing for economic democracy that placed questions of 
investment and labor into the realm of politics and into the hands of citizens and workers instead 
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of an early-20th century conception of industrial democracy that advocated for greater worker 
control of a particular plant or industry.3  OPIC was responding to what it saw as the decline of 
New Deal labor liberalism and the labor movement’s acceptance of managerial prerogatives in 
the areas of capital investment and disinvestment. It was necessary, according to the 
organization, to take plant closings out of the collective bargaining structure due to the 
“isolation” of organized labor and business’s reassertion of political power.4 OPIC’s initial 
policy proposals aimed at checking corporate power and addressing plant closings. They ranged 
from labor law reform and full employment on a federal level to supporting worker-owned 
enterprises and cooperatives.   
To discourage plant closings, OPIC devised a state anti-plant closure law, the Community 
Readjustment Act (CRA). OPIC’s bill was an expression of economic democracy grounded in 
what Lynd called community rights to industrial property. OPIC sought to hold corporations 
accountable for decisions that hurt local communities and workers. In the coalition’s advocacy 
for the CRA, they framed their arguments in the rhetoric of shared responsibility and ownership 
and gestured towards a mythic social contract between workers, communities and corporations. 
At least at the level of rhetoric, OPIC’s political appeals were more moralistic than the Detroit 
Alliance for a Rational Economy’s calls for economic democracy. DARE argued for workers’ 
and municipal control over abandoned industrial property. DARE’s vision entailed the construct 
of a public-enterprise sector where workers would develop firms where they would control 
investment and production.  
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As drafter, the CRA would have demanded a two year warning, severance pay, and 
corporate contributions to a community development fund when plants closed. However, one of 
the contradictions between OPIC’s appeals to community rights to industrial property and the 
organization’s Community Readjustment Act was that the law was reactive and thus would not 
have served as the deterrent that the organization’s rhetoric called for. No preventive provisions 
existed in the bill. OPIC’s CRA challenged the private property rights of corporations through its 
provisions aimed at hindering closure. Yet, it was less radical than the Detroit Alliance for a 
Rational Economy’s “rational reindustrialization” plan that called for workers to share rights to 
industrial property with municipal governments. In fact, as I shall demonstrate, OPIC’s political 
visions appeared to narrow as they supported national labor and full employment legislation. 
Building upon the Indochina Peace Campaign’s success, OPIC also pursued a legislative 
strategy in their campaign against factory shutdowns. OPIC was successful insofar as they were 
able to build a coalition and organize a few state congressional hearings. However, the group’s 
federal legislation never advanced outside of committee in either the Senate or House. While 
legislative strategies and more direct action approaches, such as plant occupations, may not be 
mutually exclusive, the community-based legislative approach took OPIC away from trying to 
organize workers in plants in a sustained manner. OPIC organizers acknowledged in the midst of 
the campaign to get the CRA passed that they made attempt to stop plant closings that were 
already in process. Workers in Youngstown’s steel plants and even the UAW at Van Nuys, 
California’s General Motors plant demonstrated relatively successful models of plant-based 
resistance that incorporated local communities.  
While OPIC did not seek the direct elimination of managerial prerogatives in investment, 
its campaign for plant closing legislation amounted to a challenge of managerial private property 
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rights, especially manufacturer’s control over capital investment and location. While employers 
have long sought to maintain these rights, the 1950 Treaty of Detroit agreement between General 
Motors and the United Auto Workers had embedded them in the post-World War II industrial 
economy. The Treaty of Detroit took the struggle over capital investment, location, and 
divestment off the table for the organized trade union movement. However, as postwar 
deindustrialization and the ensuing political struggles around plant closings illustrate, the Treaty 
of Detroit did not totally solve the labor question for activists in unions, civil rights and black 
power organizations, nor for progressives during the 1970s and 1980s. This circumstance, along 
with the varied crises in the national and global economies, cities, energy, and auto and steel 
industry, forced organizers like labor activist-intellectual Staughton Lynd, OPIC, and the Detroit 
Alliance for a Rational Economy to develop alternative understandings of the role of property in 
the political economy.5  
OPIC’s campaign for plant closing bill demonstrates how progressives struggled to enact 
economic reform during the 1970s. IPC’s organizing underscored how progressives could 
organize around non-economic issues successfully. IPC’s success came on an issue on which 
antiwar advocates had already won the policy debate in public discourse. Plant closure, however, 
was a completely different issue, particularly given the level of union-blaming during periods of 
economic crisis.  
Also, state politics stymied OPIC’s efforts. OPIC’s actions pushed business interests to 
mobilize against the bill. The Ohio Manufacturers Association and Greater Cleveland Growth 
Association criticized OPIC and sought to lobby against the bill. OPIC’s campaign also revealed 
the alignment of interests of key state Democrats and Republicans. Governor James Rhodes 
                                                 
5 Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union:  A Century of American Labor (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
2002) 
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favored a state redevelopment plan utilizing bonds and tax breaks and the Democrat chair of the 
State Senate’s Commerce and Labor Committee failed to push it.  
OPIC’s decision to focus on passing plant closure legislation and the campaign’s failure 
highlights the transformation of U.S. political culture during the 1970s. As stated, the group 
viewed the New Deal as dead and trade unions as ineffectual. OPIC activists, as well as other 
progressives, were keenly aware of the growing political strength of business as well. They 
concentrated on a state-based strategy because they believed political opportunities on the 
national level to be limited. Governor Rhodes adhered to prevailing assumptions about capital 
investment that stressed improving the state’s “business climate.” Such prescriptions for 
economic development grew in relevance as policymakers and key decision-makers in the 
private sector stressed tax-cutting, dismantling the welfare state, eradicating other social wages, 
and delivering public subsidies to business as keys to private investment, especially for rustbelt 
cities and states seeking to compete with growing Sunbelt areas.  
 
Context for the Rise of OPIC:  The Business Offensive, the Restructuring of the 
Democratic Party, and the Growing Relevance of Multinational Corporations 
 
Unlike the 1960s social movements that were inspired by beliefs in uninhibited economic 
growth and the redistribution of surplus, crisis, scarcity, and the transformations in political 
culture shaped 1970s progressivism. Also business began taking a greater role in public affairs 
while organized labor struggled to maintain relevance. Watergate discredited the Nixon and Ford 
regimes during the mid-1970s. However, progressives such as Tom Hayden did not see the 
Democratic Party—as it was constituted—as a viable force for economic democracy. Democrats 
during the 1970s rebranded itself into a political party that was on the vanguard of a neoliberal 
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form of governance that focused on finance rather than manufacturing, deregulation, and 
supporting free trade policies that facilitated greater capital mobility.  
 
The Business Offensive and “Good” Climate for Investment 
 
The defeat of the Ohio Public Interest Campaign’s movement for plant closing legislation 
cannot be understood without recognizing corporations’ willingness to shape political culture 
and to influence economic development policy. OPIC not only carried over their IPC-analyses of 
the threat that multinational corporations had on workers and communities, they were aware of 
the growing power of business in U.S. political culture. Even though business had waged a war 
against the New Deal and organized labor since the 1940s, left-wing activists did not perceive 
business as political threat distinct from the two major parties until the 1970s. While hundreds of 
workers rebelled against working conditions, and their unions, during the late-1960s and early-
1970s, many business and political leaders saw the fracturing of the Democratic Party and 
economic restructuring as an opportunity to further discipline workers and organized labor. 
OPIC quoted a 1974 Business Week editorial that underscored the private sector’s willingness to 
defend their interests, “It is inevitable that the U.S. economy will grow more slowly than it 
has…Yet it will be a hard pill for many Americans to swallow—the idea of doing with less so 
that big business can have more.”6 Consequently, the private sector asserted itself in the political 
arena—deploying teams of lobbyists to Washington, D.C., organizing their own educational 
institutions, and, in the case of Cleveland in 1979, throwing cities on the precipice of financial 
collapse by withholding capital.   
                                                 
6 Quoted in Ohio Public Interest Campaign (OPIC) and Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, 
Reclaiming the Future:  A Citizens’ Conference on the Crisis of the Industrial States (Washington, D.C., Conference 
on Alternative State and Local Policies, 1979), 5. 
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The argument for corporations’ willingness to mobilize against progressive politics could 
not have been clearer than in Lewis Powell’s August 23, 1971 memo to Eugene Snydor, Jr., 
President of the U.S Chamber of Commerce. In the memo titled, “Attack on the American Free 
Enterprise System,” Powell charged that business had been under attack by “Communists, New 
Leftists, and other revolutionaries who would destroy the whole system, both economic and 
political.”7 Powell also saw the most “reasonable elements of society,” such as college students, 
intellectuals, members of the clergy and the media participating in the attack. He also identified a 
racial element, “In most of these groups the movement against the system is participated in only 
by minorities.”8 Powell called for business to influence college curricula, the media, and to 
deploy legal strategies to combat the threat.9 
The frame of “good” business climate represented a strategy for influencing development 
in the public sector. Business consultants such as the Fantus Corporation began using the concept 
as a gauge for private investment during the late 1970s.10 The concept was an ideological and 
political construction that served business interests. When trying to determine a state’s business 
climate, Fantus considered many factors to determine a state’s “pro-business” stance including 
taxes, labor laws, unemployment benefits and worker’s compensation costs, size and cost of 
government, welfare costs, and indebtedness. In other words, how “free” was a state’s market? 
For Fantus, the lower the social costs businesses had to pay, the higher a state’s ranking. In one 
1975 Fantus study commissioned by the Illinois Manufacturers Association, seven of the top ten 
states came from the south, where labor laws were weak or nonexistent and taxes were low. 
                                                 
7 Lewis Powell, “Memo to Eugene B. Snydor, Jr.,” September 21, 1971, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf, accessed June 1, 2016. I 
will refer to the document as the Powell Memo.  
8 Powell Memo, 2-3.  
9 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands:  The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal (New York:  W.W. 
Norton, 2010), 156-160.  
10 Greg LeRoy, The Great American Jobs Scam:  Corporate Tax Dodging and the Myth of Job Creation (San 
Francisco:  Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2005), 79. 
221 
 
Business leaders and lobbyists tried used Fantus’ rankings to justify plant closure and promote 
tax relief for investment. The Illinois Manufacturers surveyed their membership about the causes 
of plant closure in the state and many listed four reasons:  high wages and taxes, the perception 
that the state is pro-union and anti-business, and the state’s regulatory burden.11  
Elected officials and activists expressed mixed reactions. For elected officials working in 
states with so-called “weak” business climates such as California Governor Jerry Brown, and 
even some business leaders, such studies were dubious. California’s chief economist Pauline 
Sweezy told the Los Angeles Times that the report contained “many inconsistencies.”12 The 
Ohio Public Interest Campaign, however, tried to use the Illinois Manufacturers Association 
report for its own advantage. Ohio shared the #26 ranking with Louisiana. The organization 
sought to use the ranking to make the case for plant closing legislation. In a flyer, OPIC stressed 
that the state’s climate was “second only to Indiana of all the major northern industrial states.” 
Thus, the CRA, according to the Ohio Public Interest Campaign, would “not significantly 
change” Ohio’s business climate.13 
 
The Crisis of the New Deal and the Restructuring of the Democratic Party 
 
The crisis of New Deal liberalism and the fracturing of its coalition of organized labor, 
Democratic Party, and big city mayors also formed the backdrop of for the development of OPIC 
and their construction of the Community Readjustment Act. Progressives in OPIC and DARE 
often acknowledged that a national movement was needed to institutionalize economic 
                                                 
11 “A Special Report—Fantus Study Confirms Illinois’ Sick Business Climate,” IMA Executive Memo, November 
4, 1975, Ohio Citizen Action Records, Box 18, Folder – Fantus Corp – Illinois Manufacturers Association,  Western 
Reserve Historical Society (WRHS); LeRoy, 80.  
12 Roger Smith, “Is Fantus Study Fact or Faulty?,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1978.  
13 OPIC, “Business Closing Legislation Won’t Place Ohio at a Disadvantage,” James Miller Papers, Box 5, Folder 
111, WRHS.  
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democracy. However, they often argued that the national political environment was not 
hospitable to their policy agenda.  
New Deal liberalism was in crisis by the 1970s as a result of global economic turbulence 
and sustained political attacks from business, the right, and the left. Democrats had long 
grounded the social-democratic aspects of the New Deal in notions of a perpetually expanding 
manufacturing economy, thus leaving elected officials and policymakers unprepared for the 
economic crises of the 1970s including stagflation, deindustrialization, and the oil shock.  
Democrats and organized trade unions failed to pass trade, employment, and labor legislation 
while business leaders continued their decades-long attack on organized labor.  Progressives 
believed these failures signaled the need for a construction of a new social democratic politics—
in the form of economic democracy—that could serve as an alternative to a dying New Deal 
liberalism and challenge an ascending political and economic philosophy that relied heavily on 
finance, unimpeded capital mobility, the globalization of production, and an emphasis on 
market-based solutions to all social and economic problems.  
As Japan and West Germany gained in the production of steel and automobiles, the U.S. 
entered into a crisis of trade policy. Labor unions such as the AFL-CIO pointed to the excesses 
of free trade contributing to deindustrialization and job loss in the Northeast and Midwest. Post-
WWII free trade policies created the conditions for the 1971 trade deficit. The U.S. had opened 
up its market to Europe and Japan after the war “to cement cold-war alliances” even as Japan and 
Europeans nations maintained protectionist trade policies based on tariffs and quotas. In 1970, 
the U.S. had reported a $2.7 billion trade surplus. A year later, however, the country recorded a 
trade deficit, its first since 1893.  Federal officials saw Japan as the principle contributor to the 
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deficit as Japan’s exports to the U.S. increased by 96 percent during the late 1960s. The trade 
deficit with Japan alone increased from $3 billion to $8.5 billion between 1970 and 1971.   
The Democrats’ relationship to declining New Deal liberalism and the restructuring 
global economy became more complicated.  The rise of “New Democrats” embodied by Senator 
George McGovern signaled a shift in the national electoral coalition from a urban-labor-liberal 
base towards one that drew on liberal suburbanites and the 1960s social movements. Political 
scientist Bruce Miroff refers to the new Democratic orientation as “moral politics, infused with a 
spirit of social justice.”14 This moral politics translated into rooting out corruption in politics. 
Reformers sought to displace party insiders from urban machines and big labor. Instead of trying 
to develop an economic policy suited to the turbulence of the decade, national Democrats 
concentrated on foreign policy, race, gender, political process, and the environment.15 Party 
reforms underscored Democrats’ desires to attract suburbanites, women, youth, African 
Americans and other social movement constituencies. Some liberals in the Democratic Party 
sought to check the growth of multinational corporations with the Burke-Hartke Bill in 1972, 
pass full employment legislation, labor law reform at the end of the decade, yet they failed to get 
such legislation passed.16 
President Jimmy Carter represented a departure from the New Deal-Great Society mold. 
Carter articulated a moral politics that disavowed special interests and sought to reduce the size 
of the federal government. Carter concentrated his efforts on curbing inflation. Carter initiated 
rounds of deregulation in finance that Reagan and Clinton continued in the 1980s and 1990s. He 
                                                 
14 Bruce Miroff, Liberals’ Moment:  The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party 
(Lawrence:  University of Kansas, 2009), 23.  
15 Judith Stein, “Politics and Policies in the 1970s and Early Twenty-First Century:  The Linked Recessions,” in 
Workers in Hard Times:  A Long View of Economic Crises, ed. Leon Fink, Joan Sangster, and Joseph McCartin 
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16 Stein, “Politics and Policies in the 1970s,” 146. 
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appointed Paul Volcker chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 who raised interest rates and 
famously shocked inflation out of the economy.  
Liberalism’s emphasis on free-market economics at home and abroad also contained the 
seeds of destruction of the industrial economy. Public policy scholar Oren M. Levin-Waldman 
argues in Plant Closure, Regulation, and Liberalism: The Limits to Liberal Public Philosophy, 
that post-WWII liberalism was unsuited to deal with the challenge of plant closure. “The rights 
revolution between the New Deal and the 1980s responsible for the generation of these 
entitlements,” Levin-Waldman writes, “has essentially stopped short of plant closure.”17 This is 
true, but postwar liberalism’s inability to extend rights consciousness into the realm of corporate 
governance and labor has more to do with the decoupling of labor and civil rights in the courts 
during the 1930s and 1940s and corporations’ ability to maintain control over investment 
decisions. Additionally, the economic aspects of U.S. Cold War policy such as the Marshall Plan 
and seeking to remove trade barriers for allies have also contributed to liberalism’s inability to 
protect workers from plant closure.18 
 
Economic Crisis and the Rise of Progressivism 
The 1973 OPEC oil embargo served as another key event in the transformation of the 
U.S. political economy and the emergence of progressive politics in the 1970s. In 1973, the 
mostly Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) imposed 
an oil embargo in response to U.S. military support of Israel against Egypt in the Yom Kippur 
                                                 
17 Oren M. Levin-Waldman, Plant Closure, Regulation, and Liberalism:  The Limits to Liberal Public Philosophy 
(Maryland:  University Press of America, 1992), 4.  
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War. The embargo quadrupled oil prices. 19 The shock drove up energy prices by 70% in the 
United States.20 This price hike in oil sent the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy reeling. 
Auto, appliance, textile, furniture, and television manufacturers struggled. The shock contributed 
to growing inflation and provoked a national recession in 1974 and 1975.21  
The 1974-1975 economic recession signaled the end of the postwar economic boom.22 
The 1970s recession was the worst since the 1930s. According to Stein, the U.S. economy 
experienced a dramatic decline between October 1974 and March 1975. “Productivity plunged 
2.7 percent. The decline in business profits was the worst in seventeen years. Wages fell 2.1 
percent. Unemployment reached 7.2 in December,” Stein reports.23 Black unemployment, 
typically higher than white unemployment, grew to 14.8% in 1975.24 The recession hindered and 
halted labor militancy in the private and public sectors.25  
Industrial cities such as Detroit and Cleveland felt the brunt of the oil shock and 
recessions during the 1970s. These crises hit Detroit the hardest as its economy depended 
primarily on the mass production and consumption of cars depended upon low energy costs. 
During the 1974-1975 recession, Detroit’s unemployment rate was double that of the national 
                                                 
19 Stein, Pivotal Decade, 74.  
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rate—it increased from 12.5 to 17.4% while the country’s rate rose from 5.6 to 8.5%.26 
Cleveland’s unemployment rate tacked closer to the national average. By December 1974, 
unemployment in the Cleveland metropolitan area had reached 6.1%. Manager of state 
employment services, Emden C. Schulze, estimated that the city’s unemployment rate may have 
been 10% while the rate for African Americans, Hispanics, and Latinos “was probably about 16 
per cent” combined.27 
Economic recession, urban fiscal crises, deindustrialization, disarray within the 
Democratic Party, and a largely ineffectual national organized labor movement set the stage for 
the reappearance of progressivism and economic democracy. A network of progressive activists, 
elected officials, organizations, and publications coalesced during the 1970s. Progressives 
occupied the Democratic Party’s left wing. As political scientist James Jennings explains, 
progressives “did not accept the accumulation or protection of capital as a greater priority than 
the needs of poor and working class citizens.”28 And as leftist journalists Alexander Cockburn 
and James Ridgeway once remarked about one of their conferences, “There were faces from the 
60s,” but, there was “no radical hangover.”29 This group of progressives articulated a populist 
critique of corporate power and advanced a program of “economic democracy,” which entailed, 
but was not limited to, greater regulation of corporations, establishment of worker-owned 
enterprises, the public control over energy, utilities, and banking.  
A leftist counterpublic sphere took shape during the 1960s and 1970s. Think tanks and 
publications such as the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Exploratory 
Project for Economic Alternatives, the Institute of the Black World, In These Times, Working 
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Papers for a New Society, and Mother Jones developed and disseminated progressive ideas. In 
June 1975, more than 150 activists and public officials gathered in Madison, Wisconsin for the 
first annual Conference for Alternative State and Local Public Policies. In addition to serving as 
a crucial meeting space for progressives from across the country to gather and share ideas and 
organizing and governing advice, the organization published several key documents aiding OPIC 
and other groups fighting plant closure.  
National labor- and citizen-based coalitions also arose during the 1970s. The Citizen-
Labor Energy Coalition and the Progressive Alliance emerged in response to crises in energy and 
in organized labor. William Winipisnger and Heather Booth formed the Citizen-Labor Energy 
Committee (CLEC) in an effort to develop a grassroots energy policy in response to the late-
1970s oil shock.30 UAW President Doug Fraser organized the Progressive Alliance in [year]. 
While the organization failed to create a long-lasting progressive coalition aimed at tackling 
corporate power, it contributed greatly to the movement against plant closings. The Progressive 
Alliance enlisted Barry Bluestone’s and Bennett Harrison’s expertise to publish studies of 
deindustrialization. They published their first analysis—Capital and Communities:  The Causes 
and Consequences of Private Disinvestment—in 1980.31 Their studies culminated with the 
publication of The Deindustrialization of America:  Plant closings, Community abandonment, 
and the Dismantling of Basic Industry in 1982, which built upon OPIC’s, works documenting 
plant closings.  
Although many political scientists argue that black politics also drifted rightward in the 
1970s, black politics often represented a vestige of New Deal, or left, liberalism. African 
American mayors and many of their constituents, and black political groups such as the 
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Congressional Black Caucus operated on the left wing of the Democratic Party. Even though the 
1972 “Gary Declaration” arose out of a meeting between black radicals such as Amiri Baraka 
and black politicians such as Gary’s mayor, Richard Hatcher, it contained many economic and 
foreign policy ideas that were to the left of the Democratic Party. The left-liberal “Gary 
Declaration” called for more substantial economic development, a guaranteed family income, a 
raised minimum wage, and redistributive measures through tax reforms and hikes in estate and 
gift taxes. The document was anti-imperialist and critical of mass government expenditures in 
defense as well, two stances that Washington would highlight in his primary campaign. 32  
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) operated on the Democratic Party’s progressive 
wing during the 1970s and 1980s. The CBC and its white allies also suffered a major setback in 
terms of producing and pushing through legislation that targeted the issue of unemployment. 
During the late 1970s, the CBC led the charge with the attempt to pass full employment 
legislation. In 1978, Congress passed the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which was a piece of 
legislation that black supporters believed would secure full employment, and be in the spirit of 
Martin Luther King’s Poor People’s Movement. The legislation failed to impact the national 
labor market, however, because neither the President, Congress, nor the Federal Reserve sought 
to implement it.33 
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Progressives Move toward a New Focal Point After Vietnam:  Multinational Corporations 
The Ohio Public Interest Campaign was born out of the Indochina Peace Campaign’s 
attempt to locate the next focal point for action. Ira Arlook and members of Ohio’s IPC chapters 
viewed the growth around U.S.-based multinational corporations as a possible focal point. 
Ohio’s IPC members entered into unfolding conversations among liberals and radicals about the 
rise of multinational corporations (MNCs) and capital mobility. Organized labor began 
mobilizing against the power of MNCs during the early 1970s. Radical theorists, many of them 
relying on a Marxist-Leninist analysis, began trumpeting MNC’s as a manifestation of the latest 
phase of capitalist development. Liberal analysts, such as economist Richard Barnet, critiqued 
the growing power that MNCs began to exert on nation-states and workers. And the IPC began 
laying the foundation for the Ohio Public Interest Campaign’s analysis of how the force of 
MNCs manifested themselves on a local level—via disinvestment and plant closings.  
Views on MNCs can be divided roughly into four categories—a business view that saw 
MNCs as preferred development, a liberal-labor view, a radical view, and a left-liberal view. The 
labor view, exemplified by the AFL-CIO, was grounded in mostly protectionist approaches to 
dealing with MNCs. Like left-liberals and radicals, they saw MNCs as a threat to workers’ rights, 
but, like left-liberals they proposed protectionist legislation. Left-liberals tended to eschew the 
nationalist rhetoric of organized labor unions such as the AFL-CIO and tended to disagree with 
the Marxist-Leninist analysis of MNCs. But, like organize labor, left-liberals call for greater 
regulations of corporate capital. Radical theorists and critics of MNCs advanced Marxist-
Leninist understandings of corporate and economic restructuring. Often drawing from either 
Sweezy and Baran’s concept of monopoly capital, or Lenin’s theories of imperialism, radicals 
articulated stagist theories of economic development—MNCs representing a higher form of 
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capitalism, another step towards creating the conditions for the emergence of a global proletariat. 
Radicals often emphasized MNCs’ role in uneven economic development between regions and 
within and among nations. Organized labor, left-liberals, and radicals all agreed, however, that 
unchecked MNCs were the source of plant closings and unemployment. The AFL-CIO 
spearheaded an effort to curb the power of MNCs during the late-1960s and early 1970s. The 
AFL-CIO proposed legislation to curb foreign direct investment by U.S.-based companies. The 
Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972 called for eliminating tax breaks for investing in 
foreign countries. It forbade corporations from sheltering profits and investments overseas. The 
bill also limited imports. Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana and Representative James Burke of 
Massachusetts agreed to sponsor AFL-CIO’s legislation and introduced it in late 1971.34 
Business leaders and members of the Nixon Administration roundly opposed the legislation. 
While speaking at the Detroit Economic Club in May 1972, David Rockefeller charged that 
MNCs were ‘”being hauled before the court of public opinion and indicted.’”35 Other 
businessmen, such as the Cleveland, Ohio-based Westinghouse Electric Company also defended 
MNCs and attacked the bill.36 After much opposition, the bill never made it to the floor for a 
vote.  
The union published a report in 1973 analyzing the bill’s failure.  The AFL-CIO’s report, 
U.S. Multinationals:  The Dimming of America, advanced a nationalist critique of the growth of 
MNCs. They worried that the MNCs growing power threatened the nation-state’s ability to 
govern them. They also asserted that corporations did not act as proper citizens of the U.S. They 
argued that MNCs only demonstrated allegiance to themselves. They deemed MNCs, and those 
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who ran them, as the “non-American ‘Cosmocorps.’” This group represented the emerging 
global corporate managerial class who turned their back on America and its workers. “American-
based multinationals,” the report states, “by moving to another part of the world, shun the laws 
of this country, just as they shun the flag of this nation.”37  
Despite the AFL-CIO’s nationalism and protectionism, their report anticipated many of 
the IPC critiques of MNCs and many of the leftist critiques of deindustrialization during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. They placed blame for the nation’s economic woes squarely on large 
corporations. They alluded to the local effects of corporate restructuring when they expressed 
concern about the U.S. becoming “a land of idle workers and empty factories.”38 Like many 
leftists, they pointed to the increasing power of multinational banks in restructuring the global 
political economy. They claimed that the transfer of capital represented the graver threat to the 
nation than the movement of production.39 Banks, in effect, could disturb economic public policy 
(such as monetary policy) and they help facilitated the sheltering of profits from U.S. taxation. 40 
While the AFL-CIO lost the political battle, their fight opened up a public conversation 
about MNCs among left-liberals and radicals. Radicals tended to view MNCs as the latest 
manifestation of monopoly capitalism. They saw global corporations as the primary culprit of 
economic instability, and thus, the primary target of action as the U.S. military floundered in 
Indochina. Radical theorists such as scholar Stephen Hymer, activist Robert Scheer, and 
economist Steve Babson, maintained that MNCs were the source of uneven development, 
deindustrialization, and waste. Black radicals also weighed in on the debate. Black Panther Huey 
Newton acknowledged the growing power of MNCs, but also asserted that they created the 
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conditions for a revolutionary intercommunalism whereas Black Communist Carl Bloice argued 
that MNCs represented the greatest threat to black workers.41  Similar to conversations about 
imperialism, leftist analyses of MNCs rested on the Marxist-Leninist view that monopoly 
capitalism represented the latest stage of capitalism. The following analysts drew from Lenin’s 
pamphlet on the subject, but, like Baran and Sweezy, placed U.S. corporate capitalism at the 
center.  
Black Communist Carl Bloice viewed automation, the growth of MNCs, and the global 
concentration of finance as serious threats to black labor power.  According to Bloice, 
proletarianization was under attack by these forces:  “the forces of production and finance under 
capitalism are being pitted against eh black worker and thereby all black people. Being that 94% 
of all black people in the U.S. are workers, what we are confronted with might be called the 
steady lumpenization of a people.”42 Since black Americans comprised of much of the nation’s 
urban industrial working class, the globalization of production threatened to hurt them the most. 
Yet, similar to the Detroit’s League of Black Revolutionary Workers’ outlook, black workers in 
cities represented the vanguard of the black liberation movement during this period. Based upon 
his analysis, Bloice recognized the significance of the state of Michigan, and presumably the city 
of Detroit, in the fight between black American workers and MNCs.43  
Steve Babson, a scholar from the Union for Radical Political Economics, agreed with the 
AFL-CIO that MNCs were the source for deindustrialization and unemployment. Confronting 
pro-MNC arguments that the globalization of production stimulated domestic job growth, 
Babson thought such suggestions were often exaggerated. He cited a Tariff Commission study 
that found that foreign direct investment created one job in the U.S. for every 3.3 jobs it created 
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elsewhere.44 Babson concurred with critics who contended that the globalization of production 
provided capital with a formidable weapon in its struggle against labor—the threat of leaving. 
Acknowledging the long history of “runaway plants,” or deindustrialization, in the New England 
region, Babson illustrated how corporations such as General Electric and Frigidaire used layoffs 
and threats of plant closures to discipline workers.    
Leftist journalist Robert Scheer wrote that MNCs had taken control over U.S. politics and 
the economy in his 1974 book, America After Nixon:  The Age of Multinationals. “The age of 
multinationals represent a time when effective control over what is important has passed to the 
new breed of transnational corporations. The ascension of Nelson Rockefeller to the Vice-
Presidency merely symbolizes a process that had already been well underway,” Scheer wrote.45 
Scheer maintained that one could not talk about the symptoms of the nation’s economic crisis—
inflation and unemployment—without considering the central role of MNCs. Due to their large 
size and scope, political influence, control over scale, and obsession with growth, MNCs 
undermined worker and citizen power and regulation. Echoing the AFL-CIO’s observation that 
MNCs sought to destabilize the nation-state (but not the AFL-CIO’s nationalism), Scheer 
explained, “This abandonment of the nation-state involves giving up a unit of government in 
which people have some chance of exercising control over these corporations.”46 Scheer’s point 
about MNC’s growth of power in relation to government and labor percolated in progressives’ 
critiques of corporate power during the mid-to-late 1970s.  
Scheer argued that liberalism played a role in the development of MNCs through the 
Marshall Plan and the liberalization of foreign economies. Scheer viewed liberalism as ill-
equipped to confront powerful MNCs. Instead of continuing to hold onto liberalism, Scheer 
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called for “an active, organized left political force” that could oppose MNCs and “restore citizen 
control over political life.” Scheer also called for a “new leftist coalition” that would leave 
behind “the style” of the 1960s. Students could no longer serve as the primary agent of social 
change. Instead, these “new” new leftists would have to try to capitalize on what Scheer saw as a 
burgeoning populism and build a larger progressive majority. 
Detroit leftists analyzed the impact of MNCs on the city. The Detroit Area Research 
Group (DARG) published The Average Citizen’s Guide to the Multinational Corporation. 
Written by an “ex-heroin addict, a technical white-collar worker for the city of Detroit, a 
suburban college student, a Chrysler assembly line worker, and a university professor and 
mother,” DARG was an anonymous leftist group that was clearly connected to the city’s left.47 
They specifically focused on the role of the “Big 3” automakers in urban development. The 
DARG argued the “Big 3” possessed a disproportionate power in decisions regarding 
development. The “Big 3” sought to control the creation of a proposed high speed transit system 
in the city. They also pointed to Henry Ford II’s and the Detroit Renaissance, Inc.’s—an urban 
development organization devoted to the economic revitalization of the city—reliance on 
gentrification to develop the city through luxury apartments and office buildings instead of 
rehabilitating housing in the city’s neighborhoods. “One has to ask, though, who will be using 
these gleaming castles?,” DARG asked. “No housing is going to be made available to the poor 
and the working people who manage to just make the mortgage payment,” they continued. 
DARG’s pro-neighborhood, and anti-corporate, arguments anticipated those advanced by the 
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Ohio Public Interest Campaign and Kenneth Cockrel and the Detroit Alliance for a Rational 
Economy during the late 1970s.48  
Leftists advanced several potential strategies for confronting MNCs and capital flight. 
Scholar Robert Hymer suggested the vague idea of “regional planning as a positive negation of 
the multinational corporation.”49 Babson suggested that activists rework portions of the Burke-
Hartke Bill.50 Babson asserted, “The Burke-Hartke Bill, minus the section on import quotas and 
with extensive re-writing of the remaining sections, could be made into a feasible set of initial 
demands.”51 DARG advanced vague individualized suggestions such as joining local leftist 
organizations like the Control, Conflict, and Change bookclub, a group with whom Sheila 
Murphy was affiliated.52 
Many leftists agreed that a leftist populist movement was needed to confront MNCs. 
Hymer, like Huey Newton, was confident that opponents of MNCs and the globalization of 
production could use its technological advances to confront globalized corporate power. 
“Fortunately businessmen in attacking the problem of applying technology on a world level have 
developed many of the tools and conditions needed for a socialist solution, if we can but stand 
them on their head, he wrote.53 Hymer also recognized the need for a left populist politics. 
Hymer suggested, “What is needed is a complete change in direction. The starting point must be 
the needs of the bottom two-thirds, and not the demands of the top third. The primary goal of 
such strategy would be to provide minimum standards of health, education, food, and clothing to 
the entire population…”54 
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Richard Barnet’s and Ronald Müller’s 1974 book, Global Reach:  The Power of 
Multinational Corporations inspired OPIC’s analyses of MNCs. Representing a liberal view, 
Ronald Müller was a trained economist and Richard Barnet co-founded the liberal think tank, the 
Institute of Policy Studies, with Marcus Raskin in 1963. Müller specialized in economic 
development while Barnet wrote extensively about U.S. foreign policy before publishing Global 
Reach. Barnet’s and Müller’s text was to the right of Leninism, yet to the left of the AFL-CIO’s 
critique of MNCs. However, they did echo the AFL-CIO’s contention that MNCs transcended 
the imperatives of the nation-state. They believed that the multinational corporation had not only 
become a powerful agent in shaping the national and emerging global economy, but they were 
the purveyors of economic and political inequality. However, they did not see global 
corporations as fundamental adversaries of economic and political democracy like Marxists and 
other left-liberals such as Arlook. They thought MNCs could be reformed and regulated.   
The power of their text rested upon their thick description of the emergence of the 
globalization of production. After declaring that “the men who run the global corporations are 
the first in history with the organization, technology, money, and ideology to make a credible try 
at managing the world as an integrated unit,” they went into painstaking detail to describe the 
conditions of corporate restructuring, managerial strategies, and MNCs’ effects on the United 
States and third world.55 They described how MNCs such as IBM, Mobil, and General Motors 
used advances in communications, computer technology, transportation, and management to 
direct the production, distribution, marketing, and selling of goods on a globalized scale.56 The 
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shift towards global corporate management, according to the authors, also stimulated the 
centralization of industries in fewer large corporations.57  
Müller and Barnet were especially interested in how MNCs sought to transform politics 
with the intent of creating more favorable conditions of expanding their companies and 
advancing the gospel of a borderless and unregulated global market that allowed money, capital, 
technology, and products to flow freely. “The U.S. global manager, despite his traditional 
suspicion of government and his extravagant faith in the ability of business men to serve the 
public interest better than politicians, is now asking Washington to step up official support of 
U.S. business abroad to counter the advantages that national governments afford his foreign 
competitors,” the authors reported.58 
Barnet’s and Müller’s primary criticism of MNCs was of their propensity to produce 
inequality among the “third world” and the West as well as among the wealthy and workers and 
poor within the U.S. They described the process of growing economic inequality in the U.S. as 
the “Latin Americanization of the United States.” According to the authors, MNCs created the 
conditions that made the U.S. resemble “underdeveloped nations.” Barnet and Müller asserted, 
“it is now possible to discern certain structural changes in the United States which are causing 
the world’s richest nation to take on some of the aspects of an underdeveloped country. Some of 
these changes are directly related to the rise of the global corporation.”59 
This process, according to the authors, entailed the emergence of “the globalization of 
oligopoly capitalism” where the various technological, managerial, and political transformations 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted in the expansion of U.S.-based global 
corporations. Consequently, the greatest corporate power was consolidated in those firms. These 
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corporations concerned themselves primarily with maximizing profit. They also cited the 
restructuring of the international division of labor. They pointed to the development of Latin 
American, Asian, and African nations as new production hubs in the post-colonial era.60  
Echoing the AFL-CIO, the authors acknowledged how the growth of production abroad 
meant the slimming down of manufacturing in the U.S. They confirmed that the obsolescence of 
U.S. production created more “unemployable” persons, or what 1969s policy makers called the 
“hard-core unemployed.” “The effect is to eliminate traditional jobs on the assembly line and 
thereby to reduce the blue collar work force and to replace these jobs with others (probably a 
smaller number) requiring quite different skills.” Instead of a manufacturing-based economy, the 
U.S. would produce “plans, programs, and ideas for others to execute.” The U.S. would become 
an information and service hub employing less Americans. 61 
Barnet and Müller critiqued labor and Marxist approaches to MNCs. They say labor 
unions as too nationalistic. They recognized the power of finance capital, but they did not see the 
essential union between finance capital and the state as Marxist-Leninists did.62 In fact, they 
often maintained that the MNCs threw the legitimacy of the nation-state into question. Müller 
and Barnet also disagreed with radicals over their analyses of imperialism and the role of banks 
in the national and global economy. The authors reasoned that there were times when bankers’ 
and industrialists’ shared an identical goal—to ensure profit and promote growth. When banks 
operated in “regulated industries” such as the railroads, utilities, and communications, they 
tended to wield greater power over particular companies. Despite these differences, Barnet and 
Müller advanced some proposals that future critics of MNCs and plant closings would 
appreciate—tax code reforms, ensure greater worker power, redistribution of income in order to 
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shrink the gap between the rich and the poor, the break-up of the most concentrated industries, 
making corporations more beholden to the community. 
OPIC activists believed that Müller’s and Barnet’s prescriptions needed to be turned “on 
their head,” as Arlook recalled—start from the bottom-up and plan locally rather than national 
planning.63 The conversations about MNCs that occurred within the Ohio chapter of the IPC 
allowed future OPIC members such as Ira Arlook to make valuable intellectual and political 
contributions to conversations about globalization and deindustrialization of cities. They 
successfully connected the dynamics of the national and global concentration of corporate power 
to local plant closings. Barnet and Müller only hinted at the connection. Labor unions did make 
this connection with their discussions of the relationship between MNCs and “runaway plants,” 
but future OPIC activists complicated the connection between MNCs and “runaways” by 
deepening understandings of the process of corporate disinvestment and deindustrialization.  
 
 
Establishing the Ohio Public Interest Campaign  
 
Ohio Indochina Peace Campaign activists formed the Ohio Public Interest Campaign 
(OPIC) in 1975. They charged themselves with confronting corporate power and plant closings 
in Cleveland, Ohio. OPIC functioned similarly to IPC, but on a state level. The organization’s 
base was Cleveland, but they had members in several cities including Cincinnati, Akron, and 
Dayton. OPIC also assisted activists in other cities struggling against plant closings during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s like Youngstown. Even though they engaged in local and state 
politics, OPIC’s leadership saw the organization as part of a growing movement against plant 
closings. Other progressive organizations such as Massachusetts Fair Share modeled much of 
their political proposals around the issue after OPIC.  
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Kelly and OPIC thought maintaining the state’s industrial base was in the interests of not 
just factory workers, but everyone. Arlook remarked, “We felt that unless the issue was seen as 
more than a labor question it wouldn’t be enough. It was really a public interest question that 
meant senior citizens should be concerned, traditional community organizations should be 
concerned, religious congregations, even many small businesspeople.”64 Kelly argued that it was 
necessary to move the issue of plant closings outside of traditional labor-management relations, 
or collective bargaining. It was a mistake, the organization thought, to organize around industrial 
workers alone because organized labor “was unfortunately isolated.”65 Instead OPIC sought to 
build a broad based grassroots campaign akin to IPC’s Indochina campaign. OPIC envisioned the 
campaign pulling together a wide range of constituencies including organized labor, the peace 
movement, “Nader-inspired research and advocacy groups,” and liberal Democrats.66 
OPIC sought “to work on economic issues affecting the state of Ohio.”67 Also, for 
activists like Arlook, addressing plant closings represented one strategy to connect the local with 
the global and confront “corporate globalization.”68 The restructuring of global production 
transformed the Midwestern economy. The region served as a national manufacturing hub for 
automobiles, rubber and tires, steel, and durable goods. And while deindustrialization began long 
before the 1970s, the process intensified as scores of factories closed and Midwestern and 
Northeastern cities hemorrhaged jobs, capital, and people during this period. The spate of plant 
closure during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the loss of thousands of manufacturing jobs. 
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Youngstown lost nearly 10,000 jobs due to steel mill closings between 1977 and 1979. Cleveland 
lost 68,442 manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1983.69  
According to a Department of Labor report on displaced workers, 11.5 million workers 
20 years age and over lost jobs due to deindustrialization nationally between 1979 and 1983. 
Almost half of those workers—5.1 million—were employed for at least three years. African 
Americans comprised 12 percent of those workers. The East North Central Region, which 
included Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin, lost over 550,000 jobs. Of those jobs, 
225,000 auto workers were displaced. “Of these,” the report stated, “44 percent reported they had 
lost their jobs because their plants had closed.”70  
OPIC “believed that plant closings affected the most Ohioans.” Statistics help explain 
why OPIC activists saw the state of Ohio as a crucial site for organizing against the “economic 
structure of empire,” as Paul Ryder called it.71 Between 1958 and 1983, firms fled to the suburbs 
and out of the state. During this period, the city of Cleveland lost 21.5 percent of its 
manufacturing firms. Cleveland lost 27.5 percent of its industrial workers while the number of 
manufacturing laborers increased in the suburbs by almost 50 percent between 1958 and 1972.72 
Also, the northeast Ohio region experienced several plant closings in the years following the 
establishment of OPIC. In 1975, Akron’s Goodyear Plant closed. The SCM Corporation closes 
Cleveland’s Glidden Plant in 1976. Diamond Shamrock moves south in the same year. US Steel 
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closed its plant in 1978 and Westinghouse Lamp Plant closed the following year. General 
Electric closed six factories.73 In Youngstown, Lykes Sheet and Tube closed in 1977.74  
Yet, OPIC had to organize in a state where the Republican Governor argued for a 
development model emphasizing tax breaks and building a “better” business climate. Governor 
James Rhodes served as Ohio’s governor for eight years (1963-1971) before returning for two 
more terms in 1975.75 Rhodes governed as a moderate in both stints in the statehouse. Yet, unlike 
Michigan Republican Governor George Romney, Rhodes did not boast a national profile. 
Rhodes attracted the ire of the New Left, however, for the deployment of the National Guard at 
Kent State that led to the deaths of Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, William Knox Schroeder, and 
Sandra Lee Scheuer on May 4, 1970. 
Times changed in the four years that Rhodes was not in office. Rhodes reentered the 
governor’s mansion in the midst of economic recession. He also had to face Democratic 
majorities in the General Assembly. Thus, among Rhodes’s political goals was to make the state 
“’Depression proof.’”76 This meant attracting industry and revitalizing the state’s biggest cities. 
“’We’re going to get jobs for all the people of Ohio regardless of race, color, creed or sex,’” he 
declared at his inaugural address.77 
Rhodes sought to finance the state’s economic revitalization with a cocktail of bonds, a 
slight tax increase on gasoline, and tax incentives for businesses. Rhodes sought to use tax 
abatements—a reduction or an exemption from property taxes over a specified period of time—
for urban redevelopment. \While Rhodes was willing to commit the state to public spending in 
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housing, transportation, and public improvements, Rhodes thought the state’s manufacturing 
sector suffered from high taxes. He told the General Assembly in March 1975, “’We might as 
well hang signs at the state borders that say ‘Industry Not Welcome Here.’”78 
OPIC built upon the state-based networks that IPC activists had established. The central 
office was located in Cleveland, but the organization eventually also opened offices in, 
Columbus, Akron, Dayton, and Youngstown. Not only were many of these cities the largest in 
the state, they also boasted larger African American populations. 
OPIC’s focus on economic crisis and plant closings also stemmed from IPC’s anti-
imperialist politics. Members of OPIC like Arlook maintained that U.S. corporate and military 
power were two sides of the same coin. In IPC’s June 30, 1975 program proposal for future 
action, Arlook stated, “We can begin to demonstrate the structural roots of U.S. foreign policy—
the need to provide military protection for overseas economic expansion. Public opinion is 
highly dubois about the role of the big corporations.”79 Having won the fight over the end of the 
Vietnam War, OPIC’s leadership now believed it could take on corporate power.  
So what explained OPIC’s decision to focus on state-level politics instead of remaining 
local, like the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy, or participating in national politics like 
IPC?” OPIC activists thought Congress was unlikely to deliver on their proposed economic 
reforms. Arlook explained their organization’s reasoning to a UAW/Independent Parts Suppliers 
(IPS) local in October 1975:  “We don’t have the votes in Congress yet that we need to pass such 
[plant closing] legislation.”80 The organization believed they could successfully mobilize citizens 
across the state around the issue of plant closings, and their efforts would lay a foundation for 
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federal legislation. “The efforts to pass state plant closing legislation,” Kelly reflected several 
years after OPIC’s founding, “while important in their own right, would also help build a base 
for national legislation. OPIC believed that most progressive legislation which had been passed 
by Congress was preceded by state legislation.”81 Arlook and OPIC also hoped their efforts 
would serve as model for future organizing in other states. “We believe that an important way to 
build a broad base of support for national legislation is to begin at the state level—in a key state 
such as Ohio—and try to build an organization and a coalition that can serve as a model for 
people and organizations in other states…”82 
 
The Campaign to Fight Plant Closure 
 
OPIC’s progressivism and plant closure campaign reflected the organization’s 
recognition that the crisis in New Deal liberalism foreclosed the political opportunities for 
implementing plant closure legislation and fighting corporate power on a national level. While 
the Democratic Party and organized labor leadership and civil rights organizations did not focus 
on collective rights, instead pursuing a range of single-issues, progressives believed that it was 
essential to collectivize, municipalize, etc. industry and other economic decisions. Opposing 
plant closings and seeking to hold corporations accountable represented a push for economic 
democracy, albeit a reformist one compared to DARE and other movements to stop plant 
shutdowns. The organization thought similarly as labor activist-intellectual Staughton Lynd’s 
when it came to organizing in crisis:  in times of economic hardship and crisis, workers and 
citizens would consider different ideas.83  
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In OPIC’s initial phase, the organization sought to garner support from local labor unions 
in northeast Ohio. OPIC lent support to workers facing plant closings. Arlook also delivered 
speeches outlining the organization’s analysis and plans. Arlook and OPIC saw UAW locals as 
presumptive allies because of the history of UAW locals challenging individual plant closures. 
Arlook outlined OPIC’s burgeoning progressive politics to members of Region 2 UAW and 
Independent Parts Suppliers in Mentor, Ohio in late October 1975. He began by illustrating how 
plant closings represented a community-labor issue rather than just one that unions could solve 
through collective bargaining. “I was invited here to talk about an organization that I work 
with…that has gotten started because of the problems created for everyone—not just working 
men and women, but all taxpayers; senior citizens; families with children of school age; 
everyone—problems created by plant closures due to runaway industry,” he declared.84  
Arlook’s echoed his prior analyses of deindustrialization to union members. He located 
the problem in two factors: the concentration of corporate ownership and the spread of MNCs. 
Arlook argued that the growth of corporate power through mergers and the expansion of MNCs 
had led to great transfers of capital from not just the North to the South and West, but also from 
the U.S. to nations with cheaper labor markets.85 Arlook’s argument regarding the extension of 
MNCs to low wage regions and nations underscored the organization’s efforts to connect the 
globalization of particular industries to local plant closings. 
Arlook listed the consequences of the globalization of production and the restructuring of 
corporate firms, including structural unemployment, decreased wages, tax increases for workers, 
and the decline in workers’ standard of living. Structural unemployment represented the most 
immediate consequence. In his discussion of job displacement, Arlook also acknowledged the 
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growth of the service sector. Yet, Arlook argued against the argument that overall job growth 
was keeping pace with the decline in manufacturing. “And when, and if, these [manufacturing] 
jobs are replaced, it’s with a smaller number of service jobs which are paid at a lower rate.”86 
The expansion of MNCs and plant closings also contributed to economic inequality. Arlook 
claimed that corporations took advantage of laws that encouraged foreign investment. Such 
policies allowed corporations to evade paying taxes, thus leaving workers with a greater tax 
burden. Arlook also pointed to a U.S. Department of Labor study claiming that income 
inequality had increased over the last 20 years with much “of the national income going to the 
top 20% of the population coming at the expense of blue and white collar wage-earners.”87  
Arlook then discussed OPIC’s plan to address economic restructuring, crisis, and plant 
closings. He expressed his support for the UAW’s program to address corporate power through 
ending corporate tax breaks, forcing firms to provide severance pay to laid off workers, limit 
capital exports, and federal legislation like the Ford-Mondale Bill that addresses plant closure. 
“But,” Arlook contended, “there are some obstacles in our path: we don’t have the votes in 
Congress yet that we need to pass such legislation.”88  Arlook argued instead for a state-based 
movement—a community-labor coalition that could serve as an organizing and political model 
for other states—to pass anti-plant closure legislation on the state level. “A public interest 
campaign” of organized labor, white collar workers, religious organizations, city councils, and 
civil rights groups,” he insisted, could serve as a base for a progressive electoral majority.  
Arlook concluded by outlining OPIC’s legislation. The bill would require corporations to 
pay full wages to displaced workers for two years and a tax to fund finance and community 
assistance. While Arlook did not provide any details as to how the third component would work, 
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the bill also would require firms to give laid off workers the opportunity to transfer to new and 
existing plants. Arlook acknowledged that the Ford-Mondale bill influenced OPIC’s legislation. 
Yet, he also admitted that state legislation would not be enough to stop deindustrialization. 
Consequently, Arlook contended that the process for coalition and campaign building to create 
community-labor power was vital to stopping plant closure.  
After OPIC opened its Cleveland office in January 1976, the organization sought to build 
labor support by supporting workers in their struggles against plant closings. Members of OPIC 
worked with members of [union] to organize a protest against the closing of Cleveland’s Glidden 
paint plant in February 1976. The Glidden Company established roots in Cleveland in the late 
nineteenth century. The corporation opened the plant in question in 1906. Glidden eventually 
merged with the SCM Corporation during the 1967.89 Less than a decade later, SCM announced 
that it would start phasing out the Cleveland plant the following month. The SCM told the Wall 
Street Journal that the facility had “become very costly to operate.” The layoffs affected 120 of 
the 350 workers employed at the plant.90  
OPIC and the locals from the AFL-CIO and Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers 
International Union organized a public meeting in response to the Glidden closing. Scheduled for 
Feburary 14, the meeting represented an expression of OPIC’s aims to build a community-labor 
coalition comprising of labor, citizen, and religious organizations. Arlook, the President of the 
Local Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union of the AFL-CIO, Nicholas 
Kostandaras, members of the OCAW local, religious leaders, and Cleveland City Councilman 
John Lynch and Ohio State Senator Tony Celebrezze were scheduled to speak at the meeting. 
According to OPIC, over 150 people attended. Kostandaras argued that workers helped the 
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company rebuild after a plant explosion in 1974. “The work was done by regular employees,” 
Kostandaras stated, “for which the company offered its undying gratitude. Who was to suspect 
just how soon the gratitude would die?”91 
At the meeting Arlook aspired to articulate a message that highlighted the communal cost 
of plant closings. Arlook contextualized Glidden’s closing within what he saw as a growing 
trend of deindustrialization hitting the state. Arlook claimed that the state had lost over 180,000 
manufacturing jobs since 1970. Similar to his October 1975 speech in front of the Region 2 
UAW, Arlook outlined the consequences of decisions like SCM’s. He argued that communities 
would “take on a triple tax burden.” Cities would lose tax revenues that were essential for basic 
services both from the displaced workers and the companies while the federal government and 
taxpayers would have to pick up the tab for unemployment and welfare payments.92  
Arlook laid the responsibility of the Glidden closing at the feet of SCM and argued that 
SCM was not closing because of the plant’s costliness. Arlook pointed out Glidden’s 
profitability: “The Glidden Company is the fourth largest paint company in the country. Last 
year, its sales were $332.8 million, with profits of close to $11 million… If Glidden is moving, it 
is not because the company is having financial difficulties; it is not because the plant is losing 
money…it is because it can make an even greater profit by absorbing the production of this plant 
into four others, outside of Ohio.”93 While Arlook did not issue any demands for greater worker 
decision-making power in investment, he called for greater corporate accountability. He did so 
by arguing for a law mandating corporations to help compensate workers and communities if 
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they decided to leave in order “simply to increase profits.”94 Arlook’s remarks anticipated 
OPIC’s anti-plant closure law.  “If major companies are required, by law, to shoulder their share 
of the problems they create when they move out,” Arlook declared, “they will think twice before 
leaving; and, in the event that they do leave, the workers they leave behind will receive payments 
that maintain their full wages at corporate—and not taxpayer’s expense—for a decent length of 
time; and our communities will receive payments into a fund so that the economy can be 
redeveloped.” But the only hope to get such a law passed, according to Arlook, was to organize a 
movement of “a coalition of forces all over Ohio” for the public interest. 95  
Three days later, Edward Kelly published an editorial in the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
imploring SCM to reconsider its decision. After outlining the harmful effects of SCM’s decision 
on the city’s workers, Kelly punctuated his letter by appealing to community rights to industrial 
property:  “Glidden has been operating in Cleveland since 1883. Thousands of Clevelanders have 
given their working lives to make it grow and succeed:  Surely Glidden owes something to 
Cleveland in return…It [the plant] should remain in Cleveland in the public interest.”96 For 
OPIC, SCM’s decision to close Glidden substantiated their argument about the relationship 
between the centralization of corporate power and deindustrialization.  
SCM officially closed the Glidden Plant in 1976. In the six months after the factory’s 
closing, OPIC conducted a survey to document its effects. Of the 119 employees who lost jobs, 
69 responded. Their survey found that older workers had a more difficult time finding work after 
the closing. Workers also suffered lost wages and benefits over time as a result. According to 
OPIC, nearly 35% of the workers surveyed earned lower wages.  Almost half of the laborers who 
had worked for Glidden for more than twenty years had not found a job at the time of the survey 
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while 82.4% of workers between the ages of 28-39 had found work. OPIC’s survey highlighted 
the contradictions of deindustrialization and a manufacturing-based economy. Economic 
restructuring created a set of unemployable people, either due to age, mismatched skills, 
geography, race, gender, or other attributes. The Glidden shut down illustrated the relevance of 
conversations about structural unemployment. The Glidden closing produced another set of what 
James Boggs called “outsiders.” In this case, the outsiders were older workers who possessed 
more seniority.97  
On July 31, 1976, OPIC formally launched its state-wide campaign to pass plant closing 
legislation at a public meeting in Cleveland. The meeting was called in response to several 
closings that hit Cleveland and Northeast Ohio. Like the Glidden Plant protest, this occasion 
featured speakers from a cross-section organized labor and religious organizations. Ohio State 
Senator Oliver Ocasek and U.S. Senator Howard Metzenbaum also attended and addressed those 
who attended. Arlook stated the reasons for organizing a campaign, “Manufacturing job loss is a 
rapidly increasing problem here in Ohio…As industry moves South and overseas in search of 
cheap labor, Ohioans are left without jobs and our communities lose the tax base which is 
essential to providing services.” State Senator Ocasek criticized Ohio Governor, Republican Jim 
Rhodes’s support for tax breaks to attract corporate investment in the state. Union leaders such as 
District 7 OCAW President Nick Kostandaras and President of Local 179 United Rubber 
Workers Lydia Hosler argued for relief for displaced workers.98  
OPIC’s embarked on several tactics in its campaign strategy. They continued to support 
workers protesting individual closings, they drafted plant closing legislation, held public 
meetings, and used their publication to communicate to their followers and advance their 
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analysis of deindustrialization in Ohio. The campaign culminated in a conference and a public 
rally in Columbus in support of the anti-plant closure legislation. While OPIC was able to attract 
the support of rank-and-file workers, local union leaders, civil rights and religious organizations, 
the state’s business community and its Republican Party stymied the passage of the bill. The bill 
died in committee twice, eventually forcing OPIC to concentrate on other economic issues. But, 
this was not without the organization creating model legislation for other likeminded 
organizations in the region and producing its influential analysis of plant closings, Industrial 
Exodus:  Public Strategies for Control of Corporate Relocation. While the Community 
Readjustment Act represented a more limited and reactive response to deindustrialization, 
Industrial Exodus presented a more comprehensive plan for establishing economic democracy.  
OPIC’s research director, Ed Kelly, began drafting the plant closing legislation for the 
organization. The legislation would apply to firms employing more than 100 people and 
operating for more than five years. The proposed bill would require businesses to give two years 
prior notice if the firm planned to shutdown the plant, move a part of its operation to another 
location, or shutdown a portion of the plant, “resulting in a fifty per cent loss of employment 
over two years.”99 The bill also mandated corporations to pay laid off workers and affected 
communities. These provisions of the legislation were vague. They did not identify how, or by 
what mechanism, severance would be determined. While proposing to have corporations pay 
workers was important to address the individual effects of plant closure, mandating firms to 
compensate communities illustrated the organization’s commitment to the concept of collective 
rights in industrial property.  
OPIC’s Community Readjustment Act resembled the 1974 National Employment 
Priorities Act (also known as the Ford-Mondale Bill). Michigan Representative William Ford 
                                                 
99 OPIC, “Plant Closing Legislation,” OCA Papers, Box 7, Folder:  SB 337, WRHS.  
252 
 
and Senator Walter Mondale sponsored a rather ambitious bill that sought to provide relief to 
displaced manufacturer workers. The Ford-Mondale Bill is similar to the CRA in its general 
mandates—early notification of closing and provide assistance to workers and communities. 
With the Ford-Mondale Bill being federal legislation, it prohibited federal support for 
“unjustified dislocation.” It called for the establishment of a National Employment Relocation 
Administration in the Department of Labor. This agency would investigate proposed closing, 
provide assistance to workers and communities, and conduct general research about the problems 
accompanying deindustrialization. Financial assistance would include maintenance of workers’ 
incomes, pensions, and health benefits, relocation allowances, early retirement benefits, 
emergency mortgage and rent payments, and welfare benefits.100 The bill garnered support from 
the UAW.101 Arlook and Kelly also cited the bill as model legislation.102 The 1974 bill died in 
committee. Democrats would reintroduce the bill to no avail for the next ten years.103  
State Senator Michael Schwarzwalder introduced State Bill 337—OPIC’s Community 
Readjustment Act at an International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) and OPIC-sponsored SB 
337 tacked close to OPIC’s proposal. Along with a cross-section of the type of coalition that 
OPIC sought to build: members from Ohio’s AFL-CIO, religious leaders, the President of Ohio 
State Council of Senior Citizens, and members of OPIC. The bill called for two years advance 
notice, severance pay for workers, and payment into a community fund for redevelopment. 
Schwarzwalder stated, “’The costs imposed by this legislation are very small compared to 
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corporate profits—but the advance notice and severance payments will make a great deal of 
difference to their former employees which they leave behind.’”104  
OPIC followed Schwarzwalder’s announcement with public meetings in Canton, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, and Toledo to discuss the CRA. These gatherings featured 
speakers from numerous members of OPIC’s coalition of religious, labor, senior citizen, and 
community organizations. Many participants appeared to accept what they considered as the fact 
of plant closure. Some from the civil rights community also injected a racial analysis into the 
conversation, which was a view that OPIC organizers hardly elaborated on themselves. 
Consequently, coalition members pointed out the potential benefits of the passage of SB337 at 
the meetings. At the Cincinnati meeting, Reverend U.Z. McKinnon of the Interdenominational 
Ministerial Alliance stated, “’While this bill will not keep those industries here which are intent 
upon going, it will allow us to plan for the future. We need to train our young people for job 
opportunities which are going to exist—not for jobs that are going to disappear.’”  President of 
Cincinnati NAACP, Reverend John Compton, discussed the racial impact that the bill would 
have, “’The black community has come to depend on the jobs and tax base provided by the 
manufacturing sector. While SB 337 will not stem the flow out of these jobs out of this area, it 
will provide some very real assistance to the people and communities left behind.’”105   
Workers and union organizers tended to appeal to labor and community rights in 
industrial property. The coalition sought to share private property rights with corporations. UAW 
Region 2 Director Bill Casstevens said at the Cleveland meeting, “’The people of this state need 
the security brought about by SB 337 and they have the right to expect it in return for the long 
years of hard work and loyalty they have given.’” In Toledo, Legislative Director for the local 
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AFL-CIO Council stated, “SB 337 establishes clearly the principle that large corporations have a 
legal responsibility to help individuals and communities which suffer when plants close.’”106  
 
Industrial Exodus—OPIC’s Analysis of Plant Closings. 
 
OPIC provided a frame for understanding deindustrialization to progressive activists and 
organizations during the 1970s. The organization’s analysis of the “industrial exodus” connected 
the growth of multinational corporations and the globalization of production to local plant 
closings. While Democrats and Republicans tried to address economic crises that beset the U.S. 
by tackling inflation, progressive organizations such as DARE and OPIC sought to reign in 
corporate power and advance citizen-based industrial policies. OPIC’s analysis of the industrial 
exodus formed the basis for the organization’s state-based plant closing legislation. It also 
provided their allies with a language to describe deindustrialization and influenced future studies 
of the subject.  
OPIC’s research director Ed Kelly deepened Arlook’s analysis in the organization’s 
statement on plant closings, Industrial Exodus:  Public Strategies for Control of Corporate 
Relocation, published in October 1977. In Industrial Exodus, Kelly argued against free market 
understandings of plant closings. He contended, “It is easy to view the loss of industry as an 
inevitable trend as the result of uncontrollable objective forces operating in the economy.”  “In 
truth, the trend is not inevitable; it is the direct result of conscious decisions by large 
corporations to pursue their own private gains without regard to the overall public cost,” he 
continued.107 Kelly maintained that firms moved south and overseas in search of cheap and non-
unionized labor. Industrial Exodus also addressed several key themes such as the pattern of 
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capital mobility, the impact of deindustrialization on the nation, region, and cities, and its 
implication on burgeoning non-manufacturing-based economies such as the service sector. Kelly 
also outlined a comprehensive program for tackling plant closings that ranged from supporting 
federal full employment legislation and labor law reform to employee and community 
ownership.  
Industrial Exodus explained the process and pattern of capital mobility. Like Müller, 
Barnet, Arlook, and other left observers of economic change, Kelly attributed the “corporate 
exodus from the industrial states” to greater foreign investment by U.S. companies.108 The 
process of deindustrialization took many forms—total plant shutdowns, “partial” plant closings, 
“out-of-state investments,” and the “export of capital.”109 Total plant shutdowns describe the 
process by which a business closed a plant in the process of moving operations to another 
location. Partial plant closings reflect the longer term process of moving production to another 
location. Essentially, a firm would gradually draw down production in the old plant while 
operating the new one. Out-of-state investments reflects a business’s decision to invest revenues 
in plants outside of their “traditional locations” rather than reinvesting in capital within them. 
The export of capital points to the relationship between finance capital and deindustrialization 
that historians such as Judith Stein have analyzed. Kelly argued that banks and other financial 
institutions invested in production in the south and outside of the U.S. 
Kelly argued that capital mobility and plant closings had deleterious effects on cities, 
municipal governments, communities, and workers. Kelly identified deindustrialization as a key 
culprit of what came to be known as the “fiscal crisis of the state.”110 He argued that plant 
closings drove up unemployment. Plant closings and growing unemployment depleted tax bases 
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and contributed to the fiscal crises of state and local governments. With falling revenues, 
policymakers are left to raise taxes and cut services.111  
Industrial Exodus failed to deeply examine the relationship between race and 
deindustrialization. The only instance where plant closings and discrimination appeared was in 
Kelly’s contention that citizens could pursue a legal strategy to halt closings. Kelly claimed that 
workers should file anti-discrimination suits under Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act because the 
suburbanization of industry is more likely to disproportionately affect African Americans. Kelly 
cited lawsuits filed by the New York City-based Suburban Action Institute:  “The suits charge 
that corporate movement to the suburbs discriminates against blacks and other minorities who 
cannot afford to follow and who do not now live there in significant numbers.”112 Kelly’s 
argument, and the Suburban Action Institute’s actions anticipate scholar Gregory Squires’s 
argument in his report for the Illinois Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights 
Commission, Shutdown: Economic Dislocation and Equal Opportunity. Squires conteded that 
plant closings were “a civil rights issue.” Kelly, the Suburban Action Institute, and later 
Squires’s analyses of race and deindustrialization raises questions about scholars’ understandings 
of the separation of labor and civil rights. Labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein is correct to argue 
that the New Deal state institutionalized labor and civil rights, but Kelly, OPIC, and Squires 
illustrated how activists and workers considered strategies to bring the two together, even if they 
pursued labor and civil rights in the legal arena.113  
Kelly’s document illustrated left-wing progressives’ attempts to influence policymaking. 
Industrial Exodus featured a comprehensive plan to address the industrial exodus. Kelly called 
for greater corporate regulation on Federal, state, and local levels, especially of plant relocations. 
                                                 
111 Kelly, Industrial Exodus, 6.  
112 Ibid., 17. 
113 Lichtenstein, xiii.  
257 
 
He also advocated for measures that policymakers in cities such as Chicago and in the federal 
government adopted: advance warning of plant closings, financial assistance to workers and 
communities, and withholding of Federal benefits.114 Some of the measures reflected labor-
liberalism’s efforts to reinvigorate New Deal policies such as full employment and labor law 
reform. Policies underscoring progressives’ desires to democratize the economy were also 
included in OPIC’s platform.  
On the federal level, Industrial Exodus called for greater regulation of corporations 
through the tax code and trade policy. Kelly called for the adoption of a federal plant closing law 
that required two year advance notice of relocation, assistance to workers, and withholding tax 
benefits for firms that decide to move “unjustifiably.” Kelly’s document builds upon the AFL-
CIO’s call for eliminating tax breaks that stimulated the growth of multinational corporations 
and capital mobility. “There should be changes in Federal tax laws which now encourage 
corporations to move production overseas,” Kelly declared.115 Kelly also vaguely called for 
reforming tariffs “encouraging overseas production.”  
Industrial Exodus advocated for key components of organized labor and Democrat’s 
economic policy—full employment and labor law reform. Kelly called for the federal 
government to mandate full employment and repealing section 14B—ensuring “right to work” 
legislation—of the Taft-Hartley Act. Kelly argued that passage of the Humphrey-Hawkins full 
employment bill “would be a major step in alleviating problems caused by corporate relocation” 
because earlier drafts of it mandated special attention toward the unemployed.116 For Kelly and 
OPIC, eliminating right to work laws would hinder firms’ desires to relocate where non-
unionized labor reigned. It would also reopen the south to unionization.  
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Industrial Exodus represented OPIC’s expression of economic democracy. Kelly and 
OPIC argued that the issue of plant closings needed to be taken out of the labor-management 
bargaining process. Instead, the “public” should possess greater say in plant location and 
relocation. The public had to challenge corporate power and lead economic redevelopment 
efforts. “Greater public involvement in the economy is necessary,” the report declared. “This 
public involvement should take a variety of forms—governmental, non-profit, private and 
renewed small business,” Kelly continued. Industrial Exodus called for the creation of public 
financial institutions like state and local public banks, state insurance companies, and state 
development corporations. These institutions would provide capital to support already-existing 
small businesses, cooperatives, and workers and communities that sought to takeover abandoned 
industrial plants. However, Industrial Exodus failed to explain how workers would govern their 
own plants. Kelly also argues that progressives should consider advocating for investing pension 
funds for social needs. Calls for the establishment of public financial institutions and worker and 
community ownership placed OPIC among other radical progressive economic organizations 
who called for public ownership like the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy. Yet, OPIC’s 
vision of a public economy did not call for nationalizing industries, worker syndicalism, 
advocating for the end of capital mobility, or overturning capitalism.117 
The document supplied the burgeoning movement against plant closings and capital 
flight with language and a model of analysis. Organizations such as the Illinois Public Action 
Council began talking about the “industrial exodus” in their states.118 Kelly’s analysis also laid 
the foundation for future analyses of plant closings. Assistant to UAW President, Doug Fraser, 
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Don Stillman published one of the more widely-read and cited studies of deindustrialization in 
1978 in that year’s edition of the Working Papers for a New Society, “The Devastating Impact of 
Plant Closings.” Squires relied upon Kelly’s analysis in Shutdown.119  
Don Stillman’s 1978 Working Papers for a New Society essay, “The Devastating Impact 
of Plant Closings,” is one of the more influential texts on the topic. What distinguished 
Stillman’s essay from Kelly’s was Stillman’s discussion of the effects of plant closings on 
individuals. Stillman ultimately argued that the issue of plant closing is a matter of life or death 
for workers. He used the tragic story of Jim Farley, a laborer at the Federal Mogul Corporation’s 
Detroit roller bearing plant who committed suicide, to illustrate how plant closings disrupted 
lives. Stillman pointed to research conducted by public health scholars to highlight the 
connection between plant closings and various health problems such as higher rates of 
hypertension and heart disease. He also pointed to the relationship between job loss and 
depression, anxiety, and suicide.120 Health problems were exacerbated when workers and their 
families lose health insurance. This aspect of the conversation about job loss is nothing new. The 
effects of job loss on individual mental and physical health governed conversations about the 
structural, or “hard-core,” unemployed during the 1960s. But the conversations conducted by 
Stillman, Bluestone and Harrison, are grounded intimately in a structural analysis that does not 
pathologize workers.   
OPIC’s hearings in the state legislature highlighted the organization’s efforts to build a 
Rustinian coalition of civil rights and religious organizations, and labor and progressive activists. 
The hearings in the Commerce and Labor Committee in 1978 featured testimonies deploying the 
rhetoric of shared responsibility and industrial ownership. Some activists also utilized the 
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rhetoric of fairness, claiming that workers “played by the rules,” whereas corporations did not. 
Thus, workers and communities were really victims and more deserving of benefits than 
corporations because capitalists drained communities of resources—labor, land, raw materials—
reaped the profits, and then fled to the next best location. Witnesses also sought to confront the 
idea of the “business climate” as an inhibiting factor in economic development.  
The Valentine’s Day hearings in 1978 featured members of the coalition for plant closing 
legislation. Twenty witnesses testified in front of the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, 
including members of OPIC, the Dayton Black Political Assembly, the Cincinnati NAACP, and 
the UAW. More than one hundred people representing the OPIC-led coalition of organized labor, 
civil rights, religious, and senior citizen groups packed the hearing. “‘No one was giving SB 337 
much of a chance before the hearing, ‘commented Warren Smith, Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Ohio AFL-CIO, ‘but the hearing put the bill in a new light.’”121 
Bill Casstevens testified about the effects that plant closings had had on workers during 
the 1970s. He argued that corporations had a shared responsibility to the workers and 
communities that built the infrastructure needed for business to prosper. “It seems insignificant 
that an employee has performed well for many years or that a community has built schools, 
water and sewage systems, made road improvements and other public works on the belief that 
the company was a responsible member of the community.”122 Communities and workers, 
Casstevens concluded, had fulfilled their end of the social contract, but not business.  
Casstevens also argued against the idea that the CRA would inhibit the state’s climate for 
investment, arguing that manufacturers had closed down plants because of corporate mergers 
“and shifts of production,” not because of the state’s “business climate.” Casstevens also sought 
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to advance an alternative conception of what makes a “good business climate,” one that was 
based on the needs of workers and communities rather than just managerial prerogatives. “We 
need to provide a climate where the families of workers, small business, dependent industries, 
municipal and county governments, schools and the needs of our major corporations can exist 
hand-in-hand.”123 
In his testimony, William P. Sheehan, executive secretary of the Cincinnati AFL-CIO 
Labor Council sought to contextualize the CRA within the New Deal liberal tradition, “There is a 
proud tradition in this country dating back more than forty years of taking care of the 
unemployed, poor and dependent members of our community. […] The bill you are considering 
this evening is in this proud tradition.”124 After recounting the harmful effects of 
deindustrialization in Cincinnati, due to capital fleeing to the South and outside of the country, 
Sheehan admitted that the CRA would only aid in worker transition rather than threatening 
managerial investment decisions. Yet, Sheehan argued, the government had a role to play in 
providing protections to workers affected by capital flight. “Something state government can do 
is buffer, for the people and the communities, the trauma of a plant closing.”125 
Sheehan also appealed to community rights to protection through their labor. Using the 
example of a closing of a Clopay, a door manufacturer, Sheehan maintained that the corporation 
violated their workers’ rights by closing with three months’ notice. “A job belongs not just to the 
company which provides that job. It also belongs to the person who holds that job and to the 
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community in which that job exists. These people and communities must receive consideration 
when corporations decide on that job’s final disposition.”126  
Pastor of Lorain, Ohio’s St. Matthews AME Church Thomas L. McCray also emphasized 
community rights and the importance of the social contract between workers and business. He 
used the metaphor of marriage to describe the compact between business and the community. 
“When a company invests in a community a kind of wedding (if you will) takes place.”  McCray 
declared.  “The company invests with the expectation that it will have a capable, steady and 
cooperative workforce. And there is an expectation of cooperation from the community.”127 
Black coalition members based their testimonies in a racial analysis. For Reverend 
Charles E. Winburn, Jr. of Cincinnati’s NAACP, the issue of plants closures was also matter of 
civil rights. “It is as much a civil right as any other that Ohio cities who want to work should 
have a job.”128 Winburn contended that plant closings particularly hurt the city’s and state’s 
African American population. “Industrial flight has led to the decline of the tax base and jobs in 
the central cities where the percentage of Blacks concentrated in central cities increase,” 
Winburn declared. Yet, he also connected African American joblessness to that of whites living 
in Appalachia.129 In a similar fashion, McCray concluded his testimony by quoting Coretta Scott 
King. “I agree with Mrs. Coretta Scott King who stated recently, ‘joblessness is a cancer eating 
away at the black community, destroying our hopes, our aspirations and even our most valuable 
asset, our youth.’ But, I realize that there is little hope extended to our youth when growing 
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numbers of people are faced with unemployment due to plant closings and shifts out of our 
community.”130 
OPIC and its coalition ran into an institutional roadblock in the State Senate’s Commerce 
and Labor Committee. The committee’s Chairman, Cincinnati Democrat William Bowen did not 
hold any more hearings on the bill. Chairman Bowen told the Associated Press in April, “’I have 
priorities in terms of scheduling, and at this time that is not among them.”131  Bowen disagreed 
with the bill claiming “it could push an industry over the brink.”  Joseph Krabach from the Ohio 
Manufacturers Association lobbied for the committee to bury the bill. “We want to see the bill 
killed at the earliest possible date,” Krabach told the Associated Press. The OMA and the Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce saw the bill as “anti-business.” The Associated Press reported that 
business lobbying succeeded. While Bowen promised another hearing, the committee failed to 
act when the Senate session ended in December. Instead he joined with Republican Governor 
James Rhodes to sponsor a bill that would extend tax abatements to businesses for urban 
investments..132 
Ohio’s business leaders came out against the CRA as early as 1977. OMA lobbyist 
William Costello blasted the CRA in the Akron Beacon Journal, “I’ve been here 18 years and 
seen some ridiculous legislation. This has got to be in the top five.” The Akron Regional 
Development Board, an organization that sought to attract industry to the state, contended the 
terms of the CRA were too harsh.133   The Ohio Manufacturers Association stepped up its 
opposition to OPIC and the plant closing bill. The OMA served as frequent critics of OPIC’s 
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work in the state. OMA called it an ‘industrial ransom bill.’ OMA reasoned that the plant closing 
bill encroached on manufacturers’ private property rights. It even went as far as to argue that the 
CRA “constitutes a severe threat to the very concept of ‘free’ enterprise in the state of Ohio.”134 
They argued that the bill threatened economic growth and would prevent the state from creating 
a “better business climate” for investing. Kelly quotes the organization, “’The bill’s obvious 
impact would be to drive all new jobs out of the state and discourage any industry from 
expanding or relocating in Ohio.’”135  
The Greater Cleveland Growth Association also rallied its membership. In a letter to 
members of the Association urging them to write the Senate’s Commerce and Labor Committee, 
President, John Lathe, Jr. and Vice Chairman Lawrence C. Jones referred to OPIC as a group 
that “takes decidedly anti-business stances.” They warned their members that “It is very 
important that SB 337 not reach the floor of the Senate because the Ohio Chamber of Commerce 
reports that the legislation is gaining support among the Senators.’”136 Like the OMA, the 
Greater Cleveland Growth Association also thought the bill would negatively impact the state’s 
business climate. The OMA and the GCGA received their wish—the CRA died in committee—
again.   
Schwarzwalder reintroduced the CRA on April 27, 1979. Shortly thereafter, OPIC 
organized a conference in Columbus to support the new incarnation of the CRA. The 
“Reclaiming Our Future” conference, however, did not just represent an OPIC effort to mobilize 
support for the CRA. OPIC, along with the gathering’s co-sponsors, the Ohio AFL-CIO, the 
Ohio UAW Community Action Program, the Progressive Alliance, the Citizen-Labor Energy 
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Coalition, and the Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, also sought to use the 
conference to build a national progressive political coalition around urban and economic issues. 
“The ‘Reclaiming Our Future’ Conference is based on the idea that a new coalition is emerging 
to play a decisive role in American politics in the 1980s.” This coalition not only presented itself 
as an alternative both to Reaganism and to New Deal liberalism. “Faced with this challenge, we 
can no longer rely on the strength of the liberal New Deal coalition, which dominated American 
politics for four decades,” OPIC stated in its conference program, “It has expired, and cannot be 
revived.”137  
For OPIC, the purpose of the conference was to develop responses to a number of 
national political and economic developments: economic crisis, what they called “the corporate 
offensive,” and the collapse of New Deal liberalism. […] The organization downplayed a right-
turn in U.S. politics in their analysis of the context. While they acknowledged the “birth of a new 
alignment” in U.S. politics, the organization argued that political categories were breaking down. 
“America is going through a transition. But instead a ‘shift to the right,’ all the old categories – 
left and right, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative – are dissolving.” This claim 
seemed to echo socialist Michael Harrington’s observations that U.S. politics was moving 
“’vigorously left, right, and center at the same time.’”138. What distinguished OPIC from 
Harrington, however, was that the organization named the potential new alignment—public 
interest politics. “The politics of the 1980’s will judge issues by whether they serve corporate 
interests or the public interest.”139 While OPIC had majoritarian aims, their politics remained 
progressive.  
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The speakers at the conference reflected the progressive Rustinian coalition that OPIC 
and others hoped to build on a national level. They included President of the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and one of the leaders of the Citizen-Labor 
Energy Coalition, William Winpisinger, former civil rights activists and executive director of the 
Coalition of American Employees, James Farmer, and UAW leaders Marc Stepp and Douglas 
Fraser delivered speeches to the conference. Cleveland Mayor Dennis Kucinich and State 
Senator Schwarzwalder were the only two elected officials invited to talk.  
James Farmer placed the effort to build a progressive movement within a longer 
historical context. Former CORE leader and Executive Director of the Coalition of American 
Public Employees, James Farmer drew a line from the labor struggles during the Great 
Depression through the 1960s and 1970s social movements: “The real struggles of our nation, 
the struggle of labor to bring about industrial democracy in the ‘30s and ‘40’s, to translate 
political democracy into economic democracy; the struggle of minorities in the ‘50’s and the 
‘60s to include themselves in the promise of democracy; the struggle of women for equal rights 
in the ‘70’s; all of these battles are now coming together. We are coming together in what has 
been called a giant coalition of people from around the nation.”140 The 1970s signaled a new 
time in the history of a class-based progressive politics for Farmer. With Jim Crow segregation 
in the past, corporate power represented the biggest threat to democracy. “We know who the 
enemies are. It’s no longer a George Wallace who is standing in the schoolhouse door. Now, it’s 
corporate power that, like the Sheriff of Nottingham, is stealing from the poor to give to the 
rich.”141  
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UAW President Doug Fraser pointed to fundamental issue of fighting plant closure and 
corporate power. He informed the audience, “When we talked with Ford or GM or Chrylser or 
any other big corporations of America, they said, ‘If you try to even tamper or restrict our 
fundamental managerial prerogative to make these economic decisions as to where we should 
move, you’re restricting and destroying the free enterprise system.’” Fraser maintained, though, 
that a defense of corporations’ private property rights amounted to the abandonment of 
communities and workers. He even declared, “And if that’s what free enterprise is all about, then 
we shouldn’t be concerned about destroying it—the hell with it.”142 
Fraser criticized the failure to implement progressive measures such as national health 
insurance as well as President Carter’s handling of inflation, rising interest rates, and growing 
unemployment. For Fraser, the solution the aforementioned problems lay in convincing more 
Americans to involve themselves in electoral politics. Acknowledging many Americans’ 
discontent with the political process, Fraser called for a return “to the days of the politics of 
principle rather than the politics of personality.”143  
The conference received favorable media coverage. Douglas McCormick from the 
Cincinnati Post declared, “the new progressive movement is alive and well in Columbus.” 
McCormick saw the conference as a gathering of a progressive faction of the Democratic Party 
that would support Kennedy in his challenge to President Carter. “While it was not a political 
rally and it did not endorse Sen. Edward Kennedy for president, it was evident many believe he 
is the best available alternative to an administration that has disappointed them,” he stated.144 
The Cleveland Plain Dealer’s Michael McManus published an Op-Ed endorsing anti-plant 
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closure legislation.145 New York Times reporter Reginald Stuart, placed OPIC’s CRA in the 
context of already-existing plant closure legislation in foreign countries. Stuart’s article also 
stressed the community-labor politics at hand during the conference and Doug Fraser’s appeal to 
community rights to industrial property.146  
OPIC organized a march and a rally of more than 1,000 people in Columbus to support 
the CRA in September 1979. The September 25 hearing also demonstrated the coalition of 
organizations around the bill. “Also testifying were representatives from many of Ohio’s major 
unions including the United Steelworkers, the United Rubber Workers (whose president Peter 
Bommatrip testified), and the United Auto Workers. Many other unions strongly participated in 
the rally including:  ACTWU, ILGWU, IAM, IUE, CWA, and many more.”  The state-based 
coalition was once again on display. Economist Barry Bluestone, OPIC, UAW, United Rubber, 
Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, the Ohio State Council of Senior Citizens, the 
East Market Street United Church of Christ in Akron, the Ohio Black Political Assembly, and 
the Former Mayor of Cincinnati, Theodore Berry testified. 147 
OPIC’s Legislative Director, Marylynne Cappelletti argued against the idea that the CRA 
was prohibitive to business. She argued that the CRA was not designed to stop flight. “But this 
legislation does not try to stop corporations from leaving,” Cappelletti informed the committee. 
She continued, “For a state to try to stop corporate movement would probably be 
unconstitutional and would discourage new investment.” Like many proponents of the bill, 
Cappelletti also appealed to the concept of a social contract between business and communities. 
Corporations had a responsibility toward communities in which they settle. Cappelleti stated,  
“The employees and the community are expected to act responsibly toward the corporation 
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which in turn should act responsibly toward them. This relationship is a long term one—based on 
past performance, current trust, and future expectations.”148 
UAW Region 2 Director Bill Casstevens recounted the history of the coalition’s 
campaign to stop plant closings. He concluded his remarks by pointing to the limits of collective 
bargaining approach in addressing capital flight, “It is incumbent upon this Committee and the 
Ohio State Legislature to handle the problems of plant closings and relocations for the working 
people in Ohio who do not possess the collective bargaining clout to handle it for themselves.”149 
Economist Barry Bluestone provided a technical explanation for deindustrialization. He 
pointed to technological innovations in communication and transportation as factors for 
increased capital flight. He also cited mergers and corporations who bought plants with the intent 
to liquidate their capital stock and invest resources in other ventures. He also testified that the 
bill would not impede business investment. “But the Bill will not keep viable firms from 
expanding in Ohio or stop new business from coming into the state,” Bluestone stated.150 
OPIC’s members sensed that passage of the CRA was unlikely in the near future. “While 
recognizing the degree of success we have had in pushing the idea of plant closing legislation, 
we also must recognize that we are far from passage of a plant closing bill either in Ohio or at the 
Federal level,”  stated a November 6, 1980 internal memo to the organizing staff.151 The 
organization outlined the shortcomings of the campaign. They recognized the intense business 
opposition to the bill. The organization admitted that they did not build a broad enough coalition. 
They also pointed out the problems of organizing in the midst of crisis. The organization 
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reasoned in the memo that the prospect of a plant closing does not really push workers to involve 
themselves in such a campaign. Yet, organizing around crisis places workers and organizations 
in an uneasy space because once a plant closes, they “lose their unifying institutions – employer 
and union.” Consequently, there’s no institution for displaced workers to go, and, more than 
likely, no jobs to organize for.152  
The organization also considered next steps for potentially continuing the plant closing 
campaign. Participating in electoral politics remained a potential strategy as the memo suggested 
getting involved in the 1982 gubernatorial campaign. Also, recognizing the national 
conversations around “reindustrialization,” the memo contemplated organizing for a federal plant 
closing bill. "The opportunity probably exists for squeezing some concessions from the 
'reindustrialization' effort. One of these might be some kind of plant closing regulations at the 
Federal level. Another might be greater availability of capital and technical assistance for 
reopening closed plants," the memo states.153 The Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy used 
national conversations about reindustrialization as a point of entry for their plans to redevelop the 
city.   
While the Ohio General Assembly failed to vote on the Community Reinvestment Act, 
OPIC’s campaign was consequential. They built a state-based coalition that caught the attention 
of the state’s business community. Their bill and their coalition also served as a model for 
legislation for progressive groups in other states such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.154 
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Conclusion 
 
OPIC’s campaign against plant closure illustrates how left-wing progressives sought to 
organize a state-based coalition of labor activists, civil rights and religious organizations, and 
grassroots communities against plant closure during the mid-to-late-1970s. While OPIC 
successfully organized this coalition, the campaign also underscores the difficulties that left-wing 
progressives had with trying to win on economic issues. OPIC, unlike the Indochina Peace 
Campaign, was not able to win the debate around deindustrialization in public discourse. The 
emerging argument for why industrial plants left was that the costs of running factories in the 
Midwest and Northeast were too high—manufacturers were paying too many taxes, organized 
labor forced them to pay their workers elevated wages, and welfare services dragged down the 
economy. Consequently, Republican Governor James Rhodes, as well as key members of the 
state’s legislature concurred with corporate and business interest groups such as the Ohio 
Manufacturers Association and the Greater Cleveland Growth Association that creating a “better 
business climate” was the best course of action to take for attracting and maintaining the state’s 
industrial base.  
Even though OPIC could not win the argument around deindustrialization, it contributed 
to the left’s thinking about plant closure. The organization’s conception of the “industrial 
exodus” influenced progressive organizations such as the Illinois Public Action Council and 
intellectuals such as Robert Squires and Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone. The Alliance 
hired scholars Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison to compose reports about corporate flight in 
their efforts to combat plant closures.155 Bennett Harrison’s and Barry Bluestone’s work for the 
Alliance led to the publication of The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, 
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, which documented the social 
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and economic costs of industrial flight. Their work help spark a conversation about 
deindustrialization and it established a left presence in the discussion. 
Squires’ argument was not necessarily new. Ed Kelly alluded to it in Industrial Exodus. 
Black members of OPIC’s coalition testified about the detrimental effects that deindustrialization 
had on African Americans. Coleman Young mounted a defense for saving Chrysler that he 
grounded in a racial analysis. What was probably the most significant about the race-based 
argument from Squires and Young was the relative silence around black masculinity that 
dominated discussions about job displacement and the urban crisis during the 1960s. The 
persistence of behavioral explanations for poverty, attacks on welfare, as well as a concern about 
crime and the constraints that urban fiscal crises placed on cities may explain why it seemed that 
issues of race and gender did not appear as relevant in conversations about deindustrialization 
among mainstream and progressive intellectual-activists.  
OPIC’s legislative strategy also had its limits. The state-based progressive coalition 
encountered a legislature unwilling to act on the bill, business lobbyists, and a state politics that 
favored tax breaks in seeking to address deindustrialization, not to mention a national political 
context growing more hostile to labor and the new deal. And while the coalition sought to 
moderate its arguments for the CRA in front of the Commerce and Labor Committee, business 
responded to the bill as an inherent threat towards their private property rights. This raises the 
question—was it possible for OPIC, or even DARE, to work within established political 
institutions and legal and policy structures for economic democracy if even business and political 
leaders perceived any reforms on industrial decision making as a threat to the whole “free 
enterprise” system? 
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Chapter 5 
 
“DARE to Struggle, DARE to Win”:  The Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy’s 
Electoral Politics & Response to Deindustrialization 
 
 
On September 28, 1979, 500 Detroiters gathered at Sacred Heart Seminary to discuss the 
direction of the city’s economic development at the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy-
sponsored conference, “City Life in the 80’s.” Since his election in 1973, Detroit’s Mayor, 
Coleman Young, and his supporters in Detroit’s business community had engaged in 
redeveloping Detroit’s economy through the construction of various downtown and riverfront 
projects. Observers and the city’s officials had named this urban coalition’s revitalization efforts 
the “renaissance,” after Henry Ford II’s signature luxury high rise office complex located along 
the city’s riverfront. By 1979, the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy’s (DARE) was the 
leading opposition group to what they perceived as Young’s narrow focus on private downtown 
development, hence their sponsorship of the “City Life in the ‘80s” conference.1 DARE was 
especially critical of Young’s strategy of adopting the “public-private partnership” model of 
economic growth to revitalize Detroit, using city, state, and federal resources to subsidize private 
development.2 In contrast, DARE, and its most prominent spokesperson, City Councilman 
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Kenneth V. Cockrel, argued for what it called a more “rational” approach to economic 
development.3  
What follows is an examination of the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy’s 
progressive politics and its responses to three focal points—Coleman Young’s urban 
development policies, the 1979-1980 Chrysler loan guarantee, and reindustrialization. DARE’s 
progressivism was consistent with the Anti-STRESS Coalition’s, Indochina Peace Campaign’s, 
and the Ohio Public Interest Campaign’s in that the organization couple radial analyses of their 
focal points with pragmatic and reformist strategies. While individual members of DARE, such 
as Kenneth Cockrel, called themselves revolutionary socialists, the organization self-consciously 
moved away from revolutionary politics. DARE’s Constitution called for a “socialist 
transformation of society.”4  
But, like the Indochina Peace Campaign and OPIC, DARE pursued reformist strategies to 
enact economic change. DARE grew out of Kenneth Cockrel’s city council election in 1977. 
While DARE’s leadership eschewed arguments about the efficacy of electoral politics, they did 
not romanticize electoralism.  The group’s leaders only sought political office if and when they 
believed they could win and serve effectively. They sought to utilize an insider-outside approach 
to politics combining the mobilization of outside political pressure with the election of political 
allies to public office. DARE’s leadership envisioned the construction of a multiracial left 
movement that supported workers and the poor and hoped to ally themselves with other potential 
allies in the nation’s cities in order to build a nationwide multiracial left movement.  
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In a similar fashion to the Ohio Public Interest Campaign (OPIC), DARE articulated a 
vision of economic democracy that sought to respond to Young’s downtown development, 
deindustrialization, and economic crisis. However, DARE’s conception of economic democracy 
was more radical than OPIC’s. “Rational reindustrialization” entailed the construction of a 
diversified public enterprise sector based upon a mix of market socialist principles, which 
entailed worker- and/or community control over industrial property, production of goods, and 
social control over investment.5 Building a public enterprise sector in Detroit involved collective 
economic planning, converting abandoned plants, greater community and worker control of said 
plants, and production for social needs in a renewed national market for industrial goods. DARE 
imagined local government as the primary instrument to implement such a policy. But to 
implement such a policy, DARE knew, would required both the cultivation of political support to 
challenge Young’s dominance of city politics and the organization of a regional and national 
movement capable of influencing national urban and industrial policy.  
DARE called for a rational economic approach to development based on true grassroots 
democracy in which the city’s population possessed property rights in the corporation. While 
they accepted the presence of a market in economic relations, they disagreed with the idea of free 
markets and capitalist economic development as naturally rational.6 For DARE, capitalist 
markets and economic development produced job loss and structural unemployment and were 
thus woefully inadequate for Detroit’s citizens. Markets and the private sector did not know what 
was best for the economy, workers and governments did. They sought worker and community 
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control of corporations and the creation of a public-sector economy based upon capital 
investment from various sources including private investors and the city, state, and federal 
governments. According to DARE’s rational economic approach, municipal governments and 
workers would determine investments by adhering to a set of criteria that accounted for workers’ 
needs. DARE’s call for the social production for social needs challenged capitalists’ desire for 
endless accumulation of profits and unlimited economic growth as the means of spreading 
wealth. 
DARE’s rational reindustrialization plan represented a left response to the industrial 
policy proposals of Business Week’s, the Carter Administration, and investment banker Felix 
Rohatyn.  DARE favored more government and citizen planning and control over the economy. 
The group also believed that the economy should benefit Detroit residents rather than specific 
corporations and individual capitalists. Business Week, Carter’s Commission, and Rohatyn also 
proposed national solutions while DARE’s conception of rational reindustrialization represented 
a local solution that other cities could adopt. 
Luria’s and Russell’s Rational Reindustrialization sparked debate among leftist activists 
and intellectuals in publications such as Socialist Monthly Changes and The Progressive.  Many 
of the leftist intellectuals and activists who evaluated Luria’s and Russell’s plan were often quite 
critical. The debate underscored two crucial questions that concerned leftists during the late 
1970s and early 1980s: How does one build sustainable political power in an era of decline of 
organized labor; and how does one acquire the capital needed to construct an economy with 
democratic principles?  
DARE’s concept of rational reindustrialization exemplified a post-new left and post-
black power politics of scarcity. The economic boom of the 1960s had enabled left and black 
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political activists of the period to organize around a concern for achieving equal rights and 
further integration into the U.S. economy through the redistribution of economic surplus. new 
leftist and black power organizations based their political programs on the presumption that the 
U.S. economy could sustain infinite economic growth.7  With the redistribution of economic 
growth off of the table, organizations such as DARE and the Ohio Public Interest Campaign 
argued for the retention of capital in the face of growing plant closures, rising energy costs due to 
the OPEC oil shock, and economic recession. Yet, in response to these conditions, DARE 
rearticulated new leftist notions of participatory democracy in the economy.  
The debate over rational reindustrialization challenges interpretations of scholars like 
Van Gosse who insist that the left “had no coherent alternative to the extraordinarily 
sophisticated, rationalized, world of global corporate capitalism.” 8 While DARE articulated a 
coherent plan within the constraints of national urban policy, the problem with Detroit’s 
progressive left was less a lack of ideas than a lack of mass organization and political power. The 
incorporation of African Americans into Detroit’s governing structure served as the key political 
roadblock in DARE’s organizing. The organization failed to make inroads with enough 
Detroiters, especially the city’s black workers, to be able to effectively oppose Mayor Coleman 
Young, who led a coalition of business, civil rights, and labor union leaders.9 Policy and political 
structures converged to limit the organization’s opposition to Coleman Young and his growth 
coalition. Federalism, the restructuring of national urban policy and state tax abatement laws also 
worked against progressives because they structured and helped facilitate Young’s development 
strategies. While the mayor was not able to acquire the resources necessary to implement his 
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massive Moving Detroit Forward plan, he successfully received federal resources from the 
federal government. Ultimately, Young’s domination of Detroit politics and the strength of his 
coalition left Cockrel and DARE politically isolated.  
This analysis builds upon the scholarship on politics, planning, and economic 
development in post-World War II Detroit. While the story of the city’s deindustrialization, the 
suburbanization of its metropolitan region, and the political conflicts that ensued after the 1968 
uprising are well-known, much of the scholarship lack a sustained analysis of the city’s 
progressive politics during the 1970s and progressives’ responses to the aforementioned 
transformations and events. Historian Heather Ann Thompson presents a history of Detroit as 
one characterized by political conflict—a struggle between liberals, conservatives and radicals 
for power in Detroit. Thompson’s study of Detroit politics during the “crisis-filled period in the 
North between 1967 and 1973” is significant because it stresses contingency in Detroit politics 
rather than declension. However, this study of DARE extends Thompson’s periodization beyond 
1973 and places it within a national and global context.10 DARE represents an example of 
activists who resisted industrial divestment and sought to mitigate the local effects of the 
restructuring of the national and global economies. This chapter illustrates the need for a greater 
focus on the ways activists sought to address the shift from “fordist” to “post-fordist,” or what 
David Harvey has called “flexible,” economies in the decades after World War II.11  
 
Political and Economic Context of DARE’s Development 
DARE’s emergence and its articulation of economic democracy were responses to the 
interplay of local, national, and global political developments and economic transformations, 
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such as Detroit’s “urban crisis,” turbulence in the U.S. and global political economy, downturns 
in the automobile sector, and local urban development issues.12 Uneven metropolitan 
development after World War II—capital and white flight from the central city to the suburbs—
had stunted the city’s economic development and the city government’s ability to extend services 
to its most vulnerable residents. Detroit famously birthed the modern urban fordist economy—an 
economy based upon mass production and consumption and a regulated relationship between 
multinational corporations, governments, and the nation’s major labor unions.13 For many 
Detroiters, including Coleman Young, the city’s identity rested on its reputation as “the motor 
city.” General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and the Chrysler Corporation, the U.S.’s three 
largest automobile manufacturers, based their production and management operations in the 
metropolitan area.  
Detroit’s industrial economy employed tens of thousands from the 1920s through the 
1970s. The number of unemployed workers were as low as 4,000 during the 1940s.14 However, 
various factors, including the decentralization of the auto industry, deindustrialization of the 
city’s economy, and suburbanization and white flight, revealed Detroit’s vulnerability in the 
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changing postwar U.S. and global economy. Between 1952 and 1980, the city lost 65% of its 
population while its surrounding suburbs gained over a million residents.15  Detroit also lost 33% 
of its jobs between 1968 and 1977. The resulting decline of tax revenue produced problems for 
city government as Young often confronted budget shortfalls. It was only the mayor’s ability to 
secure substantial grant funds from the federal and state governments that enabled him to balance 
the city’s budget.  
Population loss, declining property values, deindustrialization, and recession threw the 
city into episodic fiscal crises during the 1970s. In 1970, Deputy Controller Alfred Pelham 
estimated that the city faced budget deficits of $21 million and $39.5 million in 1969-70 and 
1970-71 fiscal years.16 To respond to these crises, Pelham suggested a mix of tax increases and 
austerity.  The controller urged Mayor Gribbs to raise income taxes, eliminate a deadline for the 
city to collect municipal income taxes, judiciously “control the use of overtime compensation” 
and “temporarily” eliminate “all except absolutely essential public services.”17 Gribbs 
implemented some of these measures, laying off 237 city workers and cutting city services. He 
laid off another 314 city workers in 1972.18 The cuts, however, were not sufficient.  In May 
1973, Auditor General Victor McCormick warned of another $50 million budget shortfall.19  
In 1972, Gribbs and the city also confronted the reality, or threat of, more industrial plant 
closures. GM announced that it would close its Fisher Body Plant, leaving over 1,000 workers 
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idle. Other local manufacturers such as Gar Wood, Wolverine Tube, and Eaton Corporation 
announced plant closings in March, 1972. The closings of Federal Mogul, Excello Corporation, 
North American Rockwell, and the Burroughs Corporation plants in Detroit and the western 
Wayne County suburbs pushed its Wayne County Commission to issue a resolution on February 
17 calling for the establishment of a “Jobs for Greater Detroit Committee.”  The goal of the 
committee, which would be comprised of local political, industry, labor, and community leaders, 
would be to devise strategies to stop plant closings.20 Gribbs also called for a cooperative 
approach to address deindustrialization in the aftermath of GM’s Fisher Body announcement.21 
Changes in federal urban policy also contributed to Detroit’s fiscal turbulence during the 
1970s. Unlike the big city mayors of the 1960s, big city mayors governed under a different 
federal urban policy regime. Federal aid to cities declined overall during the 1970s.22 President 
Richard M. Nixon abandoned the Great Society/Model Cities-style of urban policy that allowed 
cities to tap into various agencies for money. Nixon’s new federalism emphasized “revenue 
sharing” among cities.23 Under Nixon’s new federalism, the federal government consolidated 
funding available for urban development in several block grants including the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG). Nixon’s grants distributed federal funds more widely than 
the previous urban policy regime, which tended to extend most of its resources to northeastern 
                                                 
20 Ralph Orr and John Oppendahl, “GM Reaffirms Plant Closing,” Detroit Free Press, February 10, 1972; James G. 
Tittsworth, “Employees Assail Tube Plant Closing,” Detroit News, March 21, 1972; James Dewey, “Eaton Corp. 
Plans to Move Plant Out of Detroit,” Detroit Free Press, March 2, 1972; Nugent, “500 to Lose Plant Jobs at Gar 
Wood,” Detroit Free Press, March 27, 1972; Bernard E. Hanus, “Letter to Roman S. Gribbs,” (March 1, 1972), 
Roman S. Gribbs Papers, Box 329, Folder 5. BHL.  
21 Roman S. Gribbs, “Statement of Mayor Roman S. Gribbs on February 2, 1972,” Gribbs Papers, Box 329, Folder 
5, BHL.  
22 Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance:  Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985 (Baltimore:  The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 269.  
23 David B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism:  Slouching Toward Washington (New Jersey:  Chatham House 
Publishers, Inc., 1995), 135; Timothy J. Conlan, “The Politics of Block Grants:  From Nixon to Reagan,” Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Summer 1984), 252-253. 
282 
 
cities. 24 The federal government instituted the Urban Development Action Grant Program 
(UDAG), which awarded troubled cities grants for economic development.25 In this era of 1970s 
new federalism, Detroit obtained almost $400 million in federal aid in 1978.26 The city also 
earned $114 million in Urban Development Action Grants between 1978 and 1984.27 Young 
used these funds to offset budget deficits and for riverfront, downtown, industrial, and 
neighborhood development.28 
Nixon’s approach to urban policy exacerbated Detroit’s budgetary problems. The Detroit 
Free Press called Nixon’s impending 1974 budget, “A $400 Million Blow for Detroit.”29 Roman 
Gribbs declared in his testimony in a February 1973 Congressional subcommittee hearing that 
Nixon’s 1974 budget would “decimate many of the programs designed to contain and combat the 
social evils that plague our cities…These cuts will give impetus to a new cycle of decay in 
American cities.”30 Gribbs projected cuts in summer job programs, housing, parks, child care, 
health care, and in the construction of a six-county water and sewage treatment center.31  Other 
mayors of Midwestern and Rustbelt cities also expressed concern with the impact of Nixon’s 
budget. Gary, Indiana mayor Richard Hatcher testified that the city would suffer a $21 million 
cut due to Nixon’s revenue sharing program.32 Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter would maintain 
the same block grant structure in their urban policies, forcing Coleman Young to confront the 
same budgetary crisis that had bedeviled, his predecessor.  
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While the urban crisis helped lay the foundation for the rise of DARE, the organization 
also arose in response to transformations in the national and global economies. Historians cite 
the oil shock of 1973 as the end of the postwar economic boom and the onset of the “stagflation” 
crisis of the 1970s.33 Responding to tacit U.S. support of Israel against Egypt in the Yom Kippur 
War, the mostly Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) 
imposed an oil embargo that drove up energy prices by 70% in the United States.34 This price 
hike in oil sent the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy reeling and provoked a national 
recession in 1974 and 1975. Detroit especially felt the brunt of the oil shock because mass 
automobile production and consumption depended upon low energy costs. Detroit’s 
unemployment rate increased from 12.5 to 17.4% while the country’s rate rose from 5.6 to 8.5% 
during the 1974-75 recession.35  
Turbulence within the U.S. auto economy during the 1970s contributed to the city’s 
downturn and spurred DARE’s marxist analysis of the Chrysler crisis and its effort to construct 
an economic plan that would respond to both the local and national crises.  The 1973-74 oil 
embargo and the oil shock at the end of the decade, economic recession, government regulations, 
and increased competition from Japan and West Germany generated a crisis in the auto industry. 
Consequently, Ford, General Motors, American Motors, and especially Chrysler, experienced 
wild fluctuations of loss and profit during the decade. In the midst of the oil shock and economic 
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1974-1975 recession, auto sector profitability fell from 5 percent to 1 percent between 1973 and 
1975.36  
The surge of Japanese imports, abetted by the federal government’s trade policies, also 
exacerbated the crisis within the auto industry. Japanese auto makers intensified their penetration 
into the U.S. auto market during the 1970s.  By 1973 Japanese imports totaled over 3 million or 
15 percent of the U.S. auto market.  According to historian Judith Stein, Japanese auto 
companies exported 1.2 cars for every car bought in Japan.   As the decade progressed, Japanese 
automakers were also able to take advantage of the rising demand for fuel efficient vehicles and 
of the oil shortage stimulated by the revolution in Iran in 1979.37  By the end of the decade, 
Japanese automakers’ market share had increased to 26.7 percent.38   
Auto companies attributed blame on the turbulence within the industry on federal 
regulations. Chrysler’s business leaders, as well as pro-business publications such as Business 
Week, pointed to these federal regulations as the culprit for the corporation’s deterioration during 
the late 1970s. “The regulatory load falls unevenly on us and affects us like a regressive tax,” 
Chrysler chairman John J. Riccardo told the New York Times in August 1979.39  In fact, the fuel 
standards in the Clean Air Act of 1970, combined with the oil shock, and international 
competition to push the Big 4 automakers to produce smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles such 
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as American Motors’s Gremlin and Hornet and Ford’s Pinto.40  This shift in consumer demand 
towards more fuel efficient cars, models that Chrysler developed too slowly, was one of the 
factors that pushed Chrysler Corporation to declare bankruptcy in 1979.41  
   
The Cockrel Campaign, Establishment of DARE and the Tension between Radicalism and 
Electoral Politics 
 
DARE emerged out of Kenneth Cockrel’s election to the Detroit city council in 1977. 
Cockrel’s victory was the zenith of his personal success in politics. Soon Cockrel and his 
comrades in DARE experienced isolation as the principled opposition to Mayor Young and his 
growth coalition inside city government. Young’s coalition featured the UAW and business 
leaders such as Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford, II and the developer Alfred Taubman.  
DARE, however, thought it could use Cockrel’s election to build momentum to confront Young 
and his coalition and to eventually organize a movement around what they considered a more 
“rational” economic approach in response to deindustrialization and the city’s fiscal crisis.  
Kenneth Cockrel had first explored running for mayor while working in the anti-STRESS 
campaign during the early 1970s. While Coleman Young’s ascendancy in 1972-1973 thwarted 
Cockrel’s mayoral ambitions, he seized on the opportunity to run for city council in February 
1977. He saw his decision to run for public office as an extension of the long term political 
strategy of building a sustainable multiracial left political movement that had first emerged from 
activist-lawyer Justin Ravitz’s election to Recorder’s Court Judge in 1972.42  
Cockrel’s 1977 campaign organization boasted over 1,000 volunteers—second only to 
Coleman Young’s mayoral campaign—and a war chest of $70,000, much of it from $5 and $10 
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donations. Cockrel’s campaign distributed 50,000 buttons, 25,000 bumper stickers, and four 
thousand flyers.43 Having earned experience running Ravitz’s successful campaign, Sheila 
Murphy stepped in to serve as Cockrel’s campaign’s manager. Notable activists—Herb Boyd, 
Melba Boyd, Jim Jacobs, and Jack Russell served as campaign coordinators.44  
Cockrel’s campaign also solicited help from other leftist organizations in the city. 
Murphy convinced Cockrel to allow members of Detroit’s chapter of the New American 
Movement (NAM) to work as researchers and canvassers in his campaign.45 She recognized 
NAM’s intellectual and political capabilities.46 Ron Aronson, Judy Kunnes, Tony Rothschild, 
and Steve Shank comprised the “Detroit NAM Cockrel Committee.” Aronson led the 
organization’s “think tank,” or research team while Kunnes, Rothschild, and Shank worked as 
district coordinators. The members of the NAM Cockrel Committee approached the campaign as 
members of a political coalition; they saw electing Cockrel as an important goal because they 
assumed Cockrel would “raise issues, expose practices, and deal from an independent base 
uncontrolled by traditional political and capital interest in the city.” Yet, they also believed they 
had much to gain as an organization by working in the Cockrel campaign. “We saw it as an arena 
for recruitment to our chapter,” the NAM Cockrel Committee acknowledged. Ultimately, NAM 
saw the Cockrel campaign as an opportunity to forge “a coalition of progressive and socialist 
forces” in the city.47 
Cockrel and his campaign organization encountered a crucial question:  How much 
should Cockrel emphasize his socialist credentials? The Cockrel’s campaign’s desires to win 
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votes from a broad swath of the city, especially its African American population, produced a 
tension between Cockrel’s self-identification as a socialist and the campaign’s unwillingness to 
explicitly run on a radical platform. Mainstream and leftist press coverage often highlighted 
Cockrel’s leftist credentials.48 Yet, Cockrel’s politics remained vague in the campaign’s 
literature. Campaign flyers expressed a leftist populism. The campaign framed him as a “fighter” 
for workers and “the people.”49 A campaign profile of Cockrel contained traces of his leftist 
politics. It stressed his successes as a lawyer and activist and remarked that capitalism exploited 
all people, “At the height of racial polarization, in Detroit and nationally, he [Cockrel] was a 
clear and consistent voice saying ‘the conditions which create our situation are colorless. 
People…are not served by a corrupt capitalist system.”50 Some observers and the members of the 
NAM Cockrel Committee acknowledged how the campaign downplayed its candidate’s socialist 
politics. NAM declared that Cockrel’s campaign “was not a socialist campaign, and its main 
appeal was to the Black community.” In its postmortem of DARE, leftist journalists Mark 
Levitan and David Finkle acknowledged how Cockrel “ran as a socialist” even though “the 
campaign was vague about what this meant for the issues facing Detroit.”51 Campaign organizer 
Jim Jacobs captured this tension in his analysis of the campaign.  "The Cockrel campaign was 
not overtly socialist in its ideology or program. However, in interviews to the media, Cockrel 
always identified himself as a socialist.”52 
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The campaign’s economic views also highlighted the tension between Cockrel’s political 
identity and his platform’s content. Cockrel devoted his attention to the economic issues tax 
reform, an issue that DARE would also focus on following the election. One of his campaign 
pamphlets addressed questions of how to address deindustrialization and alluded to DARE’s 
vision of rational reindustrialization. The pamphlet asked:  “Should we enact a tax on businesses 
that move out of Detroit as an incentive for them to stay? Should we think about and implement 
another way to allocate our labor time to produce socially useful goods and services? When 
industries desert Detroit, should the City purchase and preserve plants in ways that expand 
employment and advance workers’ control?”53 Regarding Cockrel’s economic platform, one 
observer wrote, “Cockrel is stressing such themes as: government takeover of services that the 
private sector is failing to adequately deliver” and “the development of labor-intensive 
employment…”54 His concern for economic issues was indicative of the economic turbulence of 
the 1970s. “We’ve entered an era in the country generally, and Detroit particularly, where the 
questions of economic survival are paramount,” he told the Michigan Chronicle. 55  
Similar to Ravitz’s campaign, Cockrel’s campaign embodied left progressive arguments 
for the use of electoral politics, interaction with established political institutions, and the 
development of independent political organization as mechanisms for addressing the problems 
facing Detroit. As Jack Russell stated in “No Gas and Water Socialism in Detroit,” “we made the 
decision to run because we wanted to test the possibilities of creating out of the campaign a 
multi-racial organization…”56 For Cockrel, and eventually DARE, taking political office only 
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comprised one component of their model of an independent black left politics. One also needed a 
viable political organization that had the capacity to pressure the city’s institutions. Cockrel 
emphasized this symbiotic relationship between independent political organization and 
sympathetic politicians when he addressed a question regarding what voters should expect from 
his performance on the council, “What I am able to do in the council is going to be dependent 
upon what we’re able to do in the community…”57  
Cockrel saw the need for developing a nationwide network of likeminded city-based 
organizations because he recognized the limitations of local politics when trying to address 
globalized problems. He explained the reasons for the establishment of DARE as follows: 
We needed an organization because we recognized the limitations in holding elective office, 
at this or any other level of government. For example, after the 1974 embargo, the 
quadrupling of prices and the concern about fuel efficiency, you reach a point where quite 
obviously there’s not a thing that I can do in the Wayne County building or that Young can do 
in the Wayne County building about the problems which have a global geo-political genesis. 
We know we need the organized capacity to relate to other embryonic entities that do exist 
around the country…58 
 
Ultimately, Cockrel’s and his allies’ theory of social movements and politics rested upon an 
inside-outside approach. Social movements and political organizations could organize, mobilize, 
and elect their candidates into office. However, in the case of Cockrel, and what became DARE, 
those elected officials and outside political organizations would work in tandem to build more 
support for more radical policies among the city’s citizenry. Then, the political organization and 
the elected official would encourage those external to the city government to pressure the 
established institutions to adopt particular policies.  
Cockrel faced considerable odds despite enjoying mass support. He had to contend with a 
field of 73 in the city’s September 13 nonpartisan primary election. Neither Young, the UAW, 
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the local black political organization, the Black Slate, led by Reverend Albert B. Cleage, not the 
Detroit Free Press, endorsed Cockrel’s candidacy.59 However, he did earn endorsements from 
Congressman John Conyers and the local conservative paper, the Detroit News. Cockrel finished 
first in the primary election, garnering over 100,000 votes. He received over 160,000 votes in the 
general election that November, placing seventh out of eighteen candidates and first among non-
incumbents.60  
Cockrel entered office as Young’s urban regime coalesced. Young won a second term, 
defeating Ernest Brown by 77,000 votes in the mayoral runoff.61  At the same time, the city’s 
voters elected the first black majority on City Council. Erma Henderson, the city council 
president, represented the body’s most progressive member next to Cockrel.62 While Cockrel 
sought to build a progressive machine, in the form of DARE, that appealed to black Detroiters, 
then whites, the solidification of Young’s governing coalition threatened to isolate his effort. 
After Cockrel’s election, the activists in Cockrel’s political organization established an 
organization that they hoped could fill the need to an external pressure group. On September 10, 
1978, Cockrel, Murphy, Ravitz, and their supporters gathered at Cobo Hall and constituted 
themselves as the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy. DARE charged itself with supporting 
Cockrel in his opposition against Young’s redevelopment efforts. The organization did so by 
organizing conferences around economic development, facilitating an alternative city bus tour, 
establishing a newsletter, their Dispatch, and founded a policy think-tank, the Detroit Institute 
for Urban Policy Research.63 It was through their work with the Institute that Jack Russell and 
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economist, UAW researcher, and DARE activist Dan Luria produced Rational 
Reindustrialization. DARE’s members also drafted a constitution that featured its organizational 
vision and its organizational structure. The organization required members to pay $20 dues 
annually. At its height, DARE boasted over 200 dues-paying members.64  
DARE featured an elaborate hierarchical and rather democratic structure. The General 
Assembly comprised all members. The General Assembly was responsible for establishing and 
reviewing the year’s organizational objectives. The Assembly met once a year to elect the 
Executive Board. The Executive Board had seventeen members who were vested with 
administrative and decision making powers. The Executive Board and the General Assembly 
reconstitutes itself as the Executive Council, which assumes the powers of the Executive Board. 
From there, DARE implemented its strategy and program through its quadrant organizers. Two 
quadrant organizers were in charge of the four quadrants—north, south, east, and west. They 
supervised district coordinators and neighborhood captains.65 
DARE’s constitution captured the various conceptual strands of left politics that many of 
the founders had practiced in the prior decade. The first statement of the preamble of DARE’s 
constitution read:  “We are progressives who defend liberty and oppose economic exploitation, 
racism, sexism, and all forms of oppression.” Calls for “the socialist transformation of society,” 
to “work to reform the present social order” were reminiscent of Borys’s rhetoric in her essay 
supporting Ravitz’s campaign. The organization stated that its goal was to “develop a united, 
independent political force…”66 The Preamble’s inclusion of a statement of support for engaging 
in electoral politics also reflected the organization’s activists’ prior experience in Ravitz’s and 
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Cockrel’s campaign. DARE sought to make it clear that it was prepared support likeminded 
candidates and to demonstrate that an independent electoral strategy was a viable for leftists in 
the late 1970s.67  
DARE’s leadership saw the organization as having the potential to be a prototypical left 
urban organization that could lead in constructing a nationwide independent left social and 
electoral movement devoted to confronting the problems of uneven metropolitan economic 
development and capital and government disinvestment from the nation’s cities. Cockrel 
explained the organization’s broader political aspirations in an article that appeared in the left 
publication, In These Times, in the fall of 1979 entitled, “Left City Politics Must Focus on 
Working and Poor People’s Interests.” “This involvement in electoral activity provides a range 
of opportunities in the 1980s to build the kind of local organization that is essential if a 
reinvigorated national left is to emerge in the next decade.” Then, after underscoring DARE as 
“a city-wide, multi-racial, community-based organization with socialist leadership,” Cockrel 
described the organization’s “urban populism,” and presumably its rational economic policy, as  
“the essential urban core of a popular left movement in the 1980s.” 68   
Cockrel’s election to city council and the creation of DARE represented the culmination 
of a decade-long process of the development of a multiracial, left, and independent politics in the 
city of Detroit. Black and white radicals led by Cockrel and Murphy moved away from 
organizations concerned with ideological purity and a skepticism towards electoral politics 
towards a political formation coalescing around attracting a mass political base and taking power 
through the city’s established political institutions. Now that Cockrel had entered into Detroit’s 
corridors of power, DARE’s next challenge was to develop a left critique of the liberal economic 
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development of Young and the Democrats and to construct a left-wing economic and urban 
policy that could serve as an alternative.  
 
“Detroit Renaissance”:  Mayor Coleman Young, the Public-Private Partnership, and 
DARE’s Critique of Liberal Urban Development  
 
Cockrel’s and DARE’s opposition to Mayor Coleman Young’s use of tax abatements for 
riverfront and downtown development was an example of their opposition to growth liberalism. 
It also represents an example of progressives’ encounter with powerful policy and political 
structures. The city’s power structure featured a strong and popular black mayor. Local black 
political organizations such as the Black Slate either aligned themselves with Young or stayed 
out of his administration’s way. A network of development institutions such as the Economic 
Development Corporation and Detroit Renaissance, Inc. comprised of local business leaders and 
real estate developers often utilized municipal ties and public money in their efforts to stimulate 
the city’s “renaissance.”  
As Young’s coalition emerged as a crucial political roadblock for Cockrel and DARE, it 
is important to remember that Young also governed within particular institutional, policy, and 
structural constraints. Young entered into office in the midst of crucial shifts in policy and 
political economy. Detroit’s auto-based economy slowed in the midst of economic crisis and the 
1973 oil shock. President Nixon’s and Ford’s “new federalism” closed a source of revenues for 
the struggling city. While members of DARE concentrated on Young’s alliance with corporate 
leaders and developers, the mayor sought a comprehensive redevelopment strategy that included 
revitalizing downtown, riverfront, neighborhoods, and the industrial sector. As mayor, Young 
used the legal and policy resources available for urban development. These measures included 
tax abatements for downtown and industrial development, as well as Urban Development Action 
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Grants (UDAGs), and eminent domain for building a General Motors plant in the Poletown 
neighborhood. 
In his inaugural speech in 1974, Young famously told would-be criminals to “hit the 
road.” Young linked his plans to fight crime with a call for racial reconciliation and a promise to 
revitalize the city’s downtown and the riverfront. Young declared that he would “attack the 
economic deterioration of our city” and “move forward the first significant step that has been 
made since the Renaissance Center, to deal with the problem of rebuilding our city 
economically.”69 His discussion of economic redevelopment, especially his reference to the 
city’s Renaissance Center, did not stray from his campaign message where he once declared, 
“Revitalize the riverfront…and I guarantee you’ll revitalize the whole city.”70  
Despite this proclamation, Young continued to invest in industrial development. Young’s 
coalition of public and private interests’ projects reflected an effort to build a post-industrial 
Detroit that could serve as headquarters for white collar professional work and other elements of 
a service economy. Coleman Young and his corporate allies drew from an older strategy of urban 
development that was part of a national trend. Planners and local officials in cities like New 
York City, Chicago, and Pittsburgh relied upon urban renewal to clear the way for building 
highways and redevelopment projects. New York City planner Robert Moses’s and Metropolitan 
Life President Frederick Ecker’s collaboration on Met Life’s Stuyvesant Town during the 1950s 
exemplified the type of public-private strategy for urban development that Young, local 
developers, and corporate leaders sought to undertake.71 Young’s coalition’s strategy in Detroit 
relied on building large high end projects that included luxury apartments, office buildings, and 
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the construction of a sports arena. The policy, economic, and regional context distinguished 
Young’s redevelopment efforts from his predecessors and his peers.  
Young injected himself into the post-rebellion public-private infrastructure developed by 
New Detroit, Inc. and Detroit Renaissance, Inc. upon his election in 1973. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, then-Mayor Jerome Cavanagh, businessman J.L. Hudson, and an assemblage of the 
city’s business leaders formed the “nation’s first ‘urban coalition,’”—New Detroit, Inc.,—
involving representatives from business, government, labor, and the city’s neighborhoods in July 
1967.72 They charged themselves with addressing what they perceived as the economic causes of 
the rebellion. Consequently, they looked to spearhead economic development by establishing 
another public-private entity—the Economic Development Corporation of Greater Detroit 
(EDC).73 However, Henry Ford, II.’s Detroit Renaissance, Inc. superseded this organization. 
Ford’s establishment of the organization also coincided with his vision for a prominent riverfront 
development project comprising a complex of five high towers, office buildings, hotels, and 
restaurants—the Renaissance Center.74 Ford successfully attracted the financial support from all 
of the executives from the city’s major corporations affiliated with the automobile industry.  
Young established additional public-private institutions “dominated by business leaders 
to ‘coordinate public and private development efforts.’” These organizations included the 
Economic Growth Corporation (EGC), the Economic Development Corporation (EDC), and the 
                                                 
72 Richard Child Hill, “Crisis in the Motor City,” 96.  
73 Hill argues that the establishment of the EDC was “an effort to put white capitalism to work to promote black 
capitalism.” The organization, according to Hill, would “demonstrate  that ‘the private business and financial 
communities are best equipped to lead the way in opening the benefits of the free enterprise system to minorities’ 
and that ‘minority business development is one of the key solutions to our nation’s problems.’” Hill’s argument 
suggests that scholars of the black power era, especially those who focus on black power’s economic aspects, should 
build on the critique of black capitalism and what some may consider African Americans’ acceptance and advocacy 
of the public-private partnership purported by black left activists such as Robert L. Allen in Black Awakening in 
Capitalist America. Hill also notes that black capitalism failed to ameliorate black poverty in Detroit. For Hill’s 
discussion of black capitalism see Hill, “Crisis in the Motor City,” 97. 
74 Sugrue cites the construction of the Renaissance Center as product of “public private partnership.” Yet, he argues 
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Downtown Development Authority (DDA). These institutions adopted Detroit Renaissance, 
Inc.’s organizational model and took on an incestuous character as they often shared the same 
members. 75 These organizations often facilitated the use of public funds, either tax revenues or 
federal grants, in the execution of urban development projects.  
Despite the economic turbulence and urban policy reforms, Young and his administration 
developed a more comprehensive development plan—Moving Detroit Forward:  A Plan for 
Urban Economic Revitalization in April 1975.  The plan demanded $2.5 billion from the Federal 
Government. It called for federal and state money for an array of job programs and development 
projects. It called for riverfront development, the creation of industrial parks, the construction of 
a shopping center, courthouse, county jail, hospital, and an expansion of the city airport. It served 
as an example of how the federal government could work with cities to ensure post-industrial 
and post-oil shock urban reconstruction. 
Coleman Young’s plan reflected prior calls for urban reconstruction. Civil rights leaders 
such as Whitney Young and Martin Luther King, Jr. had called for a “Marshall Plan” to 
rehabilitate American cities. In a time of urban fiscal crisis, federal devolution, and the rightward 
drift in U.S. politics, Moving Detroit Forward represented a New Deal-style employment 
program. The Young administration estimated that such a plan would create over 60,000 jobs. 
The plan called for retraining 30,000 “structurally unemployed” Detroiters. Young believed the 
state should continue to protect workers and citizens from market failures and structural 
economic transformations such as the suburbanization and globalization of manufacturing.  
Young sought to make a point with the ambitious plan: the federal government was 
implicated in the urban crisis and it was responsible for maintaining the health of the nation’s 
cities. “It is now incumbent upon the Federal government to act decisively on the challenge 
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posed and sustain its greatest asset – the nation’s cities,” the report declared. Young also held the 
federal government responsible for neglecting its housing stock. HUD owned 20,000 properties 
in the city, many of which were abandoned homes and vacant lots.76 HUD’s neglect, according 
to the plan, “all but destroyed home ownership” in Detroit.77 
President Gerald Ford and his administration dismissed the plan. This is not surprising 
considering the trajectory of urban policy during the first half of the 1970s. The Nixon and Ford 
administrations designed urban policies to facilitate more economic growth in the South and 
West. The Ford administration initially balked at saving New York City during its fiscal crisis in 
1975, thus signaling to mayors of struggling cities like that they were virtually on their own as 
they navigating economic downturns and budget crises. On the other hand, Coleman Young 
aimed to use his close relationship with President Jimmy Carter to secure federal funding for 
development projects during the 1970s. Young’s early support of then-Georgia Governor Carter 
in his presidential campaign in 1976 placed him and the city in favorable position to receive 
preferential treatment in the allocation of federal grants and loans.  
 
“Tax Al and his pal Max”:  DARE’s Opposition to Tax Abatement 
 
Coleman Young relied on a corporate-centered strategy of development where city 
government collaborates with business to ensure private investment, the construction of private 
development projects, and the construction of a “healthy” business climate.78 Mayor Young’s 
                                                 
76 Biles, 213.  
77 Moving Detroit Forward, 3.  
78 Critics of the approach argue that the private entities usually emerge as the dominant partner in this relationship. 
This “unequal partnership” often results in the municipal government’s exclusive focus on downtown development 
and the neglect of neighborhood development. The privileged position of business also can also place economic 
development decisions out of the reach of the citizens because the city government could also vest public-private 
institutions with the powers of municipal government such as land clearance. Opponents ultimately maintain that the 
public-private partnership model has had little impact on mass unemployment and declining city revenues. 
Hackworth, 61; Gregory D. Squires, “Public-Private Partnerships:  Who Gets What and Why,” in Unequal 
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strategy for stimulating development was similar to Ohio’s Republican Governor James Rhodes. 
Young executed this strategy by awarding tax abatements and other forms of financial relief to 
corporations and real estate developers for settling in Detroit.79  
Riverfront and central business district development embodied the core of Young’s 
revitalization program. The construction of Joe Louis Arena and Max Fisher’s and Al Taubman’s 
Riverfront West luxury apartments characterized the major development projects along the 
riverfront and downtown. The Renaissance Center remained a “centerpiece for allied 
development” for Young.80 When the city’s hockey team, the Detroit Red Wings, threatened to 
move, Mayor Young took out a $38 million dollar loan against future CDBG funds from the 
Carter Administration to finance the arena.81 When developers Max Fisher and Al Taubman 
expressed interest in building luxury apartment complexes, Young supported the use of tax 
abatements—a reduction or an exemption from taxes over a specified period of time—to help 
fund the project. Young’s use of federal grants like the CDBG and city resources attracted the ire 
from DARE and Cockrel. The organization often maintained that Young’s use of those resources 
served the interests of private capital, not of the city’s workers and residents.82  
DARE strongly opposed city government’s use of tax abatements to subsidize private 
development on the grounds that it contributed to the city’s budget crises, therefore provoking 
                                                                                                                                                             
Partnerships:  The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Postwar America, ed. Gregory D. Squires (New 
Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 1989), 2-3. For more on the critique of public-private partnerships see Miriam 
Greenberg, Branding New York:  How a City in Crisis was Sold to the World (New York:  Routledge, 2008), 27-28. 
Greenberg discusses the role of the private-public partnership in imposing austerity and developing a neoliberal 
strategy of economic development during New York City’s 1975 fiscal crisis.  
79 Tax abatement—policies that provided relief to business, corporations, and developers for a period up to twelve 
years in the state of Michigan. Michigan State government created abatements for industrial (in 1974), commercial 
residential (1977) and commercial (1978) development. 
80 Hackworth, 155.  
81 Ibid., 157.  
82 “Cockrel fights tax breaks,” Detroit News, 6 October 1979; “Ol’ pals Cockrel, Fisher ‘clash,’” Detroit News, 5 
June 1981. It is important to note, however, that Young’s public-private partnership model did not totally preclude 
neighborhood development. According to Thomas, the city allocated $100,000 a year to the neighborhoods’ 
citizens’ district councils. She also noted that the city also refurbished “over 6,000 housing units between 1982 and 
1991.” See Thomas, 167.  
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Young’s austerity politics. The national recession of 1974-75 negatively impacted the city, 
causing Young to lay off 4,000 city workers in the face of “a projected revenue shortfall between 
$25 million and $35 million.”83 Sociologist Richard Child Hill claims that Young’s austerity 
measures contributed to the stagnation and/or decline of revenues allocated for social services.84 
He attributes the budget crises and the resulting austerity to inflation, higher taxes, “a more 
regressive tax structure” and “the decreasing weight of industrial and commercial property in the 
Detroit tax base due to corporate disinvestment, which shifted the burden from firms to 
residents” Yet, DARE also saw Young’s uses of tax abatements and public resources as 
contributing factors.  In “Tax Breaks and Burdens Workshop,” a document composed for the 
1979 City Life in the ‘80’s Conference, the organization outlined its reasoning: “The costs of tax 
abatements and other incentives by city government are borne by all the citizens of Detroit and 
are clearly measurable. Tax incentives reduce city revenues at a time when city services are 
being cut to the bare bones. The allocation of federal and state funds to downtown development 
reduces allocation of those funds to the development of residential areas and neighborhood 
commercial strips.”85 Activist Jack Russell also argued that Detroit’s residents also carried an 
unequal burden in supporting the city financially. He wrote, "We are dealing in the city of 
Detroit with a $70 million budget deficit, the sources of which are complex, but the occasion of 
                                                 
83 Shaw, 78.  Young also responded to the 1981 budget crisis with further austerity measures—freezing city 
workers’ wages, selling $125 million in emergency bonds, and asking for a tax increase. See Darden, et al., 217.  
84 Hill, “Crisis in the Motor City,” 109-110.  
85 Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy, “Tax Breaks and Burdens Workshop,” Kenneth V. and Sheila M. 
Cockrel Collection, September 29, 1979, Box 7, Folder 24, Walter P. Reuther Library. 
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fought with Mayor Young about whether the city should spend its resources on big ticket items in the central 
business district, riverfront, or industrial sector, or spread funding around to benefit smaller neighborhood projects. 
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300 
 
which allows us to raise in the public mind the question of at whose expense the necessary fiscal 
austerity must come."86  
 Cockrel emerged as the principal opponent of Young’s uses of tax abatements. He often 
submitted the lone “no” vote when council passed tax abatement measures.  In July 1979, 
Cockrel presented a resolution to City Council that would subject the issuance of tax abatements 
to greater scrutiny. Considering whether or not “a requested abatement was consistent with the 
purposes of the law and the needs of the community” would represent the crucial factor in 
offering such relief. The resolution also limited the number of abatements developers and 
businesses could receive and required developers to submit affirmative action hiring plans. The 
city council voted down Cockrel’s proposal. 
Cockrel and DARE organized against tax abatements for developers Max Fischer’s and 
Al Taubman’s riverfront luxury apartments. When Taubman and Fisher threatened not to 
proceed with constructing the Riverfront West apartments without tax abatement, Cockrel stated 
that the city already supported them with a $9.4 million Urban Mass Transit Grant for the people 
mover, $14 million in UDAG and federal resources for the project’s mortgage.87 The 
organization also contended in a flyer that money from the abatement would be better used by 
rehiring laid off city workers.88 In September 1979, DARE organized a petition drive to put 
pressure on the council to oppose any tax measures for Taubman’s and Fisher’s developments in 
response to Taubman’s and Fisher’s requests and threats. DARE succeeded in reaching their goal 
of 15,000 signatures, but they were unable to stop the Council from granting the developers their 
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tax abatement. Cockrel lost the council vote, 8-1.89 Mayor Young called Cockrel and DARE, 
“crazy,” and said he would “ignore them” in an October 6, 1979 Detroit News article. This 
outcome highlights a central problem with 1970s urban left politics—winning elections and 
serving as principled opposition was not enough to defeat Young’s governing coalition or to 
develop political power. Yet, members of DARE such as Jack Russell maintained that the 
organization’s ability to provoke debate and garner public support demonstrated the 
organization’s potential to challenge a popular black mayor. DARE’s efforts also illustrated how 
it was necessary for them to construct a city-based populist movement to attain political power 
and implement any alternative visions of economic development in the future.90  
 
DARE’s First Intervention:  Critiquing the 1979 Chrysler Corporation Bailout 
 
The 1980 Chrysler loan guarantee offered a political opportunity for DARE to challenge 
Young and the federal government’s response to crisis and advance its own policy of rational 
economic development. The organization opposed the bailout on the grounds that it would call 
for more worker concessions. DARE also criticized the bailout on more ideological terms—
articulating an anti-corporate critique of the loan package. They charged that the conditions 
should promote an economic democracy that demanded more corporate accountability to 
Detroit’s citizens. Thus, they organized a conference in March 1980 to educate Detroiters on the 
impact of the bailout and the policy’s shortcomings. The organization also published a series of 
essays and a position paper, “DARE Speaks Out: Chrysler, The People, and the City.” What was 
most significant about the document was that DARE began to advance their conception of a 
rational economic development policy. 
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Chrysler began its steep descent into crisis in 1979. Geopolitics haunted the organization 
again in January as the Iranian revolution destabilized global oil market and subsequently drove 
up gas prices. Rising gas prices discouraged consumers from buying full-size Chrysler models. 
Hundreds of thousands of unsold automobiles remained in Chrysler’s inventory.91  On May 30, 
Chrysler announced the closing of Dodge Main, its largest metropolitan Detroit plant. Located 
on the city’s eastside, the plant served as one of Chrysler’s flagship plants. At its height, Dodge 
Main could produce upwards of 12,000 cars every six-day workweek.  The plant was also a 
major Detroit employer. The factory had employed 20,000 people at one point in 1959.92 The 
Corporation had laid off closed to 6,000 workers from the plant in the year prior to the 1978 
announcement.  Consequently, Dodge Main’s remaining 2,600 jobs would be lost.93  
Fearing bankruptcy, Chrysler, with the support of Mayor Young and Republican 
Governor William Milliken, approached the federal government for federal aid on July 31. 
Chrysler requested a $1 billion tax credit from the Treasury Department. Secretary G. William 
Miller declined the request, but offered the corporation loan guarantees “in the range of” $500 
and $750 million dollars instead.94 To qualify for the loan guarantee, Chrysler would have to 
construct a financial plan and raise capital from willing investors. On August 1, Chrysler 
experienced its worst quarterly loss in history—$207 million.95 
                                                 
91 Stuart, 109-111.  
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The Chrysler debate stimulated a national conversation about industrial policy in the 
United States during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Washington Post journalist Joseph Kraft 
explained in a November 8, 1979 editorial, “The plight of the Chrysler Corporation defines a 
gaping hole in the American system. Washington has no direct means for promoting that high 
national priority, the reindustrialization of America.”96 Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams 
concurred in an Op-Ed, “First Chrysler—and Then?” Adams connected the immediate issue 
regarding Chrysler to the larger problem of how the federal government should address the 
transformation of U.S.’s industrial economy. “What we are ultimately addressing is the 
reindustrialization of America, and a new industrial revolution won’t happen by itself. I believe 
we can refurbish our factories and once again make the kind of quality product that will 
dominate world markets,” he surmised.  Democratic presidential hopefuls Edward Kennedy and 
Jerry Brown spoke favorably about reindustrialization.97 The New York Times and Business 
Week featured articles about “reviving industry” and the “reindustrialization of America.”98  
Kraft’s and Adam’s assumption that the U.S. lacked an industrial policy if one defined it 
broadly to include such historical interventions such as subsidizing railroads during the 
nineteenth century, contracting out military production to various producers like Chrysler during 
World War II, facilitating the decentralization of the nation’s defense industry after World War 
II, or even extending loan guarantees to Lockheed and Chrysler.99 Yet, considering their 
contentions from the leftist point of view provokes one to ask two questions:  What shape should 
industrial policy take? Who should control the process of reindustrialization? Leftists such as 
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DARE argued that federal, state, and local governments should incentivize the municipalization 
and democratization of industrial plants. The Chrysler debate opened a political space for DARE 
to not just advance critiques of the federal approach to the Chrysler bailout, but to push for more 
democratic reindustrialization strategies.  
The threat of massive job loss due to a Chrysler failure dovetailed with already-existing 
organizing and discussions about plant closings among left-progressives during the 1970s 
documented in the previous chapter. Ohio activists led the way in the fight against industrial 
plant closings during the mid-to-late 1970s. Activists from the Ohio Public Interest Campaign 
(OPIC) began organizing around the issue of plant closings in 1976. They drafted a plant closing 
bill in 1977 that Ohio State Senator Michael Schwarzwalder later sponsored. The Community 
Readjustment Act of 1977 contained several key provisions including two years advance notice 
of plant closings, severance pay to affected employees, and corporate payment into community 
assistance fund to aid cities.100 OPIC and DARE shared the same principle of corporate 
responsibility to workers and municipalities. Yet, DARE advocated for what they considered as 
more fundamental solutions such as municipal ownership and workers’ ability to take over 
abandoned plants.101  
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Mayor Coleman Young, members of Congress, and scholars predicted Detroit’s doom 
should Chrysler fail. The city housed 15 of Chrysler’s plants. Senator Carl Levin argued during 
the Chrysler hearings during the fall of 1979 that 80,000 metropolitan Detroiters would lose jobs. 
Almost half of the unemployed would be minority workers. The unemployment rate in the area, 
Levin stated, would rise from 8.7 percent to between 16 and 19 percent.102 According to a 
Department of Transportation study on the economic effects of a Chrysler failure, the city would 
suffer “an immediate economic shock” if the firm folded. The shock would resemble the one that 
beset the city in the midst of the initial OPEC oil shock and economic recession during 1974-
1975 when the unemployment rate rose to 14%.103 Mayor Young argued during the Chrysler 
proceedings that it was necessary for the federal government to bailout the ailing Chrysler 
because the city would lose $30 million annually from the corporation if it failed.104  
Coleman Young and other members of Detroit’s delegation advanced racial appeals in 
their testimonies as well. Chrysler was a major employer of black workers nationally and in 
Detroit. A Chrysler failure left black Americans uniquely vulnerable. Mayor Young testified, 
“Black unemployment in the city would increase dramatically. Approximately 25,000 of the 
37,000 Detroit Chrysler workers are black.105 Michigan Democratic Senator Donald Riegle 
stated, “A shutdown would create depression conditions in Detroit and it would cause 
tremendous economic losses for the minority populations there since Chrysler is a major 
employer of black and Hispanic workers” Riegle continued, “It is estimated, for example, that 1 
percent of total black income in the United States is derived from Chrysler.”106  
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After congressional hearings and negotiations among Chrysler, the UAW, and 
prospective creditors, President Jimmy Carter signed the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee 
Act on January 7, 1980. It established the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board and the Office of 
Chrysler Finance to oversee the execution of the loan guarantee. The loan plan required Chrysler 
to continue to sell assets. In addition to requiring concessions from dealers, suppliers, and banks, 
it enacted an austerity program on workers and state and local governments.  The federal loan 
guarantee not only encouraged the corporation to slim down, but it also imposed an austerity 
logic upon its workers, states, and cities that DARE and labor activists criticized. The United 
Auto Workers were expected to give up $1.2 billion in wages and benefits while state and local 
governments had to supply the corporation with $250 million.107   
UAW President Douglas Fraser’s appointment to Chrysler’s Board of Directors appeared 
as potential silver-lining for workers, and possibly for advocates of greater worker control. 
However, Fraser’s appointment stimulated much debate among union leaders and leftists. AFL-
CIO President Lane Kirkland argued that structure of Chrysler’s Board would not allow Fraser 
and the UAW any greater decision-making power. Kirkland told the New York Times in 
November 1981, “I think most companies are management-controlled…The woods are full of 
professional board-of-directors sitters, usually people who retire and then pad out their income 
by serving on this board…for a stipend and infrequent work.” Kirkland also warned in the same 
interview that such desires for union representation in the boardroom could inadvertently allow 
employers to deemphasize collective bargaining. “I have apprehensions that some 
employers…see it as a way around the collective bargaining table. And I think one has to be 
constantly on guard against that.”108   
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UAW Local 400 Representative Roger Robinson argued that Fraser’s presence on 
Chrysler’s Board signified “an honest attempt at redistribution of power in favor of the workers.” 
UAW Local 869 Representative Dave McCullough, however, argued that UAW’s seat on the 
Board would not extend more power to the corporation’s workers. Fraser would not acquire any 
information about Chrysler’s operations that he could share publicly, nor would Fraser exercise 
any influence since he represented the sole voice for labor in the boardroom. Instead, 
McCullough asserted, Fraser would have to share responsibility for capital accumulation and 
profit-making.109 Left progressive activists Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer advance a similar 
critique of worker representation in their book, Economic Democracy: The Challenge of the 
1980s. Drawing from studies about worker representation on boards of directors in Western 
European nations during the 1970s, the authors concluded that the corporate board of directors 
was structurally flawed because of the power of corporate managers and the board’s culture of 
secrecy and informality.110 
DARE responded to the Chrysler crisis by applying pressure within city council through 
Cockrel, organizing a conference, publishing articles in the organization’s newsletter, and 
producing a position paper. They questioned the logic of bailouts that depended upon enacting 
austerity on Detroit autoworkers and residents. They also began articulating other progressive 
demands and principles of what they considered a “rational economy.” DARE’s rational 
economics represented their expression of economic democracy. This model included greater 
corporate accountability by giving Detroiters a seat on Chrysler’s Board of Directors, converting 
industrial plants to produce for social needs, and generally protecting workers. DARE’s Chrysler 
efforts also contained mistakes and contradictions that eventually proved fatal to the 
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organization. They failed to garner mass support for their efforts from African Americans and 
union workers. They also missed the opportunity to throw at least qualified support behind the 
UAW. DARE also failed to incorporate a racial analysis.  
While DARE agreed with Mayor Young’s immediate concern of saving jobs, the 
organization asserted that the bailout represented a short-term fix carrying high social costs. 
Arguing that the Chrysler crisis was the product of corporate capitalist development. DARE 
stated that it was less concerned with saving the corporation and reiterated their desire to save 
jobs and use the debate as a political education tool. Russell affirmed the organization’s 
immediate concern of the crisis was to “protect further erosion of the high-wage industrial jobs 
that our own labor has made possible in this city.”111 The organization declared in its pamphlet, 
“We in DARE do not care whether or not the formal corporate entity called Chrysler survives. 
Our concern, rather, is with saving jobs and, in the process, with developing public 
understanding of the inevitability of crises such as Chrysler’s in capitalist economies, and of the 
haves- vs. have-nots struggle that determines who pays for ‘solutions.’”112  
DARE critiqued the austerity logic contained within the loan guarantee. They argued that 
the bailout could also exacerbate the city’s financial crisis and the austerity that the city’s 
workers and poor had to endure. They reasoned, “The cities and states that will have given 
Chrysler loans, tax abatements, and other breaks will similarly find themselves smothered by 
debt or, worse yet, forced to permanently forgo vital services that might otherwise have been 
affordable. Pressure for service cuts will be joined by demands for reduced worker compensation 
benefits, unemployment assistance and the like.”113 The organization also stated, “we shudder at 
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the impact of this package on another impoverished Corporation, the City of Detroit, which has 
also been forced to lay off workers, and which is also in danger of ceasing to be a ‘full line’ 
producer of a product we need more than Newports: the city services which hold life together in 
our town.”114  
Moreover, DARE advanced an anti-corporate critique and posed fundamental questions 
about class relations. They maintained that Chrysler not only stole labor from workers, but the 
corporation exploited taxpayers and cities. The organization declared:  
The federal “rescue” plan devised for Chrysler by Congress and the President with the 
assistance of the Corporation and its bankers is a lesson in the power of private capital. 
Billions of taxpayers’ dollars are held ready to save—for the time-being, at least—a 
mismanaged and tottering corporate entity and secure its financiers, while the workers who 
have produced the wealth of the Corporation are permanently stripped of $462,500,000 in 
resources. And while the workers were being gouged, few suggested that the security of their 
jobs or their voice in determining Chrysler’s future was worthy of debate.115 
 
According to DARE, corporations like Chrysler enjoyed a disproportionate amount of power in 
the U.S. political economy. For DARE, and other progressives like the UAW’s Fraser, 
Chrysler’s attempt to recoup capital from Detroit’s taxpayers and workers illustrated how 
corporations abandoned the social contract. Citizens, workers, and cities became responsible for 
paying for poor corporate planning and structural failure. The city’s residents and workers are to 
earn a return on their investment in the form of jobs, either. They are expected to pay to secure 
macroeconomic security. So, if DARE suggested that the bailout symbolized a misuse of funds, 
how did the organization seek to address this problem? DARE called for greater accountability 
and worker- and community control of the organization.  
Members of the organization saw the crisis as a chance to use the controversy to push for 
greater corporate accountability and commitment to the city and its workers. Cockrel stated in an 
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editorial, “…the crisis affords us an opportunity to build-in some safeguards against unchecked 
corporate decisions to close plants and shift production inside as well as outside of this state and 
country.”116 They claimed that the city should force Chrysler to commit to the city by ensuring 
job security to its workers. And, if Chrysler refuses to ensure that it will keep industrial jobs in 
the city, then the city should withhold funds. Russell writes, “Before voting to approve the 
UDAG application, Ken indicated that, in his view, no funds from the grant should be released to 
build the paint shop unless and until Chrysler makes some firm, written commitments to the 
city…” The commitments that Cockrel and DARE proposed were further corporate investment 
in the city, financial transparency—“’open the corporate books’”—and popular representation on 
the Chrysler Board of Directors.117 Accountability and commitment were important for DARE 
because they argued that the workers built the city of Detroit, the corporation and its wealth. 
Consequently, the corporation should serve its workers and remain accountable to the city in 
which it resides.118 
Like the UAW, DARE demanded popular representation on the Chrysler Board of 
Directors. DARE activists envisioned their demand as a step toward worker ownership and 
control of industrial plants. Cockrel asserted, “Public representation on Chrysler’s board is a 
critical step in our overall battle to achieve greater worker and community control over the 
investment decisions that determine the quality of life for Detroiters, and all Americans.” 
Activist Jim Jacobs also quoted Cockrel, “The issue of public representation at Chrysler is very 
                                                 
116 Kenneth Cockrel, “Detroiters Fight Back—Editorial,” Dispatch  Kenneth V. and Sheila M. Cockrel Collection, 
February/March, 1980, Box 9, Folder 28, Walter P. Reuther Library. 
117 Russell, “Moving Chrysler Forward,” 4.  
118 DARE, “Chrysler, the People, and the City,” 3-4. 
311 
 
simple…If public monies are used to aid the corporation, it is rational to expect that the people 
should exercise some control over the use of those funds.”119  
Jacobs admitted that public representation would not fundamentally address the problems 
plaguing the corporation or the U.S. economy. “While we have no illusions that public 
representation on the Chrysler board will solve the problems of the ailing automaker, this 
demand is a beginning step in attempts to control the irrationality of the present economic 
decisions,” he affirmed. Essentially, DARE claimed that the utility of capital and the relationship 
between the city and corporations should be defined by social impact rather than unmitigated 
economic growth. For the organization, the measure of extending “socialism” to Chrysler, as 
Cockrel called the measure in his “City Life in the 80s” speech, should function to sustain and 
grow jobs and not abet the insecurity of both local economy and the city’s workers.120  
DARE also advocated for long-term planning, plant conversion, and production for social 
needs. “Finally, the City of Detroit should take steps to secure funding for a truly comprehensive 
and bold planning effort focused on developing the capacity to convert plants such as Dodge 
Main to production of useful, under-supplied goods and services needed by the people of 
Detroit,” declared the organization. They further suggested several potential products that 
converted plants could manufacture including electric heat pumps, cogeneration equipment, and 
mass transit vehicles and parts. However, the organization did not elaborate on any decision 
making process or plan by which the city or workers would convert, run, and control plants. This 
required the organization to engage in more extensive analysis. DARE’s proposals of collective 
planning, worker and community control of plants, and conversion in their writings about 
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Chrysler illustrate the organizations desires to construct a “rational economy” governed by the 
principles of “conservation, accountability, conversion, and cooperation” pointed to a larger 
vision of economic democracy and the revitalization of Detroit.”121 
Whereas DARE’s position paper is significant because it began articulating a left 
progressive alternative to the Chrysler loan guarantee and urban industrial economies, it also 
contained glaring silences that may to help explain the organization’s inability to garner mass 
support for its critique of the bailout. The Chrysler crisis appeared to present a great opportunity 
for DARE to appeal to the UAW’s rank and file.  However, neither Cockrel, Jacobs, nor Russell 
threw their support behind UAW workers outside of critiquing the austerity logic contained 
within the loan guarantee. In fact, no one from DARE even discussed the union publicly. It is 
possible that DARE’s silence around the UAW stemmed from the city’s arrangement of political 
coalitions. Historically, Cockrel and the UAW were antagonists since the days of the 
revolutionary black union movements. The UAW leadership was part of Mayor Young’s 
governing coalition.  
 
“The Future Detroit is Possible”:  DARE’s Rational Economic Development and the 
National Conversation around Reindustrialization 
 
Published in March 1981, DARE’s Rational Reindustrialization:  An Economic 
Development Agenda for Detroit represented the organization’s answer to economic crisis and 
liberal urban redevelopment. The product of DARE’s Institute for Urban Policy Research, 
Rational Reindustrialization exemplified the organization’s most comprehensive vision of local 
economic democracy. Russell’s and Luria’s document offered a critique of Coleman Young’s 
and Detroit Renaissance, Inc.’s “Renaissance.” Russell and Luria also critiqued fundamental 
understandings of the market in the U.S. political economy. Arguing against notions that markets 
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are self-regulating and thus the government’s only role is to remove barriers to free trade, they 
advocated for government intervention on the behalf of workers. Additionally, and most 
importantly, they envisioned several aspects of DARE’s rational economic development 
supporting “radically increased” government activity in the economy—democratically collective 
planning of the local economy, social control of investment, and mass production for social 
needs.122 Plant conversion represented Russell’s and Luria’s primary strategy to achieve the goal 
of rehabilitating the city’s job market and creating a public enterprise sector. The authors 
imagined ‘rational reindustrialization’ as a route to remaking Detroit into a post-automobile 
manufacturing city during the 1980s. They also envisioned rational reindustrialization as a 
potential model for the redevelopment of Rustbelt cities. 
 DARE members Dan Luria and Jack Russell wrote Rational Reindustrialization. Russell, 
like Murphy, Ravitz, and Cockrel, involved himself in the city’s radical left after the 1967 
uprising. Russell worked with the predominately-white left organization, From the Ground Up in 
the midst of the local movement against police brutality during the early 1970s.123 During the 
mid-1970s, Russell emerged as Cockrel’s closest political and economic advisor. He, along with 
Murphy, helped develop Cockrel’s campaign strategy. Luria also cut his teeth politically in the 
1960s new left. He worked with the local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society. He 
joined those new leftists who went into the factories to revitalize the labor movement. As a 
trained economist, Luria worked as a researcher in the UAW, making him one of the few labor 
union members who worked closely with DARE.  
Rational Reindustrialization represented DARE’s contribution to the national policy 
conversation around reindustrialization. Various observers, scholars, and policymakers advanced 
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liberal and conservative solutions to deindustrialization. In June 1980, Business Week released its 
special issue on reindustrialization, The Reindustrialization of America. The editors argued for a 
new “social contract between business, labor, government, and minorities” that would rekindle 
the U.S.’s economy. The editors favored economic development uninhibited by regulation and 
argued against “specific,” or targeted, government planning of the economy. 124  
President Jimmy Carter’s Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties published 
its report the same year as DARE released Rational Reindustrialization. Regarding the political 
economy of cities, the Commission maintained that cities were “economic entities; first and 
foremost they are the settings where great wealth is produced and distributed.” Sociologist 
Richard Child Hill elaborated on the notion of “capitalist cities” in his work. According to Hill, 
they serve as exclusive cites for capital accumulation and “a locale for the reproduction of the 
labor force, a market for the circulation of commodities and the realization of profit, and a center 
where these complex relationships are coordinated and controlled.” The Commission also argued 
for a “rational” approach to managing the economy. However, the commission focused on 
reducing deficits and inflation as means to rehabilitating the economy.125 DARE’s rational 
reindustrialization fundamentally challenged the report’s argument that cities facilitated growth 
in the U.S. capitalist political economy.  
Felix Rohatyn, an investment banker and chairman of the Municipal Association 
Corporation (MAC) of New York also emerged as a prominent voice in the “reindustrialization” 
debate. He criticized Carter’s Commission’s lack of a racial analysis in urban affairs in a 
testimony to the House subcommittee on economic stabilization, revitalization, and the economy. 
Rohatyn asked the committee:  "is it realistic for a Commission reporting on our so-called urban 
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problems not to face up directly to the fact that urban problems cannot be discussed separately 
from race problems, and that the notion of 'taking the people to the jobs' completely overlooks 
the basic fact that that is not a viable possibility for many of those people in large parts of this 
country?"126 
 Rohatyn articulated a liberal answer to deindustrialization. Rohatyn published 
“Reconstructing America,” in the New York Review of Books the same month DARE published 
Rational Reindustrialization. In “Reconstructing America,” Rohatyn argued for the resurrection 
of a New Deal institution—the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). According to 
Rohatyn, the RFC would provide equity capital to failing corporations as opposed to the loan 
guarantee that Congress awarded the Chrysler Corporation the year before. The federal 
government would also charge the RFC to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure as well. Rohatyn 
even accepted the use of private-public partnerships, “geared mostly to business enterprise.”127  
Coleman Young enlisted Rohatyn’s and his firm’s assistance in dealing with the city’s 
fiscal crisis in 1981. The city was on the precipice of financial disaster. Young faced a $35 
million budget when he took office.128 As a result, Young became one of the most austere 
mayors in the city’s history. He laid off hundreds of city employees and renegotiated labor 
contracts. In 1975, Young enlisted members of his liberal-corporate-labor coalition, including 
Pelham and then UAW Vice President Doug Fraser, to serve on a financial task force that would 
analyze the city’s budget and identify savings.129 Fraser and Pelham suggested tax increases on 
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income, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages.130 The recession, auto crisis, and another round of 
energy shocks also exacerbated the city’s financial troubles.   
In 1981, the city faced a mounting deficit that would reach $135 million by June.131 
Creditors lowered the city’s rating from Baa to Ba.132 Young appointed another group—the 
Budget Planning and Stabilization committee—comprising various leaders in business, 
organized labor, and finance including the UAW, Ford Motor Company, Detroit Edison, and the 
National Bank of Detroit.133 The Committee released its report on March 11, 1981.  They 
outlined a strategy that mixed of tax increases and austerity. It called for the city to raise the 
income tax by 1%. It called for implementing a 2 to 3 percent tax cut for city residents and a one-
half to 1 ½ percent commuter tax.134 The UAW joined with auto companies and banks to provide 
more than $400,000 to a public campaign supporting Young’s effort while AFSCME and the 
AFL-CIO started an oppositional effort. 135  
In a June speech to the Detroit Economic Club, Rohatyn admitted that Detroit’s and New 
York City’s cases were not similar. He stated that Detroit did not suffer from indebtedness 
stemming from “poor financial management, weak mayoral leadership, failure to face problems, 
and lack of co-operation among business, labor and government.136 He argued that Detroit 
suffered from more structural problems. After praising Young’s program to deal with the deficit, 
he turned to national politics. He criticized the Chrysler bailout, calling it an “example of how 
not to do it,” since such an effort required more equity capital that only a renewed 
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Reconstruction Finance Corporation could provide. Rohatyn called for a “second industrial 
revolution,” which entailed federal policy that would help restructure the nation’s industrial base, 
especially in cities experiencing capital flight and obsolescence.137  
DARE’s plan for reindustrialization represented a leftist response to deindustrialization 
and the city’s decade of fiscal turbulence. The organization favored more government and citizen 
planning and control over the economy. They also believed that the economy should benefit the 
city’s residents more than particular corporations and individual capitalists. Business Week, 
Carter’s Commission, and Rohatyn also proposed national solutions while DARE’s conception 
of rational reindustrialization represented a local solution that other cities could adopt. 
DARE released their rational reindustrialization plan several months after Ronald Reagan 
took office. His entrance into the White House represented a key victory for the nation’s 
conservative movement. Reagan aimed to make good on his campaign promises to reorient the 
federal government’s relationship to states and cities, cut taxes, and drastically slash the federal 
budget. Reagan’s tax cuts formed the centerpiece of his economic policy grounded in the theory 
of supply-side economics, also known as “Reaganomics.” The logic behind Reaganomics was 
that it was necessary to relieve the country’s top earners of their tax burden to restore and 
generate economic growth. Consequently, those Americans on the lower rungs of the economic 
ladder would benefit indirectly from the top earner’s investment in the economy.138 Reagan’s 
federalism entailed encouraging states and cities to become more entrepreneurial and financially 
self-sufficient. Reagan’s pursuit of new federalism and smaller government negatively affected 
urban and social policy. Theoretically, Reagan’s policies revolved around free market principles 
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of privatization, competition, and self-reliance. In reality, they amounted to an assault on the 
welfare state and caused an increased financial stress on states, cities, and poorer Americans. 
Reagan also supported Republican Jack Kemp’s and Democrat Robert Garcia’s concept 
of free enterprise zones as a basis for urban policy. Passed in 1981, the Urban Jobs and 
Enterprise Zone Act in 198 encouraged cities to designate dilapidated areas in cities to be 
redeveloped. Local leaders would reduce property taxes for private sector development in those 
designated areas for a period of time. These zones emphasized competing with other cities to 
achieve and maintain economic growth and creating free enterprise zones whereby local 
governments would entice business investment by offering them tax breaks.139 While Luria and 
Russell criticized Reaganomics, they sought to appropriate the concept of free enterprise zones 
for progressive purposes as a matter of pragmatism.  
To set up their argument for rational reindustrialization in Detroit, the authors challenged 
the concept of laissez faire capitalism that had gained popularity with Reagan’s election. Russell 
and Luria disputed any notion that U.S. market capitalism was self-correcting and that 
government regulation was “the problem.”140 The authors wrote, “There is, moreover, no self-
correcting process by which urban disinvestment creates the conditions necessary for expanded 
reinvestment of the kind and on the scale required.”141 Another belief regarding the notion that 
U.S. capitalism regulated itself was the implication that once capital left, other private firms 
would absorb the unemployed labor in a manner that utilized their skills. In contrast, Russell and 
Luria argued that “no workable programs from inducing privately-financed economic 
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development” existed. If the private sector could not replace lost industrial jobs, then could local 
city governments fulfill this role? For Russell and Luria, the answer to this question was no—at 
least not as long as city governments continued to serve as protectorates of private capital within 
the U.S. political economy.  
Russell and Luria also contested the prevailing method of urban development which 
preserved the idea that the city’ government’s role in the U.S. political economy is to aid 
business and create a positive climate for private investment:  “…we dispute the value of using 
government as a tool to ‘improve the business climate’ in pursuit of chancy rewards…” This 
criticism extended to the business-dominated public-private partnership known as the city’s 
renaissance. The authors argued that the real purpose of urban development was not to benefit 
the city’s workers, but “protect the value of existing investments and future profit opportunities 
in the downtown hub.”142 Russell and Luria viewed the model of downtown development and its 
emphasis on attracting professional employment as essentially flawed due to the city’s 
geography as well:  
The grand designs for the future development of downtown Detroit are based upon the 
questionable belief that many thousands of salaried professionals and managers can be 
induced to settle there with their families. Some will surely be attracted to the amenities of the 
river and the hub, but with Detroit’s extraordinary upper-middle-class home bargains and the 
comfortable, secure suburbs just minutes away by freeway, we believe the downtown 
Renaissance may well abort. Given the high risk, the developers’ current terms, the narrow 
strata of the population served, and the limited impact on the local economy, we do not 
believe that the downtown strategy should have priority claims on the City’s precious 
economic development resources.143 
 
This model of development, the declared, “would not meet the needs of working class Detroit.” 
The authors stated that the Riverfront West apartments, the Trolley Plaza building, and other 
“contemplated residential developments” would not account for the thousands of jobs lost in the 
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city due to plant closings. They also estimated that the “proposed Detroit Hilton might contribute 
1,000” jobs while the Cadillac Center, “if ever built, and would add at most 2,000 new jobs to 
the Detroit economy.” They understood that the high end development that Young and his 
coalition pursued could not offer a panacea for the city’s job loss and chronic unemployment. 
Luria and Russell contended “it is a fantasy to hope that hotels, a shopping center, some office 
buildings, and the service needs of wealthy condominium owners will be able to employ the 
workers, and the children of workers, who have been discharged from our closed factories.”144 
Luria’s and Russell’s criticism of downtown commercial development highlights this form of 
development’s preference for, and reliance on, upper-middle-class gentrification of areas that the 
city and the business leaders targeted for development. It also implies that the private-public 
partnership, or the use of government funds to subsidize private development, relied upon 
“trickle down” logic. Presumably, the wealth generated by downtown development and the 
employment and settlement of white collar professionals in the city would extend to the city’s 
workers and neighborhoods.  
Luria’s and Russell’s Rational Reindustrialization is best understood as an elaboration of 
DARE’s advocacy of plant conversion and conservation in their pamphlet criticizing the 1980 
Chrysler bailout. Plant conversion served as the conceptual centerpiece for the author’s agenda 
for building of Detroit’s post-automobile economy. They asserted, “a rational economic 
development agenda must be centered on replacing the declining private activities of the city—
auto assembly, parts, and machining—with new activities that take maximum advantage of the 
existing industrial linkages.”145  Although the authors offered a list of potential products in 
“Chrysler, the People, and the City,” they placed greater emphasis on a potential set of criteria 
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for the city’s workers to use when deciding which products to produce. Elements of their 
criterion included the “scale of job creation,” “conservation of capital,” “local economic impact,” 
“characteristics of markets,” the city’s “comparative advantage,” “market countercyclicality,” 
labor cost, transport costs, “advantage of publicness,” and “profitability for entry.”146 But the 
overriding question guiding this process, according to Russell and Luria, should be which 
projects could absorb the most surplus-labor in a manner that best retained their “accustomed” 
wages and corresponded to, or presumably built upon, their existing job skills and training? The 
second important question concerning their advocacy for the reuse of abandoned plants and the 
city’s other resources—what projects could take advantage of the “area’s concentration of 
metalworking capital stock…and of the city’s deep waterway location” to produce “products for 
a growing, undersupplied, long-lived national and international market for which the business 
cycle is either absent or opposite to the auto/auto parts demand cycle.”147 They recognized four 
potential product lines that met the first eight criterions and satisfied the two aforementioned 
questions, “deep natural gas and heavy oil production, residential and industrial steam/electric 
cogeneration units, large coal- and diesel fuel-fired industrial process engines, and mine-mouth 
coal gasifiers.” They also identified key areas of production that addressed national concerns 
about energy and speculated about the development of a regional economy based upon the 
production of mass transit goods. Again, Russell and Luria imagined this production sector as 
one that supported their idea of Detroit as the post-“Motor City.”148 
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In addition to providing recommendations for what products the city’s workers should 
produce, Russell and Luria submitted guidelines for how the city and its residents should decide 
the fate of the city’s corporations. This is an important aspect of their agenda since the two 
authors opposed “unplanned, socially wasteful, and privately controlled movement” of capital.149 
The authors advocated “picking the winners,” a concept that Business Week, Carter’s 
Commission, and Rohatyn all opposed. They called for a socially conscious cost-benefit analysis 
when considering the closing and opening of plants. They further claimed owners of firms based 
their decisions to close plants solely upon their profitability. Instead, planners in Russell’s and 
Luria’s vision of the economy would consider the “social costs” such as unemployment benefits, 
increase of the tax burden on the residents, and policing.150 According to the authors, it was 
possible to ascertain whether or not a plant was socially beneficial by comparing the firm’s profit 
rate to the estimated financial impact closure would have on the city. This approach also 
considered the position of the particular firm in the local economy. Was the firm non-profitable 
yet intertwined with other firms inside and outside the city limits? While Russell and Luria 
assumed that private firms would flee the city in the event they recognized their inability to 
expand and accumulate wealth, they suggested that firms may be encouraged to keep their doors 
open for work if the city subsidizes their losses. If the city successfully brokered this type of 
arrangement with a private firm, it could stem the tide of disinvestment and capital flight. 
However, the authors failed to consider whether or not this approach would lead to the growth of 
the private firm, which would probably remain a crucial factor in any firm’s decision to close 
and/or move. This stance reinforced DARE’s stance that private firms should be beholden to the 
city and the workers who help to generate wealth. However, this sort of arrangement between 
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private capital, workers, and the city government would require the agents of capital to buy into a 
more mixed, or even less capitalist, economic system, one that replaces the desire for profit and 
economic growth with greater sustainability of labor, city government, and the firms themselves.  
The desire to convert abandoned plants and enter into presumably burgeoning markets 
did not represent the main objective of rational reindustrialization. Luria and Russell envisioned 
reconstituted plants as components of a public enterprise sector in Detroit. Again, the authors 
advocated for greater city government involvement and worker power in determining the 
direction of economic development:  “We have looked to local government to take the lead in 
initiating a continually bargained economic development plan in which workers and government 
join private enterprise as co-planners in the realm of production.”151 They argued that worker 
participation was crucial if they hoped to implement the plan:  “However, since many of the 
valuable industrial linkages we seek to protect from disinvestment exist in a metropolitan web of 
agglomerated interdependence, a higher level of working class cooperation on a metropolitan 
scale will be necessary. The workers of Warren and Detroit will have to join forces to protect 
their futures if their respective local governments are to help coordinate what should ultimately 
be a regional development plan.”152 In essence, the authors saw the process of urban 
development, especially one where workers and the government would play crucial roles, as 
inherently political. While making the case to stem plant closings and create worker-owned and 
–planned firms, workers and political allies would have to build political support in the city. If 
workers and their political allies were successful, the construction of this sector and the 
implementation of rational reindustrialization, would unfold in four phases—the pilot project 
phase, the mixed enterprise zone phase, and the mature plan phase. 
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For the authors, the first phase—the pilot project—represented the initial effort to reopen 
a closing plant. Russell and Luria envisioned workers possessing a crucial role in establishing 
decision-making power. “The objective in this phase is to reopen the facility as an enterprise in 
which the workers and community hold equity and thus can participate in bargained planning of 
the new company’s development. The product line of the new venture would be based on the 
criteria, and probably selected from among the examples, we have described” they explained.153 
To build a case for worker-ownership and working-class political capacity, advocates of rational 
reindustrialization would have to conduct what the authors called a “feasibility study,” which 
would outline a business plan documenting “the product line’s current and future market,” 
“current production technology, costs, and anticipated improvements,” “financing options,” “the 
forms of corporate governance and management structure suited to the purpose of the 
participants,” and “how to best accommodate existing or pending state law and regulations.” 154 
Russell and Luria proposed that union workers would also handle the “production, marketing, 
planning and the other traditional aspects of enterprise as a for-profit business.” The realization 
of worker ownership would manifest itself through an employee stock ownership plan 
(ESOP).155 
The city government played a greater role in Russell’s and Luria’s outline of the mixed 
enterprise zone phase. While the authors criticized the free market principles embedded in 
Reagan’s new federalism and urban policy, the concept of rational reindustrialization 
appropriated the free enterprise zone concept for their own purposes. Nodding to the concept, the 
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author’s envisioned a mixed economy comprising of both private and public enterprises.156 They 
contended that “Rational Reindustrialization can be attempted in a single large industrial tract of 
Detroit” once the problems of downtown development became apparent. Consequently, they 
state, “Local government would nurture the potential linkages among a substantial number of 
both traditional private and pilot project firms in the tract.”157 Similar to the national bill, the 
authors would accept that the local government provides incentives for firms within zones 
including tax cuts, “the provision of better services, and reduced governmental red tape.” In 
exchange for these benefits, local governments would request that private firms “provide jobs, 
training, and technical assistance to workers and residents in the zone.”158 Offering jobs and 
training would be a requirement for private firms to enjoy the benefits of a mixed enterprise 
zone.159 
Unlike their discussions of the first two phases of rational reindustrialization, the authors 
did not offer an exact vision of what the mature phase would look like. They did provide an 
estimation of the cost to produce 100,000 jobs—$4 billion.160 The authors speculated that capital 
investment would come from various sources. They looked to corporate owners to transfer 
unused capital to community corporations. Luria and Russell contended that the federal 
government’s UDAG program would play a role in the investment in the sectors’ operating 
companies. They envisioned the federal government, such as the U.S. Department of 
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Commerce’s Economic Development Administration, providing funds for Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOP). Luria and Russell also envisioned a combination of private investors 
and institutions like churches to also contribute resources. The authors’ plan for securing capital 
investment presumed a new social contract between governments, private entrepreneurs, 
workers, and citizens. However, unlike Business Week’s “new social contract,” DARE’s allowed 
for more direct citizen and government planning.161 The question Russell and Luria left open, 
however, was what incentive would private investors have to participate in such an economy? 
The authors also discussed the prospects of instituting rational reindustrialization during 
the emerging era of Reaganism. One could speculate that a mature phase of rational 
reindustrialization would encapsulate Detroit’s entire economy. The city’s new economy would 
be much more diversified and the firms would be greatly connected to each other, the city 
government, and the neighborhoods. Workers, union members, and the city’s citizenry would 
enjoy greater decision-making power in the economy; they would decide which products to 
produce and they would ultimately decide the fates of the city’s firms. Workers, political 
officials, and other investors would make these decisions based upon a socially conscious cost-
benefit analysis that would privilege the city’s residents’ interests. The workers would have a 
greater influence in defining the public interest rather than corporate capital and political allies, 
or politicians and their corporate allies. 
The authors identified various structural barriers to the implementation of rational 
reindustrialization in Detroit. First, they acknowledged that Michigan law prohibited government 
from owning shares in private companies or establishing state-owned and ran banks. State law 
also prohibited the use of public and private employee pension funds to put towards 
reindustrialization efforts. Russell and Luria also cited investment and political culture as 
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possible obstacles as well. They recognized it would be tough to acquire federal resources during 
Reagan’s presidency. The authors also recognized that private investors might well shy away 
from investing in public corporations especially if they have “unusual ownership and 
management structures” and “when they neither have a track record nor the investment tax 
advantages of established, profitable corporations.” The authors also cited the potential land 
clearance issues due to the age of many of the city’s abandoned plants.162 Russell’s and Luria’s 
discussion of the structural impediments to instituting rational reindustrialization points to the 
problem of how to implement such a radical policy.  
Russell and Luria maintained that rational economic policy represented a plan for 
reindustrialization that would only be implemented if DARE, and other likeminded activists and 
organizations, were able to organize and gain political power.  They knew that workers would 
have to challenge to challenge the current political and economic arrangements that governed 
Detroit and the United States. They argued that “Reagan and the free market troglodytes who 
shape his public policies must go” for Rational Reindustrialization to have a chance to work. 
Ultimately, Russell and Luria declared that “left and progressive forces in America” would have 
to construct a “national social-democratic movement with clear objectives.”163 
Luria’s and Russell’s Rational Reindustrialization provoked critical leftist responses. 
Labor activist and writer David McCullough reviewed Rational Reindustrialization in the April 
1981 issue of Socialist Monthly Changes. He identified several positive aspects of rational 
reindustrialization. First, he saw rational reindustrialization as a possible leftist alternative to 
what he called “Rohatynism.” While McCullough argued that Rohatyn was winning the debate, 
McCullough argued that rational reindustrialization was “an initiative that a broad section of 
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people could be rallied to.”164 Luria and Russell called for a progressive version of “rational” 
planning that placed the creation of jobs over that of increasing and maintaining profits. 
McCullough states, “Planning is for a purpose.” “The main purpose of the plan detailed in RR 
[Rational Reindustrialization] is to provide jobs for Detroiters. However, the purpose of ordinary 
capitalist planning is to produce and maximize profits,” McCullough continued.165 McCullough’s 
second and third reasons are related. Rational reindustrialization calls for the city government, 
residents, and workers to utilize available unused capital and reorient production towards a 
“socially attractive product line.”166  
While McCullough identified rational reindustrialization as a possible alternative to the 
Rohatyn plan, he also identified key shortcomings in Luria’s and Russell’s concept that reflected 
a problem in 1970s progressive economic thought. First, Luria’s and Russell’s plan, according to 
McCullough, failed to discard with the profit motive. Also, McCullough argued that the author’s 
criteria for product selection would not push for a progressive reorienting of the economy. In 
other words, rational reindustrialization may not advocate for conversion towards a peace, rather 
than defense-based, economy. McCullough’s critique also posed an important question:  Who 
actually possesses power in such an economic arrangement, especially if the private sector were 
to hand over a portion of startup capital?  Would workers and the city really hold power? Luria 
and Russell took issue with McCullough’s characterization of rational reindustrialization as an 
expression of a “classless”—lack of class consciousness and conflict—view of progressive 
economics. McCullough interpreted rational reindustrialization as a new arrangement between 
the city, industry, and private industry, which tapered over “conflicting interests.” Rational 
                                                 
164 David McCullough, “Planning a Future for Detroit:  A Case of Rationality Versus Power,” Socialist Monthly 
Changes (April 1982), 20.  
165 McCullough, 19.  
166 Ibid., 20. Italics by author.  
329 
 
reindustrialization, McCullough stated, also represented a technocratic and pragmatic plan that 
abandoned organized labor’s “unconditional defense of jobs and wages.”167  
In addition to arguing that rational reindustrialization represented a move toward the right 
because the plan did not really challenge private sector power, nor capitalism, McCullough 
advanced a point that other critics of rational reindustrialization articulated:  Luria’s and 
Russell’s economic plan would be unnecessary if robust and powerful labor unions existed to 
challenge corporations:   
Joint labor/capital enterprises are gains for labor only where labor has real bargaining power 
to force the content of labor in its own favor. But unless one sees economic conditions as acts 
of God which one can respond to but not control, it has been exactly labor’s weakness in the 
U.S., its inability to defend both jobs and wages, which has led to the impasse that RR was 
written to lead us out of. This point is crucial, so I will state it again in another way. If the 
U.S. labor movement was as combative and politically well-organized as the Italian labor 
movement in the “Red Triangle” where Bologna is located, we simply would not need ideas 
like RR’s scaled-down state capitalism.168 
 
Of course, McCullough did not blame Luria and Russell for the political context in which the 
authors developed rational reindustrialization. He points out how, as with OPIC’s call to shift 
plant location decisions from the collective bargaining process to the electoral arena, rational 
reindustrialization was a response to the diminishing power of organized labor.  To McCullough, 
DARE activists such as Luria and Russell, should work on rebuilding the labor movement and 
then reorienting towards a pursuit of controlling capital in addition to defending jobs and wages.  
 The Progressive published a forum on Luria’s and Russell’s rational reindustrialization in 
its July 1982 issue. Scholars from various disciplines including political scientists and 
economists as well as activists weighed in on rational reindustrialization. A majority of the 
analysts criticized the concept for its infeasibility. Reviewers Jeanie Wylie and Lawrence Walsh 
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contextualized the debate and the document in an analysis of Detroit’s political economy, 
national conversations about reindustrialization, and interviews from Luria and Russell. 
 Wylie and Walsh, as well as labor attorney Deborah Groban Olson and economist James 
Crotty supported Luria’s and Russell’s efforts. Even if the feasibility of rational 
reindustrialization remained up for debate, the three thought Luria and Russell offered what they 
considered much-needed leftist alternatives in national debates about reindustrialization during 
the early 1980s. “While Rational Reindustrialization neither accomplishes the revolution nor 
necessarily increases worker control of the workplace,” Wylie and Walsh state, “its programs 
warrant review.”169 Olson thought rational reindustrialization would support the concept of 
employee ownership.170 Crotty issued the strongest support for rational reindustrialization in The 
Progressive forum. He called the plan “a technically solid model” and it illustrated that the left 
could devise and articulate a detailed alternative to “both Reaganomics and Felix Rohatyn’s Big 
Brother corporatist state.”171  
 Criticisms of rational reindustrialization from the left centered on questions regarding its 
feasibility, source of start-up capital, and the lack of political power needed to create the 
conditions to implement such a plan. Labor journalist Jane Slaughter saw rational 
reindustrialization as a bad deal for workers and wondered skeptically if business would invest in 
the plan. “They can get a much more beneficial, Reagan-type free enterprise zone, and continue 
to wipe their feet on the likes of the United Auto Workers,” Slaughter wrote.172 Political Scientist 
Alfred J. Watkins focused on the question of source of start-up capital. “The crux of the problem 
is financing,” Watkins declared. Watkins, like Slaughter, argued that the incentive for business to 
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invest in rational reindustrialization did not exist, especially since firms could move to the South 
to participate in the energy hardware business.173 Calling rational reindustrialization “a blueprint 
for make believe,” UAW Local 160 member Pete Kelly saw Russell and Luria’s plan as 
fundamentally flawed because “it is purely utopian to advance quasi-socialist notions of 
industrial development within the framework of free enterprise.” Similarly to Slaughter’s stance 
on rational reindustrialization, Kelly argued that DARE’s plan would not help workers since it 
was “structured from the top down.”174  
 Crotty, Watkins, and Slaughter all agreed that the problem with rational 
reindustrialization extended beyond planning and the source of capital. The problem lays in the 
lack of leftist political power and the declining labor movement. Crotty maintained, “The major 
obstacle to the creation of democratic, local reindustrialization projects, therefore, is not their 
economic infeasibility but the lack of sufficient political power to get the job done.”175 Watkins 
appropriates the “better business climate” rhetoric to argue that the left could not implement such 
a plan unless the labor movement could organize in right-to-work regions like the South. “In 
short, Detroit will probably never have progressive, rational reindustrialization until the 
‘working-class climate’ in Texas and other low-wage havens improves.” Slaughter argued the 
strongest for focusing on organizing a more robust labor movement. She saw little value in trying 
to establish any sort of labor-management accord. Slaughter declared, “I would argue that the 
only chance for the creation of decent jobs in the 1980s and 1990s is a labor-led movement 
which is politically independent of the employers, not in coalition with them.” Such a movement 
would advocate for one of DARE’s key principles such as control over investment as well as 
“nationalization” and “direct government planning.” “And,” Slaughter declares, “that requires a 
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labor movement which is not, in The Progressive’s words, ‘content to be the limp tail on the 
Democratic Party donkey.’”176   
Young and city government and the UAW did not respond to rational reindustrialization. 
Luria’s and Russell’s program did pique some of the city’s economic and political leaders’ 
interests. Luria and Russell presented their plan to the city council in March 1982. They even 
earned a presentation to the members of one of the city’s economic development organizations, 
the Business Attraction and Expansion Council, which ironic outcome DARE and Cockrel spent 
considerable effort criticizing the city’s private-public development institutions.177  
 
Poletown:  Another Missed Organizing Opportunity? 
Coleman Young’s maneuvers to convince General Motors to construct its Central 
Industrial Park and the Detroit-Hamtramck Assembly Center in the Poletown neighborhood 
served as another aspect of the administration’s industrial policy and was one of the most 
controversial projects. It also served as another missed organizing opportunity for DARE. Young 
estimated that the construction of the GM plant would create 6,000 jobs. However, this was 
generous as the plant only ran one shift, at a little half of the projected number of positions. The 
proposed cite spanned 465 acres and it would require the city (corporation) to clear more than 
1,100 buildings and to relocate more than 3,400 residents. As planning scholar June Manning 
Thomas remarks, “This was no ordinary site. People, houses, businesses, churches, 
manufacturing firms, and a hospital occupied much of it.”178  
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DARE commented on the plan in their newsletter. Jack Russell advanced a neutral 
analysis. “The city is between a rock and a hard place. Six thousand high-wage industrial jobs, 
thousands of jobs at smaller shops which would provide supplies to the big plant and $12 to $18 
million that would be generated in annual property tax revenues, all are desperately needed by 
Detroit,” Russell wrote. However, he also recognized the “staggering” human costs of the 
development.179  This was one of the few times the organization sort of found itself on the same 
side as Young when it came to development. DARE appeared ambivalent because of the 
potential stimulus that it could provide the city.  
The Poletown case appeared to present a dilemma for the organization. DARE seemed to 
support the idea of the project creating more industrial jobs. However, they recognized the 
human costs of Young’s and GM’s destruction strategy. DARE had no clear socialist answer for 
eminent domain. Russell appeared to pose a question about how such a construction proposal 
play out in a city grounded in a “rational” socialist politics. He posed a question, “What 
responsibilities are created for progressives?” His answers were consistent with the 
organization’s views of development underscoring corporate responsibility and community 
input—“Insist that GM produce a written, unconditional guarantee that they will locate the plant 
in Detroit if the site is prepared for them. Minimize city financing of the project. Fight to insure 
that tax benefits of the plant to Detroit not be delayed through abatement or tax increment 
financing. Demand municipal equity in the plant, and municipal representation in GM decisions 
which will effect Detroit in the future.” However, Russell neglected to say anything about all of 
the residents, workers, and institutions that would be affected by the facilities’ construction. 
While one could speculate that somehow Poletown residents would incur some sort of benefits 
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from owning a stake in the plant, DARE did not say how.180 The organization did not join with 
the Poletown Neighborhood Council to mount any response. Members of the Poletown 
Neighborhood Council wrote a letter to all of the city council members asking for their 
support.181 Cockrel voted the lone “no” on the project.182  
 
Conclusion  
As Kenneth Cockrel struggled to mount a substantive opposition to Coleman Young and 
his redevelopment agenda, DARE’s membership sank. Black membership declined by 40% 
between the end of the Chrysler forum and the organization’s dissolution in June 1981. In many 
ways, DARE’s Chrysler conference spelled the downfall for the organization. Only 130 people 
attended the conference, many of them committed leftists.183  But it was Cockrel’s decision not 
to run for reelection in 1981 that prompted DARE to disband, even as group members continued 
to promote the organization’s rational reindustrialization policy.  Cockrel’s decision and the 
resulting disintegration of DARE suggest that the problem for the left in Detroit was not one of 
an inability to generate policy alternatives as historians like Van Gosse have suggested. The 
problem lay in the failure to develop a sustainable coalition that could incorporate leftists, black 
workers, and segments of organized labor around the city’s economic crisis. DARE struggled to 
build political power in a city where the liberal growth coalition enjoyed support from a broad 
coalition of black voters, organized labor, and corporate leaders. 
The formation of DARE in 1978 represented the culmination of left-wing progressive 
politics that stretched back to the left-wing Anti-STRESS coalition. DARE’s leadership drew 
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from their past experiences to construct a political strategy based on a mix of social movement 
and electoral approaches. They envisioned DARE as a local multiracial left organization that 
could help to forge a nationwide movement to reconstruct a more sustainable economy on more 
democratic principles. The organization responded to the economic turbulence, the restructuring 
of Detroit’s, U.S.’s, and the world’s political economies by developing critiques of liberal 
economic development and constructing an alternative vision of urban political economy.  It 
criticized Mayor Young for relying on the public-private partnership model and growth 
liberalism for urban development. Instead of Young’s brand of the public-private partnership and 
corporate bailouts, DARE argued for rational reindustrialization, or as the name of the 
organization connoted, a “rational economy.” DARE advocated a mix of market and municipal 
socialism that included worker and community control of economic and urban planning and 
industrial plants.184 
DARE’s critique of Young’s model of economic development illustrated how black 
mayors governed in the service of private capital. Young’s absorption into the New Detroit, Inc. 
and Detroit Renaissance, Inc. structure illustrates the political incorporation of African 
Americans into urban politics after 1965. However, Young also sought to hold the federal 
government accountable for its culpability in the decline of Rustbelt cities during this period. it 
remains difficult to assert that Young’s example of urban liberalism, in fact, stood in the way of 
structural reform at the end of the 1970s considering the constraints that Young and other big 
city mayors faced.  
DARE aimed to transform Detroit’s economy by building political support to forge a 
local public sector economy comprising of a mixture of publicly- and privately-owned firms that 
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would be more accountable to the city’s workers and voters. DARE leadership, however, 
recognized the necessity of building a political movement that could usher in that transformation 
by organizing on a local level to elect more likeminded city council-people and eventually a 
mayor, organizing on a state level to amend Michigan’s constitution to allow state and city 
government to explore more ways of generating revenue, and by organizing on a national level to 
elect allies to Congress and even a sympathetic President committed to implementing aspects of 
rational reindustrialization on a national scale.  
And yet DARE’s implementation of its politics exhibited several shortcomings. Most 
importantly, the organization failed to capitalize on potential political opportunities and failed 
advance a racial analysis of the Chrysler crisis.  Moreover, DARE’s response to Coleman 
Young’s and GM’s Poletown plan suggests that the organization may have been too committed 
to industrial development.  By forging a relationship with the Poletown Neighborhood Council 
and siding with Poletown’s residents, DARE may have been able to significantly strengthen its 
anti-capitalist reindustrialization coalition. Since DARE struggled to make inroads with the city’s 
black workers, making inroads in Poletown could have revitalized the organization. Such an 
effort would have at least sharpened the group’s economic outlook. But instead, DARE failed to 
mount any signification opposition to Young and GM’s plan to demolish a whole neighborhood 
for the sake of industrial development. 
Still, DARE’s criticisms of Chrysler operating as a weapon against the city’s workers 
would prove prescient. While the Chrysler Corporation endured, the city of Detroit and many of 
the corporation’s workers did not survive the bailout. Chrysler employed 102,389 workers 
throughout the U.S. in 1979. In 1981, Chrysler’s employment dropped by 30.3%. Austerity and 
layoffs hit black workers hard. African Americans held 33.6% of the corporation’s jobs in 1975 
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and only 27.8% in 1981. In 1980, Chrysler operated thirty-eight U.S. plants, twenty-two of them 
located in the Detroit area. Chrysler subsequently closed fifteen U.S. plants, twelve of them in 
Detroit and the number of Chrysler employees in the Detroit area fell by 26.6% between 1980 
and 1982.  Despite Young’s effort, the Chrysler crisis provoked the corporation to slim down its 
domestic production, leaving the city of Detroit with more abandoned plants, higher 
unemployment, and decreasing tax revenues. 
DARE’s response to the Chrysler bailout also suggests larger questions about leftist and 
labor politics during the 1970s. How does one organize against the emerging logic of austerity 
contained in federal-sponsored loan guarantees? Whether one points to the New York City fiscal 
crisis, or Chrysler’s 1979 failure, lawmakers, and eventually taxpayers, expected workers to “pay 
their share” for its institution’s financial failures. Bailout packages required workers to take pay 
freezes, pension cuts, and lose jobs and benefits.  
Analyzing DARE’s emergence and fall raises important questions about left-wing 
progressive politics during the 1970s. One could argue that DARE would have still been able to 
organize conferences, produce analyses of Detroit’s political economy and forge networks 
among leftist politicians and organizations outside of the city without an electoral strategy. Yet, 
via Cockrel’s seat on the city council seat gave DARE access to municipal power, provided the 
organization with a direct line to the Young administration, and enabled it to provoke debates 
about urban development that may not have occurred otherwise. DARE defended electoral 
politics as a strategy. However, members remained ambivalent about whether or not electoralism 
could actually challenge capitalists. Cockrel asked in an interview: "I say no tax breaks for the 
millionaires—what do I do when capital goes on strike? What do I do when investors say hey 
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man fuck you, as they told Dennis Kucinich?”185  Jack Russell echoed Cockrel’s questions a 
month later: 
If we do, what are the real limits that would be faced by socialists in power in the local 
situation, by having to exist in a capitalist economy, where investment is still largely privately 
controlled, where one operates within a federal political system presumably still dominated by 
bourgeois politics, where the state of the national Left's development is an imponderable (with 
perhaps no reason for great optimism). What would our relationship be to the local business 
community? Would capital go on further strike against the city of Detroit?186 
 
Cockrel’s questions about the efficacy of socialist, or even black, control of political institutions 
points to an ambivalence that comes out of a context where a self-proclaimed urban populist—
Dennis Kucinich—lost his job as mayor in 1978 over refusing to privatize Cleveland’s publicly-
owned light plant, MUNY Light, in exchange for the credit that Cleveland needed to avert its 
financial crisis.187  Cockrel and Russell’s comments also arose from their own experience 
struggling against a mayor whom considered himself liberal and also sought to solve social 
problems of poverty, unemployment, and crime, but accepted the reality that private capital 
would play a large role in revitalizing Detroit. The organization’s inability to develop substantial 
political opposition to the liberal coalition’s growth-based redevelopment plans is testament to 
Young’s political strength. Conversely, Coleman Young’s dependence on private developers and 
business leaders on their terms reflected the economic and political realities of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. It leads one to ask, what was it about the political realities of the late-1970s and 
early-1980s that explains why Young saw limited opportunities for economic development more 
independent of private capital? Could leftists really rely upon pursuing reform through 
established political institutions if they wanted to achieve structural economic change? Such a 
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proposition seemed unlikely without a mass social movement and a greater opportunity for 
Detroit leftists to take more institutional power.  
Cockrel’s question about a socialist mayor dealing with business also forces one to 
confront the dilemma that left progressives faced—how does one control capital? DARE argued 
that progressive cities could serve as the bulwark against corporate capital. Corporations would 
be beholden to community rather than its own economic interests. DARE’s progressive Detroit 
would have enabled workers to take a lead in economic planning. If a corporation decided to 
leave, it would have to compensate the city’s workers. Also, the city’s municipal government 
should be able to empower workers to rehabilitate and convert abandoned plants. And workers 
and city residents should have been able to determine the types of products they wanted to 
produce in the city. Essentially, Detroit workers should have been able to govern based upon 
“rational”—read: democratic—economic principles. DARE constructed and promoted this 
economic vision, a vision which garnered much electoral support in form of Cockrel’s campaign 
for city council.188 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Reflections on Left-Wing Progressive Politics during the 1970s and 1980s:  From Black 
Power and the New Left to Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition 
 
 
DARE’s activists continued to work for political change after Kenneth Cockrel declined 
to seek reelection in 1981 and DARE disbanded. Dan Luria and Jack Russell continued their 
work on economic development in the policy world. Cockrel returned to practicing law. Still, 
Cockrel’s name hovered over conversations about who would succeed Coleman Young.  
Young’s political standing in the city had declined by the end of the 1980s.  Sadly, Cockrel 
would not live long enough to run for mayor. Detroit left-wing politics suffered a fatal blow on 
Tuesday night, April 25, 1989. Shortly before 11pm, he collapsed in his kitchen. Detroit EMS 
pronounced him dead from a massive heart attack upon his arrival at Grace Hospital.1 Two 
months before his death, Cockrel had hinted at a possible run. He told a Los Angeles Times 
journalist, “’There is a feeling abroad that new blood would give the city a shot in the arm.’”2 As 
Detroit Free Press writer Bill McGraw observed, “With Cockrel’s death, some political activists 
are questioning not only who will take Young’s place, but who will replace Cockrel.”3 
The Ohio Public Interest Campaign (OPIC) also experienced its own transition during the 
1980s. After failing to pressure the Ohio General Assembly to pass a plant closure law, OPIC 
continued its efforts to confront corporate power. In a change of strategy, OPIC won a federal 
lawsuit against several Ohio grocery businesses in 1983. The organization also increasingly
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engaged in environmental activism. Concentrating on local politics, it successfully worked to 
pass “right to know” laws passed in Cleveland and throughout the state.  In 1989, OPIC turned 
itself into a formal membership organization in 1989, abandoning its coalitional structure. 
Members renamed itself Ohio Citizen Action, reflecting OPIC’s grassroots focus.4 
Ironically, Ohio Citizen Action activists would watch the federal government pass a 
national plant closing law in 1988. In July of that year, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN). It called for businesses employing 100 or more 
workers to give 60 days’ advance notice.5 Michigan Representative William Ford introduced 
H.R. 2847 in 1983, which called for six months-to-a-year advance notice, severance pay and 
transfer rights to affected workers, and it made employers’ liable for a community’s tax losses.6 
Ohio Democratic Senator, and supporter of OPIC’s Community Readjustment Act, Howard 
Metzenbaum introduced a significantly weaker version of Ford’s bill in 1987. The Jobs Training 
Partnership Act did not specify a time-table for advance notice nor would it hold firms liable for 
moving.7 The Senate voted to attach an amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1987 that required firms employing at least 100 people to give 60 days’ advance notice. 
The House bill required 90 days’ warning for businesses employing 50 or more workers and 180 
days if a closing affected 500 or more laborers.8  
 Plant closing legislation emerged as a prominent issue in the 1988 Democratic 
presidential primary and in national politics. President Ronald Reagan threatened to veto the bill. 
Reagan declared he would veto the legislation “’before I let a bad trade bill veto our economic 
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expansion.’”9 Similar to OPIC’s campaign for the CRA during the late-1970s and early-1980s, 
business groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers lobbied against the 
measure.10 Many of the frontrunners in the Democratic primary supported WARN. Tennessee 
Senator Al Gore voted for the bill. Jackson called on Congress to pass the bill. He also requiring 
firms to repay government subsidies should they close and move.11  Massachusetts Governor 
Michael Dukakis said at a rally in Toledo, Ohio, “’Not only is it right and fair thing to give 
workers notice before you throw them out in the street, but governors want notices…Why? 
Because we can’t possibly save those jobs unless we know long enough in advance so we can do 
something about it.’”12  
The passage of the WARN Act in 1988 confirmed OPIC’s hypothesis that it was 
important to push for national plant closing legislation in a favorable political climate. Even 
though Reagan threatened to veto the bill and national business leaders lobbied against it, the 
WARN Act did not suffer the same fate as OPIC’s CRA. Democrats controlled both houses of 
Congress in 1987. A consensus around supporting WARN emerged in the party as progressives 
such as Jesse Jackson and centrists such as Al Gore advocated for the bill. The passage of 
WARN begs the question of whether or not progressives could have organized and executed a 
campaign around plant closure during the late 1980s. It is quite possible that OPIC and other 
progressives who advocated for plant closing legislation several years too soon. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Quoted in Frank Swoboda, “White House, Congress Spar Over Trade Bill; Jackson, Gore Endorse Plant-Closing 
Provision,” The Washington Post, April 12, 1988.  
10 Randall Samborn, “A Fizzling Time Bomb,” The National Law Journal, January 22, 1991.  
11 Hobart Rowen, “Workers’ bill of rights helps Jesse,” The Vancouver Sun, April 5, 1988.  
12 Quoted in Adell Crowe, “Plant-closings bill fuels political debate,” USA Today, April 25, 1988.  
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Assessing Left-Wing Progressive Politics during the 1970s and 1980s 
“No Radical Hangover” illustrated how a consequential left-wing progressivism arose in 
the Midwest during the 1970s and 1980s. Developing in response to the excesses and fracturing 
of the New Left and Black Power movements, left-wing progressive activists in Ohio and Detroit 
combined radical analyses of several focal points—urban rebellions, policing, the war in 
Southeast Asia, urban development, and deindustrialization—with pragmatic and reformist 
political strategies. Left-wing progressives successfully organized against police brutality and the 
war while activists failed to achieve economic reforms.  
The purpose of the following discussion will be to assess left-wing progressive politics 
and strategy during the 1970s and 1980s. Also, I will conclude by considering the meaning of 
left-wing progressive politics as it relates to the question of whether or not left-wing social 
movements can include a successful electoral wing. In addition to considering the Detroit 
Alliance for a Rational Economy as the local example that appeared in this study, I will draw 
some insights from the lessons of Reverend Jesse Jackson’s presidential runs, and establishment 
of the Rainbow Coalition, during the 1980s.  
“No Radical Hangover” challenged several arguments related to the fate of the left after 
the 1960s. In this study, I argued that a consequential left-wing in the Midwest existed during the 
1970s and 1980s. Progressive campaigns in Detroit and Ohio shared important characteristics 
such taking radical analyses of focal points and pursuing reformist strategies for social change. 
Left-wing progressive activists did not succumb to sectarianism. Neither did left-wing 
progressives focus on a narrow “identity politics.” While it is true that leftist organizations such 
as Detroit’s League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the Students for the Democratic Society, or 
even the Indochina Peace Campaign split or declined, scholarship on the left often neglected how 
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organizers moved to address different focal points in new political formations in local and state 
politics. Activists often developed and articulated complex analyses around focal points that 
fused the politics of race, class, and to a lesser extent, gender with interrelated critiques of 
policing, war and empire, and economic development.   
 
Progressive Successes during the 1970s: the Anti-STRESS Movement and the Indochina Peace 
Campaign 
 
Detroit’s Anti-STRESS Movement and the Indochina Peace Campaign’s efforts to stop 
the war represented two successful efforts of left-wing progressive politics during the 1970s. 
Both formations relied upon coalition politics. The left-wing progressives’ efforts to build a 
broad based coalition of black nationalists, civil rights groups, trade and police labor unions, and 
liberals around police killings challenged the presumption that black power and new left activists 
pursued sectarian politics during the early 1970s. The Indochina Peace Campaign was an 
organization that comprised of several branches scattered throughout the country. Mostly located 
in the Midwest, each chapter developed their own political style. For example, the Detroit IPC 
articulated a more radical analysis of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia than Hayden or the 
Cleveland IPC.  
Framing and winning the debates around the focal points of police killings and the war in 
Southeast Asia enabled Anti-STRESS and IPC activists to achieve their goals. Progressives in 
the Anti-STRESS movement helped raise awareness around lethal policing through their 
participation in demonstrations and their legal strategy. Radical lawyers Kenneth Cockrel and 
Justin Ravitz helped the campaign highlight the DPD’s abuses. Also, Ravitz’s campaign for 
Recorder’s Court Judge served as a referendum on STRESS and the city’s criminal justice 
system. Ravitz and the coalition’s left-wing connected their arguments against STRESS with a 
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radical critique of the court system that extracted revenues from poor black Detroiters and an 
analysis of the heroin trade that implicated U.S military involvement in Indochina.  
Tom Hayden, the IPC, and the larger antiwar movement also won the public debate 
around U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Rather than relying on Marxist-Leninist 
rhetoric, Hayden popularized IPC’s anti-imperialist politics. This tactic seemed to work from the 
onset of the campaign as Hayden, activist-actress Jane Fonda, Holly Near, and George Smith 
attracted sizeable crowds at their initial rallies in the Midwest. The IPC also capitalized on 
Nixon’s Watergate scandal by using their Indochina Peace Pledge to organize the grassroots and 
lobby U.S. Congress. The IPC’s success with influencing public discourse was also evident in 
the organization’s ability to successfully convince Congress to discontinue U.S. military aid. 
Journalists Bill Novak and Rowland Evans detailed this influence in the Boston Globe in 1974, 
“The propaganda lines set forth then have been vigorously relayed on Capitol Hill:  the Thieu 
government, not Hanoi, is the aggressor and would collapse without provocation should the 
United States withdraw aid.”13  
The combination of stopping military aid and Nixon’s resignation hastened the demise of 
the Thieu regime. Saigon eventually fell in 1975, thus ending U.S. military involvement. The 
IPC framed Indochina as the focal point for U.S. imperialism, thus asserting that the campaign 
may be able to turn back empire if it halted U.S. military aid. On the surface, it appeared that the 
IPC did not achieve such a lofty goal. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the organization’s 
role in ending the war helped changed the perception of that the U.S. military was unbeatable. 
Also, the defeat in Indochina led to Americans’ reduced appetite for long ground wars in the 
future, at least up until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s. 
                                                 
13 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The New Crisis in Vietnam,” Boston Globe, April 10, 1974.  
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Neither the Anti-STRESS nor the IPC’s campaign operated on the same scale. The Anti-
STRESS movement was a city-based campaign. Its targets were the Detroit Police Department, 
the Wayne County Prosecutor, and the city’s mayor, Roman S. Gribbs. The campaign sought to 
mobilize as many different organizations within the city against STRESS. Detroit’s streets, its 
city council, and its courts became crucial sites for action. The IPC, on the other hand, operated 
on multiple scales simultaneously. The IPC pressured raised awareness locally, pressured local 
governments, and U.S. Congress. Even though the organization comprised of local chapters 
which engaged in grassroots organizing, Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda led the congressional 
strategy on Capitol Hill.  
The campaign strategies of the Anti-STRESS movement and the IPC not only highlighted 
how left-wing progressives worked in coalitions to pursue achievable goals, they also illustrated 
how activists continued to pursue focal points after attaining victories. The IPC split in 1974 
because it could not agree upon a post-Vietnam strategy. Success generated more debate about 
what focal points activists should concentrate on—foreign policy, the oil crisis, or multinational 
corporations. Such debates are not surprising considering the reality of working with a politically 
and intellectually diverse network of IPC chapters. Detroit’s IPC chapter argued for continuing 
an anti-imperialist course grounded in a Marxist-Leninist critique. Other IPC chapters, like 
Ohio’s, looked to more local concerns as they chose to organize a state-based campaign against 
plant closure.   
 
Progressive Defeats Between 1967 and 1981:  Albert Cleage’s Federation for Self-
Determination, the Ohio Public Interest Campaign, and the Detroit Alliance for a Rational 
Economy 
 
The 1967 urban rebellions in Detroit and Newark created focal points for black power 
activists and liberals. Black Power activists such as Reverend Albert Cleage saw the black 
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community, Twelfth Street, and the city as the focal points for action. Conversely, liberals in 
Detroit, as well as in the federal government, saw hiring, and policing, the “hard core 
unemployed” as the solution to the civil disturbances. Black power activists’ outlooks on the 
rebellions suggested a nationalist approach grounded in the principle of self-determination. The 
liberal view was grounded in longstanding understandings about racism creating a “tangle of 
pathology” and culture of poverty among black families. Revolution was neither needed nor 
desired for black Americans. Instead, black men needed to be rehabilitated and integrated into 
the workforce. Liberals viewed their focal point in an individualistic manner whereas Cleage and 
other Black Power activists saw theirs as a collective.  
The liberal and black power approaches also spurred different strategies for addressing 
their focal points. However, both relied upon coalition politics. Business and political leaders in 
Detroit formed the “first” urban coalition, the New Detroit Committee. Members of the NDC 
such as Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford, II and the Hudson Company’s J.L. Hudson offered 
jobs to the hard core unemployed. The NDC also aimed to support black organizing around 
revitalizing black communities. They offered the Detroit Council of Organizations and Cleage’s 
Federation for Self-Determination grants, as long as they did not use the money to engage in 
politics.  
Meanwhile, Cleage and others sought to build an intra-racial organization, the Federation 
for Self-Determination. This group represented an attempt for black Detroiters to close ranks 
around Cleage’s “transfer of power” strategy. Cleage’s “transfer of power” underscored black 
power activists’ desires to hold predominately-white institutions in the public and private sector 
accountable for the structural racism driving the urban rebellions. The scale of Cleage’s black 
power politics was somewhat smaller than his progressive predecessors. While he believed that 
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black Americans should take over predominately-black cities, he also thought they could start at 
the neighborhood level. In the “transfer of power” strategy, white institutions would hand over 
financial resources and power over public institutions to black Americans living in 
predominately-black neighborhoods. Cleage envisioned the construction of a capitalist, black-ran 
cooperative-based economy.  
Unlike his progressive predecessors, Cleage denied to pursue what looked to be a 
pragmatic course of action; he turned down NDC’s funds. Even though black radicals and black 
nationalists such as Cockrel and the Congress of Racial Equality’s Floyd McKissick supported 
Cleage’s decision to stick to principles and decline the New Detroit Committee’s funds, it also 
spelled the end of Cleage’s attempt to rebuild Twelfth Street. The FSD coalition strategy 
depended upon the receipt of resources from predominately-white institutions. The resources 
would have allowed the FSD to fulfill its intended purpose—to redevelop black Detroit around a 
race- and space-based cooperative economy. The FSD sought to position itself as the 
administrator for black Detroit. Consequently, without the transfer of power, there was little need 
for the intra-racial coalition.  
During the late-1970s and early1980s, left-wing progressive activists in the Detroit 
Alliance for a Rational Economy and the Ohio Public Interest Campaign saw urban development 
and deindustrialization as focal points for action. They also pursued different approaches to 
economic democracy. DARE sought to build a left-wing political organization that would run 
their own candidates and oppose Coleman Young’s black-liberal-labor-corporate coalition. 
DARE drew on prior organizing and political victories to get black radical Kenneth Cockrel 
elected to city council in 1977. The organization successfully raised awareness around tax 
abatements for riverfront and downtown development. It also developed an alternative economic 
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plan called rational reindustrialization that called for a mix of municipal and market socialism. 
The organization outlined the construction of a public enterprise sector that would produce 
transportation and energy goods. Dan Luria and Jack Russell envisioned rational 
reindustrialization within established urban policy frameworks such as the Reagan 
administration’s free enterprise zones. In such an economy, workers, citizens, and the city 
government would hold private property rights in enterprises and have a say in investment 
decisions.  
DARE, however, failed to intervene with consequence around the 1979-1980 Chrysler 
bailout and local conversations about reindustrialization. DARE advanced an analysis of the 
corporation’s failure that neglected a racial analysis. Also, by the time the organization released 
its critique and hosted its forum on the bailout, President Jimmy Carter had signed the Chrysler 
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act into law.14 The organization also missed an opportunity to build 
relationships with members of the Poletown community as Young’s administration collaborated 
with General Motors to demolish their neighborhood in order to build a plant.  
Ultimately, the incorporation of Coleman Young into the city’s power structure may have 
represented DARE’s biggest obstacle. Cockrel and the organization suffered from political 
isolation as Young mostly ignored their efforts. Young led a broad-based growth coalition 
consisting of organized labor leaders such as UAW President Doug Fraser, development 
organizations such as Detroit Renaissance, Inc., real estate developers, and business leaders such 
as Henry Ford, II. This coalition even extended to Republicans as Governor Milliken joined 
Young and the state’s delegation to Washington, D.C. to argue for the Chrysler bailout in 1979. 
All of these factions not only supported Young in elections, but helped him govern. Most 
                                                 
14 Jimmy Carter, “Remarks on Signing into Law H.R. 5860, the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979,” 
January 7, 1980, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32978axzz1iVHeHBN1, accessed, June 6, 2016.  
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significantly, Young successfully maintained a strong black political base, even as he had to 
resort to austere policies to keep the city afloat. The Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy 
failed to cut into Young’s black support and raised questions about the efficacy of an 
independent left-wing electoral politics. 
OPIC pursued an economic vision that adapted elements of 1930s and 1940s-style 
industrial democracy to the 1970s economy characterized by growing multinational corporations, 
increased capital mobility, destruction of organized labor and the social wage, and the erosion of 
Ohio’s manufacturing base. The organization saw a political opportunity in the decline of 
organized labor, the New Deal, and deindustrialization. OPIC embraced a Rustinian coalition 
model that aimed to bring together activists, labor organizers and workers, and civil rights and 
religious groups to fight for a plant closure law on the state-level. The Community Readjustment 
Act (CRA) called for early warning, severance pay, health benefits, and for fleeing businesses to 
donate to a community development fund. The group relied upon appeals toward constructing a 
new social contract where corporations would, at the very least, help maintain communities. 
OPIC built upon the Indochina Peace Campaign’s strategy that combined grassroots organizing, 
mobilizing, policymaking, and congressional lobbying. OPIC successfully organized a state-
based coalition to support the CRA. Their campaign even attracted national leaders such as 
UAW President Doug Fraser.  
OPIC’s campaign for plant closure legislation ran into opposition from the state’s 
political and business leaders. The Ohio Manufacturers Association and the Greater Cleveland 
Growth Corporation lobbied against the bill in the Ohio General Assembly. While Ohio 
Governor James A. Rhodes was willing to devote state spending to development, he saw 
constructing a “good” business climate as the best strategy to attract new industrial development. 
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The chairman of the Ohio Senate’s Commerce and Labor subcommittee, Cincinnati Democrat 
William Bowen, also thought the bill would hurt the state’s business climate. Consequently, he 
failed to move on the CRA.  
Both OPIC and DARE sought to take radical analyses of war and imperialism, police 
violence, and the economy and put them on a reform path in an effort to broaden the appeal of 
left-wing politics during the 1970s and 1980s. The two groups’ efforts raise questions of which 
organization and strategy was most effective, what was lost in each, and what other paths might 
have been taken. In terms of organizational strategy, OPIC was more successful in organizing a 
coalition to confront plant closings. The coalition regularly attracted scores of workers and 
citizens at their community meetings in various Ohio cities wracked by plant closure. Their state 
hearing testimonies were symphonic—each group built advanced a necessary distinct analysis of 
deindustrialization, whether they focused on race, macroeconomics, health, or the community 
impact around one theme, corporations failed to uphold their end of the bargain while workers 
and communities sacrificed. However, the OPIC coalition could not get a vote on the bill. 
Business mobilized against the coalition’s bill, calling it a threat to free enterprise and 
managerial prerogatives. Governor Rhodes and State Senator Bowen adhered to development 
orthodoxy—make the economic climate hospitable for business on business’s terms. The type of 
regulation that OPIC proposed was anathema to their pro-business outlook.  
Yet, OPIC’s efforts to target state government were prescient. OPIC located state 
government as a “focal point” because they thought the political possibilities for economic 
democracy did not exist on a national level. State government was, and continues to be, a crucial 
institution for progressives and left-wing activists to pursue policy change.  The“new” federalism 
policies of the 1970’s and 1980’s have given governors and state legislators more control over 
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the implementation of federal policy. Also, state legislatures and governors can put more 
resources behind the urban policy legislation they pass than either the federal government or 
municipal governments. 
Obviously, progressives and left-wing activists and organizations cannot only focus on 
state-level politics. DARE’s concentration on city politics and confronting Coleman Young was 
not misguided considering the organization’s economic plans. Cockrel’s and DARE’s inside-
outside strategy in which a political organization would seek to serve as the organizing go-
between city residents and elected officials was novel. However, they were not able to build a 
large enough base to either to continue elect left-wing candidates nor to actually pressure Young 
and his coalition to reconsider their strategy of revitalization. And, even though DARE saw 
rational reindustrialization as a model that other organizations could adapt for regional 
development, their political focus was in fact too local. The group never established working 
relationships with groups outside of Detroit and never developed a mechanism to confront 
development policies arising out of the statehouse.  
One thing OPIC and DARE had in common in strategic and tactical terms was a failure to 
develop plant-based organizing and with it the threat of direct action against industrial 
employers. Both organizations’ new leftist and black labor radical skepticism of big labor 
manifested itself in their politics and strategies. OPIC reasoned that it was necessary to take plant 
location and investment decisions out of their contemporary labor-management arrangement 
because the collective bargaining system had atrophied. The organization attracted the support of 
labor leaders, even UAW’s Fraser. But, OPIC did not acquire much from trade unions in terms 
of resources. Cockrel and DARE remained on cool terms with the United Auto Workers even 
though its leadership supported OPIC’s campaign. OPIC joined workers who protested closings, 
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but neither they, nor DARE, ever advocated for worker-led direct action. Ironically, both group’s 
failure to focus on plant-level organization reinforced the void left by a shrinking trade union 
movement. 
Thoughts about defensive organizing also provoke the question of how left progressives 
could pursue an offensive strategy to fight for economic democracy. This would require building 
an institutional structure that organizes on multiple registers—local, state, and regional. Such a 
structure would draw from IPC’s, Anti-STRESS’s, and DARE’s penchant for political education 
around progressive economic democracy. Yet, even if organizers successfully built an 
infrastructure on this type of a scale, they would still struggle around familiar structural and 
cultural constraints such as federalism and an adherence to free market capitalism. Surely, 
opportunities to intervene in national conversations generated by economic crises would present 
themselves. Activists took advantage of this situation when they occupied Zuccoti Park in 2011 
response to the financial crisis. Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign also represents such an 
opportunity.  
Ultimately, two questions linked OPIC’s, DARE’s, as well as Detroit’s Reverend Albert 
Cleage’s, the Student for a Democratic Society’s and social democrat Bayard Rustin’s politics:  
Is it possible for left-wing and progressive activists to pursue reformist means to control 
corporate capital and to pursue economic democracy? How does one build the political power 
and acquire the capital investment needed to implement such a politics on a local and state level? 
All of these activists had to confront these questions and dilemmas as they constructed their 
alternatives to liberal urban development during the late-1960s, the erosion of organized labor 
and the decline of the New Deal, or the intensification of market-based economic policies during 
the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Can Progressive Social Movements Have Electoral Wings, or Can an Inside-Outside 
Strategy Work for the Left? 
 
Kenneth Cockrel’s and DARE’s experiences trying to challenge Mayor Coleman 
Young’s growth coalition actually strikes at the heart of what seems to be the left’s irresolvable 
dilemma:  Can left-wing progressive social movements include an independent electoral wing? 
Another way to frame this question is:  Can an inside-outside strategy for left-wing organizing 
and institution building alter the Democratic Party, itself, or at least change the way it governs? 
The analyses of DARE, IPC, and OPIC also begs the question of whether or not progressives 
scale up electoral and social movement efforts to the level of presidential politics. 
The question of presidential politics for the left is vexing. Many leftists have articulated 
reasons for running and abstaining from electoral politics, especially in the presidential arena.15 
There are several reasons why one can support left-wing progressives running in national 
politics. National campaigns raise questions about the assumptions of the status quo within either 
of the major parties. Left-wing progressive presidential politics can give supporters clear focal 
points for action—the Democratic Party as well as particular issues pertaining to domestic and 
foreign policy. Left-wing candidates can use national campaigns to highlight particular issues 
that Republicans and Democrats would not discuss. Left-wing candidates can also push the 
frontrunner and the party platform leftward.  
However, presidential campaigns can become graveyards for social movements. 
Regarding the arguments against running, left-wing progressives have had to contend with 
various structural obstacles including competing in the two-party, winner-take-all, Electoral 
College system and the struggles with placing candidates onto ballots in all fifty states. Also, 
                                                 
15 The Editors, “The Nader Campaign and the Future of US Left Electoral Politics,” Monthly Review (February 
2001); Robert Brenner, “The Paradox of Social Democracy:  The American Case,” in The Year Left:  An American 
Socialist Yearbook 1985, eds by Mike Davis, Fred Pfeil, and Michael Sprinker (New York:  Verso, 1985); Bill 
Fletcher, Jr. and Danny Glover, “Visualizing a Neo-Rainbow,” The Nation, January 27, 2005.  
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left-wing organizations may have to divert needed financial and human resources away from 
mass movement building and into electoral organizing.  
Electoral campaigns, especially presidential ones, develop around a single charismatic 
leader. The fate of the social movement depends upon how the candidate responds to the 
campaign’s success or failure. If the winning candidate is not intimately connected with an 
independent social movement, then the elected official could ignore their social movement 
constituency, or maybe worse, move to demobilize the social movement. In the worst case 
scenario of defeat, if the candidate loses, then it is possible the movement loses, as the political 
parties, their supporters, and members of the media may see the loser’s politics as discredited. In 
the best case, the candidate returns to building an oppositional social movement that could 
continue to pressure local, state, and national elected officials. Ultimately, electoral campaigns, 
especially if they do not spring from a social movement, only have one objective—to win and 
place the candidate into office. 
Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition represents an example of the best and worst case 
scenarios of the fusion of social movement and electoral politics.16 Jackson’s campaigns during 
the 1980s gave voice to a progressive politics that harkened back to the 1970s. With Reaganism 
serving as the Rainbow Coalition’s focal point, Jackson articulated a platform that incorporated 
railed against multinational corporations and the “economic violence” of plant closure. Jackson 
                                                 
16 Conversations around Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 1988 campaigns are rather polarized. Political scientists Adolph 
Reed, Jr. and Robert C. Smith view Jackson’s campaigns as expressions of symbolic politics while Ronald Walters 
contends that Jackson sought to use leverage politics in order to transform the Democratic Party. Max Elbaum saw 
Jackson’s campaigns as important in accounting for left organizing during the 1980s. Adolph Reed, Jr. The Jesse 
Jackson Phenomenon:  The Crisis of Purpose in Afro-American Politics (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1986); 
Robert C. Smith, We Have No Leaders:  African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era (New York:  State 
University of New York Press, 1996); Ronald W. Walters, Freedom Is Not Enough:  Black Voters, Black 
Candidates and American Presidential Politics (New York:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005); Max 
Elbaum, Revolution in the Air:  Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che (New York:  Verso, 2002); Howard 
Brick and Christopher Phelps, Radicals in America:  The U.S. Left Since the Second World War (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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supported the antiapartheid movement and challenged U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.17 
Unlike in 1984, when Jackson appealed mostly to African Americans, Jackson popularized his 
platform as he aspired to deepen and expand his multiracial coalition.  
One of Jackson’s most vital contribution to progressive politics during the 1980s was the 
institutionalization of the Rainbow Coalition after the 1984 election. Jackson sought to 
nationalize Chicago mayor Harold Washington’s efforts to build a progressive multiracial 
electoral coalition. Akin to Cockrel’s Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy, the Rainbow 
Coalition would serve as the independent political organization that would challenge Democrats 
and help thrust its leader into office. However, the Rainbow attracted black leftists such as Ron 
Daniels, California Representative Ronald Dellums, labor organizer Bill Fletcher, Jr., and Jack 
O’Dell. Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition also enjoyed support from leftist organizations such as the 
League of Revolutionary Struggle and the Communist Party.18 
Jackson fared better in the 1988 campaign than he did four years earlier. He finished 
second to Michael Dukakis. Jackson earned nearly 7 million votes in 1988 compared to 3.2 
million in 1984. He won thirteen contests. However, Dukakis failed to pick Jackson as his 
running mate. Instead, Dukakis chose a more conservative Democrat, Texas Senator Lloyd 
Bentson. Even though Jackson remained the one of the most influential African American 
Democrats, the party failed to view him as its new standard bearer. That distinction would go to 
the more conservative-oriented Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Jackson’s campaign 
defeated the DLC in the 1988 Democratic primary, as he outperformed its candidate, Tennessee 
Senator Al Gore.  
                                                 
17 The Democratic Party also represented another as Jackson sought internal reforms. Manning Marable, Race, 
Reform, and Rebellion:  The Second Reconstruction and Beyond in Black America, 1945-2006  (Jackson:  
University Press of Mississippi, 2007).; Jesse Jackson, “A Chance to Serve,” in Keep Hope Alive:  Jesse Jackson’s 
1988 Presidential Campaign, ed. Frank Clemente (Boston:  Keep Hope Alive PAC & South End Press, 1988). 
18 Elbaum, 276-279. 
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Ultimately, Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition suffered two defeats after the 1988 election—
one by the centrist Democratic Leadership Council, and the other by Jackson, himself. Al From 
founded the organization in response to President Ronald Reagan’s 1984 landslide reelection. 
Centered on the southern wing of the Party, From and his associates articulated a “third way” 
politics that claimed to be “neither conservative or liberal but both and different.”19 The 
organization would also speak for “national” rather than “special interests.”20 Effectively, From 
and the DLC aspired to push the party rightward. The DLC endorsed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and law and order policies.21 And between 1988 and 1992, the DLC 
consolidated power within the party. From asked Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton to lead the 
DLC in 1990. The organization also sought to marginalize Jesse Jackson. The DLC supported 
the institution of Super Tuesday in an effort to stop Jackson’s 1988 primary campaign. The DLC 
also distanced itself from Jackson in subsequent years, from Bill Clinton indirectly criticizing 
Jackson at a DLC function in 1990 to disinviting Jackson from a subsequent gathering.22  
Meanwhile, and to the dismay of the Rainbow’s supporters, Jackson made two decisions 
that sealed the fate of the Rainbow Coalition. Jackson restructured the organization in 1989 
because, according to Ron Daniels, he sought “’a light and lean operation.’”23 Thus, the Rainbow 
would explicitly serve Jackson’s interests rather than work to build a progressive organization 
that could challenge the DLC and the Democratic Party. Ultimately, Jackson pursued elite 
brokerage politics, deciding to align himself closer to the Democratic Party during the early 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Bruce Miroff, Liberals’ Moment:  The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic 
Party (Lawrence:  University of Kansas, 2009), 274. 
20 Kenneth Baer, Reinventing Democrats:  The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence:  
University of Kansas Press, 2000), 67.  
21 Ibid., 180-181. 
22 Ibid., 183-186.  
23 Quoted in JoAnn Wypijewski, “Rainbow’s Gravity,” The Nation, July 15, 2004, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/rainbows-gravity/, accessed July 31, 2016.  
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1990s. The Rainbow’s demobilization was complete when Jackson decided not to run for the 
Democratic Party’s nomination in 1992.  
Jackson’s demobilization of the Rainbow Coalition begs the question about what happens 
with Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and his supporters after 2016. Will they seek to build an 
independent left-wing party that would eventually run in national elections? It would make sense 
for them to take Sanders’s advice—build from the bottom-up, develop a presence in local 
politics in as many states as possible.24 Obviously, the question, then, becomes what happens to 
the other leftist political parties such as the Green Party and the Socialist Alternative. Does one 
of those organizations emerge as the electoral vehicle for Sanders’s supporters, or do his 
supporters start a new party and incorporate those leftist parties?  
The biggest lesson of progressive electoral politics is it is not enough to just win 
elections. The question regarding the efficacy of taking over public institutions concerns the 
strategy of building enough power to push elected officials to adopt and implement progressive 
policies. While it would appear easier for progressives to run candidates for national office, they 
would probably need the existence of an independent left-wing party that is focused on winning 
elections and a progressive social movement that’s concerned with serving as an influential 
outside force working simultaneously to build more power within and outside of established 
political institutions.  
  
 
                                                 
24 Amanda Marcotte, “Sanders wants you to run:  Bernie’s plan to turn regular Americans into agents of the 
progressive movement,” Salon.com, June 27, 2016, 
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